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RAILROADS AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 




Adviser: Professor Michael Edelstein 
This study concerns the measurement and quantification of the relationship between 
railroadization in the United States in the mid-19th century and the subsequent evolution of the 
modern, large-scale, corporate form of industrial business organization marked by significant 
economies of scale and scope, as described in various writings by Alfred Chandler.  Focusing on 
American industry as it developed from 1850-1880 using data uniquely suited to empirical 
analysis of economies of scale and scope, its aim is to determine whether the growth of the 
American railroad network, as Chandler contended, expanded markets and augmented the 
American financial sector such that the result was a more concentrated, large-scale mode of 
industrial organization characterized by extensive and increasing economies of scale and scope 
in sync with the growth of its extensive railroad system. 
 
Apart from some positive results found in the scope analysis of Chapter 6 showing an ascending 
scope pattern from 1850-1880 in a few key industries, our findings indicate an overall gloomy 
prognosis for the empirical validity of the Chandler hypothesis.  With the cross-country analyses 
of Chapters 2 and 3 showing no evidence of a greater expansion of the railroad systems of the 
United States and Germany at mid-century and resultant vastness thereof with respect to Britain 
circa the 1870’s as contributing to a more concentrated industrial sector in those countries, and 
the mixed evidence in support of a rise in efficient scale in American industry from 1860-1880 as 
shown in Chapters 4 and 5, not to mention the omnipresent dips at 1870 seen in both the scale 
and scope estimates, our findings reflect poorly upon Chandler’s idea of that date as the 
 v
benchmark period in which to begin to expect to see the effects of transportation improvements 
upon scale and scope economies in American industry.  Rather, they indicate a far greater impact 
of the Civil War aftermath shock than Chandler accounted for—perhaps one that persisted on 
until the 1880’s--and suggest a much later date of the full impact of the railroads upon scale and 

























































































PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis had a long gestation period.  It began as independent study readings in the 
history of industrial technology as part of graduate studies in economics at City 
University of New York exploring the paradoxical development of Britain’s failure to 
maintain the position of supremacy it had achieved in the earlier iron-, coal-, and steam-
based industries of the “First Industrial Revolution” of the 18th century later on in the 
science-based industries of the “Second Industrial Revolution” that emerged in the late 
19th century; for example electricity, chemicals, and technology centered around the 
internal combustion engine, when it was faced with formidable new competition from 
later industrializers; most notably the United States and Germany. The contention of 
many authors that Britain’s “early start” in industrialization may have actually conferred 
disadvantages upon it in development of these later technologies, and created 
opportunities for latecomers that were shrewdly exploited by the United States and 
Germany provided me with the initial research aim of examining the various arguments 
in support of this theory and assessing their strengths. 
 The primary focus of this research was the industrial applications of electrical 
technology and developments therein, starting from the discovery of the scientific 
principles upon which the modern electrical industries were based—approximately 
Michael Faraday’s discovery of the principle of electromagnetic induction in 1831--up 
until the beginning of WWI, the period that essentially encompasses the time during 
which the basic parameters of the industry were established and its clear leaders going 
into the 20th century emerged.   
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 Although this initial research identified a few hypotheses that connected Britain’s 
early start to its relative electrical failings, the one that formed the predicate of the study 
you are about to read is that raised by Alfred Chandler in his 1994 book, Scale and 
Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1994.) which addressed the issue of economies of scale and scope in the production of 
electrical technologies among many other industries, and raised the question of whether 
failure to achieve such economies explains any of the British retardation in the large-
scale, capital intensive science-based industries of the late nineteenth century, and if so, 
can any of that failure be traced to Britain’s early start.  Chandler believed that economies 
of scale and scope were an essential feature crucial for success in these modern sectors, 
and that Britain failed to develop substantial industrial structure of this type due, in no 
small part, to a lesser impact of the railroads on its industrialization.   
 Since Chandler believed this lesser impact of the railroads was in itself a function 
of Britain’s early start, this book provided me with an as-of-yet untested hypothesis that 
appeared ripe for empirical enquiry and examination.  My research on the electrical 
industry revealed that failure to achieve economies of scale and scope therein was indeed 
a stumbling block for Britain in the late nineteenth century, as it also was for Britain in 
most other large-scale, capital intensive science-based industries at that time.  Economies 
of scale, efficiencies in production that tend to be captured by larger firms capable of 
producing in large volume, figure prominently in electrical industries, particularly in 
electric power distribution, where it has been observed that larger utilities serving an 
extensive network of customers are able to transmit power at a lower cost per kilowatt-
hour than utilities serving a smaller network of subscribers.  Economies of scope, 
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efficiencies in production that tend to be captured by larger, more integrated firms 
capable of joint production and distribution of many different, but interrelated products, 
figure prominently in electrical technology due to the tremendous interdependence of the 
various components of the industry.  Standardization of current, voltage and frequency 
characteristics is essential to ensure that machinery and appliances are manufactured so 
as to be compatible with the form of power supply in use, and vice versa.  Larger 
electrical firms capable of branching out and producing a diverse array of products have 
an advantage in this respect in their ability to market a working system of compatible 
apparatus to consumers.  In examining the research of many historians of industrial 
technology, there was a consensus that the British electrical industries in the late 
nineteenth century were, on the whole, smaller scale than their American and German 
counterparts, with a greater assortment of voltages, frequencies and currents in use, and it 
has been argued that this factor contributed to the less rapid development of this 
technology in Britain.   
 Thus my challenge as a scholar lay clearly before me—to construct and conduct 
some kind of empirical analysis to see if there was in fact, this positive correlation 
between the impact of the railroads on the industrial development of these three key 
nations of the United States, Germany and Britain, and economies of scale and scope 
achieved in their industry in the wake of that impact.  It is exactly in this manner that this 
study came to be. 
 Before we proceed to that analysis, there is an extensive literature that that while 
it did not play that important a role in the main study itself, was nonetheless crucial in 
 x
that it provided the necessary background, inspiration and motivation responsible for its 
birth.  It is therefore worthy of mention here.  
 Besides Chandler’s analyses, there is an extensive literature surrounding Britain’s 
decline as the industrial leader in the 19th century, and the relationship between Britain’s 
early start and its weakness in the more modern industrial sectors that formed the 
background for this study.  Much of it concerns the legacy of its early start and its 
implications on the size and scale of its industry, which is explained in general economic 
histories such as David S. Landes’ The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present.  London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969, and The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and 
Some so Poor.  New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.  Other noteworthy volumes in this vein are 
H. J. Habakkuk’s American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century: The 
Search for Labour-saving Inventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, and 
Sidney Pollard’s The Development of the British Economy, 1914-1950. London: E. 
Arnold, 1962 and Britain’s Prime and Britain’s Decline: The British Economy 1870-1914. 
London and New York: E. Arnold, 1989. 
 The interdependent nature of electrical technology, and its characteristics that 
favor large integrated systems, receives emphasis in many of these studies; a discussion 
that is continued in depth by Nathan Rosenberg in Technology and American Economic 
Growth.  New York: Harper & Row, 1972 and, with David C. Mowery, Technology and 
the Pursuit of Economic Growth. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989 and Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century America. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.  This discussion is 
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developed in further detail as part of a comprehensive historical analysis of the electrical 
industries by Thomas P. Hughes in Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 
1880-1930. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.  Hughes was an 
indispensable source for the background of this study because it consists, to a large degree, 
of a comparison of the development and growth of American, German and British electrical 
industries in the 19th and early 20th century.  
 Britain’s meanderings in a miasma of small-scale electrical firms and a maze of 
competing systems in this era is given extensive treatment in Hughes and the general 
histories cited above, and especially in business histories of the electrical industries.  
Some key readings in this area are Byatt, I. C. R., The British Electrical Industry, 1875-
1914: The Economic Returns to a New Technology. Oxford: Oxford University press, 
1979; Ballin, H. H. The Organisation of Electricity Supply in Great Britain. London: 
Electrical Press, Ltd., 1946; Hannah, Leslie. Electricity Before Nationalisation: A Study of 
the Development of the Electricity Supply Industry in Britain to 1948. London: 
Macmillan,1979, and Hall, Peter and Paschal Preston. The Carrier Wave: New Information 
Technology and the Geography of Innovation 1846-2003. London and Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988. 
 The theoretical discussion of the economic issues surrounding adoption of 
standards in interdependent technological systems contained in the following citations 
provided me with further valuable insight as background for this study because it 
thoroughly and accurately identifies and explains how the problem of the need for 
compatibility in complex systems can often assume a dimension of market failure that 
points to the need for coordination and planned investment, which favors large integrated 
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firms with significant economies of scale and scope in order to better expedite the 
diffusion of an interdependent technology.  See Scitovsky, Tibor. "Two Concepts of 
External Economies." In Papers on Welfare and Growth by Tibor Scitovsky. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1964; Kindleberger, C. P. "Standards as Public, Collective and 
Private Goods." Kyklos, Vol. 36, 1983; Berg, S. V. "The Production of Compatibility: 
Technical Standards as Collective Goods." Kyklos, Vol. 42, 1989;  Farrell, J., and G. 
Saloner. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation." Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 
16, No. 1, Spring, 1985, and three articles by M. L Katz and C. Shapiro: "Network 
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility." American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, 
June, 1985, "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities." Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, 1986, and "Systems Competition and Network Effects." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring, 1994. 
 For a discussion of these topics specifically pertaining to the German electrical 
industries, see Brady, R. A. The Rationalization Movement in German Industry: A Study 
in the Evolution of Economic Planning. New York: H. Fertig, 1974. 
  
In the course of composition of this study, I had the good fortune to receive the assistance 
of many a friend, colleague, and mentor for whose great efforts I would like to express 
my thanks.  In my task of mobilizing the main data set of the study for analysis herein, 
these being the Bateman-Weiss and Atack-Bateman Samples from the Manuscript 
Censuses of Manufactures, 1850-1880, I was fortunate to have received the undivided 
attention of one of its principal architects, Prof. Jeremy Atack of Vanderbilt University, 
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who took the time to answer a myriad questions about these data, and was generous in 
sharing his insight and technique in their application to his own research.  
 In a similar capacity, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Prof. Brian Mitchell 
of Trinity College, Cambridge for taking the time to answer questions concerning the 
data in the statistical volumes he authored that are used and cited in this study.  Also in 
these regards, I would like to thank Prof. Rainer Fremdling of Zedat, Free University of 
Berlin for helping me locate the sources of data on the German railroads used in this 
study, and for his patience in serving as a guide for me through these sources in light of 
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Prof. David Gabel of Queens College and the Graduate School, who was considerate 
enough to take time out from his onerous responsibilities as Department Chair at the time 
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis concerns the measurement and quantification of the relationship between 
railroadization in the United States in the mid-19th century and the subsequent evolution 
of the modern, large-scale, corporate form of industrial business organization marked by 
significant economies of scale and scope as described in various writings by Alfred 
Chandler.  Chandler’s idea that the railroads were a great impetus to market expansion 
and the emergence of a highly concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization 
characterized by extensive recourse to outside sources of finance, and that these, in turn, 
promoted economies of scale and scope implies a correlative cause-and-effect hypothesis 
that has never been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis using data.  This thesis 
attempts to remedy that deficiency with an empirical methodology that tests Chandler’s 
hypothesis in its rudimentary form with regards to American industry in the mid-to-late 
19th century, and a comparison of the development and growth of the American, British 
and German railroad networks in order to determine if Chandler’s claim that the 
American industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was particularly heavily 
impacted by the railroads has any validity. 
 
* 
Many researchers have attempted to explain Britain’s failure to maintain the position of 
supremacy it had achieved in the earlier iron-, coal-, and steam-based industries of the 
“First Industrial Revolution” of the 18th century later on in the science-based industries of 
the “Second Industrial Revolution” that emerged in the late 19th century.  For example, in 
the electricity and chemical industries as well as the early automotive industry, Britain 
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began to face formidable new competition from later industrializers; most notably the 
United States and Germany.  This is paradoxical and counter-intuitive not only when one 
considers Britain’s greater experience with factory production technologies and larger 
accumulated capital base, but also when one considers the fact that Britain was one of the 
major birthplaces of modern experimental science.   How is it that two countries which 
were, firstly, later to industrialize, and secondly, relatively deficient (almost completely 
lacking in the case of the United States) in resources for scientific inquiry, able to make 
such a tremendous leap in such a short period of time over the “mother nation” of modern 
industrial technology; the nation that had given birth to modern industrial capitalism and 
seemingly possessed the greatest potential for success in the very industries it lost ground 
in—those that combined scientific knowledge with practical industrial know-how?  In an 
attempt to resolve this paradox, many authors have contended that Britain’s “early start” 
in industrialization may have actually conferred disadvantages upon it in development of 
these later technologies, and created opportunities for latecomers that were shrewdly 
exploited by the United States and Germany.  This thesis will conduct an empirical 
examination of the hypotheses connecting Britain’s early start to a general failure to 
achieve economies of scale and scope in industry in order to determine if any of its 
relative backwardness in industrialization can be traced to that early start.  
 The main hypotheses that point to this linkage are those of Alfred Chandler in his 
1994 book, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism,1 in which he argues 
that economies of scale and scope were an essential feature crucial for success in the 
large-scale, capital intensive science-based industries of the late nineteenth century, and 
                                                 
1
 Chandler, Alfred D. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994.  Hereafter Scale and Scope.  
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that Britain failed to develop substantial industrial structure of this type due, in no small 
part, to its early start.  Because Britain industrialized before the transportation and 
communication revolution of the mid-19th century—that is, the coming of the steamship, 
telegraph, cable, and most of all, the railroads--it did not respond as vigorously to the 
opportunities for expansion of markets that the railroads bequeathed to other countries; 
the United States and Germany in particular.  Since the United States and Germany were 
undergoing their initial industrialization at the time these transportation innovations were 
being made, they were able to build their initial industrial structure in a manner more 
suitable for effective exploitation of the opportunities for economies of scale these 
innovations created.   While Britain’s older, smaller-scale, pre-existing industrial 
structure could perhaps have, with extensive investment and modification, expanded in a 
similar manner, its opportunity to do so was circumscribed by the fact that the railroads in 
Britain did little more than cement its pre-existing commercial channels that had been 
established under the age-old transportation methods provided by animal, wind and 
current.  These trading channels were too restrictive to maintain a level of throughput 
necessary to achieve the scale economies inherent in the new technologies.  
Consequently, Britain’s early start condemned its industry to a scale too small for 
efficiency in the modern industrial sectors such as electricity.  
 Furthermore, because the American and German initial industrializations occurred 
in tandem with the building of their railroads, the organizational and structural 
revolutions associated with the railroads were at the core of their industrialization process 
from its inception.  All of the requisite tools and apparatus for the building and 
maintenance of other large-scale, capital intensive industry, including the necessary 
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financial mechanisms, arose along with the railroads, and were instrumental in their 
subsequent rapid industrialization based on the modern production technologies.  The 
massive capital needs of the German and American railroads, too great for the lone 
entrepreneur to muster, called for the evolution of incorporated joint-stock enterprise 
owned by numerous scattered shareholders.  Thus, the essential structural parameters for 
success in the modern industries such as electricity were established and formed the 
bedrock of American and German industry.  In Britain, a smaller scale mode of industrial 
organization based on individual proprietorships, partnerships, and family-owned firms 
that had sufficed for the earlier production technologies of the First Industrial Revolution 
was firmer in the saddle at the time the railroads began to stimulate organizational 
changes there.  Furthermore, due to the smaller and more compact nature of the British 
railroad network, its capital requirements were modest in comparison to the German and 
American networks, therefore capable of being financed by more traditional, local 
mechanisms.  Consequently, the railroads in Britain stimulated far less organizational and 
structural change in British industry, which may have created disadvantages in later years 
when efficiency and competitiveness called for enterprise of the mammoth corporate 
variety.2 
Two fundamental assumptions underlie Chandler’s analysis: the railroad is 
correlated with, firstly, an expansion of markets and secondly, a more concentrated, 
large-scale mode of industrial organization characterized by extensive recourse to outside 
sources of finance.  Therefore, in order to determine whether a smaller and more compact 
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railroad network in Britain was responsible for its economy’s failure to develop such 
characteristics, it is necessary to determine the nature and extent of this correlation.  For 
if this relationship is weak, it casts doubt upon Chandler’s theories as acceptable or 
plausible explanations for the failure of British industry to achieve the necessary scale 
and scope advantages crucial for success in many of the industries of the Second 
Industrial Revolution.   
For instance, it would be necessary to determine if the above correlation is one 
which holds in general, across a broad spectrum of industries, or merely within the 
railroad itself and a few closely related industries.  It is possible, for instance, that Britain 
did experience some widening of markets as a result of the railroads, and it learned about 
the organizational and financial methods necessary in constructing large scale capital 
intensive enterprise, yet many segments of its industry remained small scale for internal 
reasons unrelated to market size or lack of appropriate financial apparatus.  Conversely, if 
Britain was able to build its relatively smaller, but still vast railroad network with 
traditional local means of finance, it is a puzzle as to why it would be unable to build 
other large-scale industry using similar methods.  If it were found that Germany and the 
United States had also constructed their even vaster railroad networks without extensive 
recourse to outside capital, it would serve to show that claims of the railroads as having 
been the catalyst to the modern industrial corporate structure of enterprise have been 
greatly exaggerated.  All such above evidence constitutes weakening of the empirical 
chain between the railroads and the evolution of the apparatus of large scale corporate 
enterprise, and would serve to discredit any hypotheses linking lesser impact of the 
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railroads on Britain’s economy with less industry of this type, and any backwardness in 
its modern sectors lack of such industry may have produced.  
In this study, we attempt to determine the nature and extent of this correlation 
between the railroads and economies of scale and scope by focusing on American 
industry in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.  In the second chapter, we conduct a 
comparison of the development and growth of the American, British and German railroad 
networks in order to determine if Chandler’s claims that British industrialization of the 
mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily impacted by the railroads has any 
validity.  In Chapter Three, we continue this comparison in an attempt to determine 
whether the American and German railroad systems were in fact constructed using more 
extensive recourse to outside sources of finance.   
 In the following chapters, we focus on American industry as it developed from 
1850-1880 using data uniquely suited to empirical analysis of economies of scale and 
scope in order to determine whether the growth of the American railroad network did, in 
fact, expand markets and augment the American financial sector such that the result was 
a more concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization characterized by 
extensive and increasing economies of scale and scope in sync with the growth of its 
extensive railroad system.  Lack of appropriate data preclude a similar analysis for British 
and German industry as they developed during this period, and for American industry 
after 1880 until well into the 20th century.  However, the period of 1850-80 spanned by 
our data is a sufficiently broad enough expanse of time for a test of this hypothesis as it 
concerns the United States.  Chandler believed that the great railroad boom of the middle 
of the 19th century was the catalyst to the market expansion and financial augmentation 
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that brought this large-scale mode of industrial organization characterized by extensive 
economies of scale and scope into existence by about 1870.  In these empirical analyses, 
we use these data sources to construct quantitative estimates of the degree of economies 
of scale and scope achieved in various American manufacturing industries over 
successive time periods within this period to test this theory.  Starting from the beginning 
of when these effects were purported to have begun, until 1870 which is identified as the 
benchmark period in which to expect to see the lagged effects of these transportation 
improvements upon industrial size and performance, and on until 1880 by which time 
they ought to have been in full bloom, we obtain quantitative measures of the degree of 
economies of scale and scope in various industries in order to see if this theory of a 
lagged, correlative cause-and-effect relationship between the growth of the railroads and 
economies of scale and scope has any empirical validity; something that previous 
analyses of the impact of the railroads on industrial size and performance in the 19th 
century do not contain.  Since the electrical and chemical industries were in their infancy 
at the time of the rapid take-off of the railroads, there is little or no evidence of the 
growth of these industries in 1850 or 1860 that we can use to take a retrospective look at 
and compare to their growth achieved by 1870 or 1880.  Consequently, our study has 
been confined to industries that were in full-fledged existence in 1850 for which 
sequential growth in association with the railroads for the full period from the beginning 
of the impact of the railroads to the final period can be ascertained.   
 Chapter Four introduces the measure of economies of scale achieved by various 
industries at any given time used in our analysis that is termed “Minimum Efficient 
Scale” (MES); the minimum plant size (in valued added) within the minimum size class 
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range that increased its total percentage of industry value added over a designated time 
period.  This is predicated on the notion that if economies of scale are present and 
increasing, larger firms ought to acquire greater market share as time passes.  By 
computing MES over successive time periods spanning the late nineteenth century, we 
obtain a quantifiable measure of the degree of economies of scale achieved in various 
American manufacturing industries.   
 Chapter Five continues the discussion of economies of scale by taking a closer 
look at the anomalous results our analysis in Chapter Four produced that showed declines 
in MES over the time period surveyed in six of eight key industries that Chandler said 
were the great industries that experienced the greatest impact of the decline in transport 
costs and technological advance that led to large-scale production methods.  In Chapter 
Five, we try to make sense of the anomalous results of Chapter Four by examining our 
data more closely, and attempt to “repair” those data sets found to be flawed by 
conducting new analyses using new superior data where available, organizing our data 
into more specific industry groupings, and conducting analyses of more industry groups 
with which to compare to the results of Chapter Four.   
 In Chapter Six, we introduce the measure of economies of scope achieved by a 
given multi-product industry at any given time used in our analysis that consists of 
estimating a cost function for each industry at each time period, computing the individual 
costs of producing each product independently that the given industry produced,  
subtracting from that the total combined costs of producing that bundle of goods jointly, 
and dividing that difference by the total combined costs of producing that bundle of 
goods jointly, yielding a measure of the percentage cost savings (increases) that are due 
  
9
to joint production.  By doing this over successive time periods spanning the late 
nineteenth century, we obtain a quantifiable measure of the degree of economies of scope 
achieved in various American manufacturing industries.  Our data used in these analyses, 
and the empirical results of these said economies of scale and scope computations will be 
reviewed and discussed, and an attempt is made to determine whether our empirical 
results confirm or contradict the beliefs of Chandler as to which industries experienced 
these rising economies of scale and scope advantages that were said to have occurred 
over this period, and when they occurred.  
 The thesis concludes with a summary of the overall findings of these empirical 
analyses in order to assess the degree to which they support or contradict those of 
Chandler.  An appendix follows that describes and delineates the construction of the data 




Chapter Two: DEVELOPMENT AND PHASES OF GROWTH OF THE           
AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN RAILROAD NETWORKS:  THE   
CHANDLER HYPOTHESIS EXAMINED 
 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The starting point of our analysis of Chandler’s claim that the British industrialization of 
the mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily impacted by the railroads than that of 
the United States and Germany is to juxtapose the timing of effects of the railroads on the 
industrial development of these countries with data concerning the development of the 
railroads themselves.  For instance, in order to determine whether Chandler’s claim that 
the railroads had a greater impact on the industrialization of the United States and 
Germany because they were built during their initial industrialization is true, we need to 
juxtapose the data and phases of mileage of the three countries with the revealed history 
of the industrial growth of these nations.  Or if we are to check the empirical validity of 
Chandler’s idea is that the railroads expanded markets, which led to increased 
opportunities to exploit economies of scale and scope, and that these effects were greater 
in the United States and Germany, we must do likewise.  Is there coincidence between 
the period of the most rapid expansion of the railroad systems of the United States and 
Germany and the expansion of markets that gave impetus to the growth in scale and 
scope of these enterprises?  Or was there a lag between this expansion and its effect, 
culminating in their leapfrog over Britain?  Or was there any effect of this kind at all?  
Only by examining Chandler’s claims as to when the rapid industrialization of the United 
States and Germany based on the new technologies occurred, and then looking back at 
the chronology of the phases of growth of railroad mileage and capital flow and 
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accumulation can we determine whether there does, in fact, exist this synchronicity of 
development between the railroads and other large-scale industrial enterprise.     
 We will also use this methodology to determine the validity of another theory that 
points to a linkage between the railroads and scale and concentration in non-financial 
industry; one that is largely overlooked by Chandler, yet has been addressed so 
extensively by other authors that it deserves a place in our analysis.  Any study that seeks 
to understand the relationship between the railroads and the development of large 
industrial corporations in the 19th century must consider the role of the railroads in 
stimulating demand for the inputs or intermediate goods involved in their construction 
(such as iron, coal, timber, etc.), hence growth in these industrial sectors.  It is important 
to realize that another consequence of the railroads borrowing heavily in the capital 
markets (besides the financial intermediation effect of enlarging the financial capital 
industry and stimulating industry this way), is that this capital, along with other capital 
raised in other ways, was spent again on the intermediate goods necessary for the 
construction of the railroads themselves, thus stimulating scale and concentration in these 
industries.  Consequently, the railroads may have been responsible in another important 
way for increases in scale and concentration appearing in these sectors in the wake of 
their mid-19th century investment and construction boom.  
 The method of juxtaposition of data of phases of mileage of the three countries 
with the revealed history of the industrial growth of these nations again comes into play 
here.  The larger and more extensive a nation’s railroad system, the greater its need for 
capital inputs.  If there were any validity to the theory that a larger and more extensive 
railroad system in the United States and Germany stimulated greater demand-side effects 
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upon the growth of these input-producing industries, we would expect there to exist this 
same synchronicity between the growth of these railroad systems and factor-producing 
industries as produced by market expansion and financial intermediation.  
 This analysis of comparative derived demand effects across nations makes a 
valuable contribution to this study because the magnitude of these effects, particularly 
insofar as they affected the American railroad system, is a historical controversy in the 
relevant literature whose resolution has grave implications for the purposes of this study.  
It is important in this study to determine the relative magnitude of the derived demand 
effects of the railroads on American industry vis-à-vis the British and German because if 
these effects were significant, it would weaken Chandler’s contention that the market 
expansion and financial intermediation effects of the railroad were predominant.  Or if 
they were found to be insignificant in comparison to the British, it would demand a re-
thinking of Chandler’s hypothesis of the lesser impact of the railroads on British 
industrial development.    
 This is essentially the crux of the debate over derived demand effects that is 
contained in the relevant literature.  In assessing the degree of these derived demand 
effects and their contribution to the American take-off into sustained economic growth in 
the nineteenth century, Rostow (1960) 1 claimed that the railroads’ demand for capital 
was the primary impetus in the United States’ great “take-off” into the era of modern 
economic growth, and precipitated its great structural transformation from a primarily 
agricultural to industrial economy.  However, the overall consensus of the work since 
                                                 
1




Rostow 2 appears to be that these effects of the railroads were relatively small in 
comparison to all the other factors that contributed to the growth of these modern 
industrial sectors, which is perhaps part of the reason that Chandler is relatively mute on 
the whole issue, and it doesn’t form part of his argument about why the railroads were 
such an important factor in revolutionizing the scale and structure of modern industry.  In 
his discussion of factors stimulating the American steel industry, Chandler notes that 
Carnegie, while initially experiencing great growth in his works in catering to the 
enormous demand created by the railroad boom of the 1880’s, increasingly by the 1880’s 
and 1890’s had begun to diversify into products such as boiler tanks and ship plates as 
opposed to railroad rails.  However, he does credit his placement of blast furnaces to 
produce pig iron next to the steel-producing Bessemer converters in his new Edgar 
Thompson rail works in 1879 as the factor making him the world’s most efficient steel-
rail producer.  Furthermore, he mentions that when the Illinois and Lorain Steel 
Companies merged in 1898, Illinois acquired its rail-building facilities, so this perhaps 
signifies some association between the demand of the railroads for inputs and things that 
promoted scale and concentration in industry, because Chandler does cite merger and 
acquisition as a major factor contributing to larger, more integrated facilities that were 
able to more efficiently exploit economies of scale and scope in production in the late 
19th century.  Little can be learned from Chandler about a particularly strong railroad 
demand for steel having contributed a lot to scale and concentration in the American steel 
industry.  As for the stimulating effect of the British railroads on its iron and steel 
industries, Chandler also says little.  In particular, regarding its steel industry, he notes 
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 See Fishlow, Albert. American Railroads and the Transformation of the Antebellum Economy.  Harvard 
University Press, (Cambridge, 1965) and Fogel, Robert William.  Railroads and American Economic 
Growth.  Johns Hopkins Press, (Baltimore, 1964). 
  
14
that by the time the British steel industry got going, most of its railroads had been 
completed (using iron, not steel for rails), so there were little expansionary effects from 
the railroad in Britain in those regards.3   
The main detractors of Rostow’s theory, however, are Fishlow (1965) and Fogel 
(1964).  The crux of their argument contre Rostow is that the United States’ structural 
transformation and “take-off” of economic growth based on these new modern industries 
actually occurred a lot earlier—before the advent of the iron horse.  Since these industries 
completed the lion’s share of their initial growth spurt before the railroads, it shows that 
these input demand (and perhaps also market expansion and financial intermediation) 
effects of the railroads on the great American industrial expansion of the 19th century 
were weak.  They also refute Rostow by presenting data on the percentage of output of 
these key industries that went into the railroads at the time of their great mid-century 
boom, showing that it was small.  With respect to the iron industry in particular, in an 
extensive analysis that covers an entire chapter in his book, Fogel points out that since 
this percentage was not a huge one out of the total output of the American iron industry at 
the time the railroads were being built, there is little growth in the iron industry at that 
time that can be attributed to the railroads.4  Fishlow believes that the railroads did not 
becomes huge “eaters” of the output of these key industries until the post-Bellum era, 
way after the initial surge of railroad production in the United States.5  Fishlow also 
presents an extensive analysis showing that despite the fact that the railroads were heavy 
consumers of industrial capital like iron and coal, they were still a primarily labor-
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intensive industry.6  Fogel contests the Rostow theory further by pointing out that the 
railroads did not play a huge role in stimulating the boom in the iron industry at mid-
century in the United States because much of the “new” rails that were produced each 
year were actually old rails that were re-rolled into new ones.  Thus demand for rails did 
not have such a great effect on the level of production in the smelting sector.7    
Then there is the issue that the American railroad industry did not stimulate the 
iron or steel industry that much because the United States imported a large part of its iron 
for rails from Britain initially.8  The United States purportedly had the larger and greater 
railroad system; but if it got most of its rails from the British iron industry, then the 
expansion of the American railroad system may have had more of an expanding effect 
upon the British than the American iron industry.  Fishlow believes that part of the boom 
in the American iron industry that occurred seemingly because of the demand of the 
railroads was actually created by a substitution effect that occurred due to a rise in the 
price of British iron.  So the United States merely substituted domestic iron for rails for 
imported iron.  So it was really because of a price rise that this happened, not because of 
demand of the railroads per se; if the price hadn’t risen, they would probably have 
continued to import their iron to build their rails.  And since this price rise affected an 
increase in demand for all domestic iron produced in the United States, one cannot 
pinpoint one particular demand source as having been the causal factor behind the growth 
of the American iron industry.9  
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There was also relatively less stimulation of the American coal industry from the 
railroads than in Britain, owing to the fact that wood was used more for fuel in the United 
States than in Britain, whose forests were depleted.  As an aside, this did little to 
stimulate the American timber processing industry as this wood for fuel was not 
manufactured lumber that came out of mills.10   
It appears perhaps that the derived demand effects of the railroads may have 
actually been stronger in Britain; and not merely in coal, as two preeminent scholars of 
the growth of the British railroad system, Bagwell (1974) and Hawke (1970), maintain.11  
Since the British iron industry not only produced the lion’s share of its own rails that 
went into its railroad system, but also exported a great deal of rails to the United States 
and elsewhere, it might well be the case that the railroads had a greater affect upon 
British industrial development at mid-century; at least insofar as input demand effects are 
concerned.  Bagwell and Hawke both take note of the considerable growth of the Welsh 
iron industry that served the Northern and Midlands manufacturing industries that 
included rails production.  Bagwell reports that this industry grew considerably 
coincident with the construction of railroad lines connecting it to these manufacturing 
centers and that these transport lines were instrumental in its growth, which also points to 
significant growth from market expansion effects.12   
This controversy surrounding the degree of impact of these derived demand 
effects on American industry vis-à-vis the British and German certainly merits some sort 
of further empirical analysis.  If it were to be found that these effects were substantial, it 
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would certainly weaken not only Chandler’s contention that market expansion and 
financial intermediation effects of the railroad were predominant, it would call into 
question Fishlow and Fogel’s contention that these effects were weak in their impact on 
American industry.  Or if these effects were felt more on the other side of the Atlantic, it 
might also demand a re-thinking of Chandler’s hypothesis of the lesser impact of the 
railroads on British industrial development.    
 
 
I.  RAILROADIZATION AND INITIAL INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
The following tabular analyses constitute an empirical test of Chandler’s theory that the 
British industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily impacted 
by the railroads than that of the United States and Germany through a juxtaposition of the 
timing of effects of the railroads on the industrial development of these countries with 
data concerning the development of the railroads themselves. 
 In Table 2.1 below, railway mileage for Great Britain, the United States, and 
Germany, every five years starting from 1830 until 1914 are delineated side-by-side as 
our starting point for this analysis.  From examining the table, it can be seen that although 
Britain starts off in the lead as the pioneer of the railways, the United States clearly 
overtakes it in mileage completed by 1835, and maintains a strong lead over Britain and 
Germany thereafter to 1914.  Germany’s later start leaves it behind both Britain and the 
United States until the 1870’s when it overtakes Britain.  By 1875, a clear ranking order 
of the United States first, Germany second, and Britain third is established that is 
commensurate with what would be expected given the relative areas of national territory 
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of the three nations surveyed (see a precise measure of national territory for each nation 
juxtaposed to these mileage data in Table 2.1 as well). 
 Table 2.1 is quite helpful in addressing the main questions pertaining to our 
empirical analysis of Chandler’s hypothesis of the impetus to economies of scale and 
scope the railroads may have afforded in terms of when and in which country(ies) these 
effects were most apparent and in which industries would they be most manifest.  But our 
first use of this table is to address the question does the timing of these phenomena 
correspond to the Chandlerian hypothesis that because the railroads were built during the 
initial industrializations of the United States and Germany, they had a greater impact on 
their industrial development than they had in Britain, who had industrialized before the 
railroads?  Since it is a given that these effects occurred long after Britain’s initial 
industrialization, there is no need to examine this issue.  
 With regards to the United States, there is no inconsistency between Chandler’s 
story of the genesis of American industry in relation to the railroads and the information 
as displayed in Table 2.1.  The rapid growth of the American railroad system that is 
apparent by the 1850's-60's in Table 2.1 is consistent with the time period Chandler 
considers the United States’ initial industrialization.  In discussing the reasons that the 
railroads did not have as great an impact on British industrialization as they did on 
American industrialization, he states that part of the reason (besides the fact that its pre-
railroad transport systems were more efficient than the American) is that Britain’s 
industrialization preceded the building of its railroad network, implying that the United 
States' industrialization was concurrent with the building of its railroad system.13  While 
Chandler does not explicitly pinpoint the exact time that the United States’ “initial 
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industrialization” occurred, our data leaves us with no other conclusion than it occurred at 
mid-century; a period not too far off the mark from what could be considered its early, if 
not initial industrialization.  
 However, in noting the lagged development of the railroads in Germany with 
respect to not only the United States, but Britain as well, a shadow of doubt is cast upon 
the notion that Germany’s initial industrialization was concurrent with the railroads.  
Table 2.1 reveals the fact that Germany did not overtake Britain in railroad mileage until 
the 1870's.  If Germany had already experienced significant industrialization by the 
1870's that the railroads merely buttressed, then a “layering” effect similar to what 
transpired in Britain was also characteristic of the German industrial development.  If 
Germany’s industrial development more closely resembles that of Britain than that of the 
United States, then one of Chandler’s premises or factors accounting for Germany’s 
leapfrog over Britain at the end of the century is fraudulent; unless the period that we 
refer to as Germany’s “initial industrialization” were moved up to a later date. 
 As it turns out, there is no need to “move” Germany’s initial industrialization to a 
later date to salvage the theory of synchronicity between its early industrialization and 
railroadization.  Despite the fact that Germany did not make the great final leap over 
Britain until the 1870's, it made some remarkable strides from the start of its railroad 
system in the late 1830’s until the 1870's, which is a period that can certainly be called 
coincident with Germany’s initial industrialization.   
 According to Chandler, prior to the boom of the 1870's, Germany experienced 
another earlier boom in railroad investment in the 1840's-50's.14  It is apparent from 
examining Table 2.1 that growth of the railroad system was very rapid in Germany for 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., p. 414.   
  
20
the whole period prior to the first year shown in which German mileage exceeds that of 
Britain, 1875.  The rapid growth of the German railroad system that was apparent by the 
1850's-60's is coincident with the time period during which Germany is considered to 
have experienced its initial industrialization, as is the similar growth of the railroads in 
the United States at that time.  Although the great boom in which it overtook Britain did 
not occur until the 1870's, and the leap from 1870-75 is the greatest leap so far achieved 
by Germany, it certainly cannot be considered to be the leap that “made” Germany’s 
railroad system.  Overall, from examining the data in Table 2.1, it can be seen that the 
German railroad system was a great work in progress over the entire period prior to 1875, 
thus we can certainly say that this evolution was coincident with Germany’s initial 
industrialization.   
 Moreover, in noting the railroad booms of the 1840's-50's and 1860's-70's going 
on in both the United States and Germany at the time, Chandler states that this is going 
on during both nations’ initial industrializations.  In fact, Chandler states that the rapid 
growth of the railroad network was an integral part of Germany’s initial 
industrialization.15  Since the period of rapid growth of the railroad network he is 
describing is one that extends from mid-century on into the 1870's, the 1870's can 
certainly be a period during which Germany can be said to still be experiencing lagged 
effects of railroadization in the wake of its initial industrialization.  So there is no need to 
“move” Germany’s initial industrialization to any later date in order to salvage 
Chandler’s theory. 
 While there is no further need to reconcile this aspect of Chandler’s theory with 
quantitative and historical evidence, it is worthy of noting here that the sustained boom in 
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German railroad construction leading to its usurpation of Britain by the 1870’s is 
coincident with the dawn of an era of rapid industrial progress greatly associated with the 
completion of Germany’s railroad network that can in many ways, be considered the 
inauguration point of German industrialization proper.  1870 was a watershed year for 
Germany in that the said essential completion of its railroad network coincides with the 
unification of the German Empire, which hastened the integration, both physically and 
operationally, of the railroad network.  With the large railroad network in place by 1870, 
the stage was set for the emergence of the large industrial corporation and the dramatic 
economic growth based on the new technologies that Germany experienced from that 
point on.  1870 can serve as a benchmark point at which to mark the inauguration of this 
great growth, because, as Chandler points out, Germany’s G.D.P. was far lower than 
Britain’s in 1870, but by 1914 had approached Britain’s very closely, which implies that 
1870 marks a beginning point of an era of rapid industrial and economic growth 
experienced by Germany.  The impetus to the German steel industry provided by the 
railroads in the 1870's-80's  that led to the evolution of large integrated steel mills there is 
just one example of the ways in which the railroads had, and continued to play, a 
tremendous role in the industrial growth of Germany that they had long ceased to play in 
Britain, and was one of the crucial factors, according to Chandler, that played a pivotal 
role in its usurpation of Britain in the role of Europe’s supreme industrial leader.16   
 To summarize, there is no inconsistency between Chandler’s claims that the 
American and German initial railroadizations and industrializations coincide with the 
mileage data contained in Table 2.1.  For both the United States and Germany, Table 2.1 
shows a rapid expansion in their railroad networks as having occurred at mid-century, a 
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period can be roughly designated as a take-off period of growth of large-scale industrial 
enterprise for both nations.  While Germany’s most rapid growth of its railroad system 
does not occur until slightly later, until the 1870’s, it has been here revealed that this 
railroad growth is not too far off the mark from what can be termed Germany’s “early 
industrialization” period in that it merely buttressed an earlier stage of growth of  
Germany’s railroad system, and is coincident with what one might call a “second stage” 
of its early industrialization in which the effects of rapid railroadization upon its economy 




II.  RAILROADIZATION AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE: IS   
THERE SYNCHRONICITY? 
 
Our tabular/historical analysis of Chandler now continues with a juxtaposition of these 
mileage phases data for the three countries with historical claims made by Chandler 
regarding when the dramatic effect of the expansion of these railroad systems upon the 
scale and structure of industries was felt.   
 From examining Chandler’s writings, in tandem with the information gathered 
from Table 2.1, the primary deduction gathered is that there was a lagged effect from the 
take-off period of the expansion of the railroads which occurred around mid-century, 
until the time at which the effects of this railroad construction on expansion of markets 
and financial intermediation had their effect upon the industry of these countries, which 
did not occur until after 1870.  In accounting for the smaller scale, less concentrated 
structure of industry that had materialized in Britain by the latter 19th century as 
compared with the United States and Germany, Chandler implies that because Germany 
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and the United States received the market expansion and financial augmentation from the 
railroads at the time they were being built at mid-century, there was more of it at the end 
of the century.  Whereas for Britain, due to the lesser impact of the railroads on its 
industrial development at mid-century, there were less of these effects later on, which is 
large part of what accounts for the American and German leapfrog in industrial 
development that occurred at that time.  In terms of the consequences of this for 
particular industrial sectors, it is implied that their earlier-on effect was upon industries 
existent at the time (iron, coal, etc.), and because of less scale and scope achieved in these 
industries earlier on, Britain also did not get it later when the big growth industries were 
chemicals, electricity, etc.  A further clear implication is that there was a lagged effect of 
the railroads on industrial structure equal to about twenty years or so from the rapid 
expansion of the railroads at mid-century until their concomitant market expansion and 
financial augmentation had their effects upon industrial growth by the latter part of the 
19th century.    
 Theoretical grounding in hand, we may now proceed to a more thorough check 
and verification of these accounts of Chandler’s on the dates of when the effects of the 
railroads first appeared in each country as against our railroad mileage phases data in 
Table 2.1.  In Table 2.1, the clear ranking order of the United States first, Germany 
second, and Great Britain third supports the general contention that the effects of 
railroadization were weaker in Britain relative to the other two countries.  However, the 
fact that Germany starts out behind Britain, and does not overtake it until the 1870's, 
raises questions in terms of the premises of the Chandlerian hypothesis that need to be 
resolved.  It makes no sense to speak of the greater preponderance of the railroads in 
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Germany vis-à-vis Britain, or any impetus to scale and scope this afforded German 
industry, until at least the 1870's.  This is the case at least as far as we can determine from 
looking at raw mileage data.  And, as further data in the series bears out, there appears to 
be a significant time gap in between the time at which the United States overtook Britain 
as the nation who was best poised to reap the greatest benefits from the railroads, which 
occurred perhaps as early as the 1840's, and the time at which any great advantages of 
this sort can be said to have been received by Germany, which seemingly did not occur 
until the 1870's.    
 Starting with Britain, in the introductory Part I of Scale and Scope that applies to 
all 3 countries, Chandler makes it pretty clear that the railroads did not effect their great 
revolutionary contribution to production and distribution methods until they had achieved 
their “completeness” which he considers as having been by the 1870's.17  Since Chandler 
believes that Britain did not experience this radical transformation of its economy due to 
the railroads, I am assuming he means mainly the United States and Germany.  However, 
in looking for a time period in which this “completeness” of the British railroad system 
ought to have had whatever impact it had on British industrial development, however 
meager it was, Chandler states that Britain’s railroad network was nearly complete by the 
1850's-60's, which appears to be accurate given a glance at Table 2.1, which shows that 
the growth of Britain’s railroad system after 1870 is not as rapid as previously.18  
Consequently, it is pretty safe to assume that whatever impetus to economies of scale and 
scope the British railroads afforded, while they may have been gathering momentum in 
the 1850's and 1860's, ought to have been in full swing by the 1870's.  Thus the 1870's are 
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a benchmark decade in which to look for the beginning of the effects of economies of 
scale and scope on British industry in association with the opportunities for so presented 
by the railroads.   
 As for when the effects of this railroadization were made apparent in terms of the 
tremendous impetus to economies of scale and scope American industry was said to have 
experienced, the evidence from Chandler reveals a similar benchmark period of the 
beginnings of such growth in the 1860's, and a formal starting point of the acceleration of 
such growth that led to the evolution of the large industrial corporation in the United 
States of about 1870.  The general evidence regarding the growth of railroads in the 
United States is that the effects of railroads upon economies of scale and scope in 
American industry ought to have been apparent by at least the same time as in Britain, 
say the late 1860's, and, if anything, continued to steamroll on throughout the century 
because, unlike the British, the American railroad system continued to experience rapid 
growth after the 1870's, and on until the turn of the century.  In fact, even as early as the 
1850's, the United States’ railroads were increasing more rapidly than Britain’s, as an 
inspection of Table 2.1 indicates.  
 For instance, in comparing the impact of the railroads and telegraph on the 
American and British economies and the economies of scale and scope it afforded both 
countries, Chandler compares mileage dates completed in both countries in 1860 and 
1880.  In noting the much greater mileage completed in the United States at both dates, 
he seems to imply that the more profound impact of the railroads on the American 
economy were already being felt by 1860.19  Furthermore, Chandler notes the great 
stimulus to the American and German steel industries provided by their still rapidly 
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growing railroad systems in the 1870's-80's that led to the evolution of large integrated 
steel mills in those countries during this period.  Chandler indicates that the British steel 
industry did not experience such a stimulus on account of the fact that most of its railroad 
system was complete by the 1860's.  Consequently, there was far less incentive for 
British industrialists to make the investment in these large integrated facilities, so the 
German and American firms became the first movers in large batch-process steel 
production facilities during the 1870's-80's.20 
 Regarding the case of Germany, Table 2.1 reveals the fact that Germany did not 
overtake Britain in railroad mileage until the 1870's.  So apparently, it would seem that 
the American phenomenon of a mid-century railroad boom, followed by an industrial 
expansion and modernization by the 1870’s, could not have happened in Germany; at 
least not by 1870 as Chandler contends.  Thus our railroad mileage data are apparently in 
conflict with Chandler’s idea that because Germany and the United States received 
greater market expansion and financial augmentation from the railroads at the time they 
were being built at mid-century, there was more of it at the end of the century.   
 But as discussed above, 1870 is not a date too far off the mark from what can be 
termed Germany’s “early industrialization” period to begin to look for traces of the 
effects of rapid railroadization upon its economy that may have been coincident with, or 
resultant from its earlier surge of railroad investment and construction of the 1840’s-50’s.  
And while my overall examination of Chandler indicates that the effects of 
railroadization appeared in Germany at a slightly later date than in the United States or 
Britain, they were not so much later that 1870 becomes ruled out as a reasonable 
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benchmark starting point for looking for these effects to have begun to manifest 
themselves.   
 Chandler conducts a similar comparison of the effects of the railroads and 
telegraph on the German and British economies as done with respect to the United States 
and Britain above.  Chandler points to the dates for Germany as having overtaken Britain 
in railroad mileage completed, and implied concomitant economies of scale and scope 
effects as having been achieved as being between 1880 and 1910, seeming to imply that 
the great effects of the railroads on German industrialization were not being felt until 
then.21   In his analysis of German industrialization in association with the railroads, 
while making note of a great surge in railroad investment in Germany as having occurred 
in the 1840's and 1850's, he is far more cautionary insofar as asserting any dramatic 
expansionary stimulus in association with the railroads in Germany until 1880, upon 
which time he states that Germany had achieved a transportation system comparable to 
the United States in terms of permitting the cost advantages of economies of scale and 
scope inherent in the capital-intensive, high-volume technologies of production.22 
 But at the same time, Chandler acknowledges that since Germany’s initial 
construction of its railroad network was indeed coincident with its early industrialization, 
this construction could have been producing effects that were of great importance and 
significance in terms of its later leapfrog over Britain, and that these effects could have 
been operating far earlier on than the 1880's.  Besides the great surge in German railroad 
investment of the 1840's and 1850's, Chandler notes that by the 1870's, the German 
railroad managers had perfected the operating and organizational procedures needed to 
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assure a steady, fast, regularly scheduled flow of goods over Germany’s new railroad 
network, and they had achieved this even earlier than their American counterparts, which 
suggests that economies of scale and scope effects due to enlargement of markets may 
have been operating in Germany by the 1870's.  Moreover, he notes that German political 
unification, achieved by 1871, gave further impetus to these effects when the new 
Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, made consolidation of the German railroads into a single 
system a priority of the new regime, thus hastening the integration, both physically and 
operationally, of the railroad network within Germany and with those systems of nations 
to the east and south.23     
The overall experience of Germany with respect to the railroads, and 
expansionary impetus to economies of scale and scope afforded by the railroads, while 
pointing to perhaps a slightly later date at which to look for economies of scale and scope 
effects in association with the railroads than in the United States or Britain, perhaps the 
1880's, does not direct us so far later in history that it calls for a radical forward shifting 
of the dates to look for empirical evidence of economies of scale and scope in association 
with the German railroads.  1870 is a reasonable enough benchmark date for which to 
anticipate these economies of scale and scope effects of the railroads in Germany, as it is 
for the other two countries.  It certainly is no further far off the mark than for the United 
States or Britain, whom although we have picked that same date as a starting point for 
which to examine and look for these effects in, may have been experiencing them as early 
on as the 1850's.   
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III.  EFFECTS OF RAILROADIZATION ON INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION 
 
Equal in importance to the matter of when the effects of the railroads on economies of 
scale and scope in industry appeared for any empirical analysis of economies of scale and 
scope is the issue of where they appeared--in what industries, that is.  A major component 
of Chandler’s hypothesis concerning the American and German leapfrog over Britain by 
the end of the century is of a qualitative, not quantitative nature.  According to Chandler, 
due to the lesser impact of the railroads on economies of scale and scope in British 
industry at mid-century, there were lesser economies of scale and scope in British 
industry later on when the big growth industries were chemicals, electricity, etc.  
Consequently, British industrial growth was not only quantitatively stymied, in that it was 
smaller-scale and less integrated by the end of the century, it was qualitatively less 
modern, and concentrated more in the traditional industries of its earlier industrialization.  
Chandler not only maintained that economies of scale and scope effects of railroads in 
Britain were quantitatively weaker than in the United States and Germany due to its 
earlier industrialization based on the earlier technologies, and its excellent pre-railroad 
transport systems; he also pointed out that they were qualitatively less modern, and 
concentrated in these older, labor-intensive technologies like textiles, shoes and food 
processing, rather than in the newer, scientific, capital-intensive technologies such as 
chemicals and electrical technology.   
 Chandler believed that since the railroads appeared in the United States and 
Germany during their initial industrializations, their industry evolved in a structure more 
suitable for exploiting the scale and scope advantages of these new transport innovations, 
and that new types of financial institutions evolved out of this that paved the way for 
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further large-scale industrialization.  While there is no apparent reason why these effects 
ought to have appeared more prominently in the modern sectors than in Britain, other 
than perhaps that since they were industrializing for the first time, their industrialization 
would naturally be of a more up-to-date character, thus concentrated more heavily in the 
modern sectors than in Britain, whose pre-existing, older industrial sector would have 
been its greatest recipient of the economies of scale and scope opportunities presented by 
the railroads, it is a prominent theme running throughout Chandler that in the United 
States, the wave of technological and organizational changes precipitated by the 
transportation and communication revolutions were observed most prominently in the 
capital-intensive industries of the Second Industrial Revolution, in contrast to the British 
experience in which British entrepreneurs failed to make these essential investments most 
necessary to compete in the newer, more technologically advanced growth industries, 
such as chemicals, electrical equipment, and other machinery where complex facilities 
and highly specialized technical and managerial skills were essential in obtaining and 
maintaining market share.  Consequently, it is in industries such as these that we ought to 
observe the greatest economies of scale and scope in association with the railroads in 
American industry.24 
 As indicated in the above section describing the impact of the railroads on the 
American and German steel industries, it is evident that in Germany, as in the United 
States, the wave of technological and organizational changes precipitated by the 
transportation and communication revolutions were observed most prominently in the 
capital-intensive industries of the Second Industrial Revolution.  As Chandler describes, 
the basic story of the evolution of the modern industrial enterprise in Germany is very 
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similar to that of the United States in that it appeared quickly following the completion of 
the new transportation and communication network, and that these new manufacturing 
enterprises became clustered in the industries in which the technologies of production 
provided the cost advantages of scale and scope.  By 1880, Chandler explains, Germany 
had achieved a transportation system comparable to the United States in terms of 
permitting the cost advantages of economies of scale and scope inherent in the capital-
intensive, high-volume technologies of production.25    
 Again, although 1880 is a formal starting place Chandler designates for 
observation of these changes, 1870 is not too far off the mark either for a starting 
observation point, because it marks the inauguration of a new era in Germany’s political 
and economic history—an era of mutual coincidence of the beginning of its political and 
economic unification, the completion of a significant portion of its transportation and 
communication network, the unification thereof, and the initiation of a period of rapid 
economic growth based on the new technologies that the railroads played a role in 
inaugurating. Chandler notes that during the years between 1870 and WWI, Germany, 
like the United States, quickly surpassed Britain in industrial output, and captured an 
increasing share of Britain’s international and even domestic markets.  At the core, this 
success rested on the ability of German entrepreneurs to adopt new technologies and 
build the organizations necessary to exploit them.26  Germany’s advances in those days 
may also be related to its high primary and secondary school enrollment rates, which, 
along with the United States’, exceeded Britain’s during most of the nineteenth century.  
We cannot ignore the importance of universal schooling to economic growth, as 
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emphasized by Lindert (2004) in which he details how the British belief in private, 
voluntary education caused it to lag behind Germany and its other competitors in 
enrollment rates during these crucial years of 1850-1890 in which this industrial leapfrog 
took place.  By making basic education more accessible to the masses, Germany may 
have achieved higher literacy among industrial workers, and thereby a more modern and 
efficient industrial sector than many of its competitors.27  
 The industries in which the German entrepreneurs excelled were those that lay at 
the heart of the Second Industrial Revolution—those that produced the materials and 
machinery so essential to the rapid industrializing and urbanizing of the economies—not 
only of continental Europe, but also of Britain and the United States.  By WWI, 
Germany’s industrial strength lay in what contemporaries called “the great industries”.  
These included metals—iron and steel; heavy industrial machinery, particularly the new 
machines that generated, transmitted, and used electrical power; and the new chemical 
industries that produced man-made dyes, fibers, medicines, fertilizers, and materials used 
in a wide variety of industrial processes.28  Clearly, then, for Germany, as for Britain and 
the United States, 1870 is a good benchmark starting point for looking for effects of the 
railroads upon economies of scale and scope in industries, and in the case of Germany, as 
in the United States, it is these modern technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution 
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IV. DERIVED DEMAND EFFECTS: A FAULTY OMISSION? 
 
The other important linkage between the railroads and scale and concentration in non-
financial industry that was discussed earlier is the role of the railroads in stimulating 
demand for the inputs or intermediate goods involved in their construction (such as iron, 
coal, timber, etc.) hence growth in these industrial sectors, and thus increases in scale and 
concentration that may have appeared in these sectors in the mid-19th century coincident 
with, or immediately following the construction of the railroads.  Another consequence of 
the railroads borrowing heavily in the capital markets (besides the financial 
intermediation effect of enlarging the financial capital industry and stimulating industry 
this way), is that this capital, along with other capital raised in other ways, was spent 
again on the intermediate goods necessary for the construction of the railroads 
themselves, thus stimulating scale and concentration in these industries.  Consequently, 
the railroads may have been responsible for increased scale and concentration in industry 
in another important way. 
What follows are analyses of the railroad mileage phases data already presented in 
Table 2.1 along with data on railroad mileage per thousand square miles of national 
territory for Great Britain, the United States, and Germany and railroad physical capital 
investment data for the three countries.  These are juxtaposed to the history as accounted 
for by Chandler and other authors to help us gain a better understanding of the magnitude 
of these derived demand effects across each country for the sake of international 
comparison.    
The essential theoretical underpinnings that tie these data together in an analysis 
of these derived demand effects of the railroads across countries is that growth in 
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railroad-input producing industries that stemmed from production of inputs that actually 
ended up being produced for railroads would be evidenced by a high fraction of the 
output of these industries ending up as railroad inputs, which would be a function of a 
larger and more extensive railroad system.  Or, in reverse, the larger and more extensive a 
nation’s railroad system, the greater its need for capital inputs, thus the greater the degree 
to which inputs involved in the construction of that system contributed to the growth of 
the input-producing industries.  According to Chandler, it was on account of the fact that 
the United States’ railroad system was larger and more extensive than Britain’s that the 
railroads had a greater impact upon industrialization in the United States than in Britain.  
Although he did not point to the effect of input demand to a great extent as a factor 
contributing to this phenomenon, measuring the degree of railroadization with track 
mileage provides an adequate initial yardstick with which to see if the same properties of 
the railroad that Chandler believed led to industrial growth through market expansion and 
financial intermediation could have also had these effects via input demand.  This is thus 
just as much of a scathing examination of Rostow’s theory as that of Chandler’s.  
Consequently, we need to look at physical extent of the railroad system in Table 2.1 
again to assess the relative impact of the railroads on American industrial development 
vis-à-vis that of Britain and also Germany.  
In re-examining Table 2.1, it can be seen that there is greater physical expansion 
of the railroads in the United States and Germany.  This initial surface examination 
would support the contention that these countries would have greater demand-side 
stimulus emanating from the railroads themselves as factors abetting economies of scale 
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and scope in those countries and contributing to their technological leapfrog over Britain 
in the late 19th century.  
Mileage alone, however, is an incomplete picture of the story.  As accounted for 
by the fact that the United States imported a lot of its rails from Britain, it may not be the 
case at all that a nation’s railroad-input-producing industries grew in proportion to the 
growth of its own railroad system.  The United States purportedly had the larger and 
greater railroad system; but if it got most of its rails from the British iron industry, then 
the expansion of the American railroad system may have had more of an expanding effect 
upon the British iron industry than its own iron industry.   
Consequently, for the sake of comparison, the mileage data of Table 2.1 have 
been divided by data of national territory (also shown in Table 2.1) to form a measure of 
railroad mileage per thousand square miles of national territory for Great Britain, the 
United States, and Germany for every five years from 1830-1914 displayed in the far 
right section of Table 2.1.  This adjustment is designed to gauge a better understanding of 
the relative importance of the railroads in each nation’s economy.  Chandler maintained 
that the American railroad system was larger and more expansive than Britain’s, and 
therefore more important in its economic development.  However, it must be remembered 
that we are dealing with countries of significantly different area sizes.  Given the United 
States’ greater area, it is only natural to assume that it would it would require a larger and 
more expansive railroad system.  However, given Britain’s smaller area, it is very 
possible that its albeit smaller and more compact railroad system loomed relatively larger 
in importance to its economic development than that of the United States.  Given 
Britain’s smaller area, it is natural to assume that a smaller and more compact railroad 
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system would be adequate for its needs.  However, on a per square mile basis, Britain 
may have had the larger and more expansive railroad system.  Given the fact that it 
produced mainly all its rails itself, and exported another hefty portion to abroad, Britain’s 
iron industry may well have been much more railroad-intensive than the United States’, 
thus the derived demand effects of the railroads may have had a far greater impact upon 
British industry than upon the American.  Railroad mileage per square mile of national 
territory is another potential indicator of a more heavily railroadized economy where 
railroads were a bigger industry in proportion to the rest of the economy, and therefore 
more important as a market for the output of iron, coal and other industries.  
In examining Table 2.1, the most immediately obvious and striking feature is the 
ranking of railroad mileage per square mile of national territory in reverse proportion to 
the degree that each nation was supposed to have received the benefits of railroadization; 
Britain first, Germany second, the United States third.  Table 2.1 reveals that although 
Britain is the lowest of the three in terms of sheer railway mileage, it surpasses both 
countries in terms of railroad mileage per thousand square miles of national territory 
throughout the period in question, which is to be expected given its earlier start in general 
industrialization, more urbanized nature, and smaller and more compact geographical 
layout.  Britain’s earlier start in the building of its railway system too, may have played a 
role in its achieving a relatively more expansive and ubiquitous railway system. 
 The United States, although starting out ahead of Germany, loses that lead by the 
1840’s, and never regains it.  Clearly the United States’ greater mileage of railways is not 
enough to offset its wide-open spaces and more dispersed geographical layout, and the 
British effect of a more concentrated and compact industrial landscape already begins to 
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operate in Germany’s favor by the 1840’s, despite its later start and overall smaller 
railway system in terms of sheer mileage.    
 This topsy-turvy ranking order calls the premises of the Chandler theory into 
question.  If railroad mileage per square mile of national territory were the yardstick by 
which we gauge the degree of railroadization of a nation’s economy, Britain would come 
out on top; a result in contradiction to the Chandler hypothesis that lesser (greater) 
railroadization in Britain (the United States and Germany) was associated with lesser 
(greater) economies of scale and scope in industry.  By the results of this yardstick, with 
railroad mileage per square mile as an indicator of greater railroadization, it would show 
greater railroadization linked with lesser economies of scale and scope, if what Chandler 
believes is true that the United States and Germany received greater economies of scale 
and scope benefits from the railroads.   
 While the mere fact that Britain had the greatest railroad mileage per square mile 
of national territory does completely demolish the premises of the theory--Britain could 
have easily had great railroad mileage per square mile of national territory without a 
tremendous stimulating effect of this seemingly widespread railroadization on its 
railroad-input-producing industries, not to mention little market expansion as a result of 
these railroads and lesser effects on capital market augmentation from this 
railroadization--by the same token, there is nothing in these results that assures lower 
derived demand, market expansion, or capital market augmentation effects of the 
railroads on British industry, and it makes one think. The fact that Britain had a busy iron 
industry, producing its own iron for its railroads, not to mention the United States and 
other countries, and even though its own domestic demand for rails was small after 1860 
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due to most of its own rail network having been laid down, we know that the continued 
great expansion of the American and Continental systems was yet to come, and even 
Chandler acknowledges that in 1880 Britain was still the world’s largest producer of 
steel, even though he maintains that this American and Continental expansion had its 
primary impact upon the American and German steel industries as they faced greater 
incentives to invest in large integrated steel mills at that time.29  But this all occurred 
much later.  It could be that Fishlow, Fogel and Chandler were right and Rostow was 
wrong about one thing—that these derived demand effects were weak in the United 
States and Germany prior to the latter 19th century, and it was derived demand effects 
such as these that only had a prominent effect upon the British iron and steel industries.  
However, if these effects were great in Britain from the start of its railroad system all the 
way up until the latter part of the 19th century, this is information overlooked by Chandler 
that weakens his contention that the railroads were far more important for the industrial 
development of the United States and Germany, and this cannot be used as a compelling 
explanation for Britain’s failure to achieve large scale concentrated industries in the 
modern industrial sectors by the late 19th century.     
 But before we get too carried away in interpreting these topsy-turvy results as a 
refutation of the Chandler hypothesis, we must bear in mind one crucial caveat.  That is 
that the railroad mileage per square mile of national territory of Table 2.1 do not indicate, 
on a per-square-mile basis, the much greater rapidity of railroad construction relative to 
Britain achieved by the United States from the 1850's on and by Germany from the 
1850's to the 1870's.  An examination of rates of increase in this section of the table does 
not show any one or two particular countries being especially rapid.  This is no doubt due 
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to the United States’ and Germany’s greater area.  A relatively small addition to railroad 
mileage in Britain shows up as a relatively large increase per square mile due to its 
smaller area.  So this section of the table conceals a very important phenomenon, that the 
1850's-70's were a period of very rapid growth of the American and German railroad 
systems with respect to Britain, in which they not only overtook Britain in total mileage, 
but may have gained crucial scale and scope advantages in industrial structure that were 
abetted by this rapid and extensive growth of their railroad systems.   
 
 
 V.  DERIVED DEMAND CONTINUED: PHYSICAL CAPITAL INPUTS 
 
Another yardstick we may use to gauge the relative importance of the railroads insofar as 
they stimulated different countries’ railroad-input-producing industries besides mere 
mileage alone is the amount of physical capital inputs that went into the production of 
their railroad systems.  Greater capital inflow to the railroads is another indicator of 
greater demands on railroad-input producing industries that may have stimulated these 
derived demand effects.  If the railroads were a more important part of the industrial 
development of the United States and Germany, their construction may have more greatly 
stimulated railroad-input producing industries, such as iron, steel and coal, thus 
precipitating more opportunities for exploitation of economies of scale and scope 
advantages in these American and German industries than in the British, where the 
railroad system was smaller and more compact, thus less demanding of inputs from these 
industries.  However, the historical assessment of the relative impact of the railroads on 
the iron and coal industries in such a capacity may however point to greater stimulation 
of the British iron and coal industries; a point that is bolstered further by the fact that on a 
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per square mile basis, Britain appeared to be the country poised to reap the greatest 
impact of the railroads on its economy, especially with regards to derived demand effects.  
If we want to measure the validity of the theory of the larger and more extensive a 
nation’s railroad system, the greater its need for capital inputs, why not cut to the chase, 
and look at capital inputs themselves?  
In Table 2.2 below, I delineate the total value of reproducible (physical) railway 
capital formation/expenditure as a flow variable for Great Britain, the United States, and 
Germany for every year from 1830-1914.  That is followed by Table 2.3 that delineates 
the same but as a stock variable for every five years from 1830 until 1914.   
 In looking at Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we must bear in mind that since the data are in 
current rather than constant prices, a precise comparison of the capital stock and flows at 
different dates cannot be made here.  Notwithstanding, in looking at Table 2.2 alone 
(flow), it appears that Britain experienced a brief, sharp spike in railway investment in the 
1840’s, followed by a relative lull in the 1850’s,  a bounce back in the 1860’s that tapered 
off a bit in the 1870’s, and then remained relatively constant throughout the remainder of 
the period surveyed.   
 The United States appears to have experienced a great initial thrust of railroad 
investment in the latter half of the 1830’s that subsided in the early 1840’s, but again 
picked up momentum in the late 1840’s that continued throughout the remainder of the 
period in question, during which United States achieved a sustained, steady level of great 
investment with the exception of a brief lull in the mid-1890’s.  Within this period of 
sustained growth, there was a particularly great thrust forward in the 1860’s and early 
1870’s; however the 1860’s data may not be entirely accurate because they are estimates 
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made due to a break in the availability of data for those years (see Note 8, Table 2.2 
below).   
 A high level of volatility of German investment can be observed in the figures of 
the 1850’s and 1860’s.  Some of these irregularities are due to the construction of the 
series, which involved piecing together data from different sources (see the derivation of 
the German estimates in Notes 12-13, Table 2.2 below). However, the primary reason for 
this volatility appears to be a great imbalance between land and non-land railways 
purchases, with land purchases frequently comprising a large, if not the lion’s share, of 
total capital expenditures.  Since the German railways were in their infancy, it is natural 
to expect to see land purchases comprising a greater share of expenditure than for later 
years when presumably most of the land had already been acquired, and was busy being 
filled up with railways.  However, for some reason, land purchases are more volatile for 
Germany than for Britain and the United States for these years, and produce a more 
highly variegated series for Germany for the 1850’s and 1860’s in particular.30   
 In order to provide a precise measure of these relative volatilities, a regression of 
the growth of the data for capital in Table 2.2 with respect to time has been performed for 
all three countries so that we can compare their residual variances.  In looking at the 
estimates for the variance of the residuals in the regression output in Table 2.4 below, we 
                                                 
30
 In 1857 for instance, the Hoffmann source listed zero new capital investment including land, so when the 
value of the land purchases from the Fremdling source was subtracted for that year, a negative figure for 
capital invested was the result.  There were other years in which the German railways lost land, either by 
selling it or perhaps having it expropriated by the government.  Regardless, this loss of land translated into 
a negative capital expenditure, which when subtracted from the stock of total capital invested including 
land in one year resulted in an addition to the capital stock that sometimes was quite large.   For example, 
the large figure for 1864, 290.09 million marks, was produced by subtracting the negative value of land 
loss for that year, -160.09 million marks, from the stock of total capital invested including land for that 
year, 130 million marks.  The stock of total capital invested including land figure for 1863, 250 million 
marks, was actually a lot greater than the 1864 figure, but since there was a large positive land gain 
expenditure for that year, 214.17 million marks, when that was subtracted from that total capital invested, it 
produced the low level of total investment for that year, 35.83 million marks. 
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see that German residual variance is by far the greatest, at 25,644.97.  American residual 
variance is the next largest at 17,271.09, and the least volatile is that of Britain at 32.11.  
Moreover, stationarity testing results of an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on these data 
from Table 2.2 (Table 2.5 below) indicate probability of stationarity of the data in reverse 
order, which would be what we might expect given the greater volatility of the German 
data.  In the case of Germany, with a probability of .7692, we would not reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity (has a unit root).  For the United States, with probability 
equal to .0989, it is difficult to say.  But in the case of Britain, with a probability of .0005, 
we would definitely reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity and assume these data 
are stationary.   
 However, this German volatility produced by an imbalance between land and 
non-land railways purchases appears to have diminished by the 1870’s, upon whose 
arrival land purchases never comprise a sufficiently large proportion of total capital 
investment to produce such dramatic ebbs and flows of total investment as Germany 
experienced in the 1850’s and 1860’s.  By the 1870’s, although experiencing minor dips 
in investment from time to time, Germany’s railways always seem to have been able to 
bounce back to an even higher level than before, and appear to have experienced a take-
off into sustained growth.  This can be shown in Table 2.4 with Germany having the 
highest coefficient for rapidity of growth of capital with respect to time, 5.574, followed 
closely by the United States’ coefficient of 5.518, and Britain, predictably the least, at 
.115. 
 The primary reason for the regression was to compare residual variances and to 
empirically verify the greater volatility of the German data Table 2.2 appears to contain 
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from visual inspection.  But these coefficients produced are a good secondary 
justification for the regression owing to their economic significance.  It is interesting to 
notice that they show rapidity of growth of capital with respect to time in reverse 
chronology of industrial development.  While the railroads were first developed and built 
in Britain, as it evolved they became more important for the industrial development of the 
United States and Germany.  Furthermore, as “catchers-up” in overall industrial 
development, the United States and Germany may have faced a more urgent task in 
developing, building and investing in their transportation infrastructure.  If so, these data 
definitely tend to support and verify these hypotheses.   
 The stationarity test was done as a procedural matter when using time series data.  
It has been done to check some conditions and characteristics of the data; primarily 
whether the mean and variance are constant over time.  If the data are constantly 
increasing over time, then the mean and variance are also changing which affects our 
regression results.  But our stationarity test results produced are also telling in their 
economic significance.  Firstly, they bolster and support the residual variances results 
computed from the regression in that they indicate probability of stationarity of the data 
in reverse order of their volatility, with the most non-stationary data being that of the 
United States and Germany, and the most stationary being that of Britain.  A more 
volatile data series is more likely to have a more volatile mean and variance, which this 
test confirms.  Furthermore, our results confirm the greater rapidity of growth of capital 
with respect to time in the United States and Germany as it appears from visual 
inspection of the data, and also in the coefficients.  Predictably, the more rapidly-
increasing German and American capital growth have greater probability of non-
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stationarity.  In data that are constantly increasing over time, as it appears the American 
and German data do, it is more likely that the mean and variance are changing, thus the 
data are non-stationary.  Predictably, the American and German data, with their greater 
rate of capital accumulation, have a more variant mean and variance, as this is displayed 
not only by their greater coefficients, but by their unit root tests indicating greater 
probability of non-stationarity than the British data.  
 In looking at Table 2.3 alone (stock), it appears that Britain’s capital stock grew at 
a relatively constant rate throughout the period surveyed.  The United States’ railroads 
accumulated capital at a modest rate until the 1850’s, after which they grew by leaps and 
bounds, not leveling off until the 1870’s, and then made one more large jump between 
1905 and 1910.  Germany seems to have made a great “catching-up” attempt from the 
start of its railway system, all the way up to the 1870’s.  After that, it accumulated capital 
steadily but more modestly, until the early 20th century, during which more rapid capital 
accumulation appears to have occurred, which continued up until the end of the period in 
question.  
 The patterns of growth seen in both the stock and flow capital data support the 
general contention of more rapid capital growth and accumulation in Germany and the 
United States with respect to Britain, particularly from the middle of the century until the 
1870’s; the period coincident with the early industrialization of the United States and 
Germany until the time at which Chandler believed the effects of the railroad on size and 
structure began to have their major impact.  Sharp spikes in the stock capital data, and 
high rates of inflow of capital for the United States and Germany as compared with 
steady but more modest rates for Britain at that time do not induce us to make any new 
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deductions that input demand effects affected the industrial development of the three 
countries in any significantly different way than Chandler believed market expansion did, 
or was revealed in the mileage data contained in Table 2.1.  So they do not contradict, 
and buttress in fact, Chandler’s idea that because the railroads were more important 
during the initial industrializations of the United States and Germany, they had a greater 
impact upon not only financial intermediation and market enlargement but also derived 
demand effects upon railroad-input-producing industries.   
 Since the data of Table 2.3 tend to move in the same direction within the same 
time phases as railroad mileage for all three countries, it does not appear that input 
demand affects impacted in a markedly different trajectory than market expansion affects.  
The data show the same expected ranking of magnitude of these effects by country as 
mileage do: the United States first, Germany second, and Britain third.  Furthermore, 
since the data show that for all 3 countries, the 1850's-70's are the period in which the 
greatest amount of investment in railroads occurred, there is nothing here to contradict 
the notion that the benchmark time period to begin to look for evidence of these derived 
demand effects was any different than the time at which Chandler believed that 
economies of scale and scope effects related to market expansion effects were felt, which 
was by about 1870.   
 The data also do not contradict the Fogel/Fishlow argument that derived demand 
effects from the railroads on American industry were weak in the ante-bellum era as 
opposed to the post-bellum era because they show that for the United States, the greatest 
amount of physical capital was invested in the railroads in the 1860's and 1870's—not 
only for the United States, but for Britain and Germany as well.  Consequently, it ought 
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not be at least until then that we begin to look for significant traces of expansionary 
effects on these industries in association with their role as suppliers of inputs to the 
railroads. 
 However, when one considers the sharp spikes in the British flow data in the 
1840’s and 1860’s in combination with what we already know about the strong 
dependence of its railroad system on coal, and the strong dependence of its own, the 
American, and Continental railroad systems on its iron industry; not to mention its far 
greater railroad mileage per square mile of national territory, the railroads may have had 
a far greater impact on the British industrial development at mid-century than Chandler 
gave them credit for.  The immense capital accumulation of the American and German 
railroad systems at mid-century may have been greatly assisted by Britain, as Chandler 
(and Fishlow and Fogel with respect to the United States) maintained that the American 
and German railroads did not become huge eaters of domestically-produced physical 
goods until the American post-bellum era.  Then again, we must bear in mind that we are 
dealing with nations of very different areas.  In the case of Britain, it was perhaps an 
easier feat to blanket such a small area with railroads, thus this was not as demanding on 
its other industrial sectors.  So giving Chandler his due, there is perhaps some wisdom to 
his statement that because of Britain’s smaller geographical area, the construction, 
financing, and management of its railroads created fewer challenges than in the United 
States or Germany.31 
 Furthermore, there is nothing here that makes us think that input demand effects 
may have impacted the different countries in a different magnitude than that which the 
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mileage data indicated.  It can be seen from Table 2.3 that just as in Table 2.1, Britain 
starts off as the leader in the very early days of the railroads, but by the 1850's is 
overtaken by the United States, and by the 1870's by Germany.  Just as Table 2.1 
displayed, Table 2.3 shows Britain as having experienced its last hump of great railroad 
investment in the 1860's, by which time its railroad system was essentially complete, and 
railroad investment for it as having leveled off to lower-averaging levels from the 1880's 
on.  From the 1880's on, there is still great investment in railroads going on in the United 
States, corresponding to the still rapid growth of its railroad network, whereas German 
investment in railroads slows down to British levels by this time, as Table 2.1 showed via 
the lessened rapidity of German mileage growth after that date.   
 There is one small glitch in this in that from the 1850's to the mid-60's, Germany 
does not have a significant lead over Britain in these regards, and Germany and Britain 
are actually about tied for last place.  But as was discussed and resolved in the Table 2.1 
analysis above, this doesn’t blow a hole in the theory.  It was recognized above that 
Germany did not overtake Britain in mileage until the 1870's, but this fact does not 
obviate the possibility of significant strides having been achieved over the course of the 
1850's and 1860's that could have led to the more concentrated and integrated industrial 
structure that Chandler believes had emerged in Germany by last quarter of the century.  
Greater capital market augmentation as achieved through greater reliance on outside 
capital for the construction of their system is one such potential pivotal catalyst. 
Whatever activities the German railroads were engaged in over this time, they had to 
have been doing something right, because some time around the 2nd half of the 1860's 
they began to invest a lot more than Britain, and by the mid-70's had overtaken Britain in 
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mileage completed.  The dramatic upsurge over Britain experienced by Germany by the 
late 1860's  (the cusp of the advent of the large industrial corporation), that continued on 
throughout the 1870's, comes in time to rescue the theory that by the 1870's, forces were 
operating in the German railroads that could have been propelling wide scale investment 
and financial intermediation in the business of railroads (thus economies of scale and 
scope in industry) in ways in which they were less likely to, or had ceased to have 
operated in Britain; if in fact they ever had.   At least the data do not show Germany as 
having invested less in its railroads over this period, which would be a surprising and 
discouraging result in terms of explaining its rapid railroadization that occurred over the 
1870's, and concomitant industrial growth experienced from that point on.  
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize the previous section, and in wrapping up this chapter in general, our 
comparison of the development and growth of the American, British and German railroad 
networks yields mixed results in terms of support for Chandler’s claim that the British 
industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily impacted by the 
railroads than that of the American and German, and in terms of the nature and extent of 
its implicit hypothesis of a correlation between the railroads and economies of scale and 
scope.  Our initial analysis that examined the relationship between timing of effects of the 
railroads on the industrial development of these countries and data pertaining to the 
development of the railroads themselves showed no inconsistency between the initial 
industrializations of the United States and Germany and the rapid development of their 
railroad systems that Chandler claimed gave them such a great advantage in expanding 
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the markets necessary for the development of other large scale industry later on.  For both 
the United States and Germany, the mileage data contained in Table 2.1 show a rapid 
expansion in their railroad networks as having occurred at mid-century, a period can be 
roughly designated as a take-off period of growth of large-scale industrial enterprise for 
both nations.  While Germany’s most rapid growth of its railroad system does not occur 
until slightly later, the 1870’s, it has been here revealed that this railroad growth is not 
too far off the mark from what can be termed Germany’s “early industrialization” period 
in that it merely buttressed an earlier stage of growth of Germany’s railroad system, and 
is coincident with what one might call a “second stage” of its early industrialization in 
which the effects of rapid railroadization upon its economy that may have been 
coincident with, or resultant from that earlier railroadization were realized. 
 In general, our comparison of mileage phases data for the three countries 
essentially does correspond to and support Chandler’s claims that a greater expansion of 
the railroad systems of the United States and Germany at mid-century and a resultant 
vastness thereof with respect to Britain by the 1870’s occurred, and could have been be a 
factor contributing to a more concentrated industrial sector that was intensive in the new 
science-based technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution, and that these forces 
were set in motion by the 1870’s.  While German mileage data indicate that it was a late 
bloomer compared to the United States in not overtaking Britain in mileage completed 
until the 1870’s, the rapidity of growth of and investment in its railroads in the 
immediately preceding decades, combined with the unification of the German Empire 
and its railroad system by 1870 suggest that while the date at which to look for 
economies of scale and scope effects in association with the railroads in Germany may be 
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slightly later than for the United States—perhaps the 1880’s rather than the 1870’s—this 
is not so far later in history that it calls for a radical forward shifting of the dates to look 
for empirical evidence of economies of scale and scope in association with the German 
railroads.  1870 is a reasonable enough benchmark date for which to anticipate these 
economies of scale and scope effects of the railroads in Germany, as it is in the United 
States.  The mileage phases of growth of these countries’ railroad systems also support 
the idea that this lagged effect of the great German and American expansion at mid-
century precipitated a wave of industrial growth centered around the new technologies by 
the end of the century, in contrast to the experience of Britain, where less rapid growth in 
railroads at mid-century seemingly was a detriment to the development and growth of the 
more modern sectors by the end of the 19th century.   
 In making use of our cross-country data tables for investigation of the relative 
magnitude of derived demand effects of the railroads on manufacturing industries across 
the three countries (or existence thereof), it was found that the greater physical expansion 
of the railroads in the United States and Germany would, on the surface, support the 
contention that these countries would have a greater proportion of the output of their 
railroad-input-producing industries actually ending up in the production of the railroads, 
thus greater demand-side stimulus emanating from the railroads themselves, and this 
could have been a factor abetting economies of scale and scope in those countries and 
contributing to their technological leapfrog over Britain in the late 19th century.   
 However, in looking at the railroad mileage per square mile of national territory 
data of Table 2.1, the topsy-turvy ranking order of Britain first, Germany second, the 
United States third raises the possibility that insofar as derived demand effects are 
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concerned, Britain may have received a significant boost from the railroads in its 
manufacturing industries earlier on in a way that the United States and Germany did not 
experience until long after their initial industrializations.  This factor that weakens the 
empirical validity of Chandler’s hypothesis, for it points to a later effect of the railroads 
on American and German industrial development in accounting for their leapfrog over 
Britain at the end of the century, and points to an earlier effect of the railroads on British 
industrial development that ought to have had a similar impact upon scale and 
concentration in British industry that Chandler maintains market expansion and financial 
augmentation effects from the railroads had on American and German industry.  
Empirical evidence that the American railroads did not consume a great amount of the 
outputs of its domestic burgeoning manufacturing industries until the late nineteenth 
century produced by scholars of the growth of the American railroad system such as 
Fishlow and Fogel, and further research provided by scholars of the growth of the British 
railroad system such as Bagwell and Hawke showing that it was Britain that provided the 
American and Continental railroad systems with much of their iron, and that the British 
railroads used coal far more extensively than the American railroads, which when viewed 
in combination with this more concentrated omnipresence of the railroads in Britain, 
serve to support this contention of stronger derived demand effects of the railroads in 
British industry at mid-century than in American and German industry.  However, the 
growth of the American and German railroad systems at mid-century was still more rapid 
than that of Britain.   
 In comparing and interpreting rates of physical capital accumulation of the three 
countries, both the flow and stock capital data charts (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively) 
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show more rapid capital growth and accumulation in the German and American railroad 
systems than in Britain, particularly from the middle of the century until the 1870’s; the 
period coincident with the early industrialization of the United States and Germany until 
the time at which Chandler believed the effects of the railroads on size and structure of 
industry began to have their major impact.  However, in light of the sharp spikes in the 
British capital flow data in the 1840’s and 1860’s, in combination with what we already 
know about the strong dependence of its railroad system on coal, the strong dependence 
of its own, the American, and Continental railroad systems on its iron industry; not to 
mention its far greater railroad mileage per square mile of national territory, we are still 
left with an indicator of the possibility that the railroads may have had a far greater 
impact on the British industrial development at mid-century than Chandler gave them 
credit for.  Also noteworthy is the fact that Britain’s rates of capital investment are on par 
with those of Germany all the way up until the mid-1860’s.  However, the dramatic 
upsurge over Britain experienced by Germany by the late 1860’s that continued on 
throughout the 1870's comes in time to rescue the theory that by the 1870's, forces were 
operating in the German railroads that could have been propelling wide scale investment 
and financial intermediation in the business of railroads that had a greater stimulus on 
German industry than the British.  Again, we must take heed not to put an exaggerated 
emphasis on the omnipresence of the railroads in Britain because it was probably an 
easier feat to blanket Britain’s smaller area with railroads, thus this was not as demanding 
on its other industrial sectors.   
 In the following chapter, we take a closer look at the impact of the railroads on 
financial intermediation in the three countries, and the role of financial intermediaries in 
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the evolution of large-scale industrial enterprise.  It will be revealed that the impact of the 
railroads on the financial super-structure of the three nations is not as different as 
imagined by Chandler, and that a reassessment of the Chandler hypothesis as it concerns 
























Table 2.1—Railway mileage for Great Britain (UK), the United States (US), and Germany (GR), every five years, 1830-1914. 
 
 
 Total Railway Mileage Total Area of Territory (Square 
Miles) 
Railway Mileage per Thousand 
Square Miles of National Territory 
Year UK US GR UK US GR UK US GR 
1830 97 23 -- 122,313 1,749,462 208,780 0.79 0.01 -- 
1835 338 1,098 4 122,313 1,749,462 208,780 2.76 0.63 0.02 
1840 1,497 2,818 291 122,313 1,749,462 208,780 12.24 1.61 1.39 
1845 2,530 4,633 1,332 122,313 1,749,462 208,780 20.68 2.65 6.38 
1850 6,084 9,021 3,640 89,715 2,940,042 208,780 67.81 3.07 17.44 
1855 7,293 18,374 4,864 89,715 2,940,042 208,780 81.29 6.25 23.30 
1860 9,069 30,626 6,892 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 101.09 10.31 33.01 
1865 11,451 35,085 8,639 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 127.64 11.81 41.38 
1870 13,562 52,922 11,732 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 151.17 17.82 56.19 
1875 14,510 74,096 17,383 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 161.73 24.95 83.26 
1880 15,563 93,262 21,030 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 173.47 31.41 100.73 
1885 16,594 128,320 23,351 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 184.96 43.21 111.85 
1890 17,281 156,404 26,643 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 192.62 52.67 127.61 
1895 18,001 177,746 28,900 89,715 2,969,640 208,780 200.65 59.85 138.42 
1900 18,680 192,556 32,118 89,715 2,969,834 208,780 208.21 64.84 153.84 
1905 19,535 216,974 35,264 89,715 2,969,834 208,780 217.75 73.06 168.91 
1910 19,986 240,831 38,042 89,715 2,969,565 208,780 222.77 81.10 182.21 














All data pertain to miles of track open at the end of the year, and omit mileage of parallel 
lines.  Data for Railway Mileage per Thousand Square Miles of National Territory have 
been calculated by dividing the data for Total Railway Mileage by the data for Total Area 





1. British mileage data pre-1850 are from H. G. Lewin’s Early British Railways 
(London, 1925) found in B.R.  Mitchell and P. Deane’s Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1975), p. 225 and Peter Mathias’ The First 
Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914 (New York, 1969), 
p. 257. Figures are rounded.  Although it is not stated in the original source, 
comparison of these figures to other early data sources such as Parliamentary 
Session Papers, suggests that they include Ireland.  Complete data for years 
preceding 1850 excluding Ireland were not available.  
2. British mileage data from 1850 on are from Mitchell and Deane, pp. 225-27, and 
are also found in Mathias, p. 456.   
3. Mileage Data for Britain for 1914 are 1913 data.  Data from 1914-18 are not 
listed.  I am assuming that little new railway construction occurred due to the war, 
because 1919’s statistic, 20,309 miles, is little above the 1913 figure above.  A 
further note about the 1914 data is that statistics were collected on a new basis in 
1913, in which the properties of the Manchester Ship Canal Company were no 
longer included.    
4. British territory data are from B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane’s Abstract of British 
Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 11-13.   Data have been converted 
from acres.  British data pre-1850 are greater because they include Ireland in 
order to be consistent with the mileage data in Table 2.1.  British data from 1850 







5. American mileage data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), II, pp. 
727-31.  The data from 1890 on are from series Q 284-312 in the above volume, 
which are data compiled from the annual publications of the Interstate Commerce 
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Commission Statistics of Railways in the United States.  The data from before 
1890, found in series Q 321-28 in the above volume, are from the U.S. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Railway Statistics Before 1890, Statement No. 32151 
(mimeographed), 1932.  
6. American territory data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), I, pp. 8, 
428.  Data refer to land area only, excluding water area. Since the data are from 
United States Census Bureau reports that were done only on a decennial basis, 
data for the semi-decennial years, as well as for 1914, have been estimated by 






7. German mileage data are from Brian R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 
1750-1970 (New York, 1976), pp. 581-83.  All German data relate to mileage 
contained within the area of national territory within the 1914 boundaries of the 
German Empire. 
8. Since no, or very little, railways were in operation in Germany prior to 1835, 
there is no mileage listing for 1830.  
9. The German mileage data have been converted from kilometers to miles, and 
rounded.  
10. All German territory data relate to the area of national territory within the 1914 
boundaries of the German Empire. Data for 1914 are from editor J. Scott Keltie 
(with the assistance of M. Epstein)’s The Statesman’s Yearbook: A Statistical and 
Historical Annual of the States of the World, for the Year 1914, Macmillan and 




















Table 2.2—Gross reproducible (physical) railway capital formation/expenditure 
(total capital flow) for Great Britain (UK), the United States (US), and Germany 












1830 0.34 1.60 -- 
1831 0.58 3.40 -- 
1832 0.56 4.90 -- 
1833 0.63 5.60 -- 
1834 0.64 7.40 -- 
1835 1.06 8.80 -- 
1836 3.05 12.80 -- 
1837 4.28 15.60 -- 
1838 6.44 17.40 -- 
1839 8.64 17.70 -- 
1840 9.01 14.10 -- 
1841 7.01 11.50 24.90 
1842 5.26 8.60 39.10 
1843 3.64 6.50 44.70 
1844 3.86 8.20 61.10 
1845 7.94 10.0 130.60 
1846 19.34 16.60 166.90 
1847 30.34 27.30 136.50 
1848 24.85 37.40 117.60 
1849 17.70 36.70 79.70 
1850 10.63 36.10 74.0 
1851 8.61 50.90 85.10 
1852 8.24 66.40 68.70 
1853 9.20 93.40 10.05  
1854 11.23 110.70 185.43  
1855 10.98 74.20 85.25 
1856 9.47 77.0 111.0 
1857 10.18 84.20 -12.54  
1858 9.55 67.10 273.90  
1859 9.90 60.80 58.63  
1860 11.64 52.60 232.57  
1861 14.37 323.0 103.0 
1862 15.49 323.0 139.0 
1863 18.26 323.0 35.83  
1864 21.13 323.0 290.09  
1865 23.37 323.0 112.69  
1866 23.58 323.0 299.69  
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1867 18.88 323.0 47.60 
1868 15.27 323.0 255.0 
1869 13.61 323.0 238.07  
1870 14.31 380.0 401.0 
1871 16.82 420.0 230.78  
1872 18.42 379.0 705.76 
1873 21.42 262.0 531.21  
1874 23.67 148.0 525.47  
1875 25.37 105.0 491.71  
1876 17.73 104.0 610.55 
1877 15.80 117.0 367.29  
1878 14.18 114.0 98.20   
1879 11.70 125.0 533.06  
1880 11.54 282.0 163.07  
1881 13.84 440.0 68.41  
1882 13.72 398.0 235.58  
1883 15.24 283.0 186.35  
1884 17.38 199.0 109.85 
1885 13.93 150.0 67.23  
1886 11.42 206.0 53.52 
1887 10.45 275.0 84.81  
1888 10.39 251.0 181.48  
1889 11.22 227.0 267.11  
1890 13.15 231.0 241.36  
1891 15.55 237.0 189.98   
1892 15.23 407.0 105.33   
1893 13.61 433.0 120.99  
1894 13.62 190.0 85.58  
1895 14.45 69.0 192.01  
1896 15.46 48.0 190.0 
1897 16.95 48.0 298.61  
1898 19.03 82.0 304.04   
1899 20.72 175.0 304.84   
1900 21.14 205.0 418.02  
1901 19.93 186.0 255.27   
1902 18.07 200.0 261.93   
1903 19.34 217.0 353.88   
1904 18.89 250.0 307.0 
1905 17.33 329.0 396.39   
1906 17.20 474.0 541.74  
1907 14.77 570.0 621.64  
1908 10.88 575.0 464.19   
1909 9.45 626.0 563.24  
1910 8.77 714.0 469.30   
1911 9.29 653.0 455.76  
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1912 10.63 636.0 685.02  
1913 13.61 682.0 692.02  








Data represent flow statistics of additional gross capital investment made within the given 
year listed. 
 
GREAT BRITAIN  
 
1. British data are in million pounds.  Data from 1830-75 are from A.G. Kenwood, 
“Railway Investment in Britain, 1825-1875”, Economica, New Series, Vol. xxxii, 
No. 127 (Aug., 1965), p. 322.  Kenwood’s data summarize the total of 
expenditures on “reproducible” or “real” capital that go to make up the physical 
plant of a railway.  His annual investment figures relate solely to expenditures on 
the construction of lines (including engineering costs), on railway plant, on rolling 
stock, and on repairs and renewals of track and equipment.  Capital expenditures 
excluded from his investment figures are legal and parliamentary costs, 
compensation charges, way-leave rents, the cost of land, and interest payments 
where these were made out of capital.  Also excluded from his estimates are 
capital spent on projects not strictly speaking railway investment, including 
expenditures on ancillary industries such as dock construction, and the erection of 
staiths and coal drops, as well as money spent on steamships and the purchase of 
canals and tramways.   
2. These data are presumed to be in current prices, although this is not stated in the 
original source.  They are also assumed to be for Great Britain, excluding Ireland, 
although this too is not stated explicitly in the original source.  
3. British data from 1876-1914 are from B.R. Mitchell, “The Coming of the Railway 
and United Kingdom Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 
XXIV, No. 3 (Sep., 1964), pp. 335-36.  I have made these data consistent with the 
earlier data provided by Kenwood by taking Mitchell’s figures for Total Gross 
Capital Formation, which include expenditures on repairs and renewals, found in 
Col. 5 of the table in the above citation, and subtracting figures for capital 
expenditures on Ancillary Businesses and Land, found in Cols. 3 and 4 
respectively in the same table.   Thus a figure for Total Gross Capital Formation, 
which includes expenditures on repairs and renewals, as well as Permanent Way 
and Works, and Rolling Stock, found in Cols. 1 and 2 of the table, respectively, 
that is essentially consistent with the Kenwood estimates, has been constructed.  
These data are in current prices.  They are also assumed to be for Great Britain, 
excluding Ireland, although this too is not stated explicitly in the original source.  
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4. The 1914 data are net, not gross because figures of expenditure on repairs and 
renewals were not available in that year (see Mitchell, footnote, p. 336). 
 
UNITED STATES  
 
5. American data are in millions of current dollars.  Data from 1830-60 are from 
Albert Fishlow, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Antebellum 
Economy, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge, 1965), p. 399.  Gross capital 
formation is defined by Fishlow as all capital expenditure allocated to road 
construction and equipment, including replacement expenditures of equipment 
and way (rails and ties); basically all costs involved in railway construction (see p. 
383).  Although it is not stated explicitly in the text, it is implied that land costs 
are not included in these estimates, for as Fishlow states, “Although such outlay 
[land costs] is an expense to the individual road, to the economy as a whole it is 
only a transfer expenditure since the transaction involves no production,” and that 
counting land, therefore, “fall[s] outside the scope of an investment series.” (p. 
351).   
6. American data from 1870-1914 are from Melville Jack Ulmer, Capital in 
Transportation, Communication, and Public Utilities: Its Formation and 
Financing, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 1960), pp. 256-57.   The Ulmer 
series includes all expenditures (except those for land) charged to the capital 
account by the railroads.  It includes all direct expenditures for equipment and 
road and structures and also “general expenditures”—that is, expenses incurred 
incidental to actual purchase (p. 220). This latter category, which covers 
organization costs and such overhead items as taxes and legal expenses, was 
important only in the early days of the railroads, according to Ulmer, so its 
inclusion here ought not create a significant upward bias above the Kenwood data 
that overlap this period, or the Mitchell data if they exclude these data, or the 
comparative German data for the same period, if they exclude these kind of costs.  
7.  Although it is not stated explicitly in the description of the above series, it is 
implied that these data exclude expenditure on ancillary industries of the type 
described in the Kenwood data above, for in the description of the data on value 
of the stock of road and equipment for the same period, Ulmer states “Under this 
heading is embraced all physical property of the railroads used directly or 
indirectly for transportation.  Excluded is a small amount of physical property, 
such as hotels, not used for transportation” (p. 218) 
8. American data for 1861-69 are estimates based upon the difference between the 
total value of the capital stock of 1860 and 1870 (see derivation of data of total 
value of capital stock for 1865 in Note 6 of Table 2.3 below).  Since these 
estimates were constructed using data on the total value of capital stock that are 
based on net, not gross additions to the capital stock, they represent increases in 
the capital stock that are net of expenditures on repairs and replacement of worn-








9. German data from 1841-52 are from Rainer Fremdling, Eisenbahnen und 
deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum 1840-1879 (Dortmund: Gesellschaft fur 
Westfalische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1975), p. 32.  Data are in millions of current 
marks, and include purchases on land because land purchase values data for these 
earlier years were not available.   
10. For 1853 and on, German data are from Walther G. Hoffmann, F. Grumbach, and 
H. Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19.  
Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, 1965), Table 42, pp. 259-60, 
col. 5.  These data are in current prices, and in million marks.   
11. Data for Germany for 1914 are 1913 data.  Data from 1914-24 are not listed. 
12. Data from 1853 on have been modified from their original source by subtracting 
the value of land acquisition as a flow variable for those years derived from data 
found in Rainer Fremdling, Ruth Federspiel and Andrea Kunz (eds.), Statistik der 
Eisenbahnen Deutschlands 1835-1989, (Quellen und Forschungen zur 
historischen Statistik von Deutschland, vol. 17), (St. Katharinen: Scripta 
Mercaturae Verlag 1995), pp. 512-13.   
13. Land acquisition flow data were derived from the stock data in the above Statistik 
der Eisenbahnen source by converting the figure of every year to the prices of a 
single base year (1913) using the German wholesale price indices found in B.R. 
Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993, 4th ed.,  Stockton 
Press (New York, 1998), pp. 856-58.  The difference between the figure of every 
year and the preceding year was then converted back into the prices of the year in 
question, and subtracted from the above Hoffmann data to arrive at the figures 
listed above.   
14. The stock values of land acquisition for 1878-79, from which the flow values for 
1878-80 were estimated, were made using the stock value of land acquisition for 






















Table 2.3—Total value of reproducible (physical) railway capital 
formation/expenditure (total capital stock) for Great Britain (UK), the United States 
(US), and Germany (GR) listed in pounds, dollars, and marks, respectively, for 












1830 1.4  2.6       -- 
1835 5.0  31.5  -- 
1840 36.5  103.2  58.8 
1845 55.3  135.8  281.5 
1850 145.0  244.8  825.4 
1855 228.8  625.3  1,766.0 
1860 250.2  880.0 2,119.0 
1865 315.5  2,495.0 2,731.0 
1870 339.9  3,829.0 4,116.0 
1875 395.5  4,630.0 7,041.0 
1880 371.5  4,494.0 6,918.0 
1885 361.5  5,354.0 7,273.0 
1890 365.5  5,955.0 9,758.0 
1895 329.9  6,104.0 8,863.0 
1900 472.1  6,944.0 14,182.0 
1905 476.0  7,940.0 14,399.0 
1910 518.5  11,265.0 17,648.0 








Net, rather than gross capital formation has been used for this series construction (in 
general, where available) because net, as defined by Ulmer in  the source cited above on 
p. 224, is gross less capital consumed—capital which is “used up” either through 
depreciation or obsolescence.  Since this part of expenditure does not add to the total 
physical capital stock of the railroads, but merely replaces worn-out capital, it has been 
excluded from Ulmer’s estimates of additions to the total value of road and equipment 
occurring in each year (see pp. 256-57).  To make my calculations of value based on all 
other data series consistent with Ulmer’s data, the same methodology has been applied to 




GREAT BRITAIN  
 
1. British data are in millions of current pounds.  They were compiled from various 
sources, adjusted to prices of a single year, cumulated over the period, and then 
re-adjusted to own year prices in order to obtain the series shown here.  Data from 
1825 (the first year of railroad construction in Britain) to 1875 are from the same 
Kenwood source cited above.  Data from 1876-1912 are from Harold Pollins, 
Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, Rowman and Littlefield, (Totowa, N.J., 
1971), pp. 112-13.  The Pollins data were used rather than the Mitchell data 
because they were delineated in both current prices and in prices of a single year, 
which facilitated easier accumulation.  These data are assumed to be for Great 
Britain, excluding Ireland, although this is not stated explicitly in the original 
source.  Data from 1913-14 are from the B.R. Mitchell article, “The Coming of 
the Railway and United Kingdom Economic Growth” cited above, p. 336. 
2. The series was constructed by taking the Kenwood and Mitchell data cited above 
and converting them to 1869 pounds using the Rousseaux Price Index for 
Principal Industrial Products for 1800-1913 found in B.R.  Mitchell’s British 
Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 722-24.  These data were, in turn, 
cumulated with the Pollins data, already in 1869 prices, and then re-adjusted back 
to own year prices using the Rousseaux index again. For convenience, the price 
deflator for 1913 has been used to convert 1914 data to 1869 data, and vice versa.   
3. All the data used to construct the British series are net, except for those of 1913, 
from the Mitchell series cited above, which include expenditures on repairs and 
renewals.  The 1914 data, while also from the Mitchell series, are still net because 
figures of expenditure on repairs and renewals were not available in that year (see 
footnote, p. 336). 
 
 
UNITED STATES  
 
4. American data are in millions of current dollars.  Data from 1830-60 are from the 
same Fishlow cite as above.  They have been computed by adding the figure for 
net capital formation in 1860 dollars for the first year of railroad construction in 
the United States, 1828, to the next year’s figure, thus obtaining the total capital 
stock for each year up to 1860 in 1860 dollars, and deflating each of those figures 
by the composite index provided in column 2 of the table on p. 399 cited above to 
obtain the total capital stock value for each year in its own year prices.   
5. American data from 1870-1914 are from the same Ulmer source cited above.  The 
data listed for each year corresponds to the data of the following year listed in 
column 1 of Ulmer’s table (i.e., 1870 on my table is 1871 data on Ulmer’s).  That 
is because Ulmer’s table lists the value of road and equipment on January 1st of 
each year—before the capital additions for that year have occurred.  Therefore, in 
order to obtain the value of capital for, say, 1870, that includes the value of capital 
additions made through that year, 1871 data must be used.   
6. Data for 1865 have been estimated by taking the difference between the capital 
stock at the end of 1860, $880 million, and at the beginning of 1870, $3,787 
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million, which equals $2,907 million, dividing that figure by 9, representing the 
nine annual periods between the beginning of 1861 and the end of 1869, to obtain 
an average annual net capital stock addition of $323 million.  That figure was 
multiplied by 5, representing the 5 annual investment periods encompassed by 
1861-65, obtaining $1,615 million.  This figure was added to the total capital 
stock of 1860, $880 million, to obtain the estimate for total capital stock of 1865 
listed above, $2,495 million.   
7. The great disparity between the 1860 figure of $880 million and the 1870 figure 
of $3,829 million, both listed in current prices, probably  indicates a great deal of 
inflation as having occurred over this period due to the American Civil War.  
However, since the figure for 1865 represents an average of capital increase that 
occurred between 1860 and 1870 using the current prices of both periods, the 
effects of the inflation that occurred in that period are probably well taken into 
account, and this figure may thus be a reasonably good estimate of the value of 




8. German data are in million marks.  For years before 1855, they are from R. H. 
Tilly, “Capital Formation in Germany in the Nineteenth Century”, Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe, VII (1978), p. 417.  These data are presumed to be 
in current prices, although this is not stated explicitly in the original source.  They 
are also assumed to represent cumulative capital formation, due to the steepness 
in jumps in between each five-year period, although this too, is not stated 
explicitly in the original source.  Due to this factor, and to the unavailability of 
any earlier data for German railroad capital, these data have been used instead of 
an aggregation of the Fremdling data.  Since the Fremdling data are only flow 
data, they provide us with no indication of the cumulative capital formation as it 
existed in 1841 or earlier. 
9. For 1855 and on, German data are from Walther G. Hoffmann, F. Grumbach, and 
H. Hesse, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19.  
Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York, 1965), Table 40, pp. 255-56, 
col. 5.  These data are in current prices.  These data were delineated in a separate 
table from the flow data from this source that were used in Table 2.2. 
10. German data from before 1850 include the value of total land acquisition because 
data for land acquisition for earlier years were not available.  Data from 1850 on 
have been modified from its original source by subtracting the value of land 
acquisition for those years found in Rainer Fremdling, Ruth Federspiel and 
Andrea Kunz (eds.), Statistik der Eisenbahnen Deutschlands 1835-1989, (Quellen 
und Forschungen zur historischen Statistik von Deutschland, vol. 17), (St. 
Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag 1995), pp. 512-13.  These data are 
assumed to be in millions of current marks, although this is not stated in the 
original source. The figure from 1850 was estimated by using the data on land 
acquisition from 1852 from the above source; data for 1850 were not listed.   







Table 2.4—Summary Output of  Regression Analysis of Gross reproducible 
(physical) railway capital formation/expenditure (total capital flow) with respect to 
year for Great Britain (UK), the United States (US), and Germany (GR), 1830-1914. 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT FOR UK  
    
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.450560917   
R Square 0.20300514   
Adjusted R 
Square 0.193402792   
Standard Error 5.666940761   
Observations 85   
    
ANOVA    
  df SS MS 
Regression 1 678.9330511 678.9330511 
Residual 83 2665.48006 32.11421758 
Total 84 3344.413111   
    
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept -202.485794 46.90121658 -4.317282339 





OUTPUT FOR US   
    
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.72171258   
R Square 0.52086904   
Adjusted R Square 0.51509638   
Standard Error 131.419517   
Observations 85   
    
ANOVA    
  df SS MS 
Regression 1 1558375.589 1558375.589 
Residual 83 1433500.419 17271.08938 
Total 84 2991876.008   
    
  
67
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept -10124.694 1087.66537 -9.308648113 




OUTPUT For GR   
    
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.601933467   
R Square 0.362323899   
Adjusted R 
Square 0.353467287   
Standard Error 160.1404766   
Observations 74   
    
ANOVA    
  df SS MS 
Regression 1 1049135.471 1049135.471 
Residual 72 1846438.001 25644.97223 
Total 73 2895573.471   
    
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept -10212.41638 1636.409031 -6.240747992 





















Table 2.5—Summary Output of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity of 
data for Gross reproducible (physical) railway capital formation/expenditure (total 




Null Hypothesis: UK has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.437774  0.0005 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.511262  
 5% level  -2.896779  
 10% level  -2.585626  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: US has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.591154  0.0989 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.511262  
 5% level  -2.896779  
 10% level  -2.585626  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: GR has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=11) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.942116  0.7692 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.524233  
 5% level  -2.902358  
 10% level  -2.588587  
     
     









Continuing our analysis of the nature and extent of the correlation between the railroads 
and the more concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization that had evolved 
in the United States, Germany, and purportedly to a lesser extent in Britain by the late 
19th century, we now begin to take a closer look at the role of financial intermediaries in 
that evolution, and provide a similar critical assessment of the Chandler hypothesis that 
the British industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily 
impacted by the railroads due to a lesser impact of  its railroads on financial 
intermediation.  In our task of measuring the degree of correlation between the railroads 
and greater concentration and scale of industry that was achieved through the 
strengthening of financial intermediation, we conduct a similar analysis that attempts to 
juxtapose the timing of effects of the railroads on the industrial development of these 
countries with data concerning the financing of the railroads themselves.  This 
methodology is therefore a continuation of the pattern of the analysis of the railroads’ 
market-expanding properties and input demand effects of the previous chapter that 
juxtaposed the timing of effects of the railroads on the industrial development of these 
countries with data concerning mileage and physical capital invested in the railroads.  In 
so doing, we were able to evaluate the degree of the correlation between the railroads and 
greater concentration and scale of industry achieved through the railroads’ market-
expanding properties and input demand effects.  Here we do the same, but with respect to 
the organizational impact achieved through the railroads’ impact upon financial 
intermediation; and using financial, not physical capital data.  But we will first begin with 
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a literature overview that critically examines Chandler’s not-well-documented assertions 
regarding the differing means of financing of the British, American and German 
railroads, to be followed by the theoretical framework of our empirical analysis and a 
summary of its results.   
 
 
I.  CHANDLER ON THE EFFECTS OF THE RAILROADS ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS IN BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND GERMANY: 
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION? 
 
To briefly recapitulate and expound upon the principles earlier discussed, Chandler 
maintained that because the American and German initial industrializations occurred in 
tandem with the building of their railroads, the organizational and structural revolutions 
associated with the railroads were firmer in the saddle at mid-century than in Britain, 
where a smaller scale mode of industrial organization based on individual 
proprietorships, partnerships, and family-owned firms that had sufficed for the earlier 
production technologies of the First Industrial Revolution continued to prevail on into the 
latter part of the 19th century.  Owing to the fact that Britain had an extensive transport 
system consisting of canals, coastal shipping, and wagon trails intact prior to the railroad, 
the railroad as a means of goods transport assumed a lesser degree of importance for 
Britain than for these later industrializers who, lacking such extensive pre-railroad 
transport systems, naturally constructed theirs in the most up-to-date manner, and 
consequently, by the mid-century, possessed much more railroad-intensive goods 
transport systems than Britain.  Due in part to this later industrialization, and also due to 
their greater geographic size and population, the American and German railroads systems 
became far more extensive than the British railroad system.  The importance of the 
  
71
railroads to the American case of linking up newly-settled frontier areas in the west with 
the established commercial centers of the east across wide-open spaces is obvious.  In the 
German case, greater land area combined with lesser sea access (a nearly land-locked 
country) may have also been a factor contributing to the omnipresence of the railroads 
there, as opposed to in Britain, where coastal shipping may have remained a viable option 
concurrently with the railroads.  
 The tremendous capital needs of the construction of these railroads greatly 
stimulated financial intermediation in the United States and Germany, as their 
construction called for funds way beyond the recourse of a lone entrepreneur.  While the 
British railroads also bore these characteristics, due to their smaller and more compact 
nature, they were able to be financed more internally than their American and German 
counterparts, according to Chandler.  In the United States and Germany, the construction 
and continued operation of the railroads called for an incorporated joint stock form of 
enterprise in which significant sums of outside capital had to be obtained in exchange for 
share ownership.  A more modern form of industrial organization, it is said, evolved in 
the United States and Germany this way, characterized by large firms of these types in 
which the managers were not the owners.  Instead, the owners were shareholders 
scattered around the country, and funds were raised by large investment banks whose 
business grew as more of this type of enterprise evolved.   
 Chandler calls this type of enterprise “managerial” capitalism, and credits the 
railroad greatly with providing the impetus towards its creation.  As a result of the 
railroads, the business of investment banking grew, and these banks became well versed 
in the practice of funneling capital out to fledgling other types of large, capital-intensive 
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industry.  These banks grew, branched out, and diversified, and before long, the United 
States and Germany were poised with all of the requisite tools and apparatus for the 
building and maintenance of other large-scale, capital intensive industry, including the 
necessary financial mechanisms, and thus the stage was set for their subsequent rapid 
industrialization based on the modern production technologies. 
 In Britain on the other hand, the smaller and more compact railroad system that 
evolved did not require such huge quantities of outside capital as the German and 
American railroads, and was therefore capable of being financed by more traditional, 
local mechanisms.  Consequently, the dramatic reorganization of industrial structure that 
was required for the construction and continued operation of the American and German 
railroads, and concomitant huge role for investment banking in funneling huge quantities 
of outside capital for the construction, maintenance, and basic operation of the railroads, 
did not occur in Britain, or at least not to as great an extent as it did in the United States 
and Germany.  In Britain, the smaller scale mode of industrial organization based on 
individual proprietorships, partnerships, and family-owned firms that had sufficed for the 
earlier production technologies of the First Industrial Revolution remained largely intact.  
Furthermore, the large financial institutions specializing in the channeling of large sums 
of outside capital that were necessary in order to create enterprise of the mammoth 
corporate variety also did not evolve to the extent that they did in the United States and 
Germany.  Consequently, later on in the era of the 2nd industrial revolution when the 
industrial landscape began to be changed by the modern, science-based industries of the 
“Second Industrial Revolution”, in which efficiency and competitiveness called for 
enterprise of the mammoth corporate variety capable of exploiting their vast potential for 
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economies of scale and scope, British industrial development was hamstrung.  It was 
hamstrung firstly by an industrial structure consisting of individual proprietorships, 
partnerships, and family-owned firms that was ill-suited, in fact, incapable of reaching 
the threshold scale for efficiency in the modern sectors, and secondly by lack of 
appropriate financial intermediation facilities that would be “up to the task” of providing 
the capital necessary for such a reorganization of industry even if the will, desire and 
ability to modify the prevailing mode of industrial organization was present.1 
 Chandler’s assertion that because the British railroads were smaller scale, and 
more internally-financed, their construction did not have as great an impact on 
investment banking as the American and German railroads needs to be empirically 
validated.  In order to draw these conclusions, Chandler referred to various sources 
dealing with the financing of the early British, American and German railroads (including 
his own previous work), and came to separate conclusions for each regarding the degree 
to which its early railroad companies relied on outside capital, and experienced 
concomitant financial augmentation.  He inferred from these sources that the British 
railroads were much more locally-financed than their American and German 
counterparts, and that consequently, Britain did not receive as much financial 
augmentation in connection with the railroads.  He asserted this as fact in Scale and 
Scope, but never produced any concrete empirical evidence, or cited any studies that 
demonstrated that this is, in fact the case.   
 An examination of the literature that Chandler cites, as well as other sources 
dealing with the financing of the British, the American and German railroads, reveals 
some crucial insight into the difference between the way the British railroads were 
                                                 
1
 Scale and Scope, pp. 54-58, 252-55, 397, 411-19.  
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financed vs. their American and German counterparts.  From this literature, it is not at all 
certain that the British railroads were less externally-financed than their American and 
German counterparts, and nor is it demonstrated that Britain received significantly less of 
an augmentation of its financial intermediation facilities in connection with the business 
of railroad finance.  From this literature, it appears that the British railroads were also 
heavily externally financed.  Moreover, Britain also experienced significant financial 
augmentation in connection with the railroads, but this augmentation was merely of a 
different character than that experienced by the American, just as that experienced by the 
American differed from that experienced by the German.   
 The following literature survey analyses Chandler’s key points on the differences 
between the impact of the railroads on capital markets of the three countries, his sources 
for these points, and additional key readings on the subject.  The literature surveyed 
below still does not contain any concrete empirical evidence, or cite any studies that can 
be used to compare the precise degree of outside financing of the railroads of these 
countries, or the precise degree of financial augmentation experienced by the three 
countries in connection with the business of railroad finance.  This points to the need for 
further empirical work in this area in order to determine if in fact it is the case that the 
American and German railroads were more heavily reliant upon outside capital in the 
construction of their railroad systems, and if this greater reliance on outside capital is 
associated in any way with greater growth of investment banking industry; some of 
which has been included in this study.  One fact that does emerge as fairly certain is that 
Britain did not appear to suffer from lack of adequate investment banking facilities at the 
end of the 19th century.  Why Britain failed to make the necessary investments in the 
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large-scale, science-based industries of the late 19th century, and its industrial sector grew 
less rapidly than that of the United States and Germany is difficult to pinpoint, but it does 
not appear to be due to lack of appropriate financial apparatus.  
 
 
II.  BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: CHANDLER VS. THE SCHOLARS 
 
Insofar as the impact of the railroads on American capital markets, a critical examination 
of Chandler’s Scale and Scope, and the sources he cites, does appear to indicate a great 
deal of outside financing of the early American railroads, and a great deal of financial 
augmentation in the United States in connection with this financing that was centered on 
New York.  However, these sources still do not contain any concrete empirical evidence, 
or cite any studies indicating the precise degree of outside financing of the American 
railroads, or the precise degree of financial augmentation experienced by the United 
States in connection with the business of railroad finance that can be held up to other 
countries for comparison.  Chandler states in Scale and Scope,  
 
Besides being the first business to be administered through extensive hierarchies and the first to compete in 
a modern oligopolistic manner, the railroads were the first enterprises to be funded by modern financial 
institutions.  The unprecedented capital requirements for constructing the American railroad network led to 
the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York City.  In volume of 
transactions, and complexity of operations the New York money market quickly became second to that of 
London.  From the 1850’s to the late 1890’s the institutions and instruments of finance on Wall Street were 
used almost exclusively to finance the railroads.  In fact, nearly all the instruments and techniques of 
modern finance in the United States were perfected in order to fund the construction of railroads and to 
facilitate their growth through merger and acquisition.  Before 1900 the great investment banks that were to 
play an important role in the financing of industrial mergers at the turn of the century and in the subsequent 
rationalization of facilities and personnel—such houses as J. P. Morgan; Kuhn, Loeb; Lee, Higginson; 
Kidder, Peabody; and Winslow, Lanier—concentrated on railroad finance.2  
 
It is implied in the above passage that because the railroads required such vast 
sums of outside capital, great investment banking houses came into being as a result of 
such activity, and these houses later came to play a great role in the later industrial 
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expansion experienced by the United States associated with the great merger movement 
of the late 19th century in which large scale enterprise in the United States came into full 
bloom, and the great scale and scope achievements of American industry were realized.  
 Chandler’s only source cited for the above statement is his own previous book, 
The Railroads: The Nation’s First Big Business (1965) 3, a collection of original sources 
and readings (mainly reprints from The American Railroad Journal) dealing with the 
early American railroads which he compiled, edited, and wrote prefaces and 
introductions to chapters and sections of.  The financing of the early railroads is mainly 
dealt with in Part II, “The Beginnings of Modern Corporate Finance”.4  In his 
introductory notes to this section, he merely cites some figures detailing the tremendous 
cost of the early railroads, with no sources cited.  He then proceeds to explain that due to 
the tremendous capital costs of constructing the railroads, local sources of capital 
(individuals living in a road’s termini or along its line who believed they had much to 
gain from its construction, or banks and stock exchanges situated in a road’s termini or 
along its line) were insufficient for the railroads’ construction, thus outside capital from 
distant sources was required.  This resulted in the centralizing and institutionalizing of the 
nation’s money and investment markets on Wall Street, and the rapid expansion of the 
New York Stock exchange after 1850 as securities of railroad corporations began to be 
listed and traded on its floor.5  Again, no sources provided.   
 Essentially, the “sources” of the above statements, it is implied, are the original 
articles presented in the following section of the book.  Yet none of these sources contain 
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figures that tell us the exact quantities of total railroad capital that was “outside”, or 
present any data that tell us the percentage that was outside vs. local.  It is merely 
composed of articles from contemporary observers concerning the different methods and 
instruments of financing, and describing ways of marketing railroad securities that were 
used by directors of various investment houses.   While the articles are interesting and 
informative insofar as they detail and recount the growth of a new form of industrial 
finance and provide a glimpse into the world of investment banking that was forming in 
New York at the time, and provide us with a portrait of the empire builders; men in the 
process of building their large powerful and profitable business empires, they are short on 
providing evidence of the magnitude of the quantity of capital such enterprise contributed 
to the railroads that we can use to hold up to a comparison to other countries such as 
Britain.  Nor do they provide us with a quantitative measure of the magnitude of growth 
of the money market that Wall Street experienced that Chandler claims is associated with 
the “centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York City”, 
and the tremendous “volume of transactions, and complexity of operations” the made 
New York money market second to that of London that were supposedly the consequence 
of this augmenting force of the new business of railroad securities transactions.  If the 
New York money market did grow to these great lengths, and it was railroad securities 
transactions that caused it, Chandler does not present the evidence that proves it.  None of 
the old articles contained herein from The American Railroad Journal contain it.  This 
book provides a nice chronicling of the flurry of activity on Wall Street in those days 
wrought by the likes of Morgan and Winslow, Lanier and the rest, but with no numbers to 
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really back up the claims he is making here that railroad security dealings are what were 
responsible for making the New York exchange what it became.   
 Later on in Scale and Scope, Chandler makes the contention that the British 
railroads were constructed using a greater proportion of local capital than the American, 
and that the activities of railroad finance had a greater augmenting effect on the New 
York capital market than on British capital markets.  Again, an inspection of both the 
American and British sources Chandler uses to support these contentions provides no 
data, or any links to sources containing an exact breakdown of how much capital used in 
the construction of the early American or British railroads was outside vs. local, or the 
exact percentage growth of the American or British capital markets that occurred as a 
consequence of railroad finance activity.  In comparing the impact of the railroad in 
Britain to that of the United States, Chandler explains  
 
Because Britain began to industrialize well before the coming of the railroad, the telegraph, the steamship, 
and then the cable, these innovations in transportation and communication had much less impact on 
industrial institutions there than in the United States, or in Germany.  Not only had Britain become an 
industrial urban economy before the building of the railroad network, but its much smaller geographical 
area had required a smaller, tighter network than did the United States.   Thus the construction, financing, 
and management of railroads created fewer challenges in Britain than they did in the United States. 6 
 
Later, in comparing the impact of the railroads in Britain to that of the United 
States, Chandler makes even more audacious claims concerning the difference between 
the means of finance of the American and British railroads, and the impact on capital 
markets it supposedly had.   
 
Nor did the coming of the railroads have so great an impact on capital markets in Britain as they did in the 
United States.  In industrial Britain, railroad promoters were able to rely more on local capital than could 
their American counterparts in the rural areas of the recently settled South and West.   When railwaymen 
did go to London, the world’s largest and most sophisticated money market, they had little difficulty in 
raising the funds needed.  True, the new demand for railroad capital did lead to the development of new 
financial instruments—preferred stock and debentures.  Industrialists would later use the same type of 
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nonvoting securities to meet their capital needs without losing control of their enterprises.  British 
stockbrokers, such as the partners in Foster & Braithwaite, Haseltine Powell, and Henry Cazenove, took 
their places on the railroad boards.  In no sense, however, did they acquire the influence, both formal and 
informal, that the New York investment bankers enjoyed in the affairs of American railroads at the turn of 
the century…In America the far greater capital requirements of the railroad network resulted in centralizing 
and institutionalizing the American capital market in New York, thus creating the second largest money 
market in the world.  In Britain the smaller requirements of a much smaller network only enlarged and 
refined somewhat the activities of what had long been the world’s largest financial center.7   
 
Several statements here require empirical validation.  Firstly, there is the 
contention that the British railroads were constructed using a greater proportion of local 
capital than the American, and secondly that the activities of railroad finance had a 
greater augmenting affect on the New York capital market than on the London.   
 Chandler’s sources for the above information consist of, for the American 
railroads, his own book, The Visible Hand (1977)8, and for the British, two books by T.R. 
Gourvish:  Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914 (1980)9 and Mark Huish and 
the London and North Western Railway: A Study of Management (1972).10 
 An inspection of the American sources in which Chandler cites himself provides 
no data, or any links to sources containing an exact breakdown of how much capital used 
in the construction of the early American railroads was outside vs. local, or the exact 
percentage growth of the American capital market that occurred as a consequence of 
railroad finance activity.  In The Visible Hand, Chandler states that no other enterprises 
required as large sums of outside capital as the railroads, but does not provide any cites to 
justify this claim.11  In The Visible Hand, we find merely a repetition of what Chandler 
states in Scale and Scope concerning the supposed centralizing and institutionalizing of 
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the American capital market on Wall Street as a result of railroad finance, and the 
massive amounts of outside capital the railroads required for their construction.  There 
are no cites for this information provided except for a footnote to one paragraph in which 
Chandler explains that railroad promoters seeking funds came increasingly to the New 
York capital market to obtain these funds.12  His cites for this statement are again works 
of his own, “Patterns of Railroad Finance, 1830-1850” (Business History Review, 1954) 
and Chapter Four of Henry Varnum Poor, Business Editor, Analyst and Reformer 
(1956).13  
 “Patterns of Railroad Finance” is mainly a summary of the triumph of New York 
over Philadelphia and Boston in becoming the nation’s financial center, and the role of 
railroad securities dealings in the process.  The article essentially chronicles the story of 
the early American railroads, and explains how, as these railroads spread  into the newly- 
and sparsely-settled lands of the south and west, they were unable to obtain the needed 
funds locally, and came to increasingly rely on the established financial centers of the 
Northeast for the necessary financing.  It was by acting in this capacity, Chandler 
explains, that by the 1850’s New York became established as the chief artery of the 
nation’s financial system.  The article discusses several railroads, where they got their 
funds, but contains no data summary of the total financial transactions incurred over this 
period that tells us the total quantity of outside capital employed by the railroads of the 
United States over this period.  The overall picture one receives from reading the article 
is that outside capital does begin to play a very important role in the funding of the 
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railroads, and there does seem to be the beginning of quite a flurry of activity in railroad 
securities on the Wall Street of the 1830’s-50’s, but as far as evidence you can hold up to 
the case of another country like Britain and prove that the American railroads were more 
heavily reliant on outside capital, the article comes up short.   
 Chapter Four of Henry Varnum Poor contains scarcely better empirical analysis 
of the capital composition of the early American railroads.  It is essentially a biography of 
Chandler’s great-grandfather that focuses on his career in business journalism as editor of 
the American Railroad Journal in the twelve years before the Civil War and the Manual 
of the Railroads of the United States in the postwar years.14  Chapter Four summarizes 
the manner in which Poor attempted to act as the railroads’ representative to Wall Street, 
by providing advice to railroad promoters on how to market their securities so as to 
attract wealthy investors, and also by promoting the railroads as sound investments in 
order to attract the necessary funds.  Little valuable insight as to the precise capital 
composition of the railroads is provided, other than the fact we know already: that due to 
the tremendous capital cost of the railroads, and the inadequacy of capital resources in the 
sparsely-settled southern and western regions of the country the railroads were making 
their way across, railway promoters had little recourse but to seek funding from the large 
established capital markets of the northeast, chiefly New York, Philadelphia and Boston.  
Poor’s mission was thus firmly cut out for him; he had to do the best job he could at 
representing the railroads as sound investments to the Eastern and foreign investors who 
purchased their securities through the large Northeastern markets, and do the best job he 
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could in his editorializing to provide sound advice to railroadmen on how to market their 
securities so as to make them attractive to these large investors.15 
 The chapter does not contain any facts or figures that can be used to determine the 
data we are seeking in this study, namely the precise composition of capital used in the 
railroads that could be considered “outside” at various dates that could be used to 
compare with the British or the German to see how heavily funded by outside capital the 
American railroads were as compared with the British or German railroads.  However, it 
does provide us some explanation as to why the market for railroad securities in the 
United States became concentrated in New York, and the New York market became the 
colossus it became.  As will be shown below, the main different contrast between the 
effect of the railroads on capital markets in Britain vs. that of the American is that in 
Britain, this growth in capital markets was initially dispersed across a variety of urban 
centers, with northern areas’ financial exchanges such as Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, 
Birmingham and Glasgow sharing in the profits and growth from railroad finance along 
with London.  While it is quite understandable that the American railroads would seek 
their capital from established centers in the East, why was it that Philadelphia and 
Boston, and perhaps other Eastern cities did not share in the growth that New York 
experienced?  Why was the American capital market growth concentrated in New York, 
and not also dispersed across pre-existing American industrial urban regions as in the 
British case?   
 Chandler summarizes the reasons why the New York market became the center of 
the railroad finance industry, and grew also to become the principal artery of industrial 
finance in the United States very succinctly in this chapter.  Chandler explains that, with 
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the exception of the early New England roads, the early American railroads were funded 
more by bonds than by stock, because investors at that time preferred the secured 
principal and guaranteed interest of bond issues.  Further, because middlemen were 
required to market these bonds to investors scattered overseas and in the few large 
American coastal cities, and the only men who had the expertise and connections 
necessary to market securities this way were those who operated in New York, 
Philadelphia and Boston, these became the principal markets for railroad securities.   
 Philadelphia in the 1830’s was originally the largest market for railroad securities 
due to a thriving business partnership selling railroad bonds to British mercantile houses 
that was spearheaded by the most active firm in that market, Thomas Biddle and 
Company.  However, when the depression precipitated by the financial crises of 1837 and 
1839 destroyed British confidence, Biddle’s bank failed, along with it Philadelphia’s 
primacy in American railroad finance.  Boston, however, was able to weather this storm 
due to the fact that it had been the primary financier of the Northeastern roads, and thus 
was not dependent on British capital. With a stockpile of savings from the still-profitable 
textile mill industry of Massachusetts, Boston remained a great railroad finance center 
until the depression that struck New England in 1847.  Boston’s railroad capital industry, 
built on equity finance, was no longer competitive as investors’ preference switched to 
more secure bond issues.  Railwaymen then turned to the New York railroad bond 
market, with greater specialization in the marketing of bonds and lower interest rates.  By 
that time, New York was booming in food export trade, as the Irish and German famines 
had increased demand for exports, and also a massive import trade consequent of the 
depression abroad that had forced down import prices.   New York was thus able to 
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provide a reservoir of capital to be tapped that was unavailable in the other cities.  By the 
1850’s, New York was financing most of the United States’ railroad construction.16 
  As for a comparison with the British railroad systems, Chandler’s citations, the 
Gourvish books, are equally vague in terms of being able to provide us with any definite 
figures on outside capital with which to hold up against the American and determine 
whether the American railroads were in fact more heavily dependent on outside capital or 
not.  Nor do they provide us with any definite yardstick figures with which it may be 
possible to compare the growth of the London, or other British exchanges in connection 
with the railroads with that of the American.    
 The most striking factor of all, however, is that the very sources Chandler cites for 
his British information that he uses to make this comparative assessment of the lesser 
impact of the railroads on the growth and evolution of industrial finance there actually 
paint a very different picture of this process than Chandler presents in Scale and Scope.  
While acknowledging that the railways obtained their initial financial support from local 
interests, through such means as public meetings and local advertising, Gourvish (1980) 
points to the growth of two main reservoirs of capital that established themselves as 
financial centers to meet the needs of not only railroads serving their own areas, but of 
those distant from them:  London and Lancashire, which Gourvish maintains assumed a 
role of primary importance in the promotion of companies from the 1830’s on.  In 
addition to the Liverpool and Manchester exchanges that arose in the 1830’s, provincial 
exchanges arose in Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and elsewhere to meet the task of 
helping finance the railroads during a further railroad boom that occurred in 1844-45.   
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 According to Gourvish, while local capital was prominent in the financing of the 
early British railroads, as evidenced by the creation of the provincial stock exchanges, 
this should not be misinterpreted to mean that the railroads were inexpensive to build, or 
that all capital needs were satisfied by the then-existing facilities. On the contrary, the 
ballooning of exchanges across the land, in addition to that of London, is testimony to a 
great extension of the British capital market in connection with the railroads.  According 
to Gourvish, the British railroads were also very costly to build during their formative 
era; so much so that the London Stock Exchange also experienced dramatic growth from 
the mid-1830’s on that was coincident with a radical restructuring of the British capital 
market marked by a shift in emphasis towards railroad company securities.  According to 
Gourvish’s research, railways made a tremendous impact on financial markets in Britain 
through the marketing of railway paper, which extended the geographical and 
occupational base of investment, thereby transforming the Victorian capital market.  It 
was in this extension of the capital market, Gourvish states, and the encouragement to 
savings that the railways had their most pronounced impact on the economy.  A new class 
of investor, it is claimed by Gourvish here, was introduced into industrial capitalism as a 
result of this railroad financing activity that resulted in a steady expansion of 
shareholding on a broad front.17 
 A very different picture, indeed, of Britain from that presented by Chandler in his 
own work.  To read Chandler, one would infer that the provincial facilities that arose to 
help finance the railroads were of a small-scale and local character, and were 
inconsequential as to growth and further development of the British capital market.  
Furthermore, one would infer that London experienced little growth or change as a result 
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of its railroad financing activities.  Such an anomalous description of the impact of the 
railroads on British industrial finance compels a further investigation of the vast literature 
surrounding the subject in order to determine the precise impact of railroad finance on the 
British capital market, and how it differed from the American and German.18   
 
* 
An enquiry into the literature surrounding the financing of the early British and the 
American railroads reveals that some of Chandler’s conjectures and opinions may be 
hyperbolic.  In examining the work of Albert Fishlow, we find that Chandler’s claim of 
the perennial reliance of the American railroads on outside capital may be exaggerated.  
Fishlow, while accepting the notion Chandler advances that the business of railroad 
finance in the Ante-bellum era contributed a lot to augmenting the degree of savings total 
in the economy, and developing the capital market centered in New York, does not 
believe this reliance on the capital markets of New York was as great as is stated by 
Chandler.  Fishlow maintains that it was only mainly the Western railroads for whom 
outside capital was exceedingly important, and the subsequent development of the New 
York capital market was due, in part, to its role as a conduit by which to access funds 
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from abroad.  The Southern railroads, on the other hand, had been able to finance their 
construction from mainly local sources.  Furthermore, Fishlow claims that extensive 
reliance on imported and outside capital was mainly a feature of the early construction of 
the American system pre-1850’s, when the price of rails was very high.  These high costs 
forced railroadmen to seek additional funds that were not available locally.  When the 
price of rails came down in the 1850’s, the American railroads were able to rely upon 
local sources of finance much more extensively.19  Moreover, Fishlow notes that much of 
the funds that the United States used to construct its railroad system were borrowed from 
abroad; particularly from Britain.20  So if one were to count as “outside capital” capital 
raised from outside the country, this “gift” towards the enlargement of a nation’s railroad 
system, if substantial, would certainly show a significant degree of outside capital as 
being invested in your domestic railroad system, but would have little stimulating effects 
on a nation’s own domestic financial capital industry.  On the contrary, it would have a 
greater stimulating effect on the financial industry of the donor nation; in this case, 
Britain.  
 However, far more misleading is Chandler’s depiction of the impact of the 
railroads on the capital markets of Britain.  As alluded to above in the survey of the 
Gourvish literature, it is revealed by the growth of the London and Lancashire exchanges 
in response to the capital needs of the railroads that the British railroad system was also 
very expensive to build.  Local capital sources were not always sufficient, and a new 
variety of large-scale finance of industrial enterprise may have come into existence in 
Britain in connection with the railroads in a manner very similar to that as it occurred in 
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the United States.  A further investigation of Chandler’s sources and the remaining vast 
literature on the subject leads one to draw vastly different conclusions regarding the 
degree of outside capital involved in the construction of Britain’s railroads and the 
consequent impact of this means of finance on the British capital market as a whole.  As 
it turns out, the impact of the railroads on the financial structure of Britain during the 19th 
century was not that different from its impact in the United States, or Germany either for 
that matter.  While there were some minor differences that will be discussed below, it 
appears that the British railroad system was also heavily financed by outside capital, and 
the British financial system also received a great deal of augmentation in connection with 
the railroads.   
 M. C. Reed (1975) summarizes the chief impact of the railroad construction of the 
mid-19th century in Britain as follows: “Increasing railroad demands on the capital 
market were accompanied by the development of market institutions, most clearly seen in 
the growth of stock exchanges.”21  The dramatic impact of the business of railroad 
finance on the financial landscape of Britain is also acknowledged by Hawke, who 
similarly points out the considerable impression the railroads made on British stock 
exchanges, greatly increasing the volume of trading in non-government debt in London, 
and stimulating the growth of stock exchanges in provincial towns.22 
 A major point that deserves emphasis here is that the railroads could not have 
been as cheap to construct as Chandler would have us believe if their construction 
precipitated this kind of growth of financial exchanges.  Regardless of their location, 
whether concentrated in London, or dispersed across the provinces, if there was in fact, 
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such a dramatic growth in the number of financial institutions in the land, and if there 
was such a dramatic increase in the volume of trading activity in the London exchange as 
a result of railroad finance, then Chandler’s contentions about the lesser impact of the 
railroads on capital markets in Britain are called into question.   
 We are called, firstly, to reexamine Chandler’s contention that “In Britain the 
smaller requirements of a much smaller network only enlarged and refined somewhat the 
activities of what had long been the world’s largest financial center”.  It is here revealed 
that this may be an understatement regarding the impact of railroad finance on the 
London exchange.  
 Secondly, we must reexamine his contention that “In industrial Britain, railroad 
promoters were able to rely more on local capital than could their American counterparts 
in the rural areas of the recently settled South and West.”  This statement is misleading 
because it leads one to believe that local capital sources were available to fund the 
railroads ex ante, and the impact of the railroads on these local exchanges was 
insignificant.  On the contrary, as was alluded to above, and will be show below, the 
phenomenon of railroad finance in the provinces was much more dramatic than described 
by Chandler, in that it brought about a flurry of industrial financing activity to areas in 
which there had previously been little.   
 It is also misleading because it overlooks the fact that many of these local 
exchanges grew to be financial centers in their own right, and assumed an important role 
in a market for railroad shares that was national, not local in character.  In fact, a few of 
them, notably those of Lancashire and Yorkshire, grew to become markets for railroad 
capital of a breadth and stature equivalent to London in the national market.  One should 
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not jump to the conclusion that because Britain’s market for railroad capital was more 
“local”—that is, dispersed around the nation, rather than concentrated in a single center, 
such as the United States’ was in New York—that it was smaller scale, and less 
significant insofar as the impression it made on the overall development of the financial 
system.   
 In terms of a comparison with the American railroad system, it stands to reason 
that because the American system branched out from the densely-populated and 
industrialized Northeast, and out into the sparsely-settled, rural south and west, local 
sources of capital for railroads serving these areas would be inadequate, and substantial 
sums of outside capital from financial centers such as New York, Philadelphia and 
Boston would be an imperative.  Consequently, any augmentation of the nation’s 
financial intermediation facilities in connection with the construction of the railroads 
would be seen in a concentrated form in one or more of these cities.  In contrast, in a 
much smaller, densely settled nation such as Britain, already in a stage of ubiquitous 
industrial development and urbanization, railroads would be constructed in shorter 
distances between already settled industrial areas.  Due to its smaller and more compact 
geographical layout consisting of densely populated, urban industrial areas, Britain’s 
railroad network did not involve linking urban centers with the frontier, as in the 
American case, but rather of linking urban areas with other urban areas. Consequently, 
local sources of financing would be more readily available.   
 So far, this is an accurate description of a key difference in the patterns of 
development of railroad finance in the two nations.  In Britain, more so than in the United 
States, markets for railroad capital emerged in most of its great cities, such as Liverpool, 
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Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Bristol, Glasgow, and Edinburgh, and they all played a 
significant role in the financing of railroads that ran through them, or had them as a 
terminal point. It is not surprising that a thriving market for railway shares should arise in 
thriving centers of industry and commerce such as Liverpool and Manchester, where 
there was already much economic growth and a relatively high level of savings available.  
Given that these were already active centers of trade and commerce, it was far easier to 
develop effective banking facilities in these areas than in, say, the frontiers of Nebraska.   
 However, this overlooks the point that all of these exchanges (Lancashire and 
Yorkshire in particular), dealt in securities of railroads outside their regions, providing 
capital to railroads of other regions, and vice versa.  One area, Lancashire, was so 
important to the financing of the railroads of the entire nation, and experienced so much 
growth related to this activity, that it became like a “northern London”—another financial 
capital of the nation in the north that was just as important to the financing of the nation’s 
railroad system as its southern sister, London.  What developed, then, in Britain as a 
consequence of the business of railroad finance, was an augmentation of the national 
capital market that may have been just as great as the corresponding American 
augmentation, but was dispersed across industrial regions.  Rather than concentrated in 
one financial center, as the American augmentation was in New York, Britain’s financial 
growth was dispersed across the nation; to some degree in the smaller exchanges that 
developed in cities such as Birmingham, Bristol, Glasgow, and Edinburgh, but 
concentrated in two main regions: London and the northern center of industrial growth 
and commerce, the Lancashire/Yorkshire area that contained the great exchanges of 
Liverpool, and the lesser, but still significant exchanges of Manchester and Leeds.   
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 Therefore, the moniker “local” as applied to the financing of the British railroads 
is a misleading misnomer.  If one were to observe the fact that the railroads that served 
the New York vicinity were heavily dependent on New York capital, one would not 
assume on that account that all the railroads of the United States were also similarly 
locally-financed because New York is a well known as a financial center serving the 
entire nation, if not the world.  Similarly, if one were to observe the fact that railroads 
that served the London area were heavily dependent on London capital, it would be 
erroneous and fallacious to assume that all railroads in Britain were similarly locally-
financed, because it is well known that London is the financial center of Britain, and one 
would assume that London was also involved in the financing of railroads in other areas 
of Britain.   
 Therefore, one ought not assume that because the railroads that served the 
Lancashire/Yorkshire region were heavily funded by capital from that region that all the 
railroads of Britain also had their own local, personal Daddy Warbucks.  It just so 
happens that due to Britain’s small geographic size, and densely-settled urbanized and 
industrialized layout, a plethora of financial centers were able to arise to meet the 
demands of its railroad system, and two areas in particular grew to prominence.  With 
two prominent financial centers at either end of such a small country, naturally a great 
number of British railroads found themselves with an abundant source of local capital 
available along their lines or at their termini.  W. A. Thomas, in his 1973 study of the 
provincial stock exchanges, concurs that if the British railroads were more “locally 
funded” than the American railroads, it is no doubt in probability due to the existence of 
  
93
these large provincial exchanges.23  However, as will be seen, local capital resources 
were seldom adequate for all the railroads of Britain; especially for those whose termini 
and lines did not lie in or along any of the major hubs of London, Lancashire or 
Yorkshire.  In order to make up these capital inadequacies, these railroads borrowed 
heavily from the London, Lancashire and Yorkshire markets. 
  It will be revealed below that the capital markets of London, Lancashire and 
Yorkshire played a great role in the financing of railroads all over Britain.  London and 
Lancashire capital made its way to railroads of Britain that did not touch either of these 
areas.  Moreover, there was cross-fertilization of financing between these two major 
capital markets, with Lancashire capital making its way down to the south to finance 
railroads that had access to the London market, and vice versa.  It is the consensus of the 
authors surveyed here that the great capital cost of the British railroads wrought a 
changeover in the capital market not dissimilar from that experienced by the United 
States, and that a national market for railroad shares had emerged in Britain by the 1850’s 
just as it had in the United States. Consequently, the funding of the railroads of Britain 
may not have been as “local” as was asserted by Chandler.   
 In the context of the Chandlerian hypothesis, the question naturally arises, what 
was so unique and special about this concentrated American development of the financial 
sector in New York that proved so beneficial to industry that gave the American such a 
great advantage later on in the financing of other large scale enterprise?  An answer to 
this question becomes more pressing as it is revealed below that the railroad business of 
the Provincial exchanges was a temporary phenomenon associated with the great railroad 
booms of the 1830’s-1840’s, and that ultimately, the business of railroad finance in 
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Britain became concentrated in London as the American had in New York, and this 
growth pattern only continued as the century wore on.  The fact that Britain experienced 
financial augmentation in connection with its railroads of a seemingly nearly identical 
nature and magnitude as that experienced by the United States calls the Chandlerian 
hypothesis of lesser impact of the railroads on capital markets as an explanation for 
British industrial retardation in the late 19th century into question.   
 The following section describes the processes of growth experienced by the 
British capital market in connection with the railroads.  Careful emphasis is placed on the 
tremendous capital cost of the British railroad system and the concomitant need for 
massive infusions of outside capital that led to the evolution of a national market for 
railroad capital in Britain, and the centralization and institutionalization of that capital 




III.  RAILROADS AND THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 
MARKET IN BRITAIN 
 
The two main great financial centers of London and Lancashire began their great 
trajectory of growth in the 1830’s as suppliers of capital to railroads that served their 
immediate environs.  Reed, in his 1968 article “Railways and the Growth of the Capital 
Market,”24 notes the great increase in the railway business that hit the London Stock 
Exchange in 1833, and notes that it is not surprising that this increase was coincident with 
the authorization of the first railroad companies to serve London, the London & 
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Birmingham, and the London & Greenwich.  According to Reed, from 1833 onwards, 
there was a considerable amount of business in the shares of railway companies, and that 
the companies mainly dealt in were “local” companies, in the sense that they served the 
London area.25 
 However, there was another important hub of railways, and railway financing 
activity going on simultaneously up north; particularly in Lancashire, and to a significant 
extent in Yorkshire as well.  Thomas chronicles the rise of the great financial exchanges 
of Liverpool and Manchester subsequent to a great railway promotion boom commencing 
in 1836. Their importance to the funding of the construction of the first great early local 
railway lines that served this northern area, rich in industry and commerce, is well-
documented by Thomas, and other historians.  For instance, Thomas notes the naturally 
large contribution of Liverpool and Manchester interests to the launching of the 
Liverpool and Manchester line in 1826, noting that of the 2,907 shares allotted that year, 
1,979 were held by Liverpool people, 124 were held by Manchester people, as against 
844 held by London interests.26  Reed notes that shares of the Manchester & Leeds 
railroad were seldom quoted on the London Stock Exchange, and that the lion’s share of 
its securities were sold on the Manchester market.27  The same can be said for other 
railroad lines that had as their termini, or served densely populated, urban industrialized 
areas. Thomas also notes the predominance of subscriptions held by locally interested 
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people in Lancashire and Yorkshire in the Manchester and Leeds line, as well as the same 
predominance of Birmingham people in the Grand Junction Line.28 
 Further testimony to the heavy reliance of the northern lines on these local 
financing centers can be found in Broadbridge’s outline of the early history of financing 
of the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital 
Market in England: 1825-1873 (1970).  According to Broadbridge, the overwhelming 
proportion of the capital that funded the Lancashire & Yorkshire during the period from 
about 1835-1845 came from what may be termed “locally interested” counties—
Lancashire, Yorkshire and Cheshire.29  Although primarily concerned with the early 
financing of the Lancashire & Yorkshire, Broadbridge’s 1970 book also covers the 
general affairs of the business of railway finance in the Lancashire/Yorkshire area.  In 
Chapter Four, in which Broadbridge analyses the sources of share capital for a 
conglomeration of other companies that served the Lancashire/Yorkshire area for selected 
periods in the 1830’s and 1840’s, it is revealed that these companies also relied 
principally on this “local” capital as their means of finance.30 
 Of course, one should not make the erroneous assumption that because the 
London and Lancashire capital markets arose to become principal financiers of railroads 
serving their area that the capital needs of these railroads were small, or that all the early 
British railroads were similarly served by their local providers.  Reed, in his 1975 book 
that surveys the early financing of the British railroad system, explains that the London 
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Stock Exchange experienced dramatic growth in the early years of the railroads due to the 
tremendous capital cost of these enterprises.  The railroads, Reed explains, as a whole 
required far more capital than any non-government user of borrowed capital, including 
the canals.  Even the largest canal, the Grand Junction, used less capital than any 
railroad.31  According to Reed, it was the inadequacy of local capital resources for 
railroad construction that led to the foundation of the Provincial Stock Exchanges of the 
north in the first place, and that this widening out of the capital market from London to 
the provinces was a direct market response to the capital inadequacies that existed in 
certain areas with respect to the building of the railroads.32  Similarly, once the great 
exchanges of Liverpool and Manchester were founded, these exchanges too, played a role 
in the provision of capital to less capital-rich regions to aid their railroad construction, 
and experienced a resultant growth pattern similar to that experienced by London.   As 
put by Broadbridge, “In Chapter 5 it is argued that the traditional view of pre-1840’s 
railways—that they were “locally” financed—is an inaccurate one.  The high proportions 
of initial capital subscribed to our companies by residents of Lancashire, and, to a lesser 
extent, Yorkshire, are to be regarded not as confirmation of the traditional account of 
early railway financing, but as confirmation of the paramount influence of Lancashire 
and its bordering areas in the early railway capital market.”33  
 It appears that the misnomer “locally financed” as applied to the early British 
railroads stems from the observation that large stock exchanges arose in London and 
Lancashire to construct the railroads, and that these exchanges played a major role in the 
construction of the railroad lines that lay along, or had these areas as their termini.  
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Naturally, given Britain’s small geographic size, these railroads who relied heavily on 
London or Lancashire capital would comprise a fair proportion of all the railroads in the 
land. This may lead one to the erroneous conclusion that therefore, the early British 
railroads were heavily locally financed.  There is also the misconception that remoteness 
from these capital centers forced railroads not conveniently situated along these areas, 
and/or lacking one of these principal capital markets as a terminal point, to rely heavily 
on their own local resources.   
 Reed and Broadbridge sharply refute these contentions as myths, and point to the 
significant role of outside financing in the construction of the early British railroads, both 
in those that directly served the London and Lancashire areas, and for those lying outside 
of these regions.  Firstly, while railroads that served the London and Lancashire areas 
certainly did comprise a fair proportion of the early British railroads, and their abundant 
local capital resources certainly did play a major role in their financing, “a fair 
proportion” ought not be misconstrued to mean “all”.  For there were many railroads not 
conveniently situated along these areas or lacking one of these principal capital markets 
as a terminal point.  For these railroads, outside capital from at least one of these 
principal regions played an exceedingly important role in their initial financing.  
According to the authors surveyed, remoteness from London and Lancashire was not an 
obstacle for railroads lying outside this region in obtaining capital from these regions, for 
an active national market for railroad shares had arisen by the 1820’s and 1830’s.   
 According to Broadbridge, the idea that until the great railroad mania of the mid-
‘40’s, Britain’s railroad finance was primarily local in character is not accurate.  As he 
explains, “Before the wider development of railways in the 1830’s, traveling was 
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difficult, and remoteness from London, Lancashire, and other important industrial areas, 
may well have led to some of the smaller, local lines being financed by local people.  But 
the history of many of the major lines of that decade shows that this obstacle did not 
prevent promoters from soliciting help from Lancashire and other places, such as London 
and Birmingham.”  Quoting an old Circular to Bankers from 1836, Broadbridge 
reaffirms this assessment: “On the whole, the statement ‘No considerable Railway can be 
completed that depends upon local money for its outlay’ seems to be correct.”34 
 Broadbridge’s conclusion is that remoteness of transport undertakings from the 
large capital centers as a major cause of local financing is not really justified, as viewed 
by the extensiveness of Lancashire capital all over Britain, including in those areas in 
proximity to London itself.  Importation of Lancashire capital into the London area for 
railroad financing is also confirmed by Reed, who notes that for the London & 
Birmingham railroad over the years 1833-37, Liverpool always held a significant quantity 
of shares; more, in fact, than London and Birmingham individually just about any year 
during that period.  This importance of Lancashire capital in the railroads of the far south 
in the immediate proximity of the London capital markets is also evident in its role as a 
principal financier of the London & Southampton and Grand Junction railroads.  It 
appears that for railroads in the South, midlands, east, what capital that could not be 
gotten from London was available in abundance from Lancashire.35 
 Furthermore, even the great center of Lancashire did not possess regional 
hegemony over the financing of railroads in its respective area.  The Northern railroads 
relied heavily on share capital from London, as Broadbridge notes occurred in the case of 
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the Manchester & Leeds Railway, as Reed notes occurred in the case of the Liverpool & 
Manchester, and as Bagwell notes in the case of the North British.  Not only was there 
crossover of this sort between the two main financial centers, even railroads situated 
within the proximity of Lancashire sought capital from farther afield.  According to 
Broadbridge, the Lancashire & Yorkshire received loan capital from banks as distant as 
Ireland, Scotland, the (more?) northern counties, and other areas that even included the 
Bank of Australia, as well as tapping London’s resources.  Broadbridge holds these facts 
up as testimony to the fact that railroads were drawing their capital from ever-widening 
sources as early as the early 1840’s.36 
 This assessment of the financing of the early British railroads is confirmed by 
Reed, who notes that due to the active new market for railroad capital that arose in 
London, and the creation of the great exchanges of Lancashire, railroad shares became 
readily marketable in the 1820’s and 1830’s.  In fact, for the British railroad system as a 
whole, Reed found that most railroads over the course of their early development relied 
heavily on non-local sources of capital, with London predominating in the 1820’s, and 
then Lancashire as well as London beginning to play an important role in the 1830’s.37  
 
* 
Thus, the two principal railroad capital markets of London and Lancashire were both set 
upon a trajectory of growth based on railroad financing.  This included financing of not 
merely their own local railroads, but railroads all over Britain.  
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 By serving as a capital market for the railroads that served both its immediate 
environs, and distant lines to the north, the London Stock exchange entered a new stage 
of development marked by rapid growth in volume of transactions; a rapid growth in 
connection with railroad securities dealings not unlike that described by Chandler 
concerning the growth of the New York securities industry in association with railroad 
finance.  Reed explains that the London stock exchange was originally primarily a market 
for government securities during the first three decades of the 19th century prior to the 
great railroad boom, with railroad company securities comprising a very small portion of 
total assets traded.38  However, the huge capital needs of the burgeoning railroad 
industry, that included distant lines remote to the London area, led to a spur of financing 
activity that acted like an engine of growth for the London exchange.39  Reed reports that 
as early as 1842,  railroads represented the largest single group of joint-stock companies 
quoted in London, consuming more capital than comparable older utilities such as canals, 
gas, and other utilities—not only on an individual basis but more than these other utilities 
combined.40  Furthermore, in comparing the volume of railroad share capital issued on 
the London Stock Exchange in 1843 to that of 1847, Reed found that it more than 
doubled over that time, going from 43 million pounds to 126 million pounds.  In 
comparing the number of railway companies out of total firms with quotations on the 
exchange in 1830 to that in 1844, Reed found that it had risen from 4 out of 205 (.0195) 
to 66 out of 755 (.0874).  However, even this figure underestimates the precise 
quantitative contribution of the railroads to the growth of the exchange, because while the 
actual raw number of companies on the exchange is not huge, the high value of their paid 
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up capital at the later date represented about a third of the total joint-stock company 
capital quoted on the exchange.41  The contribution of outside capital dealings to this 
growth of the London exchange in these years is also acknowledged by Reed, who 
reports that as early as 1836, railroad companies that did not serve the London area 
directly made up a significant portion of those traded on the London Stock Exchange.42 
 To summarize, Reed believes that by the 1840’s, the business of the Stock 
Exchange had been revolutionized by the railroad.  Railroad shares, much more lucrative 
than government securities, aroused a great investor passion hitherto unknown in the 
banking and securities industry, and consequently played a significant part in enlarging 
the activities of the London Stock Exchange.43 
 This momentum of growth in connection with railroads continued on into the 19th 
century, according to Cottrell (1979), who notes the rapid growth experienced by the 
London exchange from the 1850’s-80’s that was coincident with what he terms its 
“golden age” of railway construction.44  According to Cottrell, London by 1870 had 
grown to become a well-established capital market based primarily on dealings of two 
types of assets: government bonds and railway securities.  The fact that Cottrell lists 
railroad securities as one of the leading factors contributing to the growth of London as a 
financial center in these years leads one to believe that London may also have 
experienced much of the growth similar to that experienced by New York as a result of 
the railroads.45 
                                                 
41
 Reed (1968), p. 167.    
42
 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 
43
 Reed (1975), pp. 211-13. 
44
 Cottrell, P. L. Industrial Finance, 1830-1914: The Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing 
Industry (London and New York: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 152; see also railway data tables on 
capital invested in this chapter. 
45
 Ibid., p. 141.    
  
103
 Similarly, the northern provincial exchanges, particularly of Lancashire and 
Yorkshire, received a significant augmentation as a result of their railroad financing 
activities that involved railroads of their own region, as well as around all of Great 
Britain.  The description above detailing the importance of Lancashire capital in such 
northern railroads as the Liverpool and Manchester, the Manchester and Leeds and the 
Lancashire & Yorkshire lines is well documented.  It was also mentioned above that there 
was cross-fertilization of capital between the two main centers, with Lancashire capital 
often coming to the aid of railroads serving the London area.  But what cannot be stressed 
enough is the tremendous degree to which Lancashire capital financed the railroads of the 
entire realm, and the role that this financing activity played in enlarging these northern 
exchanges.   
 It is a broad consensus among the authors surveyed here that the investment banks 
of Lancashire and Yorkshire provided capital not only for railroads that served the north 
of England, but for the railroads of the entire nation, and even for those abroad.46  
According to Reed, by 1836, railroad companies that did not serve the Lancashire and 
Yorkshire area comprised a significant portion of the Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds 
exchanges.47  Reed notes that shares of the Manchester & Leeds railroad were seldom 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange, and that the lion’s share of its securities were sold 
on the Manchester market.  He reasons that if this is true of the Manchester & Leeds, as 
well as the other northern and midlands railroads, then the Manchester and Liverpool 
Stock Exchanges, in addition to their local function, must also have challenged London 
as the most active market for a fair proportion of all railway securities, and were thus an 
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important supplier of “outside” capital for railroads in between, or off the line of the 
northern areas and the London area.48  According to Thomas, the investors of Lancashire, 
particularly, were highly active in the financing of lines in other parts of the country, 
contributing the lion’s share of the capital not only to lines such as the Manchester & 
Leeds, but also more distant lines such as the London & Birmingham, the Great Western 
Railway that served Bristol (and London?), the Southern Railway, the London-
Southampton, the Eastern Counties, and the South Eastern Railway.49  Lancashire was 
not only a principal financier of railroads in its own immediate northern region, but also 
of all the principal railroads of the nation, such as the Leicester & Swannington, the 
Midland Counties, and North Midland, the Eastern Counties, and the Great Western.50  
According to Reed, the Great Western, North Midland, Leicester & Swannington and 
London & Southampton all had in common the fact that none of them served Lancashire 
directly, yet they relied heavily on capital from it.  Moreover, this Lancashire importance 
grew over time. The three latter ones, in particular, found local capital insufficient, and 
were primarily financed from outside capital, with capital from Lancashire prominent 
among this capital.51 
 As a consequence of this railroad financing activity that occurred both around 
their area, and all over the country, the provincial exchanges of Lancashire and Yorkshire 
experienced growth not unlike that experienced by London in connection with its railroad 
financing activities.  In fact, as a source of capital for the railroads, Lancashire grew to 
rival, if not exceed London in importance.  According to Reed, a shifting of the loci of 
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banking and financial activity in Britain away from London, and northwards towards 
Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham was a chief consequence of the establishment of 
the provincial exchanges in response to the capital needs of the railroads.  Noting the 
great degree to which Lancashire funded railroad projects outside its area, both 
Broadbridge and Reed contend that it was Lancashire, not London, that was the principal 
reservoir of capital for the financing of the early growth of the British railroad system, 
and it was the pressure of Lancashire capital, and not that of London, that was the more 
important influence in the early railroad capital market.52  The relatively greater 
importance of the provincial exchanges as providers of capital for the early railroads is 
also noted by Thomas, who, in a table listing stock of trade in railroad shares for the main 
provincial markets and London from 1835-46 for selected years, shows Liverpool 
exceeding London for all those years, Manchester rivaling it, and Leeds also quite 
prominent (though nowhere near as great as London).  Citing a contemporary observer, 
Henry Burgess writing in Circular to Bankers of Nov. 6, 1835, Thomas notes that of the 
railroads in operation at that time in the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, 
Durham, Yorkshire and Lancashire, less than one twentieth of their capital was provided 
by members of the London Stock Exchange.53  According to Reed, the national 
importance of Liverpool in the railroad capital market gave that city a sophistication 
comparable to that of the wider London market, and Manchester also began to assume 
this characteristic for the same reason.54  It appears that if there had to be a single main 
financial center of importance for the early British railroad system, Lancashire would 
have to have been it.  
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 The tremendous growth of the Provincial exchanges as financial centers 
equivalent in stature to London primarily through railroad securities dealings reveals 
Chandler’s claim of the early British railroad system as having been primarily “locally 
financed” as something of a misnomer.  The history of the development of the provincial 
exchanges in connection with the capital needs of the railroads chronicled above paints a 
very different picture of the financing of the British railroad system and its impact upon 
capital markets than that painted by Chandler in Scale and Scope.  Chandler maintained 
that because the British railroads capital needs were small, they were capable of being 
satisfied by local finance.  The implication is that there were local capital facilities—local 
merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and landowners living at the termini or along the rail 
lines—who specialized in small-scale financing activities that had existed all along, and 
were sufficient for the capital needs of the railroads.  Thus, there was little impact of the 
business of railroad finance upon those facilities.  There were no, or little, new 
revolutionary features imparted by the business of railroad finance to these financing 
facilities that arose on an ad hoc basis in response to the business of railroad construction.   
 What a different picture emerges from this literature I have surveyed!  In 
discussing the impact of the railroads upon these provincial exchanges, Reed notes that 
because of the great need for capital for the railroads in both the immediate 
Lancashire/Yorkshire area and beyond, including London, local brokers dealing with 
railroad securities as the greater share of their business began to appear in the provinces 
in greater and greater number as the 19th century wore on.  Formal stock exchanges were 
established in the provinces principally on account of the fact that railroad securities 
dealings were a profitable form of new enterprise.  Reed notes that apart from Dublin, 
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where there was an established Stock Exchange dealing with government securities, the 
Liverpool and Manchester exchanges were the first in Britain to be formed outside 
London, and it is not too much to say that their formation was the direct result of the 
railroad boom of the mid-1830’s.  In fact, according to Reed, it was on account of the 
railroads, and their tremendous capital needs, that sharebroking began to emerge as a 
separate profession in the provinces.  A new form of finance was thus created in the 
provinces; one that was associated with a new technology that called for greater 
quantities of capital than had ever been hitherto required.  The fact that these provincial 
exchanges subsequently grew in size to capital centers of industrial finance rivaling 
London in importance nearly from scratch (it must be remembered that London had a 
head start from previously being a great financial center based on government securities 
dealings), and that this was achieved through extensive financing of distant projects, 
shows that the term “local finance” as applied to these exchanges is a great misnomer; at 
least in the sense in which the term is used by Chandler as applied to these exchanges as 
small-scale banking facilities associated with smaller-scale industrial projects.55 
 Certainly one can say that much of the early British railroad finance was “local”.  
But one must emphasize that this was “local finance” of a much grander scale and newer, 
unprecedented variety than had ever hitherto existed in the provinces.  While it is 
possible that in Britain there developed less of this apparatus than in the United States, 
one should not jump to the conclusion that it was insignificant or backwards because of 
its “local” character.  The fact that these financial centers grew to rival London in 
magnitude, and that there was significant growth of the London exchange on account of 
the railroads should signal as a word of caution to those who would infer that the United 
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States received greater financial sector augmentation as a result of the railroads; after all, 
even Chandler acknowledges that after the railroads had completed their work in 
institutionalizing and centralizing the American money markets in New York, the New 
York money market was still in second place in the world in size to London by the turn of 
the century.  
 Furthermore, the fact that they dealt in securities that funded railroads all over the 
nation serves to bolster the claim I make that “local finance” sources is a term that really 
cannot be applied to the Provincial Exchanges; certainly not the great ones of Lancashire 
and Yorkshire.  Certainly the railroads of the North were heavily funded by Lancashire 
and Yorkshire.  If one were to observe the fact that London heavily financed the Southern 
railroads, which it did, one would not automatically conclude that all Britain’s railroads 
were locally financed, because one would reasonably assume that as a large financial 
center, London was also heavily involved in financing railroads all over Britain. 
Therefore, since we know that Lancashire and Yorkshire also served the British railroads 
in a similar capacity, we should not call their financing activity “local” either.   
 There were some smaller, less important provincial exchanges that did play an 
important role in the financing of their own regions’ railroads that one could call “local 
financing” in the sense of the word used by Chandler, although it is not clearly 
demonstrated that their financing activities were confined to their own immediate 
regions.  Both Reed and Thomas report that after the mid-1830’s boom, there was 
another, much larger boom in the mid-1840’s in railroad securities that led to the 
formation of exchanges in other cities, such as Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Dublin, Leeds, Bristol and Leicester.  We do know from Reed that by 1836, companies 
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that did not serve the Lancashire and Yorkshire area comprised a significant portion of 
the Leeds exchange.  Furthermore, as detailed above, we know that seldom were the 
railroads in the areas these exchanges served exclusively reliant upon this local capital for 
their construction.56 
 Furthermore, the evidence appears to indicate that Britain experienced a 
significant augmentation of its investment banking facilities as a result of the business of 
railroad finance.  The emergence of a national market for railroad shares, particularly 
through the growth of the great exchanges of London and Lancashire, provided a channel 
through which savings from economically advanced regions and individuals could be 
harnessed to stimulate development elsewhere and contribute significantly to the overall 
level of capital formation.  Consequently, the impact of the financing of the railroads on 
the capital markets of Britain does not appear to be as different from its effects on the 
United States as imagined, or misconstrued to be the case, by Chandler.   
 Firstly, the tremendous role played by outside capital from the great exchanges of 
London and Lancashire point to the emergence of a national capital market for railroad 
securities and the advent of large-scale impersonal finance in Britain circa the 1840’s.57  
According to Reed, “One of the most important by-products of the introduction and 
extension of the railway system in the second quarter of the nineteenth century was the 
part played by railway shares and debentures in assisting the development of a national 
market for company securities.”58  According to Bagwell, the tremendous preponderance 
of Lancashire capital in particular in the railroads of other regions bears testimony to the 
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national character of the market for railroad capital in Britain that existed by the 1840’s.59  
This description of these northern markets is echoed by Reed, who notes that the 
Manchester and Liverpool markets in the early 1840’s provided, in addition to a regional 
market in a wide range of securities, the most active national market in some railway 
securities.60 
 Secondly, the tremendous growth experienced by the two major centers of 
railroad capital dealings suggests a centralization and institutionalization of the British 
capital market in association with the railroads not unlike that which was occurring 
simultaneously in the American in New York.  Reed feels the railways had a profound 
impact on the capital market, particular the London Stock Exchange.   Prior to the 
coming of the railway, Reed explains, the London Stock Exchange was primarily a 
market for government stock and the stock of the historic chartered companies.  
However, by the mid-1840’s boom in railroad construction, the rapid increase in railway 
business had geared the London Stock Exchange to handle a growing range of company 
securities, and created a network of stockbrokers all over the country to serve the 
investing public.  According to Reed, railroad companies were a model for the increasing 
number of companies which followed the liberalization of company law, and the 
characteristics of railroad capital issues—an unprecedented volume of securities, and the 
initial opportunities for speculative profits—ensured the enlargement of the formal 
capital market so that it was able to handle other company securities.61 
 Besides this augmentation of the London exchange, the other, more radical 
change in structure of British capital markets bequeathed by the railroads was the birth of 
                                                 
59
 Bagwell, pp. 95-96.   
 
60
 Reed (1968), pp. 177-78.    
61
 Ibid., pp. 162-63, 182-83.  
  
111
the great northern exchanges of Lancashire and Yorkshire.  Reed explains that the 
railroads had a dramatic effect on the capital market in Britain by extending it to the 
provinces, for in so doing, they enabled it to draw upon the new sources of wealth and 
income that had come into existence there, thus bypassing imperfections in the capital 
market that hampered industrial development across the land.62  Lancashire, in particular, 
as the area of Britain undergoing the most rapid industrialization, and which supplied the 
bulk of Britain’s exports, was a natural source of large reserves of capital that needed to 
be mobilized in order to fund industrial development elsewhere.63  Its large and profitable 
textile industries, the Liverpudlian slave trade and shipping industries all played an 
essential role in initiating the process of railway investment in Britain.  In so doing, this 
process provided a specific channel through which the resources of an economically 
advanced region could stimulate development elsewhere and contribute significantly to 
the overall level of capital formation.64 
 In summary, as Reed states, the railroads had a dramatic effect on the capital 
market in Britain in two ways: one, their tremendous capital needs dramatically increased 
the level of investment.  By drawing on new classes of investors, railroads dramatically 
increased the overall level of savings of the economy, bringing it into productive use in 
the industrial sector.  Secondly, by drawing these classes into the community, one may 
argue, they provided the necessary army of funds to be mobilized for providing the 
massive capital needs of enterprise; or they opened up new sources of capital for the 
financing of other large-scale enterprise.65 
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 The fact that the Provincial exchanges of Lancashire and Yorkshire grew to rival 
London in magnitude, and that there was significant growth of the London exchange 
itself on account of the railroads, should signal as a word of caution to those who would 
infer that the United States received greater financial sector augmentation as a result of 
the railroads; after all, even Chandler acknowledges that even after the railroads had 
completed their work in institutionalizing and centralizing American money markets in 
New York, the New York money market was still in second place to London by the turn 
of the century.  It would appear that it is possible that the railroads may have had just as 
dramatic an impact on capital markets in Britain as they did in the United States, but that 
this impact was a little more dispersed across various financial centers rather than having 
been concentrated in London, in contrast to the American money markets that became 
concentrated in New York.   
 This leads us to the question of what happened to the Provincial Exchanges after 
the great railroad boom of the 1830’s-‘40’s?  Did they continue to grow after the railroad 
mania, and contribute to economic development along and in tandem with the great banks 
of London?  
 We know, as Reed reminds us, of how the railroad stock trade came into London, 
and revolutionized the exchange.  The magnitude of these effects remains a controversy, 
but one thing is certain: there was no shrinkage of the London exchange as a result of 
these railroad dealings, only an increase in the volume of securities traded.  And this 
growth certainly could not have been deleterious to its ability to handle other types of 
company securities.66  But what was the contribution of the Provincial Exchanges to the 
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economy’s financial intermediation facilities after the great boom of the railroads was 
over?  
 According to Reed, the provincial exchanges assumed a role after the great 
railroad manias as local capital markets and dealers of local government securities.  Their 
importance as part of the larger, national capital market for railroad and other large, 
industrial capital declined after the great railroad manias because the invention of the 
telegraph had provided convenient, ready access to the London stock exchange.  Also, 
due to the emergence of the great amalgamated railroad companies, railroad business 
became increasingly concentrated on the London Stock Exchange, where specialized rail 
markets emerged in which the specialist division of jobber and broker was able to 
maintain a liquid market in a wide range of home and foreign railroad shares, and the 
increasing concentration of banking and discount houses made all the resources of the 
money market available.  With this consolidation of local companies into the national 
railroad companies, and the concomitant emergence of a more settled market in railroad 
securities, the wide market in railroad shares that had been a feature of both Liverpool 
and Manchester in the formative years of local exchanges was largely lost to London, and 
its dominance of the market for railroad securities was quickly established.67   
 Further indication of a transferal of railroad financing resources from north to 
south is provided by Cottrell, in his recounting of the story of the investment bank, Glyn, 
Mills.  According to Cottrell, many English country joint-stock banks became absorbed 
into metropolitan concerns from the 1890’s on, which enlarged their capital base.  Glyn, 
Mills, one such bank, had acted as the London correspondent for a large number of 
country banks.  Since the bank’s partners had played such an important part of the 
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railway-building boom of the 1840’s, Glyn Mills became known as the “railway bank.”  
This bank grew, and expanded by other means after the great railroad boom, first 
handling Canadian loans in the 1850’s, then assisting in the formation of a number of 
overseas banks in the 1860’s and 1870’s, and then, from the 1880’s on, undertaking a 
number of domestic industrial issues, including British Westinghouse beginning in 1901, 
with whom the bank enjoyed a long, close relationship.68   
 The fact that the railroad business of the provincial exchanges became absorbed 
by London, who came to dominate railroad finance serves to call into question 
Chandler’s claim that the British railroads were primarily locally-financed. That 
appellation, if it were to apply to the British railroads at all, would only apply to their 
very early years during which the Provincial exchanges were in their heyday.  Even then, 
it is very misleading to say that local capital markets were dominant, considering that the 
provincial exchanges, particularly that of Liverpool, were part of a national market for 
railroad assets, and dealt with railroad securities all over the land.  Moreover, that this 
absorption of the provincial exchanges railroad dealings into London concerns further 
abetted growth and concentration of the London capital market, and that this 
augmentation of the London market was significant insofar as the financing of other 
large-scale industrial enterprise is concerned, serves to put Chandler’s assertion that the 
railroads had a less dramatic impact on capital markets in Britain than in the United 
States into question.  
  It is now revealed that not only did Britain experience great financial sector 
growth in connection with the railroads, this growth was, in the long run, concentrated in 
a main financial center as the United States’ was in New York, and did not remain 
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dispersed across industrial centers, as was the case during the early history of the British 
railroad system.  How much different is the saga of the growth of the provincial 
exchanges, and their ultimate incorporation into the London exchange, from the 
enlargement of the New York exchange following the collapse of the railroad business of 
the Boston and Philadelphia exchanges?  It appears that Britain may have experienced 
much of the same “centralization and institutionalization” of its capital markets in 
London as a result of railroad financing that the United States did in New York, even 
though London was already a great financial center before the great railroad boom of the 
mid-19th century.  Furthermore, the growth of financial institutions through railroad 
finance, and their ultimate branching out to finance other industrial enterprise--the whole 
phenomenon that Chandler claims differentiates the American and German experience 
from the British--can also be seen in Britain in the case of the London bank, Glyn, Mills 
that Cottrell recounts.  The fact that one of its clients was British Westinghouse, a typical 
example of a science-based, large-scale, capital intensive, technologically advanced 
industry, serves as testimony to the fact that Britain may have also experienced at least a 
modicum of financial augmentation as a result of the railroads, and that this augmentation 
may have been significant insofar as the financing of the enterprise of the 2nd Industrial 
Revolution.   
 
 
IV.  BRITAIN AND GERMANY: CHANDLER VS. THE SCHOLARS 
 
Britain’s lesser impact of its railroads on its financial institutions, and consequent 
financial weakness relative to the United States and Germany is further called into 
question by the comparison of the effects of the railroads on capital markets in Germany 
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to that of Britain provided by Richard Tilly (1967, 1986).69  Chandler’s depiction of the 
impact of railroad finance on Germany’s capital market closely parallels his analysis of 
the corresponding American situation, except that Chandler feels that this causal 
relationship is even stronger in the German case than in the American, thus providing an 
even more stark contrast with Chandler’s description of the British situation.  While 
Chandler’s sources do not identify any data sources that can be used to support his 
conclusions, they do lead us to further literature on the subject, particularly that of Tilly, 
that, like the literature on the financing of the British railroads discussed above, lead us to 
draw very different conclusions regarding the alleged greater impact of the railroads on 
the capital markets of the United States and Germany.  Tilly, while concurring with 
Chandler as to the dramatic effects of the railroads on financial intermediation in 
Germany, sharply differs from Chandler in his belief that Britain experienced much of the 
same impact of the railroads on its capital markets, albeit with some qualitative 
differences that will be discussed and summarized below.   
 In Scale and Scope, Chandler contends that the German railroads were 
constructed using a far greater quantity of outside capital than the British, and that 
consequently, the impact of this financing on Germany’s financial institutions was far 
greater than in the British case.  Again, an inspection of the sources Chandler uses to 
support these contentions provides no data, or any links to sources containing an exact 
breakdown of how much capital used in the construction of the early German or British 
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railroads was outside vs. local, or the exact percentage growth of the German or British 
capital markets that occurred as a consequence of this railroad financing activity. 
 According to Chandler, the “Great” German banks, or Grossbanken, had come 
into being, as had the great American investment banking houses, primarily to finance the 
railroads.70  Chandler explains that in Germany, as in the United States, the rapid rail 
growth of the late 1840’s and 1850’s created an unprecedented peacetime demand for 
capital.  Just as in the United States, where this demand led to the centralizing and 
institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York, in Germany, it resulted in 
the creation of a wholly new financial intermediary, the Kreditbanken, the largest of 
which were known as Grossbanken.  According to Chandler, the Kreditbanken became 
central to the later financing of large-scale industrial enterprise, for they were able to 
provide capital on a both a national and international scale.  Since the 1850’s, Chandler 
asserts, the Grossbanken have dominated German finance.71 
 Before this boom of the 1840’s-50’s, Chandler explains, much of the capital for 
the German railroads was raised locally, coming from merchants, manufacturers, bankers, 
and to a lesser extent, landowners living at the termini or along the rail lines.  However, 
as the network expanded, local funds proved inadequate, and external finance of the type 
provided by the Kreditbanken became a necessity.72  Quoting Tilly, Chandler writes that 
until the 1850’s, banking and finance in Germany were “personal and interfamilial.” 
Then: “The railroads, and a good deal of heavy industrial enterprise which followed or 
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accompanied their construction, involved external finance to a much larger extent than 
earlier types of business enterprise in Germany did.”73  
 Further testimony to the heavy role and importance of external finance to the 
railroads of Germany, and the impact on capital markets it had, is provided to Chandler 
by information supplied here from Jacob Riesser in his classic study of the Grossbanken 
(1911),74 who noted that of the total capital invested in German joint stock companies 
between 1851 and 1870, three-fourths of that went into railroad companies, and a major 
share of those funds were raised by Kreditbanken.75  
 Chandler goes on to explain how a second railroad boom in the 1870’s brought 
still more of these type of financial institutions into existence, and how after the 1880’s, 
when most of the railroad network was being completed and as the railroads were being 
taken over by the state, the Grossbanken began to concentrate on financing other types of 
industrial enterprises, particularly in the newer industries.  He explains the important role 
the Grossbanken played in the financing of such enterprises, often serving in an advisory 
role to the managers of large industrial corporations, thus making a great contribution to 
the economic growth and rapid industrialization Germany experienced in the late 19th 
century.76  Chandler again contrasts the German experience of railroad finance with the 
British, again ascribing a far greater impact of railroad finance on capital market growth 
in Germany than in Britain: “…the all-purpose Kreditbanken, particularly the largest, the 
Grossbanken, were the instruments that made possible the rapid accumulation of capital 
on a scale vast enough to finance the building of the new Continental transportation and 
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communication infrastructure.  In Britain, where such investment was somewhat smaller, 
and where more local capital was available and the world’s largest and most sophisticated 
money market existed, the provision of funds for railway building had less impact on 
existing financial institutions…”77  
 Again, Chandler’s sources cited contain no empirical validation of the claim that 
the German railroads were constructed using a greater proportion of external capital than 
the British, and that the activities of railroad finance had a greater augmenting affect on 
German capital markets than on the British.  Tilly (1967) and Riesser essentially consist 
of a repetition of what Chandler said above concerning the impact of the railroads on 
financial intermediation in Germany.  While Chandler’s analysis and interpretation 
appear to be on the money, or at least in agreement with the analysis presented in the 
leading literature on the subject available in English, that literature still does not contain, 
or point us to any reliable data series that confirm his allegation that the German 
railroads, through the Kreditbanken or any other sources of industrial finance, were more 
heavily funded by outside sources than the British railroads.  While neither does Tilly’s 
later 1986 article, it does, as will be shown below, present the same strikingly anomalous 
depiction of the impact of the railroads on British capital markets presented in the above 
survey of literature in that area.  In comparing the impact of the railroads on the capital 
markets of Britain and Germany, Tilly also found that Britain, like the United States, and 
like Germany, also experienced a great degree of capital market augmentation in 
connection with the railroads.  While he acknowledges that there were some differences 
between the impact of the railroads on financial intermediation in the two countries, and 
that there was at least somewhat more of a profound impact of the railroads on the capital 
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markets of Germany, he does not believe that outside finance was essentially any more 
important to the German railroads than the British, and maintains that in Britain, as in 
Germany, the great capital cost of the railroads led to the development of a national 
capital market.   
 Apparently, according to Tilly, Britain received as, or nearly as much 
augmentation of its financial intermediation facilities from the construction of its railroad 
network as Germany in the late 19th century.  What distinguishes the impact of the 
railroads on capital markets in the German instance from the British is the fact that in 
Germany, the business of railroad finance led to the evolution of large investment banks 
that formed much closer relations between themselves and large industrial corporations 
than in Britain, and this might explain part of the German great industrial leap forward.  
According to Tilly, the primary reason for the British slowdown in industrial growth and 
decline from its position of leadership in industrial innovation is not any kind of relative 
financial weakness, but rather a pronounced predilection for foreign over domestic 
investments, and other factors unrelated to the size and structure of its banking industry.  
It was errors or weaknesses that occurred much later on in the 19th century that were 
Britain’s setback in that period, not a weakness stemming from less vigorous railroad 
investment earlier on circa the 1840’s as implied by Chandler.  Both countries seemingly 
experienced great financial augmentation as a result of railroad finance; however, one 
exploited that augmentation more effectively, while the other one floundered for reasons 
unrelated to lack of adequate financial intermediation facilities. The great linkage and 
strong positive correlation between a nation’s financial intermediation facilities and its 
capabilities for industrial growth that is implied in Chandler’s analysis is absent from 
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Tilly’s. It is indeed ironic that in one of the very sources that Chandler cites as his source 
of information on the history of the development of the German railroads and their 
impact on German capital markets there should be information and opinions that so 
dramatically contradict his own assessment of the impact of the railroads on British 
capital markets.   
 In Tilly (1967), evidence confirming Chandler’s belief in the great impetus 
towards development of financial intermediation facilities presented by the German 
railroad boom of the 1840’s is presented.  The basic picture presented by Chandler above 
of a railroad system that was first dependent on local capital sources, but then finding 
these local sources insufficient is confirmed by Tilly here. Tilly describes the formation 
of local joint-stock banks in response to the earliest railroads in Germany in the late 
1830’s and early 1840’s in Rhineland, Saxony, Silesia, Berlin, and elsewhere as the first 
significant examples of investment banking in Germany.  Due to their tremendous capital 
needs in excess of the financial resources of the individual entrepreneur, the railroads in 
Germany came to be dominated by the joint-stock company organization.  Tilly notes the 
great increase in joint stock companies founded in Prussia and Saxony in the 1850’s, 
coincident with, or consequent to the great railroad boom commencing in the 1840’s.  
Tilly goes on to describe the evolution of a national capital market in connection with the 
capital needs of the railroads in the section of the article from which Chandler extracted 
the quote above that deals specifically with industrial finance and the role of the banks.  
Tilly states that due to the tremendous capital needs of the railroads after 1840, they 
involved a much greater reliance on external financing than most other types of industrial 
enterprise hitherto undertaken in Germany.  As railroad securities began to be actively 
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traded on stock exchanges in Germany by mid-century, the banking system developed the 
powerful institutional mechanisms by which to attract, draw, and pool savings capital 
sources from far and wide into industrial employment.78  
 Though insightful, this source still does not contain any data that can be used to 
determine the exact proportion or percentage of capital that financed the railroads that 
can be considered to be external; that raised on the type of exchanges mentioned above 
that are implied to be external capital sources.  Of course, it is not clear at which point the 
local joint-stock banks that funded the railroads at the beginning grew to become the 
behemoth Kreditbanken Chandler speaks of that funded projects far and wide.  Joint-
stock capital can be local capital, as the experience of the British financing of the 
railroads via the Provincial Exchanges illustrates.  More recent work on the subject 
(Fohlin, 2007; Edwards & Ogilvie, 1996)79 is more skeptical concerning the contribution 
of railroad finance to the creation of the great German universal banking system, noting 
that while banks played a significant role in early railroad financing in parts of Prussia 
and Saxony, state governments financed the vast majority of such investment in other 
areas. 
 The Riesser book does not help us determine what proportion of the capital 
employed by the German railroads at any time was external finance either.  There is only 
a brief mention of railroads in the context of a discussion of the large bank groups that 
originated from 1870-1911 as a result of the changed relations of the banks to industry 
(meaning closer alliances), the principal cause of which being the enormous demand for 
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capital by industry in general.  He merely lists a few of the leading bank groups heavily 
involved in railroad finance that were formed in this period.80  The book does contain 
tables that list figures on the value of all railroad securities issued by the great banks at 
the Berlin Stock Exchange from 1882 to 1908, and at all German Stock Exchanges from 
1897 to 1908.  However, not all railroad securities traded on exchanges, even by great 
banks, may necessarily be outside capital, and there could be more external financing of 
the railroads that occurred over this period that occurred outside of these stock 
exchanges, by banks that may not fall into the category of “great” ones, so these tables 
may not be a precise indication of the quantity of outside capital employed by the 
German railroads over these periods.81 
 Tilly’s later 1986 article discusses both the German and British early 
railroadization, and the impact it had on the capital markets of both countries.  Tilly 
argues that the financing of the construction of the railroads that both nations experienced 
in the 1840’s had a very similar, significant expansionary effect on financial 
intermediation facilities in both countries.   
 Tilly concurs with Reed, Broadbridge, and the other experts on the financing of 
the British railroad system that the large sums of capital raised through the sale of shares 
and bonds for railroads from the 1830’s on through the 1840’s was of such a great 
magnitude that they greatly contributed to the development of a national capital market in 
Britain by the mid-century.  According to Tilly, the railroads established the first major 
links between business enterprise and a national capital market in both Britain and 
Germany, and in the 2nd half of the 19th century, those connections widened and 
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intensified in both countries.82  As the century wore on, Britain was in no weaker a 
position than Germany with respect to its financial system.  Tilly presents evidence here 
showing that the financial systems of both countries developed powerfully between 1870 
and 1914, although he does not prove that railroad financing was responsible for this 
growth, and if so, to what extent.  According to R. Goldsmith, the value of assets of 
financial institutions issued in Britain and Germany between 1861 and 1913 grew about 
$11 billion and $20 billion respectively, while the value of all securities held by 
wealthholders in 1912 was $29 billion and $21 billion—about 2 to 3 times the size of 
estimated national incomes in the two countries.  By the beginning of the 20th century 
(1901-13), British wealthholders were acquiring publicly issued securities at a rate of 
about 6 or 7 per cent of national product per year, while German savers acquired at a rate 
of about 4 per cent.   For assets of financial institutions, the positions of the two countries 
were reversed, with Britain’s accumulation in the 1901-13 period approximating 3 per 
cent of the national product and Germany’s between 8 and 9 per cent.83  While it is 
possible that railroad finance played a greater role in this German growth, one certainly 
cannot say that the British financial system suffered from less thereof.  
 A purely quantitative comparison of the financial position of both countries in the 
late 19th century, however, does not tell the full story.  While Britain may have received 
as much quantitative growth of its financial intermediation as a result of railroad finance, 
Germany may have experienced financial intermediation growth of a different variety 
that may have been more conducive to subsequent industrial growth than that which 
occurred in Britain.  To Tilly, the industrial development of Germany in the first half of 
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the nineteenth century is very similar to that of Britain, in that the railroad building of the 
1840’s initiated the development of a national market for enterprise capital.  However, 
the railroad-building experience of Germany differs insofar as its impact on capital 
markets from the British experience in two ways.  Firstly, Tilly explains, railroads were 
relatively more important in the German economy, as evidenced by the greater share 
comprised by railroad investment relative to other industrial and commercial investment. 
Secondly, railroad financing in Germany paved the way for a unique form of industrial 
finance peculiar to Germany; a unique German innovation in industrial finance that 
became known as German “mixed” banking.  This form of banking, also described by 
Chandler, entailed greater involvement of financiers in the affairs of business enterprise, 
as seen by bankers taking a role in the initial organizing committees of forming railroad 
companies, and taking a leading role in marketing the securities necessary for the initial 
raising of funds for their construction.  This strong relationship between the railroads and 
their banks continued as the railroads matured, with bankers often occupying key 
positions on the boards of directors of the railroad companies, as additional safeguard 
care-keepers for their considerable investments, including organizational contributions.84 
 As Chandler explained, the banks’ relationship with railroad companies 
established a pattern of industrial finance in Germany that continued when the banks 
began to finance other large-scale enterprise, and served in the same advisory capacity in 
which they had assisted the railroads.  In summary, we find in Tilly the essentially same 
story of the great contribution of the railroads to industrial finance in Germany as 
described by Chandler; the evolution of the Kreditbanken, and their great contribution to 
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industrial growth through not only massive outside capital access, but through the 
supervisory and advisory capacity in which they assisted their industrial clients.  
 Besides the stronger bonds between banks and industrial corporations that existed 
in Germany, Tilly points out that there was another crucial advantage that Germany 
enjoyed that was not shared by Britain: these banks were busy financing domestic 
enterprise, while British banks were investing abroad.  While Britain rivaled Germany in 
terms of sheer number of securities issued on the London exchange vs. the Berlin 
exchange, Tilly presents evidence here showing that from 1882-1913, foreign issues 
dominated the British market, whereas it was quite the opposite in Berlin.85  
 It appears that Britain in general, and London in particular, did experience an 
augmentation of its financial intermediation facilities as a result of the railroads in one 
form or another that was commensurate with that experienced by the United States or 
Germany.  It may have been dispersed across the land in the provincial exchanges, or it 
may have been concentrated in London; regardless, there does not seem to have been a 
shortage of capital in Britain in the later decades of the 19th century that could have been 
used to finance industry.  There is an extensive literature on the subject of why there was 
little domestic investment in Britain at this time, and capital tended to gravitate overseas.  
According to many scholars, this occurred because these investments may have been 
more profitable, and this may have been detrimental to economic growth and industrial 
development at home.  Cottrell remarks, citing assistance from Edelstein, that in the 
London market, investors generally placed their savings in large issues, which meant 
apart from railroad securities, foreign issues (which included foreign railroad assets, as 
pointed out by Fishlow).  Railroad securities appear to have been the great domestic 
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mainstay of the British securities industry.  It seems absurd to say that because Britain got 
little railroad investment in the railroads’ formative years that this was its Achilles heel in 
its later years, when in fact railroad investment was practically its only remaining 
strength as far as domestic investments were concerned.  It points to the notion that 
perhaps British financial weakness in financing domestic large scale industry in the latter 
decades of the 19th century may have been something that occurred in spite of, not 
because of the quantity of railroad investment finance that occurred throughout the 
century.86  
 Further, Cottrell notes, this lull in domestic investment ended with the financial 
boom of 1895 that saw a tremendous increase in domestic issues until 1900 that included 
both railroad and non-railroad investments that both the London and provincial 
exchanges cashed in on.87  While this domestic boom may have occurred in “too little, 
too late” a manner in which to enable British industry to catch up with the American and 
German enterprises, who had already acquired the necessary first mover advantages in 
the crucial hi-tech growth industries of the late 19th century, it does seriously call into 
question the notion that financial sector weakness was a major stumbling block for 
Britain insofar as keeping up with the Joneses in the area of financing the large scale 
industry of the  2nd Industrial Revolution.  
 The more recent literature concerning the comparative development of the British 
and German financial systems does not support Chandler or Tilly.  Besides Fohlin, 
Edwards and Oglivie’s work cited above that called into question the degree to which 
railroad finance contributed to the growth of universal banking in Germany, these 
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scholars also dispute the alleged dissimilarity of the banking systems of the two countries 
in finding little differences in the degree of equity participation in industrial companies 
on the part of banks in the two countries.  Fohlin also dispels as myth the idea that the 
German banks had closer, longer, cradle-to-grave relationships with their industrial 
clients in finding that actually, compared to the British banks, German banks actually 
maintained significantly higher cash deposit ratios than the British banks did, and 
covered a greater share of short-term liabilities with short term or liquid assets.  Fohlin 
notes that the German universal banks may have expanded their available capital at a 
faster rate, since they invested or lent a greater share of their total liabilities than did the 
British banks, and implies that this may have played a role in relatively stronger 
performance of German industry since the end of the 19th century.  But she determines 
that this phenomenon does appear to be related to any real differences in banking 
structure.88   
 
* 
To summarize and draw some basic conclusions from our literature survey before we 
proceed to our empirical analysis, it appears that Chandler may have been only partially 
correct about the impact of the railroads on Britain’s capital markets, and its ramifications 
for industrial development in the latter decades of the 19th century.  It appears that 
Britain’s railroads may have also been heavily financed by outside capital, and that this 
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financing did have a dramatic impact on its capital markets, as evidenced by the 
development of a national market for railroad shares.  The tremendous discrepancy 
between Chandler’s and other authors’ descriptions of the impact of the railroads on 
capital markets in the three nations, particularly the relative degree of outside capital in 
the railroad networks of the three countries, demonstrates the need for further empirical 
work in this area in order to determine if in fact it is the case that the American and 
German railroads were more heavily reliant upon outside capital in the construction of 
their railroad systems, and if this greater reliance on outside capital is associated in any 
way with greater growth of investment banking industry.  Why Britain failed to make the 
necessary investments in the large-scale, science-based industries of the late 19th century, 
and its industrial sector grew less rapidly than that of the United States and Germany is 
difficult to pigeonhole, but it does not appear to be due to lack of adequate investment 
banking facilities.  A reading of Tilly suggests that Britain invested too much capital 
overseas to the detriment of home investment, and that closer bonds between the banking 
community and the industry it served was a crucial ingredient for success for Germany.  
Yet the United States invested a great deal in the large-scale, science-based industries of 
the late 19th century, and experienced a rapid industrial growth similar to that achieved by 
Germany that was mostly unaided by the German “mixed banking” model of industrial 
finance.  The Tilly readings also do not indicate any dramatic centralization and 
institutionalization of Germany’s capital markets in Berlin or any one location, as 
Chandler maintains occurred in New York, and implies was a crucial ingredient for the 
subsequent American industrial expansion.  The fact that German industrialization in the 
late 19th century appears unhampered by this lack of a single concentrated financial 
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center blows a further hole in the Chandlerian hypothesis that lack thereof was an 
impediment to British industrialization.  
 
 
V.  FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION EFFECTS: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We now develop the theoretical framework for our empirical analysis of the role of 
financial intermediaries in the said correlation between the railroads and the more 
concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization that had evolved in the United 
States, Germany, and, ostensibly, to a lesser extent, in Britain by the late 19th century.  
This component of the study attempts to quantify the impact of the railroads on capital 
markets that Chandler claims gave such tremendous impetus to economies of scale and 
scope in American and German industry via financial intermediation.  Here we provide a 
critical assessment of the Chandler hypothesis that the tremendous capital needs of an 
expanding railroad network in the United States called for such enormous quantities of 
outside capital that the result was the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s 
money market in New York, which Chandler believed was of critical importance to the 
subsequent financing of large scale industry, and provided a significant impetus to the 
growth of economies of scale and scope in American industry in the late nineteenth 
century.  We also provide a critical assessment of the Chandler hypothesis that the British 
industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was less heavily impacted by the 
railroads due to a lesser impact of its railroads on financial intermediation.  In our task of 
measuring the degree of correlation between the railroad and greater concentration and 
scale of industry that was achieved through the strengthening of financial intermediation, 
we conduct an analysis that attempts to juxtapose the timing of effects of the railroads on 
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the industrial development of these countries with data concerning the financing of the 
railroads themselves, in a similar manner as these effects were presented alongside data 
concerning mileage and physical capital invested in the railroads in the previous chapter 
in evaluating the degree of the correlation between the railroads and greater concentration 
and scale of industry achieved through the railroads’ market-expanding properties and 
input demand effects.  We also, using what data is available, attempt to conduct a similar 
analysis with respect to the impact of the railroads on German financial intermediaries to 
provide a further test of the magnitude of these financial augmentation effects wrought by 
the railroads that Chandler thought to be so important to Germany’s industrial 
development in the late 19th century.   
 The empirical evidence presented thus far shows mixed support for Chandler’s 
theory.  In the previous chapter, Table 2.1 showed that the United States and Germany 
indeed possessed larger, more extensive railroad systems than Britain.  Ostensibly, they 
therefore ought to have had greater need for capital, which in turn ought to have greatly 
stimulated the business of selling and buying railroad securities, which ought to have had 
a commensurate augmenting impact on the financial institutions of those countries, 
which, in turn, through the task of financial intermediation, ought to have contributed to 
the growth of non-financial industries, abetting economies of scale and scope in those 
countries and contributing to their technological leapfrog over Britain in the late 19th 
century.   
 However, our literature survey on the financing of the British, American and 
German railroad systems reveals that Chandler may have greatly exaggerated the role of 
American financial institutions in providing outside capital to the railroads, and may have 
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greatly under-estimated the role such institutions played in the construction of the British 
railroad system, and the respective impact these activities had on these financial 
institutions of the two countries.  Our empirical analysis of railroad mileage per square 
mile of national territory in Chapter Two buttresses these revelations of our literature 
survey, because it shows Britain as the most heavily railroadized nation of the three, with 
far greater railroad track per mile of national territory than either the United States or 
Germany throughout the period in question.  Because Britain had such an extensive 
railroad system for its size (meaning geographic area and overall size of its economy), 
the industry of railroad construction may have loomed larger relative to other industry 
there, and therefore may have been relatively more reliant on outside capital for the 
construction of its railroads.  This may have precipitated more financial sector growth as 
a result of its railroad business than in the United States and Germany.  The literature 
survey on derived demand effects also supports this contention of the relatively greater 
importance of the railroads in Britain in the tremendous impetus to its iron and coal 
industries Bagwell and other historians have attributed to it.  This points to the need for 
an empirical methodology for assessing financial intermediation effects that takes the 
relative sizes of these economies into account.   
 In order to construct our empirical methodology for testing Chandler’s theory 
concerning the effects of the railroads on financial intermediation, a brief recapitulation 
of that theory is necessary.  Chandler maintained that the capital needs of the larger and 
more extensive American and German railroad systems were beyond the recourse of the 
lone entrepreneur or local sources of capital, and were such that required massive 
infusions of outside capital provided through selling securities in large exchanges that 
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arose to meet that need.  These exchanges grew and prospered in association with their 
railroad business, and before long, a vast financial infrastructure expert in the task of 
raising funds for large enterprise, and in general capable of supplying large amounts of 
outside capital to the railroads and other industries came into existence.  With this 
infrastructure, nations were equipped with the means to effectively fund, build and 
operate other large-scale capital intensive enterprise both during, and particularly after 
the majority of their railroad systems were constructed.  Due to the tremendous capital 
input needs of the railroads, a dramatically new mode of industrial organization that was 
larger-scale and more concentrated than that that had hitherto existed was ushered into 
the developed economies of the United States and Europe, and it was Chandler’s 
contention that the greater preponderance of the railroads in the United States and 
Germany naturally resulted in a greater preponderance of this form of industrial 
organization than in Britain where the railroad system was smaller and capable of being 
financed by smaller-scale, more local, traditional mechanisms.89      
 In order to test this hypothesis, our empirical methodology must provide a fair 
measure of the degree of financial augmentation each nation experienced that was a 
direct result of this business of providing these massive infusions of outside capital to the 
railroads by selling securities in large exchanges.  If by a direct result of supplying huge 
amounts of outside capital to the railroads there was a dramatic growth in the financial 
capital industry which was of critical importance in raising the investment capacity of the 
economy in terms of providing capital to other non-financial and non-railroad industries, 
one possible indicator of that growth would be a large and growing portion of outside 
railroad capital assets in the portfolios of these financial institutions.  However, we must 
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heed the Chandler hypothesis that it was because of the greater capital needs of the larger 
and more extensive American and German railroad systems that this financial 
augmentation occurred.  For instance, it is possible for a nation with a small railroad 
network, say Britain, that did not require massive amounts of outside capital to build, to 
have greatly stimulated the smaller scale banking industry it already had as a result of its 
railroads due to the relative greatness of this otherwise small sum of outside capital in the 
portfolio of that existing financial sector—a sum that, although small, contributed a lot to 
that nation’s development of a modern financial sector.  Such a scenario would be 
indicative of a very low correlation between a large and growing railroad system and the 
growth of the modern financial sector.   
 To provide a more rigorous and appropriate test of the Chandler hypothesis, we 
need to examine the enlargement of a nation’s financial sector in association with the 
business of railroad finance in relation to the rest of its economy.  That small sum of 
railroad outside capital in the portfolios of British investment banks that made a great 
percentage-wise contribution to the growth of a modern financial sector could still have 
resulted in a small and ineffectual modern financial sector.  It all depends upon the size of 
the economy.  If the British modern financial sector was small because railroads stocks, 
for instance, were its primary asset, and there was little else in their portfolios, and/or this 
small total chunk of capital in question was a negligible portion of total investment in the 
economy, then one can rightly attribute the small capital needs of Britain’s railroad 
system as a factor contributing to a weak modern financial sector in Britain.  But suppose 
that given the size of the overall British economy, this creation of a modern financial 
sector looms large on its economic horizon; despite its small size as compared with the 
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capital raised for the railroads in the United States for example, this capital stock 
represented a huge rise in investment as a percentage of total output in the economy.  For 
an economy the size of Britain, viewed in this relative context of growth of the financial 
sector vis-à-vis the rest of the economy, it may have been a very robust and significant 
ballooning of the financial sector.  A chunk of capital that would be small for the United 
States might be very large for Britain.  As a result of the stimulation of the railroads, 
Britain’s modern financial sector may have swelled to a size that was more than adequate 
as a means for propelling economic growth given the size and population of Britain.  
Given the size of Britain’s economy, this “small” stock of capital may have constituted a 
huge package of harnessable economic development potential. 
 Thus a more appropriate indicator of financial augmentation effects in association 
with the business of railroad finance would be an enlargement of a nation’s financial 
sector in relation to the rest of its economy from selling railroad securities.  The 
percentage of G.N.P. that railroad outside capital comprised automatically subsumes this 
enlargement because it would be impossible for railroad outside capital to be a large 
fraction of G.N.P., yet a low fraction of total investment.  That would require investment 
to be such a large per cent of G.N.P. that it practically wipes out, or makes negative, the 
other portions of spending that comprise the national income identity; a nearly impossible 
scenario.   
 Conversely, if railroad outside capital were a small percent of G.N.P., it would be 
an indicator of the insignificance of railroad outside capital in a nation’s financial 
intermediation facilities.  Even if that quantity of railroad outside capital were a large 
percent of total investment, it would mean that investment itself is such a small share of 
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national output that things that induce changes in its size are irrelevant, or at least, of little 
consequence insofar as they stimulate the financial intermediation capabilities of the 
nation.  And naturally, if railroad outside capital is both a small share of G.N.P. and a 
small share of investment, changes in railroad outside capital affect neither the overall 
level of the investment capacity of the nation nor the size of the financial sector itself by 
very much.  Consequently, if railroad outside capital is a small share of G.N.P., it 
unambiguously points to both insignificance of this quantity of capital in terms of 
strengthening the overall investment capacity of the economy, and non-strengthening of 
financial intermediation occurring in relation to supplying capital for railroads.   
Consequently, the percentage of railroad outside capital in a nation’s G.N.P. 
serves as an effective empirical variable for measurement of the growth of the financial 
capital industry that in turn, can be attributed to the railroads.   If it is large, it is an 
indicator of a large stock of capital in relation to the rest of the economy that was directly 
attributable to the existence of the railroads that also contributed a lot to the strengthening 
of financial intermediation in the economy.  If it is small, it is indicative of a small stock 
of capital in relation to the rest of the economy that was insignificant insofar as bolstering 
the financial intermediation facilities of the economy.  A small and compact (large and 
expansive) railroad system could have had a great (small) impact on a nation’s financial 
intermediation facilities; if so, debunking the Chandler hypothesis.  
The efficacy of the percentage of railroad outside capital in a nation’s G.N.P. in a 
given period as an appropriate index of the degree of the impact of railroad assets on the 
augmentation of financial intermediation facilities in an economy over time is given 
further confirmation by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), who explain that a measure of the 
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stock of a given form of investment must be appropriately scaled and consistent over time 
if we are to gain some sense of the evolution of a given market for a particular kind of 
asset.  The data must be normalized from its measurement at a point in time in current 
dollars, because the growth of the economy might be associated with an increase in such 
a nominal quantity, as would any long-run inflation. These trends would have nothing to 
do with augmentation of the financial sector from railroad assets per se.  To overcome 
this problem, railroad capital must be normalized at each point in time by some measure 
of the size of the economy in question, dividing through by a denominator in the form of 
a nominal size index.  
While the total stock of financial capital might seem to be an ideal denominator 
for gauging the impact of railroad capital upon financial intermediation, Obstfeld and 
Taylor point out that the problem with this method is that financial capital measures 
multiply over the long run as the number of balance sheets in the economy expands 
through financial development as seen in the rise of numerous financial intermediaries.  
This trend, in principle, could happen at any point in time without any underlying change 
in the extent of railroad asset holdings.  According to Obstfeld and Taylor, the level of 
output as measured by G.D.P. in current prices functions better as a normalizing agent.  
Consequently, the ratio of railroad assets to output should be adequate as a proxy 
measure of the penetration of railroad capital in any economy over time.90   
Since we are interested in testing the chronological impact growing railroad 
systems eventually had on financial intermediaries in these countries in this study, 
Obstfeld and Taylor’s methodology dovetails completely with our own.  In Table 3.3 
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below in which this series is constructed, we can view it in relation to Table 2.1 and see 
how closely this financial augmentation parallels the construction of the railroad network 
as a test of Chandler’s theory.  We can also compare it to Table 2.1 that measured 
railroad mileage per square mile of national territory to obtain an indicator of the 
magnitude of the effect of these growing railroad systems on capital markets.  Britain’s 
more highly concentrated railroad system may have had a greater impact on its capital 
markets.  
Before we proceed to the empirical analysis, one further issue that must be cleared 
up is what to use as our measure of “outside capital”.  Here, we use that provided by 
Raymond Goldsmith in his1958 NBER study of long-term trends in capital formation and 
financing in the United States.  In this larger work, Goldsmith provides analyses of trends 
in the principal capital-using sectors of the economy to provide us with more appropriate 
categories of capital.  In categorizing the sources of funds for railroads in the mid-20th 
century, Goldsmith counted as “internal” sources only retained profits and consumption 
allowances.  All other sources of funds, including bank loans, mortgages, capital stock, 
bonds, and all other liabilities were considered external sources.91   
We use Goldsmith’s definition of outside capital in order to clear up possible 
confusion about the meaning of the term caused by our diverse literature sources.  In 
describing the inadequacy of local capital sources for the construction of the American 
railroads, Chandler describes these as individuals living in a road’s termini or along its 
line who believed they had much to gain from its construction, or banks and stock 
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exchanges situated in a road’s termini or along its line,92 implying that outside capital is 
that originating from any other source; an opinion echoed by Bagwell.93  However, this 
definition may be a little too cut-and-dry, as it pertains to local vs. long distance capital 
sources.  As Reed points out, the great provincial stock exchanges of Britain grew to 
immense capacity by funding railroads both inside and outside their areas.94  Does one 
count the funding from such institutions that funded railroads in their own locale as local 
or outside capital? 
Goldsmith’s definition of external capital also corresponds very closely to the 
data for railway financial capital that are available to us.  These are data for total stock of 
railway financial capital for the United States for every five years for 1850-1914 from the 
Census Bureau’s Historical Statistics that I have tabulated in Table 3.1 below along with 
the same for Great Britain for 1830-1914 and their respective decadal growth rates.  
These American data consist of total capital stock, bonded debt, mortgage bonds, 
obligations, etc. as described in series Q-347 of the Rail Transportation data series in 
Historical Statistics (the source of my pre-1890 data), and total common stock, preferred 
stock, and funded debt unmatured as described in Series Q-358 of the same Rail 
Transportation series (the source of my data from 1890 on).  These data ought to be 
adequate as a measure of the quantity of external capital in the U.S. railroad system.95 
The British sources encompass a similar array of financial instruments.  The 
1830-45 data found in Hawke and Reed (1969) represent the sum of all share capital and 
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loans and debentures and the 1850-1914 Mitchell and Deane (1975) data represent all 
paid-up capital and loans.  German data were not available.  
Following Table 3.1 is Table 3.2 that delineates Gross National Product for Great 
Britain, the United States, and Germany for 1830-1914.  Next is Table 3.3 that delineates 
the total stock of railway financial capital as a percentage of Gross National Product for 
Great Britain and the United States for every five years for 1830-1914. 
 
 
VI.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
In looking at Table 3.1 that contains the unnormalized data for total stock of railway 
financial capital for the United States for every five years for 1850-1914 along with the 
same for Great Britain for 1830-1914 and their respective decadal growth rates, we must 
bear in mind that since the data are in current rather than constant prices, a precise 
comparison of the stock of capital at different dates cannot be made here.  
Notwithstanding, it appears that British railway finance made a relatively modest start in 
absolute terms in the 1830’s and 1840’s, although in percentage terms, its rate of capital 
accumulation was very rapid.  After its large leap in absolute quantity of capital achieved 
by the 1850’s that confirms Reed’s statements about the mid-century railroad finance 
boom, Britain continued to accumulate financial capital at a steady, albeit diminishing 
rate all the way up to 1914.  The United States seems to have made its great leap in 
absolute quantities of capital during the 1870’s and early 1880’s, making leaps in the two 
billion dollar range.  After this period, investment increased at a more modest, but still 
healthy rate.  One more gigantic burst of financing activity appeared in the early 20th 
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century as seen by the nearly five billion dollar jump occurring between 1905 and 1910, 
and the 60 per cent increase over its 1900 level of capital achieved by 1910.   
 In general, Table 3.1 displays a generally more rapid accumulation of capital as 
occurring in the American railroad system as compared with Britain throughout the 
period in question which supports Chandler’s contentions regarding the relative strength 
of the effects of the railroads on financial intermediation during the early industrialization 
of the United States vs. what was going on in Britain at the same time.  I would 
particularly direct your attention to the period from the 1850's to the 1870's, during which 
doubling or near-doubling of the capital stock over five-year periods is frequently 
observed.  Such rapid capital accumulation corresponds to the period during which the 
United States overtook Britain in railroad mileage, and in doing so, purportedly, amassed 
the huge quantities of capital necessary for constructing the railroads that Chandler 
believed ultimately led to the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money 
market in New York and established the essential mechanisms for the financing of other 
large-scale industrial corporations. 
 The data are also in sync with Chandler’s timing predictions in terms of the 
effects of this capital accumulation on financial intermediation and wide-scale industry 
finance.  If Britain were to have experienced any consequences of railroadization that 
abetted the economies of scale and scope of industry through amplification of its 
financial sector, these spillover effects onto other large-scale industry ought to have 
occurred at around 1870; the same time in which all the other economies of scale and 
scope British industry received in association with the opportunities presented by the 
railroads occurred.  Since Chandler believed Britain experienced little of these effects due 
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to its smaller and more compact railroad system, he does not give us any indication of 
when these effects, if there were any, would be manifest.   However, barring any further 
exploration of the economic history of the impact of the railroads on British banking, it 
would stand to reason that if we want to measure and quantify whatever effects the 
railroads had on the British financial sector, and any concomitant expansionary effects on 
other industry associated with this augmentation of the financial sector, the peak of 
finance observed at mid-century would certainly be, as it is in the case of the United 
States, our starting point.  With the lagged effects similar to that that purportedly 
occurred in the United States, the economies of scale and scope British industry received 
in association with the opportunities presented by the railroads has been identified above 
as having begun at about a benchmark date of 1870. 
 Chandler’s timing predictions in terms of the effects of this capital accumulation 
on financial intermediation and wide-scale industry finance in the United States require 
far less guesswork.  Chandler has definite opinions as to when the dramatic effects of the 
railroads began to be felt on American financial intermediation where he mentions how 
the huge capital requirements for constructing the American railroads led to the 
centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York.  Chandler 
credits the growth of the New York money market from the 1850's to the 1890's, during 
which time it grew to be second in size only to that of London, as having occurred almost 
exclusively as a result of railroad financing activities.  He notes that the great investment 
banks that were to play such an important role in the financing of industrial mergers at 
the turn of the century all owed their birth to the specialty of railroad finance.96  This 
acceleration in the rate of capital accumulation during that time is evident in Table 3.1 
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below.  Certainly a reasonable starting point one can point to the mechanisms for such 
large-scale financing activity as having established themselves, if not at least their having 
been set in motion, would be about 1870, about the beginning of the development of the 
large, (non-railroad) industrial corporation in the United States.     
 Following Table 3.1 is Table 3.2 that demarcates Gross National Product for 
Great Britain, the United States, and Germany for 1830-1914.  Inspection of these 
nominal G.N.P. figures shows all three countries as having experienced very constant, 
steady growth in national output over the period in question, although a real G.N.P. 
comparison might show peaks and troughs a little more accurately. 
 Table 3.2 is followed by Table 3.3 that delineates the total stock of railway 
financial capital as a percentage of Gross National Product for Great Britain and the 
United States for 1830-1914.  As it can be seen in Table 3.3, Britain’s head start in 
railroad construction puts it in a strong first place over the United States all the way until 
1875, after which time the American percentage exceeds that of Britain for every year 
except 1905 and 1910, and these are only very narrow leads of Britain.  Yet we cannot 
attribute Britain’s head start in railroad construction to this phenomenon because the 
United States had overtaken Britain in railroad mileage by 1835.  Yet Britain maintained 
a strong lead in capital as a percent of its G.N.P. all the way until the 1870’s, which 
suggests that railroad finance played a stronger role in the British economy at least until 
the 1870’s, and points to a stronger impact of the railroads on financial intermediation 
facilities in Britain than in the United States all the way until the 1870’s.    
 This is strongly at odds with the Chandler hypothesis that a much more powerful 
impact of railroad finance activities in the United States by the 1850’s was responsible 
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for the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York, 
which from the 1850's to the 1890's was instrumental in the financing of industrial 
mergers at the turn of the century, and providing the impetus for rapid economic growth 
based on large scale production technologies rich in economies of scale and scope.  If 
these railroad financing activities were the catalyst to such growth, then it appears that it 
is Britain who ought to have experienced this type of growth in its financial institutions, 
not the United States.  These results confirm the contentions of Tilly and the other experts 
on the financing of the railroads in Britain that Britain did experience a great deal of 
financial augmentation as a result of its railroads, but this did not translate into great 
industrial growth at home for other reasons; a strong propensity to export capital perhaps 
being one of them.  If anything, these data overstate the American and understate the 
British financial augmentations from the railroads, because, as Fishlow pointed out, much 
of the financial capital that the United States used to construct its railroads was borrowed 
from Britain. These data also support the contentions of Reed and the other scholars of 
the financing of the British railroads that there was a massive boom in railroad financing 
activities in the early-to-mid-19th century that brought the Provincial Exchanges into 
existence and resulted in the creation of a national market for railroad shares in Britain by 
the mid-19th century, not unlike the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s 
money market in New York by the 1850’s that Chandler claimed was the result of 
railroad finance activities in the United States.   
 If a greater impact of railroad financing activities on the American banking 
system than the British was what was responsible for its leapfrog over Britain regarding 
large-scale production technologies, then this could not have begun until at least the 
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beginning of the 1870’s—not the 1850’s as Chandler claimed.  But by that time, the 
leapfrog had already begun.  The United States was already in the lead as a first mover in 
these large scale production technologies.  Thus it is very hard to make the claim that it 
was a greater impact of railroad finance activities on its banking system that was a 
catalyst to this rapid growth the United States experienced starting in the 1870’s.  
Railroad financing activities ought not to have begun to have their 20-year or so lagged 
impact that put them at an advantage with respect to Britain until the 1890’s.  But 
Chandler claims that the United States was at an advantage over Britain in these regards 
long before that time.  These data also mirror and bolster the topsy-turvy ranking order 
found in Table 2.1 that showed that in railroad mileage per square mile of national 
territory, Britain was the most heavily railroadized nation of the three throughout the 
period in question, and the historical documentation pointing to a perhaps greater impact 
of the construction of the railroad network on the British iron and coal industries.  
Relative to its size—meaning both area and economic output—the British railroad system 
may have been so large as to have put relatively greater demands upon both its railroad 
financial and physical capital input industries that the growth impact on these industries 
from the railroads was greater than the American.  Why this did not translate into 
prowess in the science-based industries of the late 19th century or a more concentrated 
industrial structure overall is another question.  But it calls the premises of the Chandler 
theory that Britain’s stumbling block in these areas was a lesser impact of the railroads on 






VII. ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY: PHYSICAL CAPITAL AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL OUTPUT 
 
Since we lack data on railroad financial capital for Germany for these years, an 
alternative methodology for comparing its financial augmentation from the railroads to 
that of the United States and Britain is presented below.  Table 3.4 displays the data for 
gross reproducible (physical) railway capital formation/expenditure (total capital flow) 
already presented in Table 2.2 below as a percentage of Gross National Product for Great 
Britain, the United States and Germany for 1830-1914.  Below, in Chart 3.1, are these 
data presented in a graph for comparison with physical capital as a percentage of G.N.P. 
on the vertical axis plotted against time on the horizontal axis.  
 These data function as an alternative measure of financial augmentation from the 
railroads indirectly, because greater investment in physical plant, way, and equipment as 
a percentage of national output would likely and logically also mean greater borrowing in 
capital markets as a percentage of national output.  If it were true, as Chandler asserted, 
that the smaller railroad network of Britain created less financial challenges for its 
economy than that of the United States and Germany, then the capital required for its 
construction ought to have been less as a percentage of G.N.P.  It stands to reason that if 
the capital used in the construction of Britain's railroad system was a smaller fraction of 
G.N.P. than in the United States and Germany, then the capital raised in financial markets 
to finance that construction also would be smaller fraction of G.N.P. than in the case of 
the American and German railroad systems.  We now have a means by which to compare 
the capital needs of the British railroad system in relation to its own and the German 
economy and assess the relative importance of the railroads in these two countries over 
this time span.  
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 In more general terms, these data provide us with a measure of the raw physical 
size and extent of a nation’s railroad system in relation to the size of its national output, 
and offset the distortions involved in comparing the railroad systems of nations of vastly 
different areas.  Chandler’s idea that that the larger and more extensive a nation’s railroad 
system, the greater the augmenting effect its construction would have on its financial 
sector is really a fallacious argument because of the vastly different geographic areas and 
G.N.P.’s of the countries we are comparing.  There is no solid theoretical reason why a 
larger, more extensive railroad system ought to have produced a relatively larger sector of 
the economy involved in supplying outside capital to industry, other than the fact that 
these features of the development of the American railroad system were so strong relative 
to the British that they did result in a financial capital industry of greater size in relation 
to the entire economy.  As Tables 2.1 and 3.3 have shown, on a per-square mile basis or 
as a percentage of national output, the American railroad system was not so large relative 
to Britain’s as to have automatically subsumed a commensurately greater augmentation 
of its financial sector involved in railroad financing relative to national output.  Britain 
had a far more extensive railroad system in terms of mileage per square mile of national 
territory and in terms of the value of its financial assets as a percentage of national 
output.  This normalized measure of physical capital investment dovetails more nicely 
with the theory that a nation for whom investment in its railroads was a more important 
part of its economic development would have received greater financial market 
augmentation as a result of this.   
 It also functions as a normalized measure of the relative impact of railroad inputs 
demand on industrial growth of the three nations.  While the patterns of growth in the 
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unnormalized stock and flow capital data of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 support the general 
contention of more rapid capital growth and accumulation in Germany and the United 
States with respect to Britain, our historical assessment of the relative impact of the 
railroads on the iron and coal industries in such a capacity indicated greater stimulation of 
the British iron and coal industries; a point that was bolstered further by Britain’s greater 
railroad mileage per square mile of national territory, and its greater normalized financial 
capital investment.  It would be interesting to see if, when normalized, taking the relative 
sizes of these nations and their economies into account, these results reproduce 
themselves or not.  Britain’s seemingly sluggish patterns of capital accumulation as 
compared with the United States and Germany may have been tremendous as a per cent 
of its G.N.P., and also, therefore, by logical implication, a large per cent of its iron, coal 
and other railroad capital producing industries, pointing to still further derived demand 
effects from the railroads on British industry.  
 Also, track mileage only tells half the story, because it omits all the other kinds of 
plant and equipment that comprise a railroad system, and contribute to making a nation 
more heavily "railroadized."  The data of Table 3.4 get us over these difficulties because 
they give us a monetary measurement of the augmentation of a nation's railroad system 
that can be compared to its G.N.P., and they include such other expenditures besides 
track mileage that go to make up a nation's railroad system. 
 Referring to Table 3.4 and Chart 3.1, and to the commentary and analysis for the 
unnormalized Table 2.2 above, it can be seen that the spike in investment Britain 
experienced in the 1840’s remains present even when measured up against G.N.P., while 
its later spike of the 1860’s appears more modest when compared to G.N.P.  Regardless, 
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prior to the late 1870’s, British investment is relatively large as a percentage of G.N.P., 
appearing to average somewhere between 1 per cent and 2 per cent of G.N.P.  This 
bolsters Reed’s belief in the mid-19th century as being a boom period for investment in 
railroads in Britain.  For the remainder of the period surveyed, from the 1880’s on, 
Britain’s investment remains very constant as a percentage of G.N.P., albeit at a slightly 
diminished level, hovering closely around the 1 per cent mark.   
 American investment when compared to G.N.P. shows the great spike of the late 
1830’s and great thrust of the late 1840’s, but what stands out even more prominently is 
the great spike of the 1860’s, as seen by the jump from 1860 to 1861 of 1.28 per cent to 
7.23 per cent, respectively.  The sustained growth that occurred thereafter can still be 
seen in Chart 3.1, with an average appearing well above Britain’s 1 per cent of G.N.P., 
albeit with significantly greater volatility.   
 The German volatility of the 1850’s and 1860’s appears to continue on throughout 
the 1870’s when compared against G.N.P., and only smoothes out by the 1880’s.  But as 
can be seen from examining German G.N.P. of the 1870’s in Table 3.2 (G.N.P. table), 
this volatility seems to come more from G.N.P. than from railroad investment, as there 
was a sharp spike in German G.N.P. in 1874, followed by a sustained dip that continued 
throughout the 1870’s, not rising again until the 1880’s.  Thereafter, German investment 
smoothes out to British absolute levels and constancy.  Ironically, Germany’s volatile 
period appears to be its highest averaging period, with an average close to Britain’s from 
the mid-1850’s to mid-1860’s, between 1 per cent and 2 per cent, then rising to higher 
levels approaching the American, averaging close to 2 per cent from the mid-1860’s to 
the start of the 1880’s.   
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 Comparing all three countries, the United States seems to be the only one for 
whom very large percentages (2 per cent or above) seem to be a normal, regular 
phenomenon, and is clearly the highest averaging country in these regards.  Next is 
Germany who seems to average well above 1 per cent for a long stretch from the mid-
1840’s to the early 1880’s.  In third place, but not far behind Germany, appears to be 
Britain, whose golden age of railway investment above 1 per cent of G.N.P. is also from 
the mid-1840’s to the early 1880’s, but who does not seem to possess spikes above 2 per 
cent during that period, as Germany does throughout the 1870’s.   
 One pattern that can be seen that all three countries have in common is a great 
take-off in the 1840’s that is more or less sustained until a leveling off period in the 
1880’s.  Even the United States, which still seems to average above 1 per cent from the 
1880’s onwards, never regains the massive spikes it achieved in the 1860’s and early 
1870’s.  In fact, for all 3 countries, it appears that the 1860’s and 1870’s were a golden 
age of railroad investment that was never achieved again.  
 The essential ranking order of the United States first, Germany second, and 
Britain third in physical capital formation as a percentage of G.N.P. shown in Table 3.4 is 
in more or less close correspondence with the degree to which Chandler believes the 
railroads impacted the industrial development of the 3 nations, and correlates with the 
specific patterns of railroad mileage growth we observed in Table 2.1.  In Table 3.4, we 
find support for Chandler’s contention that the greater capital needs of the larger and 
more extensive American and German railroad systems would have had a greater 
augmenting effect on their financial sectors.  It can be seen from Table 3.4 that just as in 
Table 2.1, Britain starts off as the leader in the very early days of the railroads, but by the 
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1850's is overtaken by the United States, and by the 1870's by Germany.  Just as Table 
2.1 displayed, Table 3.4 shows Britain as having experienced its last hump of great 
railroad investment in the 1860's, by which time its railroad system was essentially 
complete, and railroad investment for it as having leveled off to lower-averaging levels 
from the 1880's on.  From the 1880's on, there is still great investment in railroads 
relative to G.N.P. going on in the United States, corresponding to the still rapid growth of 
its railroad network, whereas German investment in railroads slows down to British 
levels by this time, as Table 2.1 showed via the lessened rapidity of German mileage 
growth after that date.   
 This ranking order and phases of growth shown in Table 3.4 are also in sync with 
Chandler’s beliefs concerning the stimulation of financial intermediation during the 
critical period in which the United States and Germany gained their lead, and support his 
contention of the 1870’s as having been the benchmark period in which the economies of 
scale and scope effects of this financial augmentation were felt.  Examining Table 3.4 
over this investment peak of the 1850's to the 1870's, the ranking of railroad investment 
in G.N.P. was the United States first, Germany second, and Britain third, corresponding 
to the degree to which railroad investment was purported to have impacted each nation’s 
financial intermediation. 
 It is likewise in the case of input demand effects, in support of Fishlow’s belief 
that the railroads did not becomes huge “eaters” of the output of railroad-input-producing 
industries in the United States until the post-Bellum era, for it shows that the period in 
which the greatest amount of physical capital was invested in the railroads relative to 
G.N.P. was the 1860's and 1870's—not only for the United States, but for Britain and 
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Germany as well.  These data also support the idea of 1870 as a benchmark period in 
which to look for significant traces of expansionary effects on these industries in 
association with their role as suppliers of inputs to the railroads.  
 Focusing in on Britain, the data show the 1860's as having been its greatest period 
of railroad investment.  If there were any significant effects upon financial intermediation 
in Britain’s economy in association with the railroads, the 1870's would be the time to 
look for their appearance.  But then Britain quickly dropped off and began a descent in 
the 1870's while Germany pulled ahead of it. Since our data show that Britain invested 
the least amount of capital as a per cent of G.N.P. of all three nations during this period 
and the time leading up to the crucial benchmark date of 1870, we determine from these 
data that whatever effects upon financial intermediation in its economy in association 
with the railroads were to be found here, they would likely be less than in the United 
States and Germany, in confirmation of the Chandler hypothesis that lesser demand for 
capital for the railroads during this period meant that Britain did not receive the 
tremendous augmentation of its financial sector that the United States and Germany did 
at this time. 
 Focusing on the United States, the steep acceleration in railroad capital 
investment as a per cent of G.N.P. that begins in the late 1840’s, and does not begin to 
level off until the 1880’ s is in tandem with Chandler’s theories as to when the dramatic 
effects of the railroads began to be felt on American financial intermediation.  Chandler 
dates the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money market in New York 
that occurred as a result of financing the huge capital requirements for the United States’ 
railroads as having occurred from the 1850's to the 1890's, during which time it grew to 
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be second in size only to that of London.97  Consequently, the results of our analysis of 
railroad physical capital investment as a percent of G.N.P. for the United States also point 
to as reasonable starting point of the establishment of the mechanisms for such large-
scale financing activity as being about 1870, about the beginning of the development of 
the large, (non-railroad) industrial corporation in the United States.  Furthermore, since 
the United States is the leader in these regards, our data here show a greater impact of 
railroad financing activities on the American banking system than for either Germany or 
Britain.   
 Focusing on Germany, the steep acceleration in railroad capital investment as a 
per cent of G.N.P. that begins in the 1850’s, and does not begin to level off until the 
1880’s is also in tandem with Chandler’s theories as to when the dramatic effects of the 
railroads began to be felt on German financial intermediation.  According to Chandler, 
the Kreditbanken and larger Grossbanken arose to meet the tremendous capital needs of 
Germany’s earliest railroad booms of the 1840's-50's.  This relationship grew and 
prospered during Germany’s second great railroad boom of the 1870's, and these large 
banks began funding other types of large enterprise.  Chandler credits these large banks 
with having been the instruments that made possible the rapid accumulation of capital on 
a vast enough scale to finance the large investments necessary to exploit the cost 
advantages of scale and scope and acquire first mover advantages in the newer, capital 
intensive industries.  Although it was not until the 1880's that Chandler says that the 
Grossbanken began to play a great role in the financing of the new industrial enterprises, 
it is owing to their long history in the making in response to the long history of the 
development of the railroads that 1870 seems like a reasonable enough benchmark time 





period in which to begin to look for traces of influence of the railroads on industrial 
expansion via their indirect contribution to the growth of financial intermediation.98  
While Germany’s lead over Britain in capital invested as a per cent of G.N.P. over this 
crucial period covering the 1840’s-80’s is not enormous, the evidence from the data 
presented here is at least compatible with Chandler’s theory that a greater impact of the 
railroads on German investment banking may be responsible for some of its advantages 
in amassing the funds for the large investments necessary to exploit the cost advantages 
of scale and scope and acquire first mover advantages in the newer, capital intensive 
industries that emerged in the final decades of the 19th century.   
 Further, these data do not contradict, and buttress in fact, the Chandlerian 
hypothesis that because the railroads were more important during the initial 
industrializations of the United States and Germany, they had a greater impact upon not 
only financial intermediation, but also on market enlargement and (unstated) derived 
demand effects upon railroad-input-producing industries, and were a factor in propelling 
them above Britain in economies of scale and scope exploitation opportunities in the 
latter 1/3 of the 19th century.  The rapid growth of railroad investment experienced by the 
United States from the 1850’s through the 1870’s can certainly be said to have 
overlapped part of the United States' early industrialization.  Although Germany does not 
experience rapid growth approaching American levels until the end of the 1860's, 
recalling the discussion of this issue above in the Table 2.1 analysis, this does not blow a 
hole in the theory because the period which we may refer to as the “early German 
industrialization” extends slightly past that of the United States due to uniquely 
advantageous circumstances gained in association with political unification and territorial 
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 Ibid., pp. 415-19.  
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acquisition after 1870 that not only abetted the growth of Germany’s railroad system, but 
were conducive to business enterprise in general, and contributed greatly to the German 
industrial triumph achieved by the end of the 19th century.  The further fact that from the 
1850's to the mid-60's Germany does not have a significant lead over Britain in railroad 
investment relative to G.N.P., and Germany and Britain are actually about tied for last 
place, does not weaken the Chandlerian hypothesis either.  As was discussed and 
resolved in the Table 2.1 analysis above, Germany experienced a dramatic upsurge in 
railroad investment just in time to rescue the theory that by the 1870's, forces were 
operating in the German railroads that could have been propelling financial 
intermediation in ways in which they were less likely to, or had ceased to have done in 
Britain, contributing to its leapfrog in economies of scale and scope in industry 
experienced from that point onward. 
 
 
VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In examining the role of financial intermediaries in this said correlation between the 
railroads and economies of scale and scope, we find evidence that makes one very 
skeptical about Chandler’s claims that the American and German railroad systems were 
constructed using more extensive recourse to outside sources of finance than the British, 
and its ramifications for industrial development in the latter decades of the 19th century.  
Our literature survey indicates that Britain’s railroads may have also been heavily 
financed by outside capital, and that this financing did have a dramatic impact on its 
capital markets, as evidenced by the development of a national market for railroad shares.  
Our empirical analysis of comparative financial intermediation effects from the railroads 
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consisting of the stock of financial capital data for the United States and Britain for 1830-
1914 showed that while the unnormalized financial capital data of Table 3.1 displayed a 
generally more rapid accumulation of capital as occurring in the American railroad 
system as compared with Britain throughout the period in question, which supports 
Chandler’s contentions regarding the relative strength of the effects of the railroads on 
financial intermediation during the early industrialization of the United States vs. what 
was going on in Britain at the same time, when these data were normalized by being 
measured relative to G.N.P. in Table 3.3, Britain possessed a strong lead in capital as a 
percent of its G.N.P. all the way until the 1870’s, which suggests that railroad finance 
played a stronger role in the British economy at least until the 1870’s, and points to a 
stronger impact of the railroads on financial intermediation facilities in Britain than in the 
United States all the way until the 1870’s.   
 This phenomenon mirrors the findings of our literature survey, and contradicts the 
Chandler hypothesis that a much more powerful impact of railroad finance activities in 
the United States by the 1850’s was responsible for the centralizing and institutionalizing 
of the nation’s money market in New York, and from the 1850's to the 1890's was 
instrumental in the financing of rapid economic growth based on large scale production 
technologies rich in economies of scale and scope, because it shows that these forces 
ought to have been operating more in Britain’s favor.  In this component of our empirical 
analysis, we find greater support for the contentions of Tilly and other experts on the 
financing of the railroads in Britain surveyed that Britain did experience a great deal of 
financial augmentation as a result of its railroads, but this did not translate into great 
industrial growth at home for other reasons such as a strong propensity to export capital.  
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We find more support for the contentions of Reed and the other scholars of the financing 
of the British railroads that there was a massive boom in railroad financing activities in 
the early-to-mid-19th century that brought the Provincial Exchanges into existence and 
resulted in the creation of a national market for railroad shares in Britain by the mid-19th 
century that resembles the centralizing and institutionalizing of the nation’s money 
market in New York by the 1850’s as described by Chandler, who claimed this was the 
result of railroad financing activities in the United States.  
 Our additional empirical analysis of comparative financial intermediation effects 
from the railroads consisting of gross physical railway capital flow as a percentage of 
Gross National Product for Great Britain, the United States, and Germany for 1830-1914 
in Table 3.4 showed  an essential ranking order of the United States first, Germany 
second, and Britain third in physical capital formation as a percentage of G.N.P. in more 
or less close correspondence with the degree to which Chandler believes the railroads 
impacted the industrial development of the 3 nations, and in particular supports 
Chandler’s contention that the greater capital needs of the larger and more extensive 
American and German railroad systems would have had a greater augmenting effect on 
their financial sectors.  These data also correlate with the patterns of railroad mileage 
growth we observed in Table 2.1 that showed Britain as the leader in the very early days 
of the railroads, but by the 1850's being overtaken by the United States, and by the 1870's 
by Germany, and having experienced its last hump of great railroad investment in the 
1860's, by which time its railroad system was essentially complete, and railroad 
investment for it as having leveled off to lower-averaging levels from the 1880's on while 
there was still great investment in railroads relative to G.N.P. going on in the United 
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States, corresponding to the still rapid growth of its railroad network.  These data also 
show the 1850's-70's as being the period of greatest investment in railroads relative to 
G.N.P. for all three countries, with the ranking of the United States first, Germany 
second, and Britain third, corresponding to the degree to which railroad investment was 
purported by Chandler to have impacted each nation’s financial intermediation, and as a 
result, by the 1870's to have helped create efficient, modern investment banking facilities 
capable of financing other large-scale industry that greatly abetted economies of scale 
and scope in other industry.     
 In further analysis and interpretation of the empirical results, one factor that 
cannot be ignored is the way in which the normalization of the financial capital stock in 
Table 3.3 showed a vastly different result than the unnormalized financial data of Table 
3.1 in that it showed Britain as the leader in financial augmentation effects of the 
railroads.  We cannot dismiss this phenomenon as a mere result of demographic 
differences in area or output because when the physical capital flow data were 
normalized by G.N.P. in Table 3.4, there were no anomalous results that refute the 
Chandler hypothesis.  However, that fact that this anomalous result occurred in 
normalized stock data, not flow data, suggests that Britain’s position as the early leader in 
railroad construction and finance may be partially responsible for this greater relative 
degree of capital accumulation.  It remains to be seen what results a normalized 
comparison of physical railroad capital stocks might produce.  
 Another factor to bear in mind is that these investment data only pertain to capital 
invested in the railroads, and do not discriminate with respect to point of origin of that 
capital.  As it was revealed in the analysis of physical capital accumulation, the early 
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construction of the American and Continental railroad systems were heavily dependent 
on imported British capital inputs, such as rails.  We must therefore be skeptical in our 
interpretation of the seemingly greater rates of physical capital investment and 
accumulation observed in the United States and Germany in the early years of the 
construction of their railroad systems in assessing the impact these could have had on 
their domestic railroad-input-producing industries.  Similarly, the financial capital data do 
not segregate foreign from domestic assets.  So we must also exercise caution in 
interpreting the unnormalized financial data of Table 3.1, for it has also been revealed 
that Britain invested abroad a great deal in these years, including in foreign railroad 
assets, and in American railroad assets in particular.  Our results may therefore contain an 
upward bias as indicators of the effects of railroad investment on American banking and 
manufacturing industries, and underestimate the total impact that railroad finance and 
construction, both foreign and domestic, may have had on the British economy in the 19th 




















IX. TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Table 3.1—Total stock of Railway Financial Capital for Great Britain (UK) and the 
United States (US), including Decadal Growth Rates, listed in pounds, dollars, and 























1830 1.8  --  
1835 7.5   --  
1840 48.2  2,577.78  --  
1845 87.7   --  
1850 234.9 387.34  318.0  
1855 282.4  763.0  
1860 327.5 39.42  1,149.0 261.32  
1865 429.8  1,149.0  
1870 502.7 53.50  2,476.0 115.49  
1875 600.0  4,658.0  
1880 694.6 38.17  5,402.0 118.17  
1885 780.3  7,842.0  
1890 860.2 23.84  8,984.0 66.31  
1895 961.8  10,347.0  
1900 1,136.2 32.09  11,491.0 27.91  
1905 1,228.8  13,805.0  
1910 1,273.2 12.06  18,417.0 60.27  








British and American data are presumed to be in current prices, although this is not stated 







GREAT BRITAIN  
 
1. British data are in million pounds, and for each year listed measure total paid-up 
capital and loans as of Dec. 31 of each given year.  
2. British data from 1830-45 are from  G.R. Hawke and M.C. Reed’s “Railway 
Capital in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century”,  The Economic 
History Review, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Aug. 1969), pp. 270-72.  They 
include data for Ireland, in order to be consistent with the Mitchell and Deane 
data for those years referred to above.  
3. British data from 1850 on are from B.R.  Mitchell and P. Deane’s Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1975), p. 225-26, and apply to Great 
Britain excluding Ireland.  
4. Data for Britain for 1914 are 1913 data.  Data from 1914-18 are not listed.     A 
further note about the 1914 data is that statistics were collected on a new basis in 
1913 in which the properties of the Manchester Ship Canal Company were no 
longer included.   Thus, the figure listed for 1914 above is lower than that of the 
next most recent year, 1912, which was 1,289.6 million pounds. 
 
 
UNITED STATES  
 
5. American data are in million dollars, and for each year listed measure total stock, 
mortgage bonds, funded debt unmatured, equipment, obligations, etc.  All figures 
are based on reports of individual railroads for fiscal years ending in the calendar 
year indicated.  
6. American data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), II, pp. 734-35.  
The data from 1890 on are from series Q 356-366 in the above volume, which are 
data compiled from the annual publications of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Statistics of Railways in the United States.  The data from before 
1890, found in series Q 346-355 in the above volume, are from the U.S. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Railway Statistics Before 1890, Statement No. 32151 
(mimeographed), 1932.  
7. American data for 1865 are identical to those of 1860 due to a break in the 
availability of data from 1861-67, presumably on account of the American Civil 
War that occurred during that time, during which new railroad investment may 











Table 3.2—Gross National Product for Great Britain (UK), the United States (US), 












1830 505.0 919.7  5,099.3  
1831 502.0 995.0  5,439.4  
1832 480.0 1,073.4  5,383.5  
1833 475.0 1,229.5  5,187.2  
1834 505.0 1,271.0  5,260.1  
1835 535.0 1,220.6  5,403.1  
1836 571.0 1,378.9  5,548.1  
1837 548.0 1,515.3  5,334.5  
1838 581.0 1,519.7  5,697.7  
1839 612.0 1,692.4  5,994.5  
1840 573.0 1,573.7 5,998.0  
1841 545.0 1,527.9  5,922.1  
1842 524.0 1,491.7  5,996.9  
1843 523.0 1,859.5  6,032.7  
1844 571.0 1,907.0  5,988.9  
1845 606.0 2,009.7  6,540.3  
1846 647.0 2,308.7  7,103.2  
1847 673.0 2,485.9  7,922.7  
1848 646.0 2,348.0    6,280.4  
1849 656.0 2,263.9  5,851.7  
1850 602.0 2,313.7  6,070.0 
1851 633.0 2,491.7  6,431.0 
1852 640.0 2,805.4  7,296.0 
1853 715.0 3,406.9  7,189.0 
1854 758.0 3,597.7  8,203.0 
1855 779.0 3,568.6  7,882.0 
1856 812.0 3,915.0  9,139.0 
1857 821.0 4,030.3  8,581.0 
1858 785.0 4,150.1  8,334.0 
1859 847.0 4,124.5  8,134.0 
1860 847.0 4,099.9 9,630.0 
1861 905.0 4,466.0  9,379.0 
1862 914.0 4,832.1  10,050.0 
1863 970.0 5,198.3  10,372.0 
1864 1,024.0 5,564.4  10,207.0 
1865 1,064.0 5,930.5  10,279.0 
1866 1,111.0 6,296.6  10,714.0 
1867 1,106.0 6,662.7  11,558.0 
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1868 1,110.0 7,028.9  11,558.0 
1869 1,121.0 7,395.0 11,750.0 
1870 1,188.0 7,141.0 12,876.0 
1871 1,247.0 7,135.0 14,013.0 
1872 1,316.0 8,163.0 16,627.0 
1873 1,394.0 8,333.0 16,627.0 
1874 1,449.0 8,073.0 19,544.0 
1875 1,375.0 7,964.0 18,242.0 
1876 1,341.0 8,065.0 17,966.0 
1877 1,296.0 8,279.0 17,414.0 
1878 1,366.0 8,244.0 17,874.0 
1879 1,216.0 8,701.0 16,678.0 
1880 1,437.0 10,962.0 16,902.0 
1881 1,366.0 11,208.0 17,330.0 
1882 1,394.0 12,050.0 17,489.0 
1883 1,466.0 11,884.0 18,014.0 
1884 1,442.0 11,547.0 18,540.0 
1885 1,385.0 10,883.0 18,731.0 
1886 1,389.0 11,258.0 18,935.0 
1887 1,429.0 11,739.0 19,280.0 
1888 1,446.0 11,740.0 20,716.0 
1889 1,512.0 12,500.0 22,749.0 
1890 1,562.0 13,100.0 23,676.0 
1891 1,589.0 13,500.0 22,624.0 
1892 1,584.0 14,300.0 24,061.0 
1893 1,550.0 13,800.0 24,357.0 
1894 1,629.0 12,600.0 24,361.0 
1895 1,640.0 13,900.0 25,254.0 
1896 1,727.0 13,300.0 26,979.0 
1897 1,716.0 14,600.0 28,714.0 
1898 1,832.0 15,400.0 28,714.0 
1899 1,974.0 17,400.0 31,761.0 
1900 2,026.0 18,700.0 32,448.0 
1901 2,155.0 20,700.0 31,617.0 
1902 2,109.0 21,600.0 31,928.0 
1903 2,100.0 22,900.0 34,402.0 
1904 2,140.0 22,900.0 36,284.0 
1905 2,211.0 25,100.0 38,878.0 
1906 2,244.0 28,700.0 40,643.0 
1907 2,296.0 30,400.0 42,976.0 
1908 2,278.0 27,700.0 42,441.0 
1909 2,320.0 33,400.0 44,358.0 
1910 2,386.0 35,300.0 45,785.0 
1911 2,507.0 35,800.0 48,106.0 
1912 2,565.0 39,400.0 51,563.0 
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1913 2,729.0 39,600.0 52,440.0 




Source Notes, Table 3.2: 
 
 
GREAT BRITAIN  
 
1. British data are from B.R.  Mitchell’s British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 
1988), pp. 831-33.  They are in million pounds, and at current market prices.  
Entire series includes Ireland.  
 
UNITED STATES  
 
2. American data from 1830 are from Paul A. David, “The Growth of Real 
Product in the United States Before 1840: New Evidence, Controlled 
Conjectures”, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 1967), p. 
184.  This figure was calculated based upon Variant II of David’s estimates 
for Gross Domestic (not National) Product which include value added in 
home manufacturing and the value of improvements made on farm land, 
activities that did not normally pass through market channels (see p. 169). 
This figure, given in per capita terms in 1840 prices in the original source, was 
converted into nominal G.D.P. in 1830 prices by multiplying it by the figure 
for U.S. population for 1830 given on p. 165 of the above source, and 
converting it to 1830 prices using the price deflator found in Fishlow, 
American Railroads, p. 399.   
3. American data from 1834-60 are from Paul W. Rhode, “Gallman’s Annual 
Output Series for the United States, 1834-1909”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 8860, April 2002, p. 28.  The data from 
1835-59 have been converted from 1860 prices to own year prices using the 
price deflator found in Fishlow, American Railroads, p. 399.  1860’s figure, 
not listed in the original source, is the figure for G.N.P. for 1859 from the 
above source expressed in 1860 prices.  Thus, the entire series for that period 
are in millions of current dollars.  These data were not constructed for analysis 
as an annual series.  
4. American data from 1831-33 have been estimated by taking the estimate for 
1830 G.D.P. above, converting it to 1834 prices using the price deflator found 
in Fishlow, American Railroads, p. 399,  thus obtaining $1,003.9 million.  
Then Rhode’s figure for 1834 G.D.P. was converted from 1860 prices to 1834 
prices using the same index, obtaining $1,271.03 million.  The difference 
between these two figures, $267.13 million, was divided by 4, corresponding 
to the 4 annual periods occurring between the beginning of 1831 and the end 
of 1834, and added consecutively to the figure for 1830 G.D.P. in 1834 prices 
above, $1,003.9 million, obtaining estimates for G.D.P. for 1831-34 in 1834 
prices.  These estimates were then converted into their own year prices using 
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the same index found in Fishlow to obtain the estimates for G.D.P. for those 
years shown above. 
5. American data from 1869-88 are from the same Rhode source as above, p. 31.  
They are in millions of current dollars. These data were also not constructed 
for analysis as an annual series.  
6. American data for 1861-68, not listed in the Rhode source, have been 
estimated by taking the difference between the estimate for G.N.P. at the end 
of 1860, $4,099.9 million, and at the end of 1869, $7,395 million, which 
equals $3,295.1 million, dividing that figure by 9, representing the nine annual 
periods between the end of 1861 and the end of 1869 over which that increase 
occurred, to obtain an average annual increase in G.N.P. of  $366.12 million.  
That figure was consecutively added to 1860’s G.N.P., $4,099.9 million, to 
obtain the estimates for G.N.P. for those years shown above.   
7. The great disparity between the 1860 figure of $4,099.9 million and the 1869 
figure of $7,395 million, both listed in current prices, probably indicates a 
great deal of inflation as having occurred over this period due to the American 
Civil War.  However, since these data represent an average of G.N.P. increase 
that occurred between 1860 and 1870 using the current prices of both periods, 
the effects of the inflation that occurred in that period are probably well taken 
into account, and this figure may thus be a reasonable good estimate of the 
value of G.N.P. as it existed at that time in current prices.  Moreover, 
comparing this disparity to other decadal jumps in the series, such as the jump 
from 1850-60 (a near  $2,000 million jump and a near doubling of nominal 
G.N.P.), or the jumps from  1870-80 and 1880-90 (both close to $3,000 
million), or the jump from 1890 to 1900 (in the $5,000 millions), or the jump 
from 1900-10 (nearly $17,000 million) suggests that this decadal jump in 
G.N.P. that occurred over the 1860’s is not an unrealistic disparity.  
8. American data from 1889-1914 are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 





9.  All German data relate to Germany within the 1914 boundaries of the 
German Empire.  
10.  German data from 1830-49 are from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: 
Historical Statistics (Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Paris, 2003), p. 46.  They are G.D.P. in 
millions of current marks.  This series was constructed by taking the 
difference between the figure for 1830 and 1850 (the only two for that period 
listed, the latter Maddison’s, not below Mitchell’s figure), dividing by 20, and 
consecutively adding 1/20 of that difference to the 1830 figure to obtain 
figures for 1831-49.  These figures were converted from 1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars to 1990 marks using the conversion data found in 
Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992 (Development 
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Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Paris; OECD Publications and Information Center [distributor], Washington 
D.C., 1995), p. 172.  These figures, in turn, were converted from 1990 marks 
to current marks using the German wholesale price indices found in B.R. 
Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993, 4th ed., 
Stockton Press (New York, 1998), pp. 856-61.   
11. German data from 1850-1914 are from B.R. Mitchell, International Historical 
Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993, 4th ed., Stockton Press (New York, 1998), pp. 
906, 910.  They are in million marks at current market prices. They are in Net, 
not Gross National Product.  Data for 1914 are 1913 data repeated, and data 





































Table 3.3—Total stock of Railway Financial Capital as a percentage of Gross 
National Product for Great Britain (UK) and the United States (US) for every five 










1830 0.36 --- 
1835 1.40 --- 
1840 8.41 --- 
1845 14.47 --- 
1850 39.02 13.74 
1855 36.25 21.38 
1860 38.67 28.03 
1865 40.39 19.37 
1870 42.31 34.67 
1875 43.64 58.49 
1880 48.34 49.28 
1885 56.34 72.06 
1890 55.07 68.58 
1895 58.65 74.44 
1900 56.08 61.45 
1905 55.58 55.00 
1910 53.36 52.17 




Source Notes, Table 3.3: 
 
















Table 3.4— Gross reproducible (physical) railway capital formation/expenditure 
(total capital flow) as a percentage of Gross National Product for Great Britain 




Per cent of 
G.N.P. 
US 
Per cent of 
G.N.P. 
GR 
Per cent of 
G.N.P. 
1830 0.07  0.17  0 
1831 0.12  0.34  0 
1832 0.12  0.46  0 
1833 0.13  0.46  0 
1834 0.13  0.58  0 
1835 0.20  0.72  0 
1836 0.53  0.93  0 
1837 0.78  1.03  0 
1838 1.11  1.14  0 
1839 1.41  1.05  0 
1840 1.57  0.90  0 
1841 1.29  0.75  0.42  
1842 1.00  0.58  0.65  
1843 0.70  0.35  0.74  
1844 0.68  0.43  1.02  
1845 1.31  0.50  2.0  
1846 2.99  0.72  2.35  
1847 4.51  1.10  1.72  
1848 3.85  1.59  1.87  
1849 2.70  1.62  1.36  
1850 1.77  1.56  1.22  
1851 1.36  2.04  1.32  
1852 1.29  2.37  0.94  
1853 1.29  2.74  0.14  
1854 1.48  3.08  2.26  
1855 1.41  2.08  1.08  
1856 1.17  1.97  1.21  
1857 1.24  2.09  -0.15  
1858 1.22  1.62  3.29  
1859 1.17  1.47  0.72  
1860 1.37  1.28  2.42  
1861 1.59  7.23  1.10  
1862 1.69  6.68  1.38  
1863 1.88  6.21  0.35  
1864 2.06  5.80  2.84  
1865 2.20  5.45  1.10  
1866 2.12  5.13  2.80  
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1867 1.71  4.85  0.41  
1868 1.38  4.60  2.21  
1869 1.21  4.37  2.03  
1870 1.20  5.32  3.11  
1871 1.35  5.89  1.65  
1872 1.40  4.64  4.24  
1873 1.54  3.14  3.19  
1874 1.63  1.83  2.69  
1875 1.85  1.32  2.70  
1876 1.32  1.29  3.40  
1877 1.22  1.41  2.11  
1878 1.04  1.38  0.55  
1879 0.96  1.44  3.20  
1880 0.80  2.57  0.96  
1881 1.01  3.93  0.39  
1882 0.98  3.30  1.35  
1883 1.04  2.38  1.03  
1884 1.21  1.72  0.59  
1885 1.01  1.38  0.36  
1886 0.82  1.83  0.28  
1887 0.73  2.34  0.44  
1888 0.72  2.14  0.88  
1889 0.74  1.82  1.17  
1890 0.84  1.76  1.02  
1891 0.98  1.76  0.84  
1892 0.96  2.85  0.44  
1893 0.88  3.14  0.50  
1894 0.84  1.51  0.35  
1895 0.88  0.50  0.76  
1896 0.90  0.36  0.70  
1897 0.99  0.33  1.04  
1898 1.04  0.53  1.06  
1899 1.05  1.01  0.96  
1900 1.04  1.10  1.29  
1901 0.92  0.90  0.81  
1902 0.86  0.93  0.82  
1903 0.92  0.95  1.03  
1904 0.88  1.09  0.85  
1905 0.78  1.31  1.02  
1906 0.77  1.65  1.33  
1907 0.64  1.88 1.45  
1908 0.48  2.08  1.09  
1909 0.41  1.87  1.27  
1910 0.37  2.02  1.03  
1911 0.37  1.82  0.95  
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1912 0.41  1.61  1.33  
1913 0.50  1.72  1.32  




Source Notes, Table 3.4: 
 










































Gross reproducible (physical) railway capital formation/expenditure (total capital flow) as a percentage 




































































Source Notes, Chart 3.1: 
 























Chapter Four: ECONOMIES OF SCALE ESTIMATION 
 
 
Introduction--Minimum Efficient Scale—Quantification of Economies of Scale   
 
In this chapter, we develop more fully the discussion of economies of scale contained in 
the previous chapters by introducing the measure of economies of scale achieved by 
various industries at any given time that is termed “Minimum Efficient Scale”, and is 
expressed by the acronym MES, where 
MES = the minimum plant size (in valued added) within the minimum size class range 
that increased its total percentage of industry value added over a designated time period.   
 
By computing MES over successive time periods spanning the late nineteenth century, we 
obtain a quantifiable measure of the degree of economies of scale achieved in various 
American manufacturing industries because if the minimum size that a firm needed to be 
in order to be competitive in its respective industry rose over time, that serves as an 
indicator that increasing size is something associated with a plant’s ability to survive and 
compete in this industry, thus presence of economies of scale.  An increasing MES over 
time in a given industry thereby serves as an indicator of increasing economies of scale as 
having been achieved over time in that industry.  Our data used in the analysis, and the 
empirical results of this said MES computation will be reviewed and discussed.  An 
attempt is made to determine whether our empirical results confirm or contradict the 
beliefs of Chandler as to which industries experienced these rising scale advantages that 








I. INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE OF METHODOLOGY: THE 
“SURVIVOR TECHNIQUE’ EXPLAINED 
 
A variety of techniques have been employed in the past to measure and quantify 
economies of scale.  However, Jeremy Atack’s 1985 article “Industrial Structure and the 
Emergence of the Modern Industrial Corporation”1, as the first systematic attempt to 
address the core of Chandler’s thesis with quantitative evidence, provides a good starting 
point for outlining the empirical method of measurement of economies of scale for this 
study.   
 Atack tests Chandler’s key argument, that the modern business corporation 
evolved by taking advantage of continuous production technologies and the opportunities 
afforded by the railroad and declining transport costs to market a high volume of 
production nationwide, by measuring the extent to which the average plant at the end of 
the 19th century (when most of the developments discussed by Chandler had taken place) 
differed in size from plants that survived the Civil War decade, that is, prior to such 
changes.  The  methodology is predicated upon the idea that competition, whether pure or 
tainted by elements of monopoly, tends to drive less efficient producers out of business.  
Consequently, the given industrial structure that exists at any given time contains strong 
indications of the long-run competitive equilibrium outcome of forces set in motion prior 
to that period.  If one observes a more highly concentrated industrial structure in a given 
industry, marked by larger plant size, as having evolved over that time period, it serves as 
testimony to support the theory that efficiency is something associated with greater size, 
thus evidence of economies of scale in that industry. 2 
                                                 
1
 Atack, Jeremy. “Industrial Structure and the Emergence of the Modern Industrial Corporation” 
Explorations in Economic History 22, 29-52 (1985); hereafter “Atack, 1985 (A)”. 
2
 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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Atack, in discussing his choice of technique for measuring economies of scale in 
United States manufacturing industries from 1870-1900, explains that scale economies 
are usually estimated by the ordinary least-squares fit of a homogeneous production 
function.  This approach, however, is flawed within the context of the Chandlerian 
hypothesis because since it implies a linear cost function, and scale economies that are 
independent of plant size, it disguises the rapid exhaustion of scale economies in the 19th 
century manufacturing data.  Chandler’s emphasis on forces internal to the firm (the 
technology of continuous production) and external (falling transport costs and the 
widening market) compel a methodology that incorporates factors internal to the firm and 
its production technology and externalities that is capable of dealing with dynamic 
adjustments.  Under these conditions, production function estimates are unreliable and 
biased as they assume technological homogeneity between observations. 3 
 Instead, Atack used the “survivor technique” for measuring economies of scale.  
The survivor technique, as pioneered in its application to measurement of scale 
economies by George Stigler, William Shepherd and Leonard Weiss among others, 4 
seeks to identify the those size classes of firms or plants that not only survived the rigors 
of market competition, but also succeeded in increasing their share of total industry 
value-added.  An increasing share of industry value-added held over time by the larger 
size class or classes of firms or plants in the industry is empirical evidence in support of 
the idea that larger firms or plants gained a competitive advantage over their smaller 
counterparts, and hence came to acquire greater market share.  This acquisition of greater 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
4
 Stigler, G. J. “Economics of Scale” Journal of Law and Economics, 1:5-71 (1958); Shepherd, William G. 
“What Does the Survivor Technique Show about Economies of Scale?” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 
34, No. 1 (Jul., 1967), 113-122; Leonard W. Weiss. “The Survival Technique and the Extent of Suboptimal 
Capacity” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jun., 1964), 246-261. 
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market share by the larger size classes of firms or plants indicates greater competitiveness 
associated with this greater size, thus economies of scale. 5 
 According to Leonard Weiss, the survival technique seems more likely to yield 
optimal scales usable for evaluative purposes when applied to plants rather than firms.  
Regardless of the source of its over-all size, a large, multi-plant firm would build plants 
of optimal scale whenever markets were sufficient to support such plants, as would a 
smaller single-plant firm.  Thus, if the survivor method is used as a measure of efficiency, 
it would be much easier to identify optimal plant scales with this method than firm 
scales.6 
 One important fact that one must bear in mind about applying the survivor 
technique is that it is not always the very largest sized class of plants that gain market 
share.  Usually, the surviving class size that gains market share is somewhere in the 
middle.  In the tests of the theory I have surveyed, just as there is usually a size class 
below the optimum that loses market share over a given period, there is also usually a 
size class above the optimum that also loses market share over any period.  So one must 
be careful when applying the survivor technique and using it as an indicator of economies 
of scale.  An industrial structure that identifies a minimum efficient scale (MES) below 
which plants have lost market share, and above which plants have gained market share 
clearly shows a scale advantage as having been achieved by the plants in the upper 
gaining share size class.  But an industrial structure that also identifies a maximum 
efficient scale above which plants have lost market share clearly shows the limits to 
potential economies of scale in the industry.  If one were to use the share of industry 
                                                 
5
 Atack, 1985 (A), pp. 36-38. 
6
 Weiss, p. 247. 
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value-added belonging to the group of plants who increased their share of total industry 
value-added over a given period as an estimate of the degree of economies of scale in the 
industry, one would probably want to exclude the share of industry value-added held by 
the very largest size class or classes of plants in the industry who lost market share from 
this estimate in order to avoid an exaggerated conception of the degree of competitive 
advantage from greater scale that existed in this industry (although Weiss does not follow 
this practice). 
 This study requires a measure of the degree of economies of scale that can be 
discerned as having occurred in connection with market expansion and financial sector 
growth from railroads.  Unfortunately, as Shepherd and Atack point out, survivor 
estimates themselves lack such an indicator, as they only indicate the presence of 
economies of scale, and the borders of a range in which it can be observed. 7  However, 
for lack of any other suitable or satisfactory methods, a measure of the degree of 
economies of scale can be derived from survivor estimates by measuring the growth of 
the MES of plant size itself over time. A rising minimum point of the range in which 
economies of scale are observed may tell us much about rising scale in an industry, and 
the degree to which this rising scale is associated with efficiency.  
 What follows is an essential summary of the tools and techniques that provide a 
menu of possible means of measuring the degree of economies of scale in various 
industries, and a justification of the chosen method through compare and contrast.  Due to 
the tremendous similarity in method and technique in applying the survivor method 
                                                 
7
 Shepherd, p. 115; Atack, Jeremy, Estimation of Economies of Scale in Nineteenth Century United States 
Manufacturing, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc. (1985), p. 39. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYIS OF APPLIED 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In his 1985 Explorations in Economic History article, Atack determined the entire range 
of size class (size measured in terms of value-added per plant) that increased its share of 
industry value-added from 1850-70 for 24 industries.  Then he computed the total share 
of industry value-added held by plants in that size class, and expressed it as a percentage 
of total industry value-added. 8 
Then he took the lower and upper bounds of those size classes that were 
determined to be optimal in 1870, and divided total industry value-added in both 1870 
and 1900 out by those individual value-added sizes.  That gives the number of 
“potentially” optimal plants that industry value-added could sustain, using this 1870 
survivorship size class as the standard of optimality. 9 
Then he compared this number of potentially optimal plants to the actual number 
of plants in each industry at each date. The higher the ratio of potentially optimal plants 
to the actual number of plants, the greater the indication that many establishments had 
achieved an efficient scale, and the more economies of scale there was in that industry. If 
there were more potentially optimal plants than actually existed in an industry, that would 
                                                 
8
 Atack, 1985 (A), pp. 39-42 
9
 Presumably Atack did not compute a new survivorship class as it emerged from 1870 to 1900 with which 
to divide out 1900’s industry value-added by because the data set he used for this study, the Bateman-
Weiss and Atack-Bateman Samples from the Manuscript Censuses of Manufactures, 1850-1880, do not 
contain individual plant-level data for 1900 that would be necessary to determine a new survivorship class 
for 1900.  For more information, see Atack, Jeremy and Fred Bateman. “Nineteenth-Century U.S. 
Industrial Development through the Eyes of the Census of Manufactures: A New Resource for Historical 
Research.” Historical Methods, Fall 1999, Vol. 32, No. 4: 177-88, pp. 177, 179.  This article is also 
available on line and downloadable at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/faculty/Atack/atackj.htm. 
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mean that a handful of plants are producing a large portion of industry output, and they 
are well above the MES.  Whereas, if there were far fewer potentially optimal plants than 
actually existed in an industry,  that would mean that industry output is divided out 
amongst many, many plants, few of which are operating at this efficient scale.  A rising 
ratio of potentially optimal plants to actual number of plants can be construed to indicate 
increasing size of enterprise that is consistent with a widening of market opportunities 
permitted by cheaper transportation and the existence of economies of scale that could be 
both internal and external. 10 
Then he used these results to test the Chandler hypothesis that it was in the 
industries that experienced the greatest impact of transportation improvements and the 
most rapid technological progress over 1870-1900 that the most economies of scale were 
found in.  He categorized various industries by these criteria, and found that those that 
had the most impact of transportation improvements and the most rapid technological 
progress also had the highest ratios of potentially optimal plants to total plants as 
computed in the previous section.  These industries were meat packing, flour milling, 
malt liquor, leather tanning, and pig iron.  
While this test does not provide us with a quantitative measure of the degree of 
economies of scale, it is noteworthy in terms of what its results tell us about industrial 
growth from 1870-1900, and the degree to which Atack’s results confirm the Chandlerian 
hypothesis.  It was Chandler’s thesis that the modern business enterprise, as exemplified 
by American Tobacco, Carnegie Steel, and Armour and Company emerged as a response 
to the combined forces of continuous production process technology and the 
                                                 
10




transportation revolution of declining railroad freight rates.  The effects of this revolution 
in transportation and production technology on the scale of enterprise, according to 
Chandler, were seen most visibly in the production of tobacco and grain products and in 
the furnace and foundry and distilling and refining industries.  Atack’s results here must 
be regarded as an empirical validation of the Chandlerian thesis. 11 
Weiss identified MES in 5 industries—automobiles, steel, petroleum refining, 
flour and cement in the United States from 1924 to 1961.  He measured optimal size in 
terms of plant output per year, or day; actual plant capacity in units of goods, not value-
added.12  Then he divided this whole time expanse into sections; 1924-29, 1929-34, etc. 
and identified the MES for each period; the minimum plant size that increased its total 
percentage of industry capacity over each of these periods.  He found that MES increased 
over time.  In other words, the minimum size that a firm needed to be in order to be 
competitive in its respective industry rose over time.  This seems to be a good indication 
of much unexploited economies of scale in each industry, and increasing exploitation of it 
over time.  If average plant size is not only rising over time, and the minimum size a 
plant needs to achieve in order to be competitive and survive in the industry is also rising, 
it certainly shows that increasing size is something associated with a plant’s ability to 
survive and compete in this industry. 13 
Weiss continued his study with a method similar to that used by Atack in his 1985 
article 14 to determine optimal ranges that plant sizes fell into, and to express the total 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., pp. 47-49. 
12
 Weiss does not say how he selected these size classes, except that he did it so that at least several plants 
would ordinarily fall within each class (see p. 248).  He seems to have derived his methodology from  J. S. 
Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), where perhaps 
these size classes are delineated.  See Weiss, footnotes, pp. 247, 249. 
13
 Weiss, pp. 247-50, Table 1. 
14
 Atack, 1985 (A), pp. 39-42. 
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share of industry value-added held by plants in that size class as a percentage of total 
industry value-added. However, Weiss was able to perform successive calculations of 
that percentage to compare to earlier dates; a practice that Atack could not do due to data 
limitations.15  Weiss determined a size class- or range-based MES--the minimum plant 
size class that increased its total percentage of industry capacity over each of these 
periods—and computed the percent of total industry capacity accounted for by plants in 
that size class or greater at the end of each period (unlike Atack who only counted the 
percent of total industry capacity accounted for by plants in the optimal size class), and 
called that percentage “P”.  
 Weiss found that P did not increase that much consistently.  Although MES rose 
over the years, the percentage of industrial capacity actually in it did not follow suit.  He 
actually regressed P on MES and got negative parameter estimates.  Then he determined 
the predicted change in P if you were to assume no changes in MES over time periods.  
His regression equation predicted that you would get moderate rises in P over time which 
would seem to indicate a positive tendency for firms to move into the optimal range over 
time periods, but overlooks the fact that the optimal range to be in is itself increasing, so 
a lot of the economies of scale that exist in this industry are being overlooked. 16 
It is essentially for that reason that I have chosen to measure and quantify the 
degree of economies of scale achieved in my model with Weiss’s MES method, rather 
than his P method, which is essentially conceptually the same as all of Atack’s methods.  
A choice between the two is necessary because the negative parameter estimates that 
Weiss obtained from his regression of P on MES for United States manufacturing 
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industries from 1924 to 1961 put us in a quandary in terms of methodology choice; 
clearly they cannot both be correct as a measure of economies of scale in industry.  High, 
rising levels of P can coexist with low, or even diminishing levels of MES, and vice 
versa.  In order to determine which method is a more accurate and appropriate measure of 
economies of scale, I will examine the two hypothetical situations; firstly the case in 
which a high P and low MES is observed, secondly the case in which a low P and high 
MES is observed.  It will be revealed that P is a misleading indicator of economies of 
scale in an industry, because a high P may conceal a low MES, thus exaggerating the 
degree of economies of scale in an industry, and as Weiss’s research on United States 
manufacturing industries from 1924 to 1961 indicates, a low P may conceal a very high 
MES, thus underestimating the degree of economies of scale in an industry.  
The fact that high levels of P can be observed simultaneously with low levels of 
MES implies that use of P as an indicator of the degree of  economies of scale yields an 
exaggerated picture of the degree of economies of scale in a given industry.  A large 
percentage of industry value-added in the optimal range at any give time may not indicate 
great economies of scale in these industries because MES may have been easy to reach at 
low output. It could be indicative of a situation in which once a plant has reached MES, 
increased scale could only either lead to constant or decreasing returns to scale. The 
increasing concentration of output in the optimal range could consist of either the 
enlargement of existing optimal plants’ output or entry of new plants into the industry 
that are smaller, but just as efficient as the larger ones, with no efficiency gains 
associated with greater scale, and average plant size increasing, remaining the same, or 
even diminishing within this optimal range of plant sizes.  A rising MES observed over 
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consecutive periods, however, indicates an industry of growing plant size in which there 
are great economies of scale that have not yet been realized at the beginning of the 
period, and are increasingly being obtained and exploited over the course of a given 
period, and over successive periods surveyed.  
Atack acknowledges in his study of plant survivorship from 1850-70 that while a 
clear MES was established for each industry surveyed, and very large increases in the 
value-added of the optimally-sized plants were often observed over this period, both of  
which suggest decreasing costs for larger firms, there were also observed a wide range of 
surviving plant sizes in almost every industry, which suggests that a considerable portion 
of the long-run average cost curve may have been flat, or almost so.  He also found that 
in many industries, MES was quite small.  In flour milling, for example, firms producing 
as little as $100 (1860 dollars) value-added in 1870 could still be efficient.  This was a 
bottom range of an efficient scale that extended up to $16,000 value-added (1860 dollars 
again).17  This again indicates that for many industries, MES may have been easy to reach 
at relatively low output.  So a large percentage of optimal value-added out of the industry 
total itself, even excluding the upper portion of plants in the super-optimal range, may 
yield an exaggerated picture of the degree of economies of scale in the industry.  
Furthermore, if one were to precisely apply Weiss’s P method to the data Atack 
used (which is in fact, the same data used in this study), still further exaggeration of the 
degree of economies of scale in these industries is possible because Weiss included the 
upper super-optimal range of class sizes in the numerator of the expression. 
Consequently, Weiss’s method would include the output or value-added of plants that 
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were really not optimal, thus giving an even more exaggerated picture of the efficiency of 
larger firms. 
Weiss is aware of this problem, but trivializes its importance.  Overall, he found 
in these industries in this period that most or all plant size classes declined in relative 
importance below the MES, and increased for a very substantial range above it.  In 
accounting for the largest size class of plants whose share of industry output declined, he 
is skeptical about net decreasing returns to scale as an explanation for this phenomenon.  
Due to the presence of modern administrative techniques, it is difficult to distinguish a 
size class that is too large for technological or administrative reasons from one which is 
declining in relative importance because large firms are at some strategic or political 
disadvantage, or simply because large firms may be more mobile than small ones and 
thus may more readily abandon unpromising industries.18   
However, the same standards may not apply to 19th century industry.  Atack 
excluded this super-optimal portion of industrial value-added from his survivorship 
estimates from 1850-70, and found that a strong case can be made for decreasing returns 
to scale in the very largest plants arising from the traditional source, managerial 
inefficiency.  He found that of the 24 industries covered in this study, all but 2 possessed 
an upper bound of size range beyond which a decreasing share of industry valued added 
was observed over that period. 19  Since these data are the same data used in this study, it 
is best to rule out the P technique; at least in the manner as applied by Weiss.  
Conversely, the fact that low levels of P can be observed simultaneously with 
high levels of MES implies that use of P as an indicator of the degree of economies of 
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scale poses the potential to greatly underestimate the degree of economies of scale in a 
given industry.  Weiss’s results showing negative correlation between P and MES for 
United States manufacturing industries from 1924 to 1961 show static or slightly 
diminishing levels of P associated with increasing MES over these periods.  Although the 
MES is coming up over the years, the percentage of industrial capacity actually in it 
doesn’t seem to follow suit.   
Weiss used his regression equation to determine the predicted change in P if you 
were to assume no changes in MES over time periods.  His regression equation predicts 
that you would get moderate rises in P over time which would seem to indicate a positive 
tendency for firms to move into the optimal range over time periods.  However, these 
results are not very robust because the equation predicts that  with MES fixed, most of 
the potential economies of scale in any industry would be exhausted in maybe one or two 
decades.  The implication, Weiss feels, seems to be that further gains in economies of 
scale from plant size growth must depend primarily on technical changes that may create 
new economies of scale, resulting in larger and larger efficient firm sizes over time, as 
exhibited by a rising MES being observed over time. 20  The fact that P fails to account 
for these scale increases associated with productivity-enhancing technical changes means 
that it is a less-than adequate indicator of the degree of scale economies in an industry.  
Merely focusing on the degree to which firms move into the optimal range, but 
overlooking the fact that the optimal range to be in may itself be increasing yields an 
understated and incomplete picture of scale economies achieved in the industry.  
Weiss acknowledges that the rising MES observed in these industries over this 
period empirically validates the conventional wisdom concerning the histories of these 
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industries over this period; that technological improvements in steel and flour production 
and petroleum refining made it more efficient to produce in large volume, and that 
Fordism in the automobile industry resulted in increasing plant size and concomitant 
cost-cutting there. 21  The non-increasing P estimates are a counter-intuitive result 
considering what is known about structural and technological change in these industries.  
Weiss seems to imply here that a rising MES is something definitely associated with 
economies of scale, and the new technique associated with large-batch continuous 
production methods.  
This seems to correspond closely to the history of the Chandler industries, and 
their pattern of growth as he describes it in his works, both Scale and Scope and his 
earlier work, The Visible Hand, the primary inspiration for the Atack study referred to 
above. 22  According to Chandler, Britain’s trading channels were too restrictive to 
maintain a level of throughput necessary to achieve the scale economies inherent in, or 
presented by the new technologies that emerged in the late nineteenth century. 23  In 
contrast, in the United States, the railroads greatly expanded markets, affording them far 
greater opportunity to exploit the scale economies offered by the new technologies.  As 
Weiss implies, a rising MES is evidence of this pattern of growth as it occurred in the 
highly mechanized 20th century United States industries that were still experiencing 
growth associated with efficiency gains from new technique.  I see no reason why it 
could not also be used as an indicator of the degree of this pattern of growth as it 
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occurred in the American industrial expansion of the late nineteenth century Chandler 
industries; or say, to compare to the corresponding degree of economies of scale in the 
same, or another group of British or German industries.        
 
 
III. DESCRIPTION OF PRECISE METHOD AND DATA     
 
We may now proceed to an empirical study of American industry as described above 
using the same data set Atack used. 
 
Regarding industry selection, Atack categorized industries by the degree of impact of 
transportation improvements and pace of technological improvements in a table in his 
1985 article that I have reproduced in this text as Table 4.1. 24  In the left hand column of 
Table 4.1 are listed the industries that Chandler said were the great industries that 
experienced these great impacts of the decline in transport costs and technological 
advance that led to these large-scale production methods.   They are also, by Atack’s 
study, the group of industries that had the highest ratios of potentially optimal plants to 
total plants as computed in the previous section of that article, which was an indicator of 
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Technological Change, Transportation, and the Adjustment 
To 1870 Optimal Plant Sizes, 1900 
 
 Pace of Technological Progress 
Impact of Transportation High  Low 









Gray iron foundaries 
Sheet metal 
Low Distilled liquor 
Tobacco manufacture 
Clothing 
Boots and shoes 




Printing and publishing 
Saddlery and harness 
Farm machinery 




Within that left hand column, there are some industries that, according to Nelson’s study 
on the great merger movement at the end of the century 25 experienced a great impact of 
transportation improvements, and those that did not.  It is an interesting fact that those 
that did not have a great transportation impact, those in the lower left cell in Table 4.1, 
had a slightly smaller ratio of potentially optimal plants to total plants.   
 It would be interesting to see if all of these industries also have a rising MES over 
1850-80 (the period the availability of the appropriate data confines our study to).  It 
could be that these industries in the lower cell may have also gained great economies of 
scale in association with the declining transport costs and scale opportunities afforded by 
the railroads.   
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 Nelson, R. Merger Movements in American Industry 1895-1956. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press 
for the NBER, 1959, pp. 158, 159, Table C-3. 
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 There is a second  column of industries Atack surveyed in the right hand column 
that do not coincide with those purported by Chandler to have experienced great growth 
due to continuous production technology and the transportation revolution.  Atack’s 
results show that for these industries, the margin of the lower difference in ratio of 
potentially optimal plants to total plants for these industries as compared with those in the 
left hand column is substantial, which is a basic confirmation of the Chandler theory that 
whatever the great impact of technology or declining transport costs on this group of 
industries was, it was not significant. It is for that reason that I am also going to test these 
industries and compare the results to the left hand column industries to see if my results 
confirm the Chandler theory.  This test comprises a major portion of the topic of Chapter 
Five, which takes a closer look at these results, their data, and the grouping of industries 
together in the data.  For now however, it is worthy of noting that the upper right cell that 
contains industries that had a low pace of technological progress but a high impact of 
transportation has a greater average ratio of potentially optimal plants to total plants than 
the cell that contains industries that had both a low pace of technological progress and a 
low impact of transportation.  That does support the Chandler hypothesis that the 
transport improvements had an impact of sort, even if the industries did not experience a 
great amount of technological change.   
 
Thus the industries covered by the study of this chapter shall be organized into 2 groups 
corresponding to the left hand column in Table 4.1.  These are the following, each 
followed by its respective 3 digit code per U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
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Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1987. 26  These are the codes by which the 
industries are categorized in the data set used in this study (see discussion below).  
 
High pace of technological progress/High impact of transportation 
  
Meat Packing-- Industry Group 201: Meat Products 
Flour Milling-- Industry Group 204: Grain Mill Products 
Malt Liquor-- Industry Group 208: Beverages 
--2082 Malt Beverages (ex. Beer) 
Leather Tanning-- Industry Group 311: Leather Tanning And Finishing 
Pig iron-- Industry Group 331: Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, And Rolling And 
 
 
High pace of technological progress/Low impact of transportation 
 
Distilled liquor-- Industry Group 208: Beverages 
--2085 Distilled and Blended Liquors (ex. Whiskey) 
Tobacco manufacture--Major Group 21: Tobacco Products 
--Industry Group 212: Cigars 
--Industry Group 213: Chewing And Smoking Tobacco And Snuff 
--Industry Group 214: Tobacco Stemming And Redrying 
Clothing--Industry Group 225: Knitting Mills 
-- Industry Group 231: Men's And Boys' Suits, Coats, And Overcoats 
--Industry Group 232: Men's And Boys' Furnishings, Work Clothing, And 
--Industry Group 233: Women's, Misses', And Juniors' Outerwear 
--Industry Group 235: Hats, Caps, And Millinery 
--Industry Group 237: Fur Goods 
--Industry Group 238: Miscellaneous Apparel And Accessories 
Boots and shoes--Industry Group 314: Footwear, Except Rubber 
 
 
All these categories will be analyzed separately except for Distilled Liquor and Malt 
Liquor because they share the same Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, 208, 
and because for 1880, a period that Atack did not take into account in his study, there are 
no fields in the data set corresponding to individual final product codes, quantities or 
value.  Therefore no basis exists upon which to disaggregate these plants into primarily 
malt liquor- or distilled liquor-producing plants, as these finer 4 digit sub-categories 
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indicate.  Thus a separate analysis for that year is impossible.  Thus they have been 
combined into one industrial class called simply “Beverages.”  Also, since at least a 
segment of this Beverages category was determined by Atack to be in the High pace of 
technological progress/High impact of transportation category (Malt Liquor), the entire 
combined Beverages category will be thusly grouped, even thought it includes Distilled 
liquor, which is not among those industries thought by Atack to have experienced a great 
impact of transportation changes.  
There are also two industries, Tobacco and Clothing, that embraced more than 
one 3 digit SIC code.  Thus all plants that appeared in the data set with codes that fell 
under the rubric of one of these industry categories were analyzed together with their 
respective main industry category. 27 
A regrouping of these industrial categories was necessary because the SIC codes 
used in Atack’s 1985 article were obviously that of some earlier unspecified period prior 
to 1987.  The codes used in this study are those of 1987 because these are the codes that 
are used in the new machine-readable version of the census samples on United States 
manufacturing during the second half of the nineteenth century that Atack based his 1985 
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IV.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Since the data set contains only data from 1850-80, the first period for which a MES can 
be ascertained is the group of plants that increased their share of industry value added 
over 1850-60.   That is followed in the table below by MES as it emerged from 1860-70, 
and finally, from 1870-80; 3 periods in total.  
The following Table 4.2 shows MES in value added in constant 1860 dollars, 
rounded. 29  Following Atack’s practice, all plants in each industrial category in each year 
were grouped by size of value added according to the following schema: $0-249; $250-
499; $500-999; $1000-1999; $2000-3999; $4000-7999; $8000-15,999; $16,000-31,999; 
$32,000-63,999; $64,000-127,999; $128,000-255,999; $256,000 and over.  The MES 
range was determined by identifying the smallest size class of plant that increased its 
share of total industry value added over each period delineated in the columns, and the 
MES of plant delineated in those columns below the year headings was the smallest size 
of plant value-added within that class that increased its share of total industry value-
added over the period. 30 
When MES occurred in the $0-249 size class (as it did frequently in 1870—see 
discussion below), and the smallest sized plant within that class was a plant with value-
added equal to zero, the next smallest plant with a value-added greater than zero was 
designated as the MES instead.   This occurred in four out of eight industries in 1870: 
Clothing, Tobacco, Shoes, and Flour. It also occurred in Meat in 1880. 
                                                 
29
 Value-added were adjusted by the rise or fall in the wholesale price indices for the United States in 
Mitchell, Brian R. International Historical Statistics: the Americas, 1750-2000, 5th ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 
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Industries that had both high pace of technological progress and high impact of 
transportation are highlighted. 
 
TABLE 4.2 
Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) for Selected Industries, 1860-1880  
in Constant 1860 Dollars 
 
Industry MES, 1850-60 MES, 1860-70 MES, 1870-80 
Meat 450 89,060 11 
Flour 2000 28 502 
Beverages 8000 265 1163 
Leather 8200 86 19,298 
Iron 560 276 326 
Tobacco 2000 69 256 
Clothing 50 96 130,200 
Shoes 67,000 7 33,792 
 
 
The main results do not lend much credence to the Chandler hypothesis.  In fact, 
the trend is decreasing.  There is only one industry, Clothing, whose MES increased 
steadily over the period of 1860-80.  Only three out of the eight industries, Beverages, 
Leather and Clothing, achieve a higher MES in 1880 than they started out with in 1860.  
These results tend to refute the Chandler hypothesis, because we know that railroad 
mileage was a steadily increasing variable over all the years that could remotely be 
construed as correlated with these scale changes, namely 1830-80, which implies an 
inverse relationship between the railroads and economies of scale in these industries.   
Even if for the earlier periods there was very little increase in the size of the railroad 
network, and very little growth in these industries that could be attributable to the 
railroads, these results show economies of scale still going in the wrong direction.    
The other striking feature of the table is the phenomenon of a nearly ubiquitous 
dip in MES circa 1870.  Each industry surveyed barring two, Meat and Clothing, drops 
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down to a lower MES in 1870 than it started out with in 1860, and then rebounds to a 
higher MES in 1880.  
Taking another perspective, if one were to analyze with 1870 as the starting point, 
the results would overwhelmingly support the Chandler hypothesis.  In all but one 
industry, Meat, there is a rise in MES, and for all those seven industries whose MES rose 
but one, Iron, the rise may be considered precipitous.  Looked at thusly, the results really 
are a validation of the Chandler hypothesis, because Chandler did not make any claims as 
to a significant impact of transportation improvements upon scale economies and 
technological progress as having occurred prior to 1870.  To reiterate what was stated in 
Chapters Two and Three, a minimally efficient plant size circa 1870 constitutes a 
reasonable benchmark period in which to begin to analyze effects of transportation 
improvements upon scale economies in American industry.  Lack of appropriate data 
preclude a similar study for 1890 and 1900 that would  provide further evidence of a 
rising MES over those periods, thus further validation of the Chandler thesis that the 
modern business corporation evolved by taking advantage of continuous production 
technologies and the opportunities afforded by the railroad and declining transport costs 
to market a high volume of production nationwide, and that this resulted in larger plant 
size at the end of the 19th century (when most of the developments discussed by Chandler 
had taken place) than had existed immediately following the Civil War decade (that is, 
prior to such changes), and that larger firms began to replace smaller ones because they 
were more efficient.   
The only thing about these results that strikes one as odd when analyzed from 
1870 on is that the industries that had both high pace of technological progress and high 
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impact of transportation do not appear to have achieved greater rises in MES than the 
industries that had high pace of technological progress and low impact of transportation.  
In fact, the only industry that experienced a significant drop in MES from 1870-80, Meat, 
was in the high pace of technological progress/high impact of transportation category.  
These results suggest that the impact of transportation improvements on greater industrial 
scale, if Nelson’s study reveals anything value-worthy about these effects, may be 
illusory. Either that or the impact of the railroads on those industries in the high pace of 
technological progress/low impact of transportation category may be greater than Nelson 
estimated.  
Still, the nearly ubiquitous dip from 1860-70 attracts one’s attention.  If the 
impact of the railroads that Chandler claims was responsible for the great scale gains of 
the late nineteenth century was not felt until the post-bellum era, what was responsible 
for the relatively greater MES that existed prior to the impact of the iron horse?  This 
hearkens back to Fogel and Fishlow’s work, who dispute Rostow’s  claims that the 
railroads’ demand for capital was the primary impetus in the United States’ great “take-
off” into the era of modern economic growth, and precipitated its great structural 
transformation from a primarily agricultural to industrial economy, and instead argue that 
the effects of the railroad were relatively small in comparison to all the other factors that 
contributed to the growth of these modern industrial sectors, which is perhaps part of the 
reason that Chandler really is relatively mute on the whole issue of derived demand 
effects, and it doesn’t form part of his argument about why the railroads were such an 
important factor in revolutionizing the scale and structure of modern industry.  Ironically, 
Fogel and Fishlow’s work that trivializes the importance of the railroad in the earlier 
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industrial “take-off” period saves the Chandler thesis that lionizes it for the latter 
industrial expansion period because it offers an explanation for the rapid industrial 
growth experienced by these industries in the ante-bellum era that would otherwise, in the 
context of the Chandler thesis, lead one to the conclusion that increases in the 
railroadization of the nation led to declines in MES, thereby refuting his thesis.   
Still, the nearly ubiquitous dip in MES observed circa 1870 raises questions.  
Granted, the relatively large MES’s achieved from 1850-60 could have been achieved 
due to factors unrelated to the railroads.  Even though the railroads had been increasing 
prior to this period, the scale-expanding properties may not have achieved their main 
impact until much later.  But why would a decrease in MES, of all things, be observed 
during the time in which the effects of the railroads upon market expansion and financial 
intermediation ought to have been in full swing?  Weiss noted in his study of 
manufacturing industries in the United States from 1924 to 1961 that while an overall 
trend of rising MES was observed throughout the period, this was not so during the 
World War II period, in which MES in all industries surveyed but petroleum declined.  
According to Weiss, this change may reflect the relatively small additions to capacity, the 
ability of practically all firms to survive in war-time demand conditions, and possibly the 
superiority of small plants in the black and grey markets of that shortage period. 31  It is 
not unreasonable to suppose that similar effects of war on the American economy in the 
period immediately following the Civil War could not also have been in play.  A dip at 
the immediate post-war period, and a subsequent gain in MES as the effects of the 
railroads on market expansion and financial intermediation began to be felt, dovetails 
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with Weiss’s results for American manufacturing industries from 1924 to 1961 as with 
Atack’s results for the same for 1870-1900.     
A further examination of the economic shocks caused by the Civil War leads one 
to believe that Weiss’s hypothesis concerning the dips in MES experienced during the 
World War II period may also apply to American industry during the Civil War period. 
The up, down, up-again pattern observed in the MES table above conforms to the general 
historical knowledge concerning the cyclical macroeconomic fluctuations of those 
periods.  Robert Gallman’s estimates of value added in manufacturing 32 show an average 
growth rate of 7.8  per cent from 1840-60, a slowdown to 2.3 per cent from 1860-70 (the 
lowest rate for any decade during the century), and a pick-up of 6.0 per cent from 1870-
1900.  Further, total commodity output rose at an annual rate of 4.6 per cent from 1840-
60, slowed to 2.0 per cent from 1860-70 (also the lowest rate during any decade in the 
nineteenth century), and picked up again to an annual rate of 4.4 per cent from 1870-
1900. 33  This pattern conforms exactly to the high peak MES starts out with in 1860, the 
dip at 1870, and the moderate gains achieved by 1880.   
 It is impossible to separate the economic impact of the war from the dip in MES, 
value added, and overall capital formation that economic statistics display circa 1870.  
With the withdrawal of the services of perhaps one fifth of the labor force, the disruption 
of normal channels of supply, and the weakening of foreign exchange earnings by the 
loss of raw cotton exports, it would, in fact, have been very surprising if the war had not 
disrupted industrial growth. The decline in the availability of raw cotton, caused by the 
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embargo of the Union military, probably has something to do with the 30 per cent decline 
in cotton textiles production during the war.  While the MES movements do not show a 
dip in Clothing at 1870, a movement from $50 to $96 is hardly a significant increase.  It 
must be remembered that the category Clothing includes clothing made of all materials, 
such as wool textiles, whose output increased significantly during the war as cotton 
shortages prompted a shift to substitute materials.  If the Clothing category had only 
included clothes made from cotton, there probably would be a precipitous dip at 1870.  It 
is an established fact that the war disrupted the most iron-intensive industry of all, 
railroad construction, as is seen by the 1870 dip there.  And Stanley Engerman notes that 
Massachusetts boot and shoe production (one half of the nation’s) slipped from forty-five 
million pairs in 1855 to thirty-two million in 1865.  The precipitous dip in this industry of 
$67,000 in 1860, down to $7 in 1870, and back up to $33,792 in 1880 displays this 
wartime disruption of growth in this industry prominently. 34 
Crowding out also explains much of the economic slump associated with the 
immediate post-war years.  The government paid for the war largely through the sale of 
massive amounts of interest-bearing bonds.  Jeffrey Williamson believes that by 
exchanging federal government bonds for the financial resources investors would have 
otherwise have made available for purchases of capital stock, federal government debt 
crowded out private investment expenditures, leading to lower rates of capital formation.  
Relying on Gallman’s data, Williamson reports that as a share in the 1859 non-South 
GNP, annual increases in the federal long term debt amount to more than 15 per cent.  
This figure is almost equal to the non-South gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) as 
a percentage of GNP of 19.4 per cent achieved in the 1850s.  When one considers that the 
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federal deficit in 1865 was some 30 per cent of northern GNP, one can only wonder, if 
Gallman had computed it, what the GDCF/GNP ratio would have been!  The figure 
calculated for 1869-78, 27.4, is pretty darn close to that 1865 deficit figure.  It is 
completely plausible that for at least some years during and immediately after the war, 
the federal deficit could have exceeded GDCF as a percentage of GNP. 35 
The greater levels of capital formation occurring after 1870 reported by Gallman 
may have resulted in additions to capacity, as evidenced by higher MES achieved by 
1880.  According to John James, there was a post-war recovery “crowding in” effect 
associated with the government’s decision to retire its debt rather than lower taxes.  
Taxes were collected from the poor, who had low saving rates, to pay interest on the war 
debt held by the rich, who saved higher proportions of their income.  As a result, the 
national savings rate increased, leading to a rise in investment in the post-war years. This 
reduction in debt also drove down interest rates, further stimulating investment and 
economic growth.  James estimated the real stock of capital that would have occurred if 
the government had continued to hold its debt that existed in 1865 until 1890, and then 
compared it to the amount that would have occurred had the government decided to retire 
all of it over the same period, and found that capital formation would have been 5 per 
cent lower than it actually was in the former case, and just 2.16 per cent higher than it 
actually was in the latter case.  This leads one to believe that debt retirement had a lot to 
do with the acceleration in the rate of capital formation that occurred after the war, and 
also with the increases in competitive scale observed in my own empirical results. 36  
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Post-war capital formation was also stimulated by a decline in the relative price of capital 
goods that Williamson believes was caused by Civil War tariff policy, which provided 
relatively more protection for consumer goods than for capital goods.  This led to a rise in 
the relative price of final goods that increased the expected profitability of returns on 
post-war investments. 37 
What factors, then, may account for the ability of so many smaller firms to 
survive in such a depressed economic climate?  While some lowering of the MES might 
be expected in such a climate that interrupted new capital formation, one would think that 
such conditions would have fostered an even more competitive environment in which 
only the strong survive, thereby resulting in MES still in the upper ranges.   
There is a misleadingly rosy picture of the impact of the Civil War on American, 
particularly Northern, industrialization that has been painted in the past by historians 
Charles and Mary Beard and later, by Louis Hacker, who argued that by destroying 
slavery, the war shifted the balance of power to northern industrialists and spurred 
northern industrialization.38  The Beards believed that the Civil War may have spurred 
industrialization; however the data reported above concerning the depression experienced 
in the iron, cotton textiles, and boot and shoe industries at this era evidences the folly of 
this notion.  The overall impact of the war, the evidence indicates, is that it had an overall 
retarding effect upon the level of capital formation.   
The demands of war may, however, have created a short-run situation that 
contributed to the ability of all firms to survive, no matter how small and inefficient they 
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were; a hypothesis that Weiss would nod his head in agreement  with as to its plausibility 
in explaining the low MES’s observed at 1870.  For instance, as reported above, while 
there was a slump in the iron industry due to the suspension of railroad construction, 
small blacksmith shops and iron foundries may have received a new breath of life due to 
the overwhelming demand for small arms, horseshoes, and other such implements.   
 Another, more compelling explanation for why industrial activity supposedly 
boomed during the war, that may partially explain the ability of smaller plants to gain 
market share, is that the inflation resulting from the government’s decision to finance a 
significant part of the costs of the war through money creation caused prices of 
commodities to leapfrog over wages, whose prices were renegotiated only infrequently.  
This decline in real wages increased the expected profitability of investments in much the 
same manner as the rise of prices of final goods over capital goods caused by the 
government’s tariff policy discussed above did, and may have facilitated the entry of 
many smaller, marginally efficient enterprises during this era, creating a situation that 
may have appeared to be a boom, but was in reality a period of very low addition to total 
capacity. This explanation of the alleged post-war boom figures prominently in the 
Beard-Hacker explanation of how industrialists managed to gain from the war.  While it 
doesn’t provide a compelling or convincing argument that the war was good for the 
economy, it may illuminate our understanding of the phenomenon of low MES observed 
in many industries in 1870. 39 
The “decision” to increase the money supply to pay for the war was really the 
outcome of a revenue crisis that left the government with very little else in the way of 
options. Reuben Kessel and Armen Alchian recount the saga of the shaky position of the 
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government on the eve of the Civil War.  When the Union blockaded the southern cotton 
trade, an important source of export revenue was lost.  Further, New England textile mills 
were forced to import expensive foreign cotton, resulting in a huge balance of payments 
deficit.  Given the shaky position of the Union government, further credit from abroad 
was a dead issue.   
 To remedy this problem, the government abandoned the gold standard, and 
allowed the dollar to fluctuate in accordance with market forces.  This abandonment of 
the gold standard allowed the government to print all the money it needed to finance the 
war, because this new money, called “greenbacks”, while not exchangeable for gold 
coins of the same face value, was declared legal tender for all debts public and private 
(though not for import duties and interest on the national debt).40 
 The result of this policy, however, was much inflation, and the deterioration in the 
exchange rate of the dollar vis-à-vis other currencies.  While output prices soared, 
nominal wage rigidity meant that all wage earners experienced a significant drop in their 
real wages, thus creating windfall profit opportunities for capitalists. And anyone—wage 
earner, capitalist or farmer—who consumed goods made abroad received a reduction in 
their dollar purchasing power. 41 
Many other factors besides the inflation of the money supply contributed to a 
decline in real wages in this period, that may have abetted business creation and explain 
the entry of many new smaller firms into the market.  There was further deterioration in 
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real wages due to the government’s tax policy during this era.  While most of the 
expenditures for the war were financed through bond sales and money creation, taxes 
were also raised.  Wage earners were made relatively worse off than other groups 
because, as Williamson explained above, many of the new taxes that were initiated were 
tariffs that allowed domestic manufacturers to raise their prices. But for consumers of 
these goods, there was a loss in purchasing power of wages.  Just as the tariffs raised the 
price of final goods relative to capital goods, they also increased the price of final goods 
relative to wages. The decline in wages relative to output prices, particularly in the 
import-competing industries, must have created still further windfall profit opportunities 
for would-be entrepreneurs.  Further excise taxes on goods such as tobacco and liquor 
were raised during the war, raising the price of these goods for consumers. 42  Stanley 
Engerman also believes that a deterioration in the quality of the labor force may have 
driven down real wages, as wartime demands brought marginal workers into the labor 
force.  Shifts in age and sex composition of the labor force towards younger and more 
female, and the continued influx of lower-skilled immigrant labor all may have 
contributed to a decline in labor productivity.43 
There is ample statistical evidence in support of the notion that real wages declined 
during the Civil War.  Jeffrey Williamson calculated real wages in manufacturing from 
1851-1878, and found a steep descent at the onset of the war, with real wages not 
regaining their pre-war levels until the end of the 1860’s. 44  Stephen DeCanio and Joel 
Mokyr also calculated the difference between what real wages for Northern non-farm 
workers would have been in the absence of inflation from 1861 on, and what they 
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actually were with the effects of inflation figured in for each year until the end of the war 
in 1865.  They found that for 1861, there was no wage gap; in fact, real wages were 
actually higher than they would have been without any inflation.  Thereafter, however, a 
gap emerges, in which the non-inflated real wages exceed the inflation-impacted wages 
for each subsequent year until 1865. 45 
In summary, the deterioration in the real value of wages vis-à-vis prices of all other 
goods may have created a temporary situation that increased the expected profitability of 
all enterprise, thus facilitating the entry of many smaller firms into the market.  The 
relative decline in the price of capital goods caused by the wartime protectionist policies, 
and the crowding in effects of debt retirement discussed above that account for the post-
war rebound may also have been beginning to take effect, further abetting the 
profitability of new enterprise by lowering the cost of credit, and the price of the capital 
equipment itself.   
These effects do not, however, appear to have offset the crowding out effects of 
war debt upon capital formation; at least not by 1870.  Overall, the Beard-Hacker thesis 
that the war spurred economic growth and industrialization is hard to substantiate.  While 
there may have been some short-term factors that facilitated the entry of many new 
smaller firms into the market during and immediately following the war, overall, the war 
was a setback for the industrial North that retarded the rate of economic growth during 
                                                 
45
 DeCanio, Stephen, and Joel Mokyr. “Inflation and the Wage Lag during the American Civil War.” 










the war years.  Real growth in the economy marked by large increases in the level of 
investment and additions to capacity did not occur until the 1870’s, as is seen in the 
resurgence in MES achieved by 1880, indicating that a resumption in capital 
accumulation may have led to a situation in which larger firms were again able to gain 
the upper hand.  The Civil War must be regarded as a disruption in the normal course of 
economic growth and activity in which there may have been some short term disruptions 
or blips to investment activity that produced temporary alterations or adjustments in the 
standard mode of industrial organization of the economy.  But then the economy resumed 
its course, and it was business as usual.  The Civil War economic experience parallels 
Weiss’s account of the increases to capacity that produced rising MES throughout 
American 20th century manufacturing industry history, only interrupted by the war 
emergency of World War II, a disruption in the course of normal economic activity that 
also produced relatively smaller additions to total capacity.  
 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, our empirical findings indicate that the industries that Chandler said were 
the great industries that experienced the greatest impact of the decline in transport costs 
and technological advance that led to large-scale production methods did not achieve 
great scale economies by 1880; the time by which, if Chandler’s theory were correct, they 
ought to have.  In our results that measure and quantify economies of scale through the 
method of MES, the general pattern of the industries surveyed is relatively great 
economies of scale as having been achieved by 1860, followed by a pronounced dip at 
1870, and only modest increases by 1880 that do not regain their 1860 levels.   
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While the dips of 1870 make sense in the context of the Civil War aftermath 
shock, there is no rational explanation for the extremely low MES’s observed at 1880 in 
the context of Chandler’s hypothesis.  If 1870 is the benchmark period in which to begin 
to expect to see the effects of transportation improvements upon scale economies in 
American industry, then 1880 is certainly a liberal allowance in terms of time to expect to 
see the effects of the railroads upon market expansion and financial intermediation to 
have been taking place; post-war resumption of investment and capital accumulation 
notwithstanding.   
These results compel us to take a closer look at our data and to conduct deeper 
analyses in order to determine the root cause of these anomalous 1880 results.  In the 
following chapter, it is revealed that flaws in the 1880 data for some industries may be 
responsible for these anomalous results, and also the fact that many of the industrial 
categories analyzed may have been more broadly defined industry conglomerations 
encompassing a wider range of products than the corresponding industries in the Atack 
article.  Chapter Five conducts more thorough analyses of these data sets by looking at 
sample sizes and range distributions in order to see if there is a correlation between 
flawed data and lower-than-expected MES for 1880.  For those industries found to 
contain flawed 1880 data, Chapter Five also reports the results of a search for alternative 
data for those industries, and results of analyses performed using whatever superior data 
was available.  Chapter Five also, where possible, conducts disaggregated industry 
analyses based on finer product group distinctions in order to see how our results differ.  
It will be revealed that by mixing a flawed data set, or one with a downward trend in 
MES for one sub-group with that of another sub-group with a good data set and an 
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upward trend in MES, we obtained the end result of a downward MES trend for some 
industries.  By disaggregating these into more “pure” industrial categories, we were able 
to remove the flawed portion of some of these conglomerations and see that for many 
groups, our results really aren’t so bad after all.   
Chapter Five also conducts MES analyses of the new group of fresh industries 
thus far unanalyzed in the right hand column of Table 4.1 in order to see if the Chandler 
hypothesis that these industry groups were less strongly impacted by the technological 
and transportation improvements of the era is correct, and also to inspect and 
disaggregate the data sets of these industries in turn, in order to determine what these 
industries’ data characteristics and their MES results have to tell us about how faulty data 
may have affected the results of the left column industries.  It will be revealed that faulty 
and misconglomerated data alone cannot account for these anomalous results, and that a 
reassessment of the Chandler hypothesis consisting of further industry data analyses may 












Chapter Five: ECONOMIES OF SCALE REVISITED: TAKING A CLOSER 
LOOK 
 
Introduction—Data and Measurement Problems   
 
In this chapter, we conduct a more thorough investigation as to the causes of the 
anomalous results of the previous chapter that showed declines in MES from 1860-80 in 
eight key industries that Chandler said were the great industries that experienced the 
greatest impact of the decline in transport costs and technological advance that led to 
large-scale production methods.  The basic pattern of the industries surveyed--relatively 
great MES having been achieved by 1860, followed by a pronounced dip at 1870, and 
only modest increases by 1880 that do not regain their 1860 levels—is anomalous in that 
while the dips of 1870 make sense in the context of the Civil War aftermath shock,  we 
would expect to see a greater rebound as having been achieved by 1880; the time, if 
Chandler’s theory is correct, the effects of the railroads upon market expansion and 
financial intermediation on size and structure of industry ought to have been firmly in the 
saddle.  We will examine the data more closely—particularly the 1880 data in which the 
anomalous results are contained—and attempt to “repair” those data sets found to be 
flawed by conducting new analyses using disaggregated industry conglomerations based 
on finer product group distinctions and new superior data where available, and comparing 
our results to similar analyses using the new group of fresh industries thus far unanalyzed 
in the right hand column of Table 4.1.  Our final results indicate that faulty and 
misconglomerated data alone cannot account for the anomalous results of Chapter Four, 
and that a reassessment of the Chandler hypothesis and/or further industry data analyses 
may be desired in the future to further our knowledge and understanding of the true 
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trends of efficiency and size of firms wrought by the railroads in the late nineteenth 
century.   
 
The first step in the investigation procedure surrounding lower-than-expected MES in 
1880 was to ignore the anomalous results of 1870 and to conduct a new analysis skipping 
that year; in other words, computing MES as it emerged from 1860-80.  The rationale for 
doing this is that the unusually low MES’s of 1870 were the result of wartime conditions 
that favored the concentration of plants in the lower ranges of industry valued added 
percent.  This may have occurred to the detriment of plants in the middle size ranges, 
creating small industry value added percents in that year that were easy to beat in the next 
period.  While it is true that many firms may have moved into the small-to-medium size 
ranges in 1880, the middle-to-upper ranges may have filled up still more.  But since these 
were not the smallest size ranges that increased their percentages since 1870, they were 
not the MES.  However, I reasoned, if I were to compute MES since 1860, that might be 
another story.  There was a high concentration of firms in the middle size ranges in 1860.  
If firms in the middle-to-upper ranges in 1880 had increased their percentages 
significantly above their 1860 levels by 1880, then it is possible that these firms may 
have been in the smallest range whose percent increased since 1860; not the firms in the 
small-to-medium ranges who may have risen since 1870, but not since 1860.  
 This theory did not hold water.  Despite the fact that many more plants had moved 
into the upper scale ranges in 1880, the results from skipping 1870 produced MES in 
scale ranges for 1880 that were either equal to, or lower than the ranges computed by 
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comparing 1880 to 1870.  There was not a single exception to this rule in any industry 
previously surveyed or in those that follow.  
A far more plausible main hypothesis I determined, and endeavor to test now, is 
that part of the reason for the lower-than-expected MES’s for 1880 is that sample sizes 
were very small in that year.  The data samples, in other words, were not wholly 
representative of the gamut of firms.  For instance, take an industry that ended up with a 
lower MES in 1880 than it started out with in 1860—say Beverages.  This is a surprising 
result, given not only the conventional wisdom about what happened to scale of industry 
as time went on in this era, but also observation of size ranges over time from examining 
the data.  In general, across industries, one notices that each year, the size distribution of 
plants is increasing in the upper direction.  For instance, in 1850 there are few plants in 
the upper ranges.  In 1860, the upper ranges fill up some more.  In 1870, although there 
was an increasing concentration of firms in the lower ranges that produced a low MES in 
those years, many new plants entered the upper ranges to the point where there were at 
least some plants in each range all the way up to the top, $256,000+.  The thing that 
happens in 1880 in Beverages, however, is that the size ranges become truncated at both 
ends, top and bottom.  In other words, you have a bunch of empty extreme lower ranges, 
a bunch of empty extreme upper ranges, and a handful of average-sized plants in the 
middle.  
 It could be the case that since the sample sizes were small in that year, the plants 
the census takers obtained data on were naturally, by the law of averages, the average-
sized plants.  The very small ones and very large ones may indeed have existed, they just 
weren’t taken account of.  So since the average, medium-sized plants were all that existed 
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in the samples, naturally the MES existed somewhere in the medium range.  It is entirely 
possible that if the sample sizes were larger, and included the output of all the very 
largest plants, these plants in the medium ranges would have comprised a lower fraction 
of total industry value added than actually shown, and larger plant size ranges could have 
been the ones that made a jump in share of total industry value added since 1870. 
 In looking at the sample size of Beverages for 1880, we find that this is certainly 
the case.  There were only 11 plants in the sample that year!   
Atack and Bateman’s article on the Census samples reveals information about the 
1880 Census that shows that my fears that the 1880 Census might not be wholly 
representative of the gamut of firms might not be unfounded.  Atack and Bateman report 
that for the 1880 census, special experts on the industry in question were assigned to 
collect data on specific industries.  These industries included iron and steel, cotton, 
woolens and worsteds, silk, beer, liquor, glass, coke, mining and drilling. Unfortunately, 
despite exhaustive investigation, no one has been able to locate all of the returns taken by 
the aforementioned experts.  Thus many firms from these separately canvassed industries 
that appear in the 1880 samples are enumeration mistakes and were not generally 
tabulated from the regular returns by the Census Office, although they aren’t missing in 
their entirety.1 
So this means that for the 1880 samples for the industries in those categories, 
which include Beverages, credence ought not be held in them as representative at all of 
those industries.  The hypothesis about small sampling size leading to truncation of the 
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data for that year is also possible for these industries because of the omission of so many 
plants.  Had these plants been included in the samples, it is likely that there would be 
many more plants in the upper and lower ranges.  So it is likely that had these additional 
plants been included in the samples, total industry value added would have been greater, 
and the proportion held by small-to-medium-sized plants might have been smaller, thus 
MES might have been observed in higher size ranges.   
In order to remedy this data deficiency, an exhaustive search for alternative data 
sources for at least the iron, steel and textile industries for some time from approximately 
1875 until 1895 was conducted.  Unfortunately, apart from some excellent iron and steel 
data, it yielded meager results.  In 1890 and 1891, the U.S. Bureau of Labor issued two 
reports as part of its Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor series; one covering 
iron, steel and coal (1890), the other covering textiles and glass (1892). 2  These books 
contain data on costs and output for a group of establishments in each industrial class for 
an approximate one-year period occurring sometime within 1888-90 (although some have 
a shorter period covered and terminal dates).  For iron, for instance, it has pig iron, muck 
bar iron, finished bar iron, and steel in all its various forms; steel rails, steel ingots, etc.   
For textiles, similarly, it has separate groupings of cotton textiles, cotton yarns, woolen 
and worsted textiles, woolen and worsted yarns, etc.   For convenience, I will often refer 
to these data simply as either the Bureau of Labor (BOL) data, or by their common title, 
Cost of Production, or by their common author, Commissioner of Labor.   
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Upon locating these slightly later-than-optimal, but adequate data sources, I 
conducted a careful analysis of the product coding on the Atack-Bateman-Weiss (ABW) 
samples for iron and textiles for 1850-70 in order to determine whether there was 
sufficient correspondence between these and the BOL data for mobilization and 
incorporation of the latter into my survivor method analysis.  Based on the ABW product 
coding, it appeared that the BOL data do incorporate the gamut of products that fall under 
the rubric of the three-digit SIC codes used in the former, apart from a few multi-product 
firms.  I determined that the Commissioner of Labor books provide a very large sample 
for iron/steel and cotton and wool textiles that does correspond to the products included 
in the ABW samples under their respective categories.  For instance, the BOL books have 
a large set of data for each variety of iron.  Although the ABW data are titled simply 
“Iron” as per the SIC code 331 under which they are grouped in the data set, this coding 
includes steel and coke; both of which are to be found in at least a modicum in the ABW 
samples, and are in abundance in the BOL data.  The fact that the BOL data are titled 
“Iron and Steel” may thus be counted as a purely semantic difference, perhaps reflective 
of the fact that by the time these books had come out, steel had begun to be increasingly 
used in place of iron in a variety of industrial processes, and the authors merely wanted to 
emphasize this fact.   
These data are not limited to any particular state(s).  While the samples of firms 
were drawn heavily from the Northeast, some Southern industry is also represented.  




These data contained all the data necessary to do an Atack-esque value added 
measurement, barring price of output. They contained each establishment’s materials, 
labor, supplies and repair (capital) costs for the period, and output quantity.  The iron 
volume also contained some prices data, such as the price of a ton of pig iron in 
Philadelphia at each month of the year over 1887-90, and for several other varieties and 
grades of iron. I was able to obtain price data for much of the remaining products from 
the various publications of the American Iron and Steel Association, U.S. Census Bureau 
and U.S. and state Departments of Labor (see explanatory notes of following analysis).  
Mobilizing these data to accommodate the Cost of Production output figures was pretty 
straightforward for iron and steel, due to the fact that most (but not all) firms in the series 
produced a single, homogeneous product, such as a single particular variety of pig iron or 
bar iron, so the task amounted to finding a single price per firm based on its output.   
  Textiles were much more complicated.  In the industrial category of “cotton 
textiles”, for instance, each firm produced a gaggle of different products that fall under 
that rubric.  Cost of Production tells us which of these products each firm produced, but 
not how many pounds or yards of each; only how many total pounds and yards of textiles 
each firm produced.  Since the products are non-homogeneous, they have different 
prices.  If quantities of each product each firm produced were known, a weighting 
scheme to form a unique price estimate for each and every plant in the sample could have 
been devised.  Unfortunately, since neither the quantities nor proportion of each sample 
firms’ output were given, the textiles data could not be used.   
  There were also some chunks of the Cost of Production iron & steel data that had 
to be discarded for similar reasons.   Many of the firms were multi-product, and the 
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quantities of each product they produced are unknown.  Therefore it was impossible to 
assign a properly-weighted price estimate for their output.  The data are arranged in the 
book in separate tables by variety of iron and steel product.  So there is a separate table 
for pig iron, finished bar iron, etc.  In each of those tables, there is a product description 
for each firm listed.  While some of these firms produced a single, homogeneous product 
across the samples, for which a single price is available, others did not.  So for pig iron, 
for instance, the variety of pig iron each firm produced is listed (hot blast charcoal, cold 
blast charcoal, Bessemer, etc.).   While some sample firms produced  a single, 
homogeneous variety of pig iron, say Bessemer, there were another bunch of firms with 
the product description “Run of furnace”, which was used to designate the product of a 
furnace which produced several grades of pig iron in considerable quantities, the separate 
quantities of which are not listed in the table.  The Finished bar iron table had a similar 
“Run of mill” product description category.3  So the data for pig iron and finished bar 
iron incorporated in the following analysis has been truncated from its complete form in 
the original tables so as to purge the data of these multi-product firms, whose quantities 
or proportion of their various outputs are unknown. 
There were also two entire tables for miscellaneous iron and miscellaneous steel 
products in which, in most cases, each establishment produced several different articles 
of numerous sizes.  While the product description column lists only each firm’s leading 
product, the cost data is for the entire mixed product.  Thus there is no correspondence 
between a value of output figure computed from the price of the leading output multiplied 
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by its quantity, and the cost data.  So the data from these miscellaneous categories also 
had to be discarded.   
A detailed description of the exact product categories included and the source and 
methodology of construction of each product category’s price estimate accompanies the 
results and commentary on the MES calculations for iron and steel using the Cost of 
Production data.  This commentary and analysis is juxtaposed to the corresponding 
analysis using the ABW data that is reiterated for the sake of comparison in the below 
Section I.  Suffice it to say, the Cost of Production data yield far more intuitively-
pleasing results than those for iron and steel obtained using the ABW data, and for that 
reason have been included in the following tabular analysis. 
 
Another factor possibly contributing to the lower-than-expected MES in 1880 for the 
industries surveyed in Chapter Four is the fact that all of the industrial categories 
analyzed, both in Chapter Four and in the analysis that follows, may be more broadly 
defined industry conglomerations than in the 1985 Atack article frequently referred to in 
Chapter Four.  In comparing the SIC codes used to classify industries on the internet data 
samples to the SIC codes in the article, one notices that Atack uses the more precise 4-
digit subgroupings contained within these 3-digit classifications; whereas on the internet 
samples, only the 3-digit product code is listed.  The 3-digit codes on the internet data 
sets encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath them.  We do not 
know whether there is correspondence or not between these 3-digit codes on the internet 
data set, and the 4-digit codes in the article.  The original data set Atack used to write the 
1985 article is not available.  Since the 1850-70 data contained product code delineations 
that would enable one to disaggregate the data based on finer product distinctions, it is 
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possible that the original data sets may have consisted of much finer groups.  These data 
sets were delineated by an idiosyncratic system of industry coding that was recoded to 
SIC ex post c. 1987 to form the current internet data samples.  In addition, Atack and 
Bateman did additional sampling on 1850-80 in order to generate self-weighting 
nationally representative samples, which is also reflected in the current internet data sets.  
It is thus entirely possible that the industrial categories currently analyzed are much 
broader, and encompass a wider range of products than the corresponding industries in 
the Atack article.   
This is another X-factor that might be behind these anomalous results.  For 
instance, in the analysis of the Tobacco industry below, it was found that by 
disaggregating it into separate components of Cigars and Chewing tobacco, flaws in the 
data set for Chewing tobacco were responsible for the anomalous results earlier obtained 
in the Tobacco analysis in Chapter Four.  When Cigars were analyzed separately, they 
displayed a steadily ascending MES over 1860-80.  It is possible that further 
decomposition of the internet data into more “pure” industrial categories might correct 
further “errors”, and yield more intuitively pleasing results.   
Unfortunately, without these original data sets, a precise analysis of the industries 
in the exact same manner as performed by Atack is impossible, so we must make do with 
the data classifications as they exist in the current internet samples.  I did not do an in-
depth inspection of the product codes for all the industries to ascertain the degree of 
correspondence between the internet data samples and the 4-digit industry descriptions in 
the Atack article; the main reason being that for the very year that such information 
would be most helpful for, 1880, there are no product codes delineation—a defect from 
  
217
the original census manuscripts that neither I nor Atack can do anything about.  Even if 
we were able to get finer industry distinctions from the earlier years, we would still be 
stuck with the broad ones from 1880 for which we observe the anomalous results for.  
The internet data sets also contain state samples, which are closer to the datasets that 
Atack used in 1985.  However, the same difficulties mentioned above apply to these.  
These also contain no product code delineations for 1880, and we do not know if finer 
industry classifications exist in the original data sets in comparison to these, because 
these sets are unavailable.  This is another issue of the data to be wary of and this 
problem is alluded to frequently in the below analysis.  
 
The analysis that follows attempts to determine if these smaller-than-expected MES’s for 
1880 were due to small sample size by more carefully examining the data.  The first 
section attempts to analyze more carefully the empirical results already presented in 
Chapter Four by inspecting sample sizes of the data, looking for evidence of truncation of 
the size distribution, and determining if there is a correlation between small sample size, 
truncated (top and bottom) size range distribution, and lower-than-expected MES.  Such a 
correlation, if it exists, would tend to support the hypothesis that the smaller-than-
expected MES’s for 1880 were due to small sample size.  It also checks for an increasing 
size range distribution over time.  If the size range was increasing for previous periods, 
yet became truncated in 1880, this is further evidence that the smaller-than-expected 
MES’s for 1880 were due to small sample size.  The first section also compares the MES 




The second section attempts to, where possible, group similar industries together 
and disaggregate them so as to compare their MES tables in both forms.  This is being 
done in order to see if the anomalous results remain, disappear, or are reinforced when 
industries are disaggregated in this manner, and sample sizes are reduced.  For instance, 
in reference to Cotton and Wool textiles in the lower right Low-Technology/Low-
Transportation cell of Table 4.1 which was not analyzed in Chapter Four, but is analyzed 
here, it is possible that an entire aggregated group of textiles displayed these anomalous 
results, but that that was due to the preponderance of cotton textiles in this group, which 
were known to have experienced a war-time depression relative to wool textiles.  If 
disaggregated into cotton and wool textiles, it might show that wool textiles rebounded to 
a greater MES in 1880 than in the case of the aggregated results. Or, it is equally possible 
that this chopping down of sample size might produce even more anomalous results 
because it chops down the already-small sample size of 1880, thereby producing an even 
more truncated range distribution in that year, producing further anomalies.  
The third section performs the same function as the first two sections, but for the 
new group of fresh industries thus far unanalyzed in the right hand column of Table 4.1 
(which includes the textile categories mentioned above).  This is being done not only to 
provide further testing of the hypothesis that small sample size may be responsible for the 
anomalous results, and to see how these results differ when disaggregated, but also to see 
if anomalous results even exist.  For instance, it could be the case that sample sizes were 
better for these industries, and that 1880’s results show greater scale rises than in the left 
column industries.  Such results would point to the possibility that the results of the left 
column industries’ MES have a downward bias, and that an upward revision of those 
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results would produce greater MES in 1880.  Or, they could have good samples, yet show 
even smaller MES in 1880 than the left column industries.  Such results would not only 
vindicate the hypothesis that small sample size is responsible for these anomalous results; 
it would also vindicate the Chandler hypothesis that these industry groups were less 
strongly impacted by the technological and transportation improvements of the era that 
promoted greater scale of industry.  Comparison with the left column industries in order 
to test the Chandler hypothesis is a paramount reason for examining some of these right 
column industries.  Fortunately, there were enough similar industries in the right column 
to provide a few monolithic single industry groups consisting of a sub-grouping of these 
similar disaggregated industries to test.    
The fourth section describes the remaining right column of Table 4.1 industries 
that were not similar to each other enough in any way to be grouped together in any way 
to form monolithic single industry groups that could be disaggregated and analyzed 
separately, but are present in the Census samples in sufficient sample size in each year so 
as to permit a separate individual MES chart for all these industries for 1860, 1870, and 
1880, should future need or desire arise.  
The fifth and final section, the conclusion, summarizes the results produced by 
providing us a final comparison of right vs. left column industries to see who, in the final 
scheme of things, has “better” results, telling us in summary how botched sample size 
may have affected our results, and what insight the results provide in terms of a test of the 






I.     SUPPLEMENTATION OF TABLE 4.2:  SAMPLE SIZE, TRUNCATION OF 
RANGE DISTRIBUTION, AND MES 
 
 
In order to determine if there was this correlation between small sample size, truncated 
(top and bottom) size range distribution, and lower-than expected MES, I have amended 
Table 4.2 so as to include a description of the sample size and range distribution of all 
these industries for each year in which MES was ascertained.  This means the final date; 
so for 1870-80, I am looking at the sample sizes and range distributions as they existed in 
1880.  I have also looked at the sample sizes from the other years in which a MES was 
ascertained, 1860 and 1870, because if sample sizes were also small and ranges were also 
truncated in those years, then one cannot point to this feature of the 1880 data as being a 
reason for its anomaly.  In this section, we conduct a more thorough analysis of the data 
sets to see what happens when we face diminished sample sizes, and apply more 
skeptical scrutiny of those industries whose 1880 data was collected by “experts”.  The 
sample sizes listed pertain to the number of firms in the samples who possessed value 




















Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), Sample size, and Range distribution for Selected 





The results show that the two industries whose MES was higher in 1880 than in 1860, 
Leather and Clothing, both had good sample size and a normal size distribution.  Less-
than perfect sample size was a phenomenon that only appeared among the industries 
whose MES dropped.  However, it was only two of the remaining 6 industries whose 
MES diminished, Beverages and Iron, that had less-than perfect sample sizes, and these 
were both industries whose 1880 data must be regarded with skepticism.  Note their 
highly truncated 1880 data sets.  This may not prove that the diminished MES is due to 
this flaw in the data, because it is worth noting that these drops do not happen to be any 































































































































in Beverages of 8000 to 1163 was a drop of 85.5%, and the drop in Iron of 560 to 326 
was a drop of 41.8%.  The drops in the other 4 industries with good sample sizes were: 
Meat, 97.5%; Flour, 74.9%; Tobacco, 87.2%; and Shoes, 49.6%.  Thus we cannot rule 
out these surprising results of lower MES in 1880 than in 1860 to inadequacies of the 
data without more evidence.   
 We must therefore look at the actual numbers of the sample sizes of the industries 
with good sample size but diminishing MES.  If the sample sizes diminished over time, 
and are therefore not as representative of the industry as the earlier samples, it would be a 
sound explanation for a diminishing MES observed without the truncation.  We must also 
inspect the upper and lower extremities of their distributions, for while they may not be 
blanked-out zero spaces, they might still be sparse and thin relative to the two extreme 
tail ends in the earlier samples.  
 Of those 4 industries whose MES dropped but whose sample sizes were good, 
there not only were no significant drops in sample size; there actually were increases.  It 
is therefore hard to make the case that the drops in MES were due to inadequacy of 
sample sizes.   
 If the sample sizes were good, then tiny fractions of industry value added in the 
extreme upper and lower ranges probably are indicative of the actual structure of the 
industry, and not of an inadequacy in the sampling procedure that overlooked the 
extremes and only caught the middle ground average plant.  An examination of these 
percentages in these 4 industries shows that the percentage of industry value added in the 
upper ranges actually increased over time.  In comparing just the upper ranges of size 
distribution in 1860 to that in 1880, only Shoes shows a shrinkage of proportion of value 
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added in the upper ranges.  In examining the lower ranges as compared with 1860, there 
are also no significant proportional differences.   
There is thus no evidence of a pattern of across the board truncation in the 1880 
data.  Beverages and Iron may have been, which may have contributed to a slightly lower 
MES than would have existed otherwise with better data.  But the fact that the sample 
sizes for the other industries whose MES diminished were good and not truncated at all 
show that this hypothesis cannot be used to explain the diminished MES that appears in 
these industries in 1880.  For the most part, these industries in 1880 continue and 
reinforce the trend of increasing concentration of industry value added in the upper 
ranges observed from 1850-70.  Yet despite this increasing concentration in the upper 
ranges, it was the small-to-medium-sized plants that that picked up market share.  
However, had the sample size been still larger, there might have been observed still 
greater concentration of industry value added in the upper ranges, thus MES in the higher 
ranges.   
However, if one were to look at the results excluding Iron and Beverages, they 
aren’t quite as counter-intuitive.  The ratio of industries whose MES diminished from 
1860-80 to those whose MES increased becomes 4 to 2, or 2 to 1,  instead of 6 to 2, or 3 
to 1.   Further computations done excluding the flawed 1880 industries might reveal a 
lower proportion of such anomalous industries in the samples, and may even prove such 
results to be the exception rather than the rule.  It remains to be seen what tests of further 
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In Table 5.2 above, I have substituted the BOL data for iron & steel from 1888-90 
discussed above for the flawed ABW 1880 iron data, recalculated MES, and displayed 
the results.4 In other words, I have treated the BOL data from 1888-90 as data of a single 
                                                 
4
 The data used in this analysis were constructed from a variety of sources besides the Bureau of Labor’s 
Sixth Annual Report of 1890, Cost of Production: Iron, Steel, Coal, etc. While all the data on output and 
costs were obtained from it, prices data used to compute output value (thus value added), and deflate prices 
when necessary, were obtained from the following sources: United States Census Office, 11th Census.  
Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Pt. 3, Selected 
Industries. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895;  American Iron and Steel Association. 
Statistics of the American and Foreign Iron Trades. Philadelphia: The Association. 1888, 1889;  United 
States Department of Labor. Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Washington: Government Printing 
Office.  Vol. V (1900), No. 29 (July, 1900);  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), I;  and Mitchell, Brian R. International 
Historical Statistics: the Americas, 1750-2000, 5th ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003.  
The data in Cost of Production were categorized in different industrial classes, which appear in 
different sections of the book.  The data on output and costs that were used to perform the above analysis 
were only the data pertaining to pig iron, muck bar iron, steel ingots, steel rails, and coke that appeared on 
pp. 35-37, 51, 52, 110, 113, 152, 155, 164, 165, 234, and 236 of Cost of Production.  Within those 
individual tables’ categories, some firms were omitted based on their product description either due to the 
fact that the firms were multi-product, or there was an inconsistency between their output and cost data, or 
merely due to the fact that no price data was obtainable for that product.  Thus the data used in the above 
analysis for pig iron consisted only of that for Hot Blast charcoal, Cold blast charcoal, Bessemer, Foundery 
No. 1, Foundery, and Gray Forge pig iron.  The data used for steel ingots consisted only of that for the 
varieties of steel produced by the American firms in the table, which were Bessemer and Open hearth.  The 
remaining industrial classes were of a uniform homogeneous variety, and contained no product description 
based upon which a different price could be assigned to them.   
The prices data contained within Cost of Production that were used in the analysis applied only to 
Bessemer pig iron, Foundery No. 1 pig iron, Gray Forge pig iron, Steel rails and Coke, and appeared on pp.  
103-04, 179, and 243.  That pertaining to Gray forge pig iron is the price of Gray forge pig iron at 
Philadelphia on p. 103, not that at Pittsburgh that appears in the next column on p. 103 that was lake ore 
mixed.  That pertaining to coke is that at Pittsburgh, except for the month of March, 1888, for which no 














































alternative period (labeled simply “1888/90”) with which to compare to the ABW 1870 
iron data in order to obtain a new and different MES as it emerged from 1870 to the later 
period of 1888-90.   
The table shows the very good result of a MES for 1888-90 of 2588; a MES 
that exceeds not only the low, Civil-War-induced MES of 276 for 1870, but also the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prices data for Hot & Cold blast charcoal pig iron, and Bessemer & Open hearth steel ingots were 
estimated based on national aggregate data obtained from the Census of 1890 found on pp. 472 and 477.  
For each, the total value of output for 1890 was divided by the quantity of output in tons of 2000 lbs., then 
multiplied by 1.12 so as to convert to tons of 2,240 lbs. to be consistent with the Cost of Production data, 
thus providing single price estimates for 1890 for these products.  These estimates were then deflated into 
the prices of 1888 and 1889 using the Warren-Pearson wholesale price index for metals and metal products 
(Series E 58) found in Historical Statistics, p. 201.   
Prices data for Muck bar iron were obtained from Statistics of the American Iron Trade for 1888 
(p. 21) and 1889 (p. 22).  These data, originally presented in price per pound, were multiplied by 2,240 so 
as to be consistent with the data in Cost of Production which were in tons of 2,240 pounds.   
Prices data for Foundery pig iron were estimated based on the monthly data on prices of Foundery 
No. 2 pig iron for 1889 and 1890 found in the Bulletin of the Department of Labor, p. 813.  Prices data for 
1888 were estimated by taking the average price of 1889, and deflating it into 1888 prices using the 
Warren-Pearson price index. 
As matters of general practice, wherever monthly data were available, an average price was 
constructed for each firm based on its production run.  When monthly data was not available, annual data 
was substituted in its place, regardless of whether the firm’s production run occurred in a single year, or 
overlapped years.  For firms whose production run began or ended at a day of the month other than the first 
or final one, its average price was a rounded estimate.  So if a firm’s total production run began or ended 
with a run that was less than 15 days out of a month—say it began at a day past the 15th of the month, or 
finished its run before the 15th of the month—that month’s price was not counted in its average price.  Only 
if the first and final months of the firm’s production run consisted of over 15 days in the month was that 
month counted in the firm’s price average.  Production runs consisting of over 15 days in a month were 
weighted equally to runs that spanned an entire month.  
Similar monthly averaging techniques were applied to the price deflating described above.  In 
cases in which a firm’s production run overlapped years, its final average price was computed based on the 
appropriate deflated price values.  It is only natural to assume that since the firm’s production run occurred 
over the course of more than one year, its price received for its product ought to be reflective of the prices 
that prevailed over that production run.  This practice was also applied in order to maintain consistency 
with the costs data.  The output value figure ought to correspond to the costs data found in Cost of 
Production, which were merely totals of the costs incurred over each firm’s production run; therefore, they 
were costs that were paid for in the prices of different years, if the firm’s production run overlapped years.  
To do the best job of ensuring an accurate value added measure, then, output value figures were computed 
using an average of prices of the different years.   
Once value added figures were obtained, similar methods were applied again in deflating the final 
figures, in prices of 1888,1889, 1890, or some average thereof, to the prices of 1860 in preparation for 
computing MES figures that could be compared to those of earlier years using the ABW data.  These 
deflator data were the same used to deflate the ABW value added data; the North American Wholesale 
Price Indices on p. 702 of International Historical Statistics.  If a firm’s production run overlapped 1888 
and 1889, for example, its price deflator was an appropriate average of the deflators of 1888 and 1889 





starting point MES of 560 for 1860.  These results are a considerable improvement over 
those obtained using the flawed ABW 1880 iron data, which yielded a MES of 326 for 
1880, which gave the impression that efficient scale had decreased from its1860 level.  
The results may actually even understate the scale economies achieved by that 
later date, because many of the firms in the sample had shorter period covered and 
terminal dates than one year, as in the Census samples.  Thus many of the firms appear as 
much smaller firms than they would be had the data included their entire annual output, 
which are unknown.  Had annual outputs for these less-than-one-year firms been 
estimated in some way, perhaps by obtaining an average monthly output figure, 
multiplying that figure by the number of missing months in the firms’ production run, 
and adding it to the existing figure, scale would have been even larger for many of these 
firms, thus adding more larger firms to the sample, and perhaps resulting in greater shares 
of industry value added held by the larger firms in the sample, thus producing an even 
larger MES for this period.   
Had the BOL data been substituted into Table 5.1 for iron in place of the ABW 
data, and the later period of 1888-90 been used in place of 1880 as a final period with 
which to measure MES, the overall industries’ results improve.  There would now be 
three, not two industries whose MES was higher in 1880 than in 1860, all of which 
possessed good sample size and a normal size distribution.  Only 5 industries experienced 
diminishing MES from 1860 to whichever final period we are comparing to.  The BOL 
data also is of satisfactory sample size that stands up to the best of the ABW data, and is 
non-truncated, which further reinforces the general pattern observed in the other 
industries of increasing concentration of industry value added in the upper ranges 
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observed from 1850-70.  The only industry with a truncated 1880 data set that would 
remain if the BOL data were substituted for the ABW data would be Beverages, also one 
of the flawed expert-collected data series. If one were to look at the results excluding just 
Beverages, and including the new iron data, they become much more intuitively pleasing.  
The ratio of industries whose MES diminished from 1860 to the later period to those 
whose MES increased becomes 4 to 3, or one and one third, instead of 3, the same ratio 
as computed including the ABW Iron and Beverages data.    
 
 
II.  SUB-SECTOR MES ANALYSES: HIGH PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS/HIGH IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION AND HIGH PACE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS/LOW IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION 
(COLUMN 1, TABLE 4.1) 
 
Of the Table 4.1 left column industries that fall into the High pace of technological 
progress/High impact of transportation and High pace of technological progress/Low 
impact of transportation categories, there was only one, Tobacco Products, that 
represented a Major Industry Group as per the 1987 SIC manual.  That group, 21, 
comprised a few individual Industry Groups that appeared in the ABW samples: 212 
(Cigars), 213 (Chewing and Smoking Tobacco and Snuff) and 214 (Tobacco Stemming 
and Redrying).   
Again, as explained in Chapter Four, a segmented analysis of Industry Group 208, 
Beverages, into its two subcategories 2085 (Distilled and Blended Liquors) and 2082 
(Malt Beverages) as Atack did, is impossible because in the data set, they share the same 
SIC code, 208, and because for 1880, a period that Atack did not take into account in his 
study, there are no fields in the data set corresponding to individual final product codes, 
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quantities or value.  Even for the other years, even if I were to look at their output codes 
on the data set, and determine what product was each plant’s primary output, many plants 
in the data set in the 208 category produced a significant amount of say, Beer, which 
would fall under the 2082 Malt Liquors sub-category, and also a significant amount of 
say, Whiskey, which would fall under the 2085, Distilled, Rectified and Blended Liquors 
sub-category.  So without further information, I cannot make any distinction between 
plants in the two categories.5  These earlier data sets used an idiosyncratic set of industry 
codes, and then were recoded to SIC codes ex post to form the current data sets on the 
internet.  So in the case of Beverages, one would need to look at the original data sets to 
see how the 208 data were divided into distilled vs. malt liquors.  
The only other group that comprised more than one individual Industry Group 
analyzed above, Clothing, was an industry group of my own construction based on SIC 
classifications that could be construed to represent the group that also appeared in the 
ABW samples.  This definition of Clothing, I think, is not the definition that Atack used 
in his 1985 study.  The only industry category we have enough information to link 
“Clothing,” as it appears in Table 4.1 with, that Atack actually could have run empirical 
analyses of, is Industry Group 232, Men’s and Boys’ Furnishing, Work Clothing, which I 
believe corresponds to Industry Group 2321, Men’s, youth’s, and boys’ clothing, as it 
appears in the tables in Atack’s article on pp. 34-35 and 40-41.  Since this Industry Group 
was of extremely small sample size, and sometimes entirely absent from the ABW 
samples, I combined it with various other Industry Groups contained in the samples that 
could be so construed as to represent the broad category of “Clothing” as it appears in 
Table 4.1.  However, there is no evidence that Atack ever included any of these other 
                                                 
5
 Atack is not sure what happened to the original data sets he used when he wrote the 1985 article. 
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Industry Groups in his 1985 study.  I could take these sub-sections apart, and analyze 
them separately, but it wouldn’t correspond to anything Atack did that I could hold up to 
his results for comparison.  
I do not, as of yet, know how Atack obtained his results for this Industry Group 
with such small sample sizes.  “Clothing”, as it appears on Table 4.1, could not have 
included Industry Group 221 (Cotton textiles) or 223 (Wool textiles), because these are 
listed separately in Column 2 of Table 4.1, and are analyzed separately under their 
respective SIC codes in the 1985 article.  Again, without the original data sets, and the 
recoding program he used to convert to SIC codes, there is no way to document exactly 
what data on the current internet data sets corresponds to 232 in the 1985 article.  
Consequently, in looking for an industry in Column 1 that could be sub-divided 
using the SIC codes provided in the samples to see if the MES structure was any different 
for the individual goods than for the greater grouping, that only leaves us Tobacco 
Products.   Of the individual Industry Groups within that Major Group, only 212 (Cigars), 
and 213 (Chewing and Smoking Tobacco and Snuff) were of sufficient sample size in the 
data to make such separate analyses meaningful (and even some of these were small in 
some years).  214 (Tobacco Stemming and Redrying) was entirely absent from some 
years, and in the years it existed, it was extremely small in sample size.  The results for 
Cigars and Chewing and Smoking Tobacco and Snuff (labeled simply “Chew”) are 
shown in Table 5.3 below.  The aggregated results already displayed in Table 4.2 (which 
include whatever meager data for 214 there was) are displayed in the bottom row for the 
sake of comparison.  Since Tobacco was in Atack’s High pace of technological 
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Chew 2000 Medium 
(22) 
Truncated 279 Small 
(11) 



















The evidence from Tobacco supports the hypothesis that there is a correlation between 
small sample size, truncated size range distribution, and lower-than expected MES.  By 
breaking down the individual categories of Cigars and Chew, we find that the anomalous 
results are only to be found in Chew, which had low sample size and truncated range 
distribution in every year.  By removing chew from the data set, and analyzing cigars 
independently, we start off with a medium-sized MES in 1860, followed by an expected 
dip at 1870 due to war-time scale shrinkage, followed by an impressive rebound in 1880.   
The results are all the more impressive given the fact that we started out with an 
aggregated Tobacco category that originally displayed anomalous results.  It is apparent 
from looking at Column 2 of Table 5.3 that the original result for the MES of 2000 for 
Tobacco in 1860 was due to the presence of at least one, if not more medium sized-plants 
of $2000 in value-added coming from the small and truncated data samples of chew in 
that year.  Had the sampling for Chew been greater in that year, perhaps there would have 
been many more plants in the lower ranges, producing a MES for Chew, and therefore 
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Tobacco as well, that was much lower.  By removing this component of the data set that 
was perhaps flawed, and non-representative of the true structure of the industry, we 
obtain an untainted “pure” estimation of an industry that had good sample size, Cigars, 
and find that MES was not as great in 1860 as had been originally believed when 
combined with its flawed partner.  This shrinking-down of 1860’s MES produces results 
that gel nicely with the hypothesis that scale was increasing throughout the 19th century, 
and only interrupted by war-time abnormalities.   
Except for the perhaps flawed separate Chew data, sample sizes only get better as 
the years go on, so there is no evidence of “veiled” truncation of the data set that a small 
data sample might produce.  The range distributions fill up closer and closer to the top in 
accordance with the theory that scale was increasing over the years.  All in all, this first 
segmentation of the data set has produced very encouraging results that show that it is 
very possible that small data sets for some industrial categories in some years may very 
well have produced anomalous results.  It calls for closer scrutiny of other industries to 
see if the same factors may apply.  If so, it could very well provide evidence pointing in 
the direction to show that even though sample sizes looked good and there was no 
observable truncation, veiled or otherwise, in the data sets for many of the Table 4.1 
industries, inadequacy of sample size of a segment of some conglomerated industries 
may have been the culprit behind the anomalous results observed in some of those 








III.   SUB-SECTOR MES ANALYSES: LOW PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS/HIGH IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION AND LOW PACE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS/LOW IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION 
(COLUMN 2, TABLE 4.1). 
 
Below are analyses based on pairings together of industry groups in the right hand 
column of Table 4.1; the industries thought by Chandler to have not experienced a 
tremendous impetus to scale from the technological and transportation improvements of 
the day.  This is being done in order to see if my test yields a similar result as Atack’s.  
Atack found that the left column industries had the highest ratios of potentially optimal 
plants to total plants as computed in that article, which was an indicator of great scale 
economies as having been achieved over 1870-1900.  Conversely, the right column 
industries had lower ratios, indicating that there had not been great scale economies 
achieved in these industries over this period.  It would be interesting to see if the same 
results hold for the periods I am examining using this alternative methodology.  In 
examining rises in MES in the left hand column industries, I did not get exactly robust 
results showing a clear pattern of rises in MES from 1860-80.  I got very great MES in 
1860, followed by a dip in 1870, and mild regaining of MES by 1880.  It would be 
interesting to see if we get similar results for the right column industries, or if different, 
how they differ.   
This procedure is also being done in order to determine if there was this 
correlation between small sample size, truncated (top and bottom) size range distribution, 
and lower-than expected MES for these industries.  The general pattern observed in the 
Column 1 industries, that industries with good sample size tended to display the 
anomalous results of lower-than expected 1880 MES, showed us that small sample size 
could be partially to blame for these anomalous results, but we cannot automatically 
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attribute them to this problem.  Perhaps examining the sample sizes and MES’s of these 
industry groups might shed further light on this unexplained phenomenon.  
The pairings are based on information provided in the Atack article, the 1987 SIC 
manual, and on my own inferences based on that information.  In addition to seeing if 
scale gains were different in these industries than in the Column 1 industries, the other 
basic idea is the same as in the above Tobacco example: to see if scale gains were 
different for individual industries than for the larger broader industry class under whose 
rubric they fell under.  For instance, in the first example to be discussed below, it would 
be interesting to look at a broad industry category, such as “Textiles”, and then to take 
that apart into wool textiles and cotton textiles.  As was discussed in Chapter Four, there 
was a tremendous disruption in the cotton textiles industry during the Civil War.  
However, this was offset by great growth in the wool textiles industry.  So while an 
aggregated measure of the textiles industry might show little or no scale gains made in 
this period, a disaggregated measure might show that these little gains are due to a 
shrinking MES in Cotton, while Wool displayed great scale gains.   
The fact that the pairings I have constructed appear together in the same cells in 
Table 4.1 is further testimony as to the legitimacy of these pairings constructions.  The 
fact that technological and transportation improvements impacted them in similar ways is 
evidence of their similarity in character.  As per the tables highlighting in Chapter Four, 
industries in the Low Technology/High Transport cell have been demarked in bold, and 







Pair 1: Textiles (Cotton and Wool; SIC’s 221 & 223) 
 
Below are the 1987 SIC classifications of two groups that clearly go together; Cotton and 
Wool textiles.  They share the same Major Industry 2-digit classification code: 21, 
Textile Mill Products.  Since the 4-digit codes that Atack referred to represent these 
products in his tables are the only sub-groups within these 3-digit categories, there is 
probably close correspondence between the 3-digit codes the data are listed under in the 
data samples and the 4-digit codes Atack used in his study.  However, even these results 
must be treated with caution in comparison with Atack’s study because the current data 
sets on the internet are the result of additional sampling he and Bateman did in order to 
generate self-weighting nationally representative samples.  The earlier, mid-80’s datasets 
were not weighted.  Again, without a copy of the datasets as they existed in the mid-80’s, 
there is no way we can know for certain that we are dealing with the exact same data set 
Atack used in his study for these, or any of the industries currently being analyzed.  The 
empirical results for Cotton and Wool separately are displayed in Table 5.4 below, along 
with their aggregation compiled and analyzed by me, which I have named simply 
“Textiles”.    
 
Industry Group 221: Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton 
2211 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton (only sub-group in this category) 
 
Industry Group 223: Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Wool (including Dyeing 










Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), Sample size, and Range distribution for Textiles, 1860-1880  




































































Bearing in mind that Cotton and Wool textiles were among the industries whose 1880 
data were collected by experts, and subsequently lost, we see that both the combined and 
separate results display the up-down-up-again pattern we are familiar with.  To 
temporarily put aside the issue of the 1880 data, we find no evidence of an offsetting 
expansion of the wool industry to offset the depression the cotton industry experienced in 
the Civil War in 1870.  Cotton actually has a greater MES than Wool in 1870.  Both 
experience significant drops from their 1860 levels.  Cotton dropped from 1860 to 1870 
from 205,000 to 999; a drop of over 99%, and there was also a pronounced 95% drop in 
Wool from 4000 to 207.  Of course, the sample size for Cotton for 1870 is extremely 
small; which might actually only reflect the fact that there were very few firms in the 
industry in that year, and that this is in fact, a realistic portrayal of the shrinkage of the 
industry that year.  But the fact that there were many more plants unaccounted for is also 
very possible, and that had the sample size been greater, medium-sized plants would have 
weighed less, and MES could have been in a higher or lower range.  The range 
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distribution for Cotton in 1870 is non-truncated, but only at its upper range, where in fact, 
over half of industry added existed in the $250,000+ range.  Its lowest two ranges were 
completely empty.  If the sampling bias was towards larger plants, veiled truncation of 
the lower ranges could imply a greater share of industry value added in those ranges, and 
could have produced an even smaller MES.  This could very well have been the case, 
because in examining Wool, whose sample sizes were larger, we observe an even smaller 
MES for 1870.  The aggregated Textiles computation also yields the familiar 1870 dip. 
The over time range distributions for all three show the familiar increasing 
concentration of plants in the upper ranges in support of the hypothesis that had better 
sampling for 1880 existed, there would have been greater concentration of plants in the 
upper ranges, thus perhaps higher MES’s than observed with the available data.    
 
 
Pair 2: Printing and Publishing (Newspapers and Books; SIC’s 271 & 273) 
 
Below are the complete 1987 SIC classifications of groups that came under the rubric of 
the same Major Industry 2-digit classification code 27, Printing, Publishing and Allied 
Industries, that corresponds to the category of “Printing and Publishing” Atack defined 
that appears in his tables.  I have presented below the entire set of 3-digit codes that fell 
under that rubric, along with the 4-digit codes that fell under their respective 3-digit 
industry groups, because Atack did not make any distinctions among the 3-digit 
categories that fell under this rubric in his paper.  He simply assigned the SIC label 
“2700” to the data or collection of data he used to represent “Printing and Publishing” in 
his study.  According to Atack, for his 2700 category, all of the 3-digit categories 
beginning with 27 that appear in the data set have been aggregated together. Therefore, I 
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have delineated below all those 3-digit categories, and have highlighted those that 
actually do appear somewhere in the ABW samples.   
Disaggregating those individual 3-digit categories for separate analyses was 
complicated by the fact that for many, sample size was too small across the years to 
produce a meaningful analysis.  A brief description of the frequency of occurrence of 
each 3-digit code in the samples has also been provided below.  It is purely accidental 
that only two categories, 271 (Newspapers) and 273 (Books) are present in the samples in 
sufficient magnitude to permit a separate analysis, and a second “pair” has been produced 
this way; otherwise, I would have disaggregated the data into more than two groups.  
These two groups have been marked with an asterisk to indicate not only that they existed 
in the samples, but that they were present in sufficient magnitude to permit separate 
analyses.  
According to Atack, all of the 4-digit code industries that fall under the rubric of a 
parent 3-digit code that appears in the Census samples are included in the samples under 
that 3-digit listing.   For 271 (Newspapers), there was only one 4-digit code that was 
identical to its 3-digit parent, so it is pretty safe to assume all of the 271 samples in the 
data set are of uniform variety.  For 273 (Books), there were two 4-digit codes; one that 
denoted book publishing and printing (2731), and one that denoted just book printing 
(2732).  According to Atack, 273 in the samples meant book publishing and printing 
together and along with book printing.  My own examination of the Census samples 
product codes for plants listed under 273 however, reveals that most of the product codes 
indicate book printing rather than publishing, so 273 might only mean 2732.  And I can 
only verify this for the samples from 1850-70, because product code delineation is absent 
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from the 1880 samples.  The remaining 3-digit industry groups not separately analyzed 
also have their 4-digit children listed purely for the sake of interest.   
So the below empirical analysis will consist of Newspapers, Books, and a 
combined aggregate analysis of publishing that includes all of the below 3-digit codes 
that fall under the 2-digit code of Publishing in the data samples.  These empirical results 
have been presented in Table 5.5 below following the SIC classifications of groups that 
came under the rubric of Major Industry 2-digit classification code: 27, Printing, 
Publishing and Allied Industries.   
 
Major Group 27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries (2700 in Atack’s paper). 
 
 
*Industry Group 271: Newspapers: Publishing, Or Publishing And Printing 
 
Frequent in all years. 
 
2711 Newspapers: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing  
 
Industry Group 272: Periodicals: Publishing, Or Publishing And Printing 
Sparse in all years 
2721 Periodicals: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing  
 
*Industry Group 273: Books 
Kind of sparse in 1870, but enough to do a separate analysis of.  
 2731 Books: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing  
 2732 Book Printing  
 
Industry Group 274: Miscellaneous Publishing 
Sparse or completely absent from all years except 1870. 
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 2741 Miscellaneous Publishing  
 
Industry Group 275: Commercial Printing 
Only 1880 has any at all.  
 2752 Commercial Printing, Lithographic  
 2754 Commercial Printing, Gravure  
 2759 Commercial Printing, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 
Industry Group 276: Manifold Business Forms 
 2761 Manifold Business Forms  
 
Industry Group 277: Greeting Cards 
 2771 Greeting Cards  
 
 
Industry Group 278: Blankbooks, Looseleaf Binders, And Bookbinding 
 
Sparse or absent from all.  
 2782 Blankbooks, Looseleaf Binders and Devices  
 2789 Bookbinding and Related Work  
 
Industry Group 279: Service Industries For The Printing Trade 
 
Sparse in all 
 
 2791 Typesetting  
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Books 920 Small 
(13) 
Truncated 1,033 Small 
(8) 





















The most striking pertinent feature of these publishing groups are the pleasing results 
observed in Newspapers that are similar to the phenomenon observed in the Cigars 
category of Tobacco products above.  In the aggregated category of Printing and 
Publishing, we get the familiar “bad” result of large MES in 1860, followed by the dip of 
1870, and the modest rise in 1880 that is still below the MES of 1860.  However, when 
Newspapers are analyzed separately, we find the dip of 1870 followed by a regain in 
1880 that supersedes the MES of 1860.  Sample sizes for Newspapers are on the small 
side in 1880, and its range distribution is also somewhat truncated, but this need not 
discount the results, as a larger sample size in 1880 may have produced still greater 
concentration of plants in the upper ranges, yielding an even larger MES for 1880.   
          Books results are less satisfactory, but these may be disregarded due to inadequacy 
of samples sizes in the first two periods.  Small samples sizes yielding truncated range 
distributions for 1860 and 1870 produce very unusual results of a rise from 1860 to 1870, 
  
241
followed by a decrease to below its 1860 level in 1880.  Had sample sizes been better, 
Books may have had a greater concentration of plants in the lower ranges in these years, 
producing smaller MES’s than observed in those years, showing an ascending pattern.  
However, since there was no evidence of increasing concentration of plants in the upper 
ranges in any of the groupings over the years, and since sample sizes for all groupings 
were pretty good in 1880, there is little evidence of veiled truncation of the upper ranges 
that would conceal a real-life greater MES for Books for 1880, or the aggregated Printing 
& Publishing group either, for that matter.  Newspapers thus stands alone as the only 
robust data set of the two sub-sets, and the disappointing results of the aggregated 
measure must be considered as due to the presence of the highly-flawed Books data.  
 
 
Pair 3: Fabricated Wood (Millwork and Furniture; SIC’s 243 & 251) 
 
 
Below are the 1987 SIC classifications of two groups that can be so construed as to “go 
together”; Millwork and Furniture.  While they do not share the same Major Industry 2-
digit classification code (Millwork belonging to Major Group 24, Lumber and Wood 
Products, Except Furniture; Furniture to Major Group 25, Furniture and Fixtures), they 
are similar enough to be grouped together under a general grouping of fabricated wood 
products.  Since the 4-digit codes that Atack referred to represent this group in his tables 
are the only sub-groups within these 3-digit categories, there is probably close 
correspondence between the 3-digit codes the data are listed under in the data samples 
and the 4-digit codes Atack used in his study.  Again, however, we must remember that 
there was additional sampling done to generate these national weighted samples, while 
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the earlier work was not weighted.  So without the original data set that still remains 
unaccounted for, we do not know if we are dealing with the exact same set of samples for 
these industries that Atack used in his 1985 study for Millwork and Furniture.  A brief 
description of the 4-digit categories from the SIC manual below consisting of examples 
of the types of products that fell under each category provides us with testimony as to the 
similarity of the products. The empirical results for Millwork and Furniture separately are 
displayed in Table 5.6 below, along with their aggregation compiled and analyzed by me, 
which I have named, simply “Fabricated Wood”.    
 




Fabricated woodwork like doors, blinds, awnings, stairs, window frames.  
 
Industry Group 251: Household Furniture 
2511 Wood Household Furniture, Except Upholstered 
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All three categories show the familiar up-down-up-again pattern, with 1880 gains still not 
equaling, or superseding MES of 1860.  Size range distributions show only little-to-
moderate filling up of the upper ranges as the years progressed, proving little further 
evidence of rising scale in these industries.  There is little truncation of the range 
distributions in any years, nor of any drops of sample size in 1880 that might indicate veiled 
truncation concealing a higher-than-shown MES in 1880.  Sample sizes of 1880 are actually 
the best observed for all three categories.  Sample sizes over all years, for all categories, are 
actually quite good.  We thus are left with little to show that the results are not indicative of 
the actual competitive scale conditions of these industries. 
 
 
Pair 4: Fabricated Metal (Foundaries and Sheet Metal; SIC’s 332 & 344) 
 
Below are the 1987 SIC classifications of two groups that can be so construed as to “go 
together”; Grey Iron Foundaries and Sheet Metal.  While they do not share the same Major 
Industry 2-digit classification code (Foundaries belonging to Major Group 33, Primary 
Metal Industries; Sheet Metal to Major Group 34, Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery and Transportation Equipment), they are similar enough to be grouped together 
under a general grouping of fabricated metal products.  While there were more than one 4-
digit codes within these 3-digit categories in the SIC manual, since Atack only referred to 
one of these in his article (the one I have highlighted below), I am assuming at least a 
modicum of correspondence between the 3-digit codes the data are listed under in the 
samples and these 4-digit codes Atack used in his study.  Again, the 3-digit codes on the 
internet data samples do encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath it.  
So all of the 4-digit subcodes have been listed below, but for the case of the 4-digit code that 
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Atack in his tables made a clear indication, that particular 4-digit code has been highlighted.  
Further, without the mid-80s data sets in hand, which used idiosyncratic coding, we cannot 
be sure of exactly what data in the 3-digit coding contained in the data sets corresponds to 
that in the 4-digit coding in the 1985 article.  This murkiness is compounded by the fact that 
the internet data samples are the result of additional sampling done to generate weighted 
nationally representative samples.  A brief description of the main 4-digit categories that 
Atack referred to in his article from the SIC manual below, consisting of examples of the 
types of products that fell under each category, provides us with testimony as to the 
similarity of the products.  The empirical results for Foundaries and Sheet Metal separately 
are displayed in Table 5.7 below, along with their aggregation compiled and analyzed by 
me, which I have named, simply “Fabricated Metal”.    
 
 
Industry Group 332: Iron And Steel Foundries 
 
3321 Gray and Ductile Iron Foundries 
Pipes, castings, manhole covers, wheels, etc.  
 
 3322 Malleable Iron Foundries 
 3324 Steel Investment Foundries 
 3325 Steel Foundries, Not Elsewhere Classified 
 
 
There were more 4-digit sub-groups that came under this 3-digit rubric.  But since the 3-
digit is all there is in the data set, and since it is this 4-digit classification of 3321 that 
Atack explicitly mentions in his article, I am assuming at least a modicum of 
correspondence between the 3-digit code these data are listed under in the samples and 
the 4-digit code Atack used in his study.  Again, the 3-digit codes on the internet data 
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samples do encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath it.  Further, 
without the mid-80s data sets in hand, which used idiosyncratic coding, we cannot be 
sure of exactly what data in the 3-digit coding contained in the data sets corresponds to 
that in the 4-digit coding in the 1985 article.  This murkiness is compounded by the fact 
that the internet data samples are the result of additional sampling done to generate 
weighted nationally representative samples.   Therefore, we cannot be certain that all the 
stuff in the data set under 332 is this 4-digit classification.   
 
Industry Group 344: Fabricated Structural Metal Products 
3444 Sheet Metal Work 
Metal awnings, canopies, ducts, mail chutes & collection boxes, roofing, stove 
pipes, ventilators, vats, wells.  
 
 3441 Fabricated Structural Metal 
 3442 Metal Doors, Sash, Frames, Molding, and Trim Manufacturing 
 3443 Fabricated Plate Work (Boiler Shops) 
 3446 Architectural and Ornamental Metal Work 
 3448 Prefabricated Metal Buildings and Components 
 3449 Miscellaneous Structural Metal Work 
 
The same holds true as above with 332. There were more 4-digit sub-groups that 
came under this 3-digit rubric.  But since the 3-digit is all there is in the data set, 
and since it is this 4-digit classification of 3444 that Atack explicitly mentions in 
his article, I am assuming at least a modicum of correspondence between the 3-
digit code these data are listed under in the samples and the 4-digit code Atack 
used in his study.  Again, the 3-digit codes on the internet data samples do 
encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath it.  Further, 
without the mid-80s data sets in hand, which used idiosyncratic coding, we cannot 
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be sure of exactly what data in the 3-digit coding contained in the data sets 
corresponds to that in the 4-digit coding in the 1985 article.  This murkiness is 
compounded by the fact that the internet data samples are the result of additional 
sampling done to generate weighted nationally representative samples.  Therefore, 
we cannot be certain that all the stuff in the data set under 344 is this 4-digit 
classification.   
 
TABLE 5.7 
Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), Sample size, and Range distribution for Fabricated Metal, 









































































All three categories display some of the best results seen so far.  The familiar dip at 1870 
is present, but 1880’s MES for all three categories rebounds to a higher position than in 
1860.  Sample sizes for Sheet Metal are extremely small, so little credence can be held in 
its results, but when aggregated with Foundaries, whose sample sizes are very good, we 
get very good results for the aggregated Fabricated Metal category.  Sample sizes are not 
huge overall, but are adequate.  Barring Sheet metal, whose sample sizes were too small 
to check for for evidence of increasing scale over the years, we obtain mixed results when 
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examining the range distributions of Foundaries and Fabricated Metal.  In Foundaries, 
one sees little evidence of increasing concentration of value added in the upper ranges 
until 1880, in which over 50% becomes concentrated in the upper-most size range.  
Similar results are seen in Fabricated Metal, in which almost 50% of industry value 
added is in the upper-most range.  Although it is not an entirely consistent pattern of 
rising scale, it does at least indicate that scale was headed in the right direction in 1880.  I 
do not know if these industries would be counted along with iron and steel as some of the 
special industries whose 1880 data is unaccounted for.  In examining the sample sizes, we 
do not see any breaks in the pattern of sample size and quality established for earlier 
years that would point to a problem with the 1880 data.  
 
 
IV.     REMAINING UNPAIRED AND UNANALYZED : LOW PACE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS/HIGH IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION AND 
LOW PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS/LOW IMPACT OF 
TRANSPORTATION (COLUMN 2, TABLE 4.1). 
 
The following are other industries that appear in the right hand column of Table 4.1 that I 
have not analyzed MES for yet, because there is no discernable sub-division of them in 
the samples, and/or there’s no way to link them into pairs as I have done for the several 
above.  In the samples, they are all listed by their 3-digit industry codes.  All of the 4-
digit subcodes have been listed below, but for cases in which Atack in his tables made a 
clear indication of the 4-digit code of these industries that he surveyed, that particular 4-
digit code has been highlighted.  I would assume that there is at least a modicum of 
correspondence between the 3-digit code these data are listed under in the samples and 
the 4-digit code Atack used in his study.  Again, the 3-digit codes on the internet data 
samples do encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath it.  Further, 
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without the mid-80s data sets in hand, which used idiosyncratic coding, we cannot be 
sure of exactly what data in the 3-digit coding contained in the data sets corresponds to 
that in the 4-digit coding in the 1985 article.  This murkiness is compounded by the fact 
that the internet data samples are the result of additional sampling done to generate 
weighted nationally representative samples.  Therefore, we cannot be certain that all the 
stuff in the data set under the below 3-digit classifications are their corresponding this 4-
digit classification from the Atack article.  For industries in which this linkage between 
the 3-digit code on the data set and the 4-digit code in the article is not clear due to a 
discrepancy between the coding system Atack used and that of the 1987 manual, the 4-
digit codes are delineated along with explanatory notes that attempt to determine exactly 
which of these 4-digit product codes are implied by the 3-digit coding listed in the 
Census samples.   
        A brief description of each industrial group is also included; mainly just examples of 
the type of good that it includes.  For each of these 3-digit groups, there is ample data in 
the samples with which to do an MES analysis for each period.  
 
 
Industry Group 242: Sawmills And Planing Mills 
 
2421 Sawmills and Planing Mills, General 
Lumber making 
 
Other codes:  
 
 2426 Hardwood Dimension and Flooring Mills 








3251 Brick and Structural Clay Tile 
Just like every kind of brick; for building & stuff.  
 
Other codes: 
 3253 Ceramic Wall and Floor Tile  
 3255 Clay Refractories  
 3259 Structural Clay Products, Not Elsewhere Classified  
 
 
Industry Group 205: Bakery Products 
2051 Bread and Other Bakery Products, Except Cookies and Crackers 
Other codes:  
 2052 Cookies and Crackers  
 2053 Frozen Bakery Products, Except Bread  
 
Screwed-up thing with this one is that the SIC Atack used as “Bread and other Bakery 
Products” in his study, 2057, doesn’t appear to exist in the 1987 codes.  I checked the 
1987 manual, which accounts for all changes in coding made since the previous 1972/77 
manual, and there isn’t anything about a change here.  I’m assuming there’s a modicum 
of correspondence between 2057 in the Atack paper and 2051 as it appears above circa 
the 1987 manual on account of the similarity in phrasing, and therefore that much, most, 
or perhaps all of the data that appear under 205 in the data set are this category, and not 
2052 (cookies and crackers) or 2053 (Frozen bakery products).   
 
 
Industry Group 235: Hats, Caps, And Millinery 
 
2353 Hats, Caps, and Millinery 
It’s pretty much just plain old hats. Only 4-digit code under this rubric.  
 
 




3199 Leather Goods, Not Elsewhere Classified 
 
This is “Saddlery and Harness” in all the Atack tables, and the 4-digit code above, 3199, the 
one that Atack did his analyses using, is the only 4-digit code listed under 319 in the 1987 
SIC manual.  In the manual, it includes a lot of other leather goods besides saddlery & 
harness: leather bags, aprons, jackets, whips, holsters, etc. But I’m assuming that if you did a 
thorough examination of the samples, and looked at each product code for all plants under 
the 319 SIC code, you’d find that most of the stuff these plants produced during these periods 
is stuff that could be considered as falling under the rubric of “Saddlery and Harness”, 
otherwise Atack wouldn’t have named it that.   
 
 
Industry Group 352: Farm And Garden Machinery And Equipment  
3523 Farm Machinery and Equipment 
 
Other codes:  
 
3524 Lawn and Garden Tractors and Home Lawn and Garden Equipment 
 
Now this appears as SIC code 3522 in Atack’s analysis.  Again, it’s the same screwed-up 
thing with this one as with the “Bread and other Bakery Products” category above.  The 
SIC Atack used as “Farm Machinery and equipment” in his study, 3522, doesn’t appear 
to exist in the 1987 codes.  I checked the 1987 manual, which accounts for all changes in 
coding made since the previous 1972/77 manual, and there isn’t anything about a change 
here.  I’m assuming there’s a modicum of correspondence between 3522 in the Atack 
paper and 3523 as it appears circa the 1987 manual on account of the similarity in 
phrasing, and that all the data that appear under 352 in the data set are this category, and 





Industry Group 379: Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment 
 3799 Transportation Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified  
Other codes:  
 3792 Travel Trailers and Campers  
 3795 Tanks and Tank Components  
Atack used the phrase “Wagons and Carriages” to describe all the data listed under the 4-
digit code 3799 in his study.  I am assuming that he chose this industrial code because in 
modern days, wagons and carriages don’t really come into play anymore, so they go into 
this esoteric, miscellaneous category.  Even in the 1987 manual’s description of 3799, all 
you see are 
 All terrain vehicles (ATV)  
 Automobile trailer chassis, except travel trailer  
 Autos, midget: power driven  
 Boat trailers  
 Caddy cars  
 Cars, electric: off-highway  
 Electrocars for transporting golfers  
I’m also assuming that if you were to go through the product codes in the actual data, and 
look at what plants under the SIC code 379 actually produced, most of it was stuff that 
could fall under the rubric of “Wagons and Carriages”, otherwise Atack wouldn’t have 
named it that.   
 
I’m also assuming that under 379 in the data set, he hasn’t included too many of the other 
4-digit sub-groups that are listed above; 3792 (Travel Trailers and Campers) and 3795 
(Tanks and Tank components), even though the 3-digit codes on the internet data samples 
do encompass the entire spectrum of 4-digit codes that fall beneath it. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, our more thorough initial analysis of the eight industries surveyed in 
Chapter Four indicated that it is hard to make the case that flawed data sets consisting of 
small sample size and truncated firm size range distributions are what was responsible for 
the results in Chapter Four that refute the Chandler hypothesis.  Of the six out of eight 
industries whose MES of 1880 was lower than 1860, only two had flawed data sets.  Our 
initial results indicated that the trend of diminishing MES was not due to flawed data, but 
was rather an indicator of the actual structure of these industries.   
After substituting newly-found superior data for 1888-90 for one of the two 
industries in the original study whose 1880 data was found to be flawed and whose MES 
declined, Iron, it was found that Iron’s new 1888-90 MES exceeded its 1860 level.  After 
decomposing one of the four industries with good data yet diminishing MES, Tobacco, 
into separate sub-groups of Cigars and Chewing tobacco, and analyzing these as separate 
industries, it was revealed that the anomalous results found in the original analysis of 
Tobacco may have been due to the presence of the Chewing tobacco data, which had low 
sample size, truncated data and diminishing MES when analyzed separately.  With Chew 
removed from the data set, and analyzed as Cigars alone, the result was a robust, non-
truncated data set with good sample size, and a rising MES pattern barring the expected 
dip at 1870.   
After substituting the Cigars data set cleansed of its flawed component for the 
Tobacco data set used in the original study that was found to be flawed, and using the 
superior BOL Iron data in place of the original flawed ABW data for 1880, the ratio of 
industries with a 1880 MES that exceeded its 1860 level to those whose MES declined 
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rose from just 2/6 in the original study to 4/4; an even match.  However, 3 out of 4 of 
those industries in the denominator whose MES diminished in 1880 from their 1860 
levels appeared to have good data sets.   
Consequently, our empirical findings for eight industries of the left column that 
Chandler believed were the industries that experienced the greatest impact of the decline 
in transport costs and technological advance that led to large-scale production methods 
and concomitant economies of scale by 1880 are far from encouraging.  Even after 
substitution and purging of the flawed data from the study to the best of our ability, the 
eight industries contained are only evenly split between those whose MES rose in 1880 
over their 1860 levels and those who declined.  The four whose MES rose; Iron, Tobacco, 
Clothing and Leather, are not even clustered in the upper left quadrant of Table 4.1.  
These are the industries that supposedly gained great gains from both technological 
progress and transportation improvements.  Among those four, only Iron and Leather 
tanning are to be found in this quadrant.  However, if the industry whose data set was 
damaged beyond repair, Beverages, were not counted in the analysis, and the analysis 
were confined to only seven remaining industries in the left column, the results are a little 
better in that at least a majority, four out of seven, have increasing MES.   
In comparing these results to those of the right column industries that Chandler 
believed were less strongly impacted by the technological and transportation 
improvements of the era, also with sample sizes and truncation patterns delineated, we 
find that when similar industries among this group were aggregated into single 
monolithic industry groups, four such groups were formed.  Out of these four, our initial 
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analysis showed a majority of three displaying 1880 MES’s that were below their 1860 
levels.   
In comparing these right column industries to the final results of the left column 
after substitution and purging of bad data, these results would appear to vindicate the 
Chandler hypothesis that these industries were in fact, much less strongly impacted by the 
technological and transportation improvements of the era.  However, the data sets of the 
industries in that falling ¾ were far from perfect. Textiles, which was among the 
industries whose 1880 data was collected by experts and subsequently lost, displayed the 
decreasing MES in both its aggregated form and its disaggregated separate Cotton and 
Wool textiles analyses.  In decomposing one of the industries with overall good data yet 
diminishing MES, Printing & Publishing, into separate sub-groups of Newspapers and 
Books, it was revealed that the anomalous results found in the original analysis of 
Printing & Publishing may have been due to the presence of the Books data, which had 
low sample size, truncated data and diminishing MES when analyzed separately.  With 
Books removed from the data set, and analyzed as Newspapers alone, the result was a 
robust and only mildly-truncated data set with adequate sample size, and a rising MES 
pattern barring the omnipresent dip at 1870.  Despite mild truncation of Newspapers data 
set for 1880, and lack of evidence of increasing concentration of plants in the upper 
ranges as having occurred over the years, this stands as an increase that cannot be 
discounted.  After substituting the Newspapers data set cleansed of its flawed component 
for the Printing & Publishing data set used in the original study that was found to be 
flawed, the ratio of industries with a 1880 MES that exceeded its 1860 level to those 
whose MES declined rose from just 1/3 in the initial analysis to 2/2; an even match.   
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In summary, the right column industries fare no worse than the left column 
industries in their MES analyses; perhaps even better.  After substitution and purging of 
the flawed data from the study to the best of our ability, the four industries contained are 
only evenly split between those whose MES rose over its 1860 level and those who 
declined; the exact same result as in the left column industries. Moreover,  if the industry 
whose data set was damaged beyond repair, Textiles, were not counted in the analysis, 
and the analysis were confined to the three remaining industries in the right column, the 
results are even better in that a majority, two out of three (.66) had an MES that rose over 
its 1860 level as compared with the narrow majority of four out of seven (.57) in the left 
column industries after similar substitution, purging, and removal of the flawed 
Beverages table from the group.  As with the left column industries, there is no clustering 
of the industries whose MES rose in the upper right quadrant of Table 4.1 that contains 
industries that had a low pace of technological progress but a high impact of 
transportation that Atack found had a greater average ratio of potentially optimal plants to 
total plants than the lower right cell that contains industries had both a low pace of 
technological progress and a low impact of transportation.  While one of those whose 
MES rose, Fabricated Metal, is in this upper right quadrant, the other that rose, Printing 
and Publishing (Newspapers) is in the lower right quadrant.   
We must therefore interpret our refined results of this chapter as still a refutation 
of the Chandler hypothesis; or at best, a tepid confirmation.  Even after substitution and 
purging of flawed elements of the data, only half of the eight left column industries that 
Chandler believed experienced the greatest impact of the transportation and technological 
advances of the day experienced a MES in 1880 that exceeded their 1860 levels.  The 
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sampling of four of the right column industries that he did not believe experienced as 
great an impact of the transportation and technological advances of the day, after similar 
substitution and purging, fare no worse in the analysis; if not better, which is very bad 
news for the Chandler hypothesis and also is a refutation of Atack’s findings.  However, 
the number of industries analyzed in the right column, four, is less than the eight we 
analyzed in the right column.  It remains to be seen what insight further analysis of the 
remaining seven industries in the right column for which sufficient data permits 
(Sawmills, Bricks, Bread and baked goods, Millinery, Saddlery and Harness, Farm 
Machinery, Wagons and Carriages) might reveal.   
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Chapter Six: ECONOMIES OF SCOPE ESTIMATION 
 
Introduction—Quantification of Economies of Scope   
 
In this chapter, we develop more fully the discussion of economies of scope that began in 
the first three chapters by introducing the measure of economies of scope achieved by a 
given multi-product industry at any given time that is a modification of that employed by 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang in their 1983 analysis of the structure of costs, 
technology, and productivity in the U.S. automobile industry.1  Friedlaender, Winston 
and Wang’s methodology as applied to a given multi-product industry in my model 
(taking footwear as a hypothetical example), consists of estimating a cost function for the 







YCYCYCYCS −++=                                (1) 
 
where (lower-case) s denotes output of shoes, b denotes output of boots, sl denotes output 
of slippers, and N denotes the collective output bundle.  
 
Thus defined, Sc measures the economies of scope of the entire footwear industry by 
computing the individual costs of producing each product independently that the given 
industry produced.  Then by subtracting the total combined costs of producing that 
bundle of goods jointly, and dividing that difference by the total combined costs of 
producing that bundle of goods jointly, a measure of the percentage cost savings 
(increases) that are due to joint production is obtained.  
                                                 
1
 Friedlaender, Ann F., Clifford Winston and Kung Wang. “Costs, Technology, and Productivity in the U.S. 




 By computing Sc over successive time periods spanning the late nineteenth 
century, we obtain a quantifiable measure of the degree of economies of scope achieved 
in various American manufacturing industries because if the Sc of each respective 
industry rose over time, that serves as an indicator that the percentage cost savings that 
were due to joint production were increasing, thus increasing economies of scope as 
having been achieved over time in that industry.  Our data used in the analysis, and the 
empirical results of this said Sc computation will be reviewed and discussed in this 
chapter.  In addition, an attempt is made to determine whether our empirical results 
confirm or contradict the beliefs of Chandler as to which industries experienced these 
rising scope advantages that were said to have occurred over this period, and when they 
occurred. 
 
The formulation displayed as Equation (1) above is a slight modification of the 
framework of the Friedlaender, Winston and Wang article, which estimated economies of 
scope in the Big Three American automobile producers (General Motors, Ford and 
Chrysler) from 1955-1979 by dividing their output into three output variables (small cars, 
large cars, and trucks) and estimating Sc based on three distinct disjoint product 
arrangements consisting of the joint costs of producing two out of the three outputs (say 
large cars and trucks), and the individual cost of producing the remaining good (small 
cars) by itself.  They then subtracted the joint costs of the total output bundle N from that 
disjoint arrangement in the numerator just as shown above.  They then constructed 
disjoint arrangements consisting of  large cars plus small cars & trucks combined, and 
trucks plus small & large cars combined, thus producing three Sc industry estimates per 
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period that measure the scope economies advantages of an aggregated three-good 
arrangement over the three possible disaggregated arrangements in which only two out of 
the three goods are jointly produced.  
Instead, I have used their definition to measure the economies of scope of the 
entire industry by computing the individual costs of producing each product 
independently that the given industry produced, and proceeded from there exactly as 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang have done by subtracting the total combined costs of 
producing that bundle of goods jointly, and dividing that difference by the total combined 
costs of producing that bundle of goods jointly.  This approach may seem a little cut & 
dry in comparison with Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s methodology, in that it  
makes no allowance for the possibility that there were firms that produced two out of 
three goods.  So we are deprived of an indicator of the cost advantages that three-good 
firms might have had over two-good firms, and are only able to gauge the cost 
advantages of three-good firms over the completely disintegrated single-good structure.    
However, this was a necessary departure in methodology due to this study’s need 
for a single generic variable representing the economies of scope of each industry as a 
whole at each given time period, similar to the manner in which MES functions as a 
single “one size fits all” measure of economies of scale for an industry per time period, as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five.   
As it turns out, little is lost in painting with a broad brush in this manner.  Due to 
data limitations (insufficient sample sizes for some industries, years; paucity of multi-
output plants within multi-output industries, etc.), it was a struggle in most industries to 
construct a data set consisting of two aggregate output measures, let alone three.  Of all 
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the industries surveyed, only one, Men’s & boys’ formal & work clothing, displayed a 
clearly identifiable, frequently occurring bundle of similar goods among the firms in the 
samples that was greater than two in number (coats, pants, and vests).   The data sets for 
most industries displayed either very little integrated production, or when their 
production was integrated, it was in a willy-nilly, highly variegated pattern which would 
have required collapsing many other highly variegated goods into single categories even 
to just form a two-good pairing scheme, which would not tell us much about scope 
economies.   
In situations in which a realistic collapsing of an industry’s outputs into two (and 
only two) aggregate measures was possible, Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s and my 
formulation become identical, because when one computes the individual cost of 
producing one output of a two-output industry, that leaves us with only one other output 
produced by the industry.  There is thus only one possible disjoint group arrangement 
with which to compare to the economies of joint production.  The consequent Sc measure 
is thus the only Sc measure possible for the industry.  Consequently, the “search” for a 
single unitary variable that represents the economies of scope of the industry as a whole 
at a given time period isn’t; it is actually the only kind of scope measure available to us 
for most industries given data limitations.   
Furthermore, even in the case of men’s and boys’ clothing, comparing the cost 
advantages of  three-good production to one-good production as opposed to Friedlaender, 
Winston and Wang’s comparison to two-good production may actually be more 
appropriate given the time period covered by this study.  While Friedlaender, Winston 
and Wang’s study was a 20th century one, during which large-scale, integrated, 
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diversified, continuous-process production technology was firmly in the saddle, my study 
concerns American industry in a state of transition from cottage industry to that large-
scale production technology.  So in order to highlight the gains from scope that may have 
been being made in light of these revolutionary changes in production methods, a 
comparison of joint to individual costs may actually provide a better indication of the 
gains from scope that may have been being achieved at this time, over and relative to the 
old-fashioned, mostly single-product methods that existed before the Industrial 
Revolution.  And of course, a three-to-one good comparison is an omission from 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s study, which merely compares one integrated 
structure to another by comparing the marginal efficiency of a 3-output plant over a 2-
output plant.  Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s formulation makes no allowance for the 
possibility that automobile production could ever be wholly specialized, and thus might 
be an understatement of the true gains from scope, which I have here provided.   
 
 
I.  COST FUNCTION DISCUSSION  
 
The type of industry cost function used in the above analysis is the hedonic, quadratic, 
second-order Taylor approximation around the mean cost function as employed by 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang in their analysis, sans any variables corresponding to 
hedonic quality attributes or technological variables indicating organizational differences 
among firms (such as the degree of vertical integration) as Friedlaender, Winston and 
Wang were able to use and incorporate into their cost function for their 20th century 
study. 2  The below cost function is composed of variables corresponding to the only data 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., pp. 5, 9. 
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that were available on the plant level in the ABW data for the period on which I here 
focus.  Thus it is a function of merely a vector of factor prices w, and a vector of output 
quantities, y, and a dummy variable for time, T, that captures time-related changes in 
costs and technology (see discussion on industry selection and input vector data set below 
for explanation of specific variables used in this analysis, that vary by industry).  I thus 
write the cost function as:   
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Before turning to the data discussion, it is useful to consider the economic interpretations 













= ∑∑α   (3) 
 
Thus each iα represents the marginal cost of output type i when evaluated at the given 
output levels, factor prices, and time period.  Just as in the case of the final empirical 
analysis using the estimated Equation (2) for each period (see below Section III.), the 






II.  DATA DISCUSSION 
 
(1) Industry Selection Criteria 
 
Cost functions were estimated for the eight industry conglomerations whose data sets 
were most well suited for such an analysis for 1850, 1860, and 1870.  Of these eight, only 
four were estimated for 1880 due to another deficiency in the data for that year (besides 
the missing expert-collected data), which is missing data on individual input and output 
types, quantities and values, even for the non-expert-collected samples that survive.   This 
was not due to loss of data, but due to the fact that the Census Office simply did not 
instruct its enumerators to collect any of these data that year, and instead merely reduced 
the measurement of raw materials and final products to their aggregate values. 3  This 
made a vector of output quantities and material input prices extremely difficult to 
construct, or even estimate.  Nevertheless, an attempt to do so was made which is 
described and presented in the Appendix to this chapter.     
Even some of the industry conglomerations for the earlier years contained missing 
or patchy data for output and input types, values, and quantities, which made construction 
of variables for total cost, input prices and output quantities difficult without chopping 
down the size of their data sets to near nothingness.  Sufficient data on individual input 
and output type, value and quantity to form a data set consisting of enough observations 
with the full set of variables for at least two out of the three years was a prerequisite for 
an industry grouping for inclusion in the analysis.   
                                                 
3
 Atack, Jeremy and Fred Bateman. “Nineteenth-Century U.S. Industrial Development through the Eyes of 
the Census of Manufactures: A New Resource for Historical Research.” Historical Methods, Fall 1999, 




Industry conglomerations for the analysis were formed and selected based upon 
further criteria measuring the suitability of their respective data for such an analysis.  For 
instance, another necessary feature of any data set for any industry was a clearly 
identifiable, frequently recurring pairing of similar goods in the bundle of goods 
produced by the multi-output firms in the samples.  A willy-nilly, highly variegated 
pattern of goods production observed in an industry was a rejection because this would 
require collapsing many other highly variegated goods into single categories, which 
would not tell us much about scope economies of any one particular goods pairing.  
Discernable, frequently recurring pairing patterns that were observed in an industry 
group, or could be formed by aggregating the data of more than one industry group were 
thus an essential feature I looked for in determining which industry conglomerations were 
selected for the analysis.   
By “frequently recurring”, I mean there had to be an adequate number of 
observations of the two or three goods selected for the analysis within the samples, and 
there had to be at least a modicum of occurrences of the that good grouping being 
produced jointly by individual firms for evidence of any testable scope economies.  
Collapsing of similar outputs into single product categories was used for both these 
purposes of supplementing and bolstering a weak data set, and also to keep the number of 
outputs in the analysis down to two or a maximum of three.  This is because if more 
outputs are used, the number of coefficient estimates explodes due to the interaction and 
squared terms in the type of cost functions employed in these type of analyses. 4  
                                                 
4
 Besides the modified version of Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s  hedonic, quadratic, second-order 
Taylor approximation around the mean cost function that appears in this study, see also the translog flexible 
functional form found in Stewart, Kenneth G., Introduction to Applied Econometrics. Thomson 
Brooks/Cole, 2005, p. 504, as well as the quite more elaborate version of the same in Shin, Richard T. and 
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Friedlaender, Winston and Wang for instance, initially divided their output into six 
categories in accordance with general market classifications: luxury cars, full-size cars, 
compact cars, subcompact cars, truck production, and a residual representing tractor 
production, changes in inventory, and non-automotive production; a residual obtained by 
subtracting the figures of sales on the first five things from total sales.  But for their final 
empirical analysis, they aggregated further to produce three output variables: compact & 
subcompact cars (“small cars”), luxury & full size cars (“large cars”), and trucks. 5 
I therefore applied similar collapsing methods in construction of my data sets.  In 
Tobacco for instance, rather than counting American cigars and Spanish cigars as two 
separate products, they were counted together in the same product group, Cigars.  
Homogeneity, or easy convertibility of units classification in order to facilitate such 
collapsing was an additional attribute of a data set that formed part of my criteria for 
industry selection.  Collapsing American and Spanish cigars into a single category was 
simple, because they were both measured in the same units: number of cigars.  Forming a 
second product category of loose tobacco was more complicated.  While the multifarious 
varieties of loose tobacco, such as smoking, chewing and snuff, could be collapsed 
together in a similar manner as Spanish and American cigars, highly variegated units 
measurements  in the case of this product group made things much more complicated.  In 
the case in which sometimes loose tobacco is listed in pounds and other times in tons, one 
could be converted to the other easily.  But if loose tobacco were in pounds, and a bunch 
of the other tobacco listings were in leaves, stems, lumps, or strips, as they sometimes 
were, there was no easy way to convert.   One could purge a data set of the products 
                                                                                                                                                 
John S. Ying. “Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone.” The RAND Journal of Economics, Summer, 
1992, Vol. 23, No.2: 171-183, pp. 173-74. 
5
 Friedlaender, Winston and Wang, pp. 7-8. 
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listed in more esoteric units measurements, but if doing so were to cut the data set down 
to an insufficient size, then that would be a disqualifying factor for that industry for 
inclusion in the analysis.   
As it turned out, there was no industry that was completely free of its “freak” or 
“oddball” products that would not fit neatly under the rubric of one of the two or three 
main product group categories.  All of the industry conglomerations were variegated by 
product type or heterogeneous units measurements to some extent, so some purging of 
goods was necessary for all of them.  The industry conglomerations selected for the 
analysis are those that still contained ample observations of products that fell neatly into 
the main categories after this purging was done.  All of the industries in the samples 
produced, in addition to a couple of principal outputs that appeared frequently in pairs, 
many other diverse products that were delineated in the samples, and contributed to the 
firms’ total costs.  In Flour, for instance, the frequently recurring product pair was barrels 
of wheat flour and bushels of corn meal.  Besides those two, a few odd ones cropped up 
now and then, like rye, oats, bran, buckwheat, rice, pig slop, offal, grist, chicken feed—
measured in various units like pounds, bushels, sacks, tins, etc.  Sometimes there was 
even something in the data that was completely out of the rubric of basic grains 
production that was still produced by farms in the Flour category, like bread, cakes, 
shingles, lumber, boards, cloth, etc.  Similarly, among the firms in the Shoes category, 
the basic frequently recurring pair was boots and shoes.  Even after logical collapsing of 
ladies’ shoes with men’s shoes to form the broader category of “shoes”, and aggregation 
of men’s boots with ladies’ boots to form the larger category of “boots”, as Friedlaender, 
Winston and Wang did with similar types of cars, there were third outputs such as “repair 
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work” or goods simply listed as “miscellaneous” that were not measurable in units, but 
nevertheless, contributed to the firms’ total costs.   
Therefore, rather than attempting an elaborate collapsing scheme so as to include 
the goods that did not fit into the basic 2- or 3-good framework, I excluded them from my 
final data sets.  In keeping with the Friedlaender, Winston and Wang framework of 
analysis, it is a fact that Ford, Chrysler and GM  probably produced other types of motor 
vehicles that fall outside of the basic six (or collapsed three) categories that Friedlaender, 
Winston and Wang constructed, and even produced products and services that fall outside 
the general broad category of “motor vehicles”.  Friedlaender, Winston and Wang note 
that their data on total costs come from the firms’ annual reports, and hence include cost 
of foreign and nonautomotive operations.  They simply assumed that domestic production 
and foreign and nonautomotive production were disjoint, and note that they were able to 
disaggregate foreign and domestic operations costs aided by information in another 
analysis.  But they say nothing about having been able to disaggregate automotive and 
non-automotive costs.  So while their costs data probably included some nonautomotive 
costs, their output vector represented purely automotive output, and their cost function 
was estimated for domestic automotive production alone. 6  I have therefore mobilized 
the ABW data for cost function estimation in a similar manner.  So as applied to the Flour 
industry for example, I took the ABW data on total costs for each firm; say a flour mill 
that produced wheat flour, corn meal, and a little pig slop, and simply omitted the 
quantity of pig slop it produced as a relevant variable in the analysis, predicated on the 
similar assumption that wheat flour and corn meal and pig slop production were disjoint.   
 
                                                 
6




(2) Final Industry Selection 
 
These said criteria unfortunately excluded many industries from the analysis.   Iron, 
which never had great sample sizes to begin with, did not appear to have been a heavily 
integrated industry.  Those firms that were multi-product within its samples were an even 
smaller sliver out of the total.  The multi-product firms produced different forms of iron, 
such as bar, pig, blooms, and “unspecified”—however, these did not appear in pairs.  
Collapsing them into a single category called simply “iron” was a possible option, but 
because their partner products were so highly variegated, a second goods category was 
off the table.  They were very diverse casted items like doors, nails, wires, railings, and 
were listed in very variegated units definitions (tons, number, etc.). 
Textiles was even more unmanageable.  It had many multi-product firms, but the 
products were too highly variegated to collapse into a couple of neat categories of 
frequently-recurring pairs.  Cotton-specializing firms alone, which were very few out of 
the total samples in the “Textiles” category, produced cotton goods, cloth, skirting, 
sheeting; different kinds of cloth, printed and unprinted; all in just a few samples!  Wool-
specializing firms, which were abundant in the samples, produced a myriad different 
things: woolens, yarn, rolls, satinets, flannel, blankets, carpets, cassimeres—in yards, 
pounds, feet, and number.  It was nearly impossible to pick out a frequently-occurring 
pair combination.  Virtually every multi-product firm had its own idiosyncratic output 
mix.   
Consequently the data were mobilized for the handful of the industries with the 
most easily manageable data sets.  Out of the thirteen major industry groupings compiled 
and discussed in the final scale analysis of Chapter Five, eight have been mobilized for 
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the scope analysis here. These are delineated below in Table 6.1, along with their 
respective output vectors.  Of the eight I have organized as such, only five exhibit 
potential for robust Sc estimates; in other words, there was frequent incidence of the two- 
or three-good production among the firms in the samples across the years.  The remaining 
three had problems such as infrequent appearance of firms with this pairing scheme, or 
frequent incidence of it in the earlier years, but infrequent or non-incidence of it in 1870, 
for example.  These suitable, but less-than-exemplary industries appear denoted by an 
asterisk in the below table.   
Intuitively, it would appear to make sense that an industry with a highly 
variegated product mix would be less able to exploit economies of scope than an industry 
that specialized in two or three main product lines.  It is far more likely that an industry 
such as Men’s’ Clothing, that specialized in coats, pants and vests, would have more 
economies of scope than a textiles firm that produced a great variety of products. An 
industry with a more manageable data set was therefore probably also more likely to be 
an industry with greater potential for measurable economies of scope.  
It is also worthy of noting that while Iron was completely unsuitable for analysis, 
its vertical cousin, Foundaries, which consisted heavily of fabricated and casted items 
made from iron, was suitable, but did not exhibit potential for robust Sc estimates.  It is 
also noteworthy that while Textiles was unsuitable for analysis, the sub-conglomeration 
of its vertical cousin, Men’s clothing, possessed one of the best data sets in the samples 
for such an analysis.  A comparison of industries in the entire group reveals that the better 
the data set, the more likely that industry was one that concentrated on final, rather than 
intermediate goods.  The ratio of industries that concentrated more heavily on final goods 
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to those that produced intermediate goods was much higher, six to one, in the industries 
that made it into the analysis than the same ratio among the rejects, which was just over 
one.  This may lead one to believe that integration and economies of scope were much 



















(3) Notes on Industry Conglomerations 
 
The industry groups Shoes and Flour correspond exactly to the same groups as in the 
Scale analysis of Chapters Four and Five, those delineated by SIC codes 314 and 204, 
respectively. 
 
Men’s clothing was a sub-conglomeration of the conglomeration “Clothing” as it was 
organized and analyzed in Chapters Four and Five.  While “Clothing” was composed of 
many inter-related industry groups, this new conglomeration is only composed of two of 
those that were originally included in “Clothing”:  231, Men's And Boys' Suits, Coats, 
And Overcoats; and 232, Men's And Boys' Furnishings, Work Clothing.  The 
Industry Grouping 1y  2y  3y  
Shoes Shoes, prs.  Boots, prs.  ---- 
Flour Wheat flour, bbl. Corn meal, bu. ---- 
Men’s clothing Coats, nos. Pants, prs. Vests, nos. 
Millwork Sashes, nos. Doors, nos. ---- 
Furniture Bureaus, nos. Bedsteads, nos. ---- 
Tobacco* Cigars, nos. Loose tobacco, lbs. ---- 
Foundaries* Castings, tons Plows, nos. ---- 
Meat* Beef, lbs. Mutton, lbs. ---- 
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remaining industry groups were excluded from this analysis because they were too few in 
sample size to perform any kind of meaningful analysis upon as separate industry groups, 
and/or could not be analyzed in aggregation with Men’s Clothing as defined above due to 
a heterogeneous product mix.   This sub-conglomeration of 231 & 232, men’s & boys’ 
formal & work clothing, respectively, was of good sample size, and its two components 
share a similar pairing scheme.  231 was in the samples in abundance.  While there were 
few 232’s, those that did exist were able to be lumped in with the 231’s due to a similar 
pairing scheme.  The pairing scheme was “coats & pants” and often “vests” in a triplicate 
fashion.  So a real 3-good analysis a la Friedlaender, Winston and Wang was possible 
with this conglomeration.   
While industry group 235, Hats, Caps, And Millinery, was of sufficient sample 
size for a separate analysis, its pairing pattern was completely distinct from, and not 
nearly as uniform as that of the 231 and 232 combination that made it into the analysis.  
Things were a little more variegated.  Pairs in this industry category usually consisted of 
“bonnets” with some other kind of hats of a generic nature, or a variety of others such as 
fur hats, wool hats, caps, or something completely out of the rubric of hats, such as 
gloves and mittens.  These second outputs were not only highly variegated, thus difficult 
to collapse into a second category, they often were missing output quantity data.  Even 
“bonnets” itself was scant, having only one appearance among the output of the multi-
product firms in this category in 1870.  So this industry group was excluded from the 




Millwork and Furniture, SIC codes 243 and 251 respectively, correspond exactly to the 
same groups as in the Scale analysis of Chapter Five, but have only been analyzed 
separately here, not together as in the industry conglomeration defined as Fabricated 
Wood in the Scale analysis.  That is because they each have a totally different pairing 
scheme; a “sashes & doors” pairing for 243, and a “Bureaus & Bedsteads” pairing for 
251.   
 
Tobacco here corresponds exactly to the same group as in the Scale analysis of Chapters 
Four and Five; that is, the aggregation of 212 (Cigars), and 213 (Chewing and Smoking 
Tobacco and Snuff), barring the fact that 213 has been here renamed “Loose Tobacco” 
rather than “Chew” as in Chapter Five because it excludes 214 (Tobacco Stemming and 
Redrying), which was included in the “Chew” sub-conglomeration of Tobacco that was 
created for Chapter Five.  That is because 214 did not contain any multi-output firms, 
was entirely absent from some years, and in the years it existed was extremely small in 
sample size (although there were several occurrences of it in 1880).  1850 and 1860 
contained no samples of it at all.  In 1870, there was one observation of it, and the only 
product that one firm produced was tobacco stems, an esoteric product that did not fit into 
either of the main pair group categories.  
Cigars and Loose tobacco were aggregated in this manner due to a similar pairing 
scheme.  While those firms in the 212 category did tend to specialize in cigars, and those 
in 213 in assorted varieties of loose tobacco, there were enough 212 firms that also 
produced some loose tobacco, and enough 213 firms that also produced some cigars that 
an aggregation of the two made sense in the context of the model.   
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While collapsing of the multifarious varieties of cigars was a simple process due 
to homogeneity of units classification, and therefore produced a very robust output 
vector, loose tobacco was more problematic.  While chewing, smoking and snuff loose 
tobacco are not so heterogeneous in product type as to preclude collapsing, due to highly 
variegated units classification many observations measured in more esoteric units had to 
be omitted, leaving us only with those varieties of loose tobacco measured in pounds; and 
consequently, a less than robust output vector for this product group.  While pounds were 
the most common unit, there were also leaves, stems, strips, hogsheads, boxes, lumps, 
and tobacco in unspecified units.  I was firstly very leery of anything called strips, stems 
or leaves because I fear that these may be intermediate goods that firms that produced 
final tobacco goods for smoking, sniffing and chewing produced for other firms besides 
these final goods.  So I omitted them.  Hogsheads does have a pounds correspondence, 
but it only seemed to apply in the data to the intermediate stems, strips and leaves 
products, so I passed on any attempts at conversion of it.  I also eliminated “Tobacco, 
Manufactured boxes” due to insufficient USDA information on exactly what boxes 
meant. Intuitively, it is probably something significantly more than a pound, the unit that 
most of the other non-cigar tobaccos are measured in.  I got some idea of how much a 
case, bale & crate could be, but since these were units pertaining to cigar leaf tobacco in 
the USDA classification literature, an intermediate good for cigar-making, not a box of 
manufactured tobacco for final consumption, I assumed a similar product type 
correspondence for boxes of tobacco, so I eliminated it.  Furthermore, its appearances in 
the samples were relatively infrequent, so eliminating it did not result in a huge loss of 
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data.  Wherever tobacco in unspecified units appeared, its corresponding quantity was 
blank, so I omitted these as well.      
Consequently, the resultant output vector consisted of well-filled-in columns 
corresponding to cigars, but columns corresponding to loose tobacco consisting largely of 
zeros.  There is only an occasional firm that produced both, or just loose tobacco without 
any cigars.  1870 was the worst, as it contained some firms that produced only loose 
tobacco, but none that produced both (see data tables in Appendix to this chapter). 
 
Foundaries here corresponds exactly to the same group as in the Scale analysis of Chapter 
Five, that designated by SIC code 332.  Its sister industry group, with which it was 
aggregated and analyzed together as the industry conglomeration defined as Fabricated 
Metal in the Scale analysis, Sheet Metal, SIC code 344, has been excluded due to 
insufficient sample size for some years, a weak and inconsistent pairing scheme, and 
patchy data for output and input types, values, and quantities, which made construction of 
variables for total cost, input prices and output quantities difficult without chopping down 
the size of its data set to near nothingness. 
While Foundaries’ pairing pattern consisted of castings and plows, the only 
discernable pairing pattern for Sheet Metal was stoveware and tinware.  While a 
collapsing scheme was possible for castings and plows due to units homogeneity, 
stoveware and tinware were much less manageable.  While stoveware usually consisted 
of stove pipes, which were usually measured in number, tinware was always cited as 
exactly that—“tinware” with no units designation.  Even if tinware had had some units 
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specification, it would have been of little use because it was frequently lacking output 
quantity data.  Output quantity data was also weak for stoveware.   
Since there was not much that could be done with the tinware data, any kind of 
output collapsing that could have been done with stoveware was pretty much rendered 
moot.  While there were many observations of stove pipes in 1850, that diminished 
considerably in the later years as the sample sizes diminished.  While there were the 
occasional observations of products such as “stoves”, “ovenware” and “stove casting”, 
these appeared too highly variegated to collapse with stove pipes.   
This left only Foundaries, and its pair of castings and plows, as a possible two-
output industry for the analysis.  After collapsing and aggregating, Foundaries was still a 
very weak data set.  While there were many observations of castings, plows were few and 
far between.  When they did appear, they appeared alone, barring one incidence of them 
being produced jointly with castings in 1860. 
 
Meat here corresponds exactly to the same group as in the Scale analysis of Chapters 
Four and Five; that designated by SIC code 201.  The only discernable pairing pattern 
was Beef & Mutton.  Firms that produced pork usually specialized in it, producing the 
product type “pork”, as well as ham, bacon, and sausages.  So it was like an industry unto 
itself.  However, a secondary pairing pattern could not be constructed within these pork-
specializing firms because the pairing pattern that did exist within those that were multi-
product was unclear and inconsistent; ham & pork; bacon & pork; bacon & sausages, etc.  
Furthermore, the pork firms were much smaller in sample size than the beef & mutton 
firms, and while the beef & mutton units classification was fairly consistently in pounds, 
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pork products’ units were much more highly variegated.  Sausages, for instance, could be 
measured in number, pounds, or barrels.   
Leaving me with just the beef & mutton pairs to contend with, a robust data set 
was still a dream gone awry.  While there were a few beef & mutton pairs in 1850, and 
several in 1860, 1870 was a dud.  The 1870 data set was small in sample size overall, and 
the one beef & mutton pair it contained lacked output quantity data.  In fact, there were 
only two firms that were listed as producing any quantity of beef at all in collapsible 
units, and none producing mutton whatsoever.  
 
 
(4) Input Vector Data Set Discussion 
 
The formation of the variables corresponding to the vector of output quantities in the 
above cost function has been discussed at length in the above section on industry 
selection.  I now complete the discussion of the above cost function with an analysis of 
the variables corresponding to the vector of input prices, w, and total costs, C.  
 
While the ABW data lack the detailed data for this period on hedonic quality attributes or 
technological variables indicating organizational differences among firms, such as the 
degree of vertical integration, as  Friedlaender, Winston and Wang and Shin & Ying in 
their 1992 costs study of the telecommunications industry that focused on local exchange 
carriers7 have been able to use and incorporate into their cost functions for their 20th 
century studies, the industries selected for this analysis do contain sufficient data with 
which to construct variables pertaining to basic input costs that are on par with these 
                                                 
7
 Friedlaender, Winston and Wang, pp. 5, 9; Shin, Richard T. and John S. Ying. “Unnatural Monopolies in 




analyses, and are in keeping with the necessary data for a basic generic form of a cost 
function that states that total cost is a function of a vector of factor prices and (in my case 
of a multi-output industry) a vector of output quantities.8 
 
Shin and Ying & Friedlaender, Winston and Wang both only had three input prices in 
their cost functions; price of labor, capital, and other factors/materials. 9 The ABW data 
have good data for price of labor (as defined by Shin and Ying as “compensation per 
employee”) because for most firms in the selected industries, they have the total amount 
paid in wages for the year, and the total number of persons (man, woman & child) 
employed in each year.  So I simply divided the total amount paid in wages for the year 
for each firm by the total number of persons employed in each year to obtain an estimate 
of the average annual compensation per employee.  
In absence of more information from Shin and Ying as to exactly how they 
defined “compensation per employee”, this seemed a reasonable estimate.  Shin and Ying 
do not say anything about this construction, except that it was compiled primarily from 
information on number of employees from annual reports, so I would assume that they 
are annual rates computed in some similar manner.  Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s 
labor costs were estimated as the average hourly wage of domestic labor, which implies 
that they were computed based on actual wages data.  While the ABW data have some 
figures on the average monthly cost of male, female and child labor, for many industries 
and years these data fields are blank, whereas the data on aggregate annual wages paid 
                                                 
8
 See Stewart, Kenneth G., Introduction to Applied Econometrics. Thomson Brooks/Cole, 2005, p. 478, or  
Berndt, Ernst R. The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary.  Addison-Wesley, 1991, Eq. 
3.3, p. 63. 
9
 For a complete description of Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s and Shin and Ying’s input prices data 
construction, see Shin and Ying, pp. 174-75 and Friedlaender, Winston and Wang, pp. 7-8.   
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and number of hands employed were much more complete, so my approximation of Shin 
and Ying’s method is much better suited for these data.   
 
For price of capital, Friedlaender, Winston and Wang used data for return of firms’ 
assets, which the ABW data do not contain.  Shin and Ying used capital expenses divided 
by the average number of telephones or access lines.  The ABW data have excellent 
figures for capital expenses for each firm.  However, their output quantity data are not as 
neat and uniform as in Shin and Ying’s study of efficiency in telephone service because 
ABW were dealing with many firms that produced a variety of products, measured in 
different units.   It would have been impossible, for instance, to calculate price of capital 
per unit output in this manner for a tobacco firm that produced, say 800 cigars and 400 
pounds of smoking tobacco in a year.  So instead, I computed price of capital by dividing 
capital expense by total aggregate value of output as an approximation of what Shin and 
Ying did. 
 The price of capital used in this analysis is thus a real capital/output ratio. In the 
final empirical analysis, this ratio was converted to prices of a single year so as to better 
measure the real cost of capital faced by firms in the sample.  So an industry that say, 
experienced diminishing cost of capital relative to the value of its output over time was 
said to have obtained capital more cheaply in real terms.  
 
For price of materials, Shin and Ying constructed a variable called “price of other 
factors”, which in the ABW data simply corresponded to price of materials.  Shin and 
Ying defined it as “residual expenses divided by average number of access lines”.  All 
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“residual expenses”—those other than labor and capital in the context of the Shin and 
Ying article—would be encompassed by a variable in my data set called INPUTS_VAL, 
the aggregate value of all raw materials, including mill supplies and fuel.  Barring labor 
and capital cost, the ABW data set lists no other expenses but these.  Again, the same 
problem cropped up in applying Shin and Ying’s price of materials method to my data as 
in applying their price of capital data to it.  The ABW data have excellent figures for 
materials expenses for each firm.  However, their output quantity data are not as neat and 
uniform as in Shin and Ying’s study of efficiency in telephone service because they were 
dealing with many firms that produced a variety of products, measured in different units.  
For price of materials, Friedlaender, Winston and Wang just used the price of 
steel plate per ton as a proxy.  This was fairly reasonable for them, for that was the 
principal input of automobiles.  I therefore applied a similar methodology to the ABW 
data by trying to identify a principal input for each industry, but instead of using some 
general generic price quoted on just one market as one would find in a reference book, as 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang did, I constructed a proxy based on actual prices faced 
by firms in the samples.10  Rather than inspecting the inputs of the industries, and 
identifying one or a couple of basic standard inputs for each industry for which price data 
were easily available in a reference book such as the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, I opted for this strategy because of the greater degree of heterogeneity of the 
inputs of the industries in the ABW data.  While it was possible to identify one or two 
basic inputs for most of the industries analyzed here, these inputs tended to be more 
differentiated than “steel” was as an input for cars.  One would assume, naturally, that for 
shoes the price of leather could serve as a reasonable proxy for the basic price of a 
                                                 
10
 Friedlaender, Winston and Wang do not cite the source of their data for price of steel plate per ton. 
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material input.  But leather is not a homogeneous product like steel.  There were in fact a 
plethora of varieties of leather used as inputs for shoes in the ABW data, each with their 
own price, for which accurate, detailed data concerning is difficult to obtain, and 
frequently unavailable from the reference sources that exist from that era.   
To construct an input price proxy, I first identified each input listed in the samples 
for each industry for each year, and discovered that for each industry, there was either 
one basic input (leather for shoes, yards of cloth for clothing, planks of lumber for 
millwork and furniture, pounds of tobacco leaf for cigars, chewing and smoking tobacco) 
or a couple of basic inputs (bushels of wheat & corn for flour, tons of pig iron & coal for 
iron foundaries, and various livestock animals for meat).  Naturally, there were a few 
auxiliary inputs for each industry category, like leather and cloth for upholstery for 
furniture, and sometimes a more exotic input like mahogany, cherry, pine or walnut for 
furniture, or goat skins for shoes.  But there was a clear pattern of one, or at most a 
handful, of basic inputs that were discernable for each industry.   
Next, I tried to obtain prices for each input by dividing value of each input by its 
quantity.  These were not available for all firms, because often either the input value, its 
quantity, or both were blank or zero in the data.  But enough prices were computed this 
way to arrive at some conclusions.   
It was discovered that no matter what the principal input(s) was (were), a basic 
price range could be discerned for it (them) that distinguished it (them) from the non-
basic input items.  So for instance, for furniture and millwork, the basic unit was foot 
planks of lumber, which always occurred within a certain basic modest price range, like 
$0.01 to $1.00 a foot.  The only time I saw prices outside of that range was when it was 
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some ancillary item, like gallons of varnish or oil, skins for upholstery, or lumber coming 
in some larger units specification, like cords, thousands of planks, or tons.  So by 
averaging all the prices that fell in the $0.01 to $1.00 range for each year, I reasoned that 
I could obtain a good estimate of the price of a basic unit input, which was foot planks of 
lumber.  Very few firms listed their lumber inputs in those larger units, so by ignoring 
them, I was not losing too much valuable information about prices.  There were still 
many more firms listing their lumber inputs in the basic plank feet unit.   
Even for firms that had more than one basic input, such as flour, the price 
disparity existing between the two inputs, and their units measurement difference were 
not so great so as to preclude a similar type of analysis based on computing the average 
price of a basic unit input subject to a range restriction.  For flour I saw that the two basic 
inputs were bushels of wheat & bushels of corn.  There was no great price disparity 
between the two; they were both always between about $0.50 and $1.50 a bushel.  And 
they were both in the same units, bushels.  So I was spared the difficulty that would have 
existed if one of the two inputs was listed in tons, and therefore having to divide all the 
results of its prices by 2,420 to get it to fit in with the other before averaging them 
together, or separating all the corn prices from the wheat prices and creating two input 
price categories.  So by dividing input value by input quantity, and taking an average of 
all the prices that appeared within that range, I was able to create a reasonably good 
proxy for the price of a basic unit input; call it “cereal” or “grain” if you wish.   
This methodology solved the problem posed by a differentiated basic input, as 
described above pertaining to leather, because by averaging all the basic inputs’ prices 
together subject to a range restriction in a manner similar to that applied to bushels of 
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wheat and corn in flour, a proxy input price was formed that was a reasonably accurate 
measure of the price of a basic input.  In shoes, although there were a variety of different 
types of leather inputs; sole sides, upper sides, calf skins, sole lbs., unspecified lbs., etc., 
there was nothing so widely variegated in highly variegated units that I could not use the 
method of dividing individual input value by respective quantity for all firms, and taking 
an average of all the prices that appear.  The basic price of a unit input was in the $0.50-
$3.00 range; sometimes there was something used a little more expensive and exotic like 
“goat skins”, or some unidentified miscellaneous input item expense that was like $10 or 
$20 a unit.  Sometimes there was something over $10 that was something like calf skins 
measured in dozens units.  Despite inflation, this basic inputs price range was pretty 
consistent from 1850-70.  So to simplify matters, to obtain an average, I just took the 
average of every item that was less than $10 in each year for a good proxy for the basic 
unit price of a basic unit input.11 
Some kind of thing like this worked for all the industries I looked at that had more 
than one principal input.  In meat for instance, although there were a variety of different 
livestock animals listed as inputs; cows, hogs, sheep, beef, beeves, their prices were not 
so highly variegated that they could not be all lumped in together to form an average of 
what a basic livestock animal cost for meat processors.  Hogs were in the range of $4-
$25, and cows and beef (beeves) were in the neighborhood of $20-$60.  Sheep were very 
disparate in price and ranged from a very cheap $1 to $30 apiece.  The only things that 
were less than $1 were non-basic inputs like pounds of coal, bushels of salt, marble slab 
                                                 
11
 In checking these proxy input price averages for each industry over the years, the pattern observed was 
that they were generally increasing within their respective range restriction, in accordance with what one 




feet, or meat measured in some smaller unit, like pounds of dead meat.  The only time I 
saw anything over $100 was when it was meat measured in different units like tons (dead 
I am assuming). So I averaged everything that was over $1 and under $100 in order to 
obtain a proxy for the basic unit price of a basic unit input. 
I considered this methodology to be no more of an over-simplification, and in 
some ways superior to that employed by Friedlaender, Winston and Wang, in 
consideration of the fact that Friedlaender, Winston and Wang used the price of steel as a 
basic input price proxy, which they also held as constant and uniform across all firms.  
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang also omitted all the other materials inputs that go into 
making a car, just as I have omitted the ancillary inputs. And in some ways, my proxies 
are superior to Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s in that they are based on actual prices 
faced by firms in the samples, not some general generic price quoted on just one market, 
such as the New York market, as I would most likely have had to contend with by 
consulting reference books. Unfortunately, for the 1880 data, I had no other recourse than 
to consult reference books to obtain input price proxies (see discussion in Appendix to 
this chapter). 
 
For total costs, Friedlaender, Winston and Wang were able to use aggregate data from the 
firms’ annual reports, which the ABW data do not contain.  Shin and Ying estimated total 
costs by aggregating data on capital expenditures and expenses for factors excluding 
capital, which are given by operating expenses minus depreciation.  
As an approximation of Shin and Ying’s method of total cost construction, I 
aggregated the ABW data for capital expenses for each firm (the variable CAPITAL) 
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with the only data for non-capital operating expenses the data contained; the total amount 
paid in wages for year (the variable WAGE_BILL), and the aggregate value of raw 
materials including mill supplies and fuel (the variable INPUTS_VAL).  
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, I present the empirical results of the study, and provide a synopsis of the 
basic trends and patterns found in the results in order to determine the degree to which 
the results support the Chandlerian hypothesis in terms of which industries reaped the 
greatest benefits of scope economies with respect to the expansion of the railroad 
network as would be seen in ascending scope estimates over the time period in question.   
 
Table 6.2 (a-h) presents the estimated economies of scope that were calculated for each 
industry for each year, using alternating means/totals raw data input for the input prices 
and output quantities (i.e. w-means/y-totals, w-totals/y-means, etc.) yielding four different 
input data sets, which are delineated in the far left column in each sub-table.  Following 
Friedlaender, Winston and Wang’s practice12, for each of these means/totals 
combinations, I computed 3 different scope estimates using different values of small 
numbers in place of zeros for the disjoint cost predictions:  1, 10, and 100.  The zero-
replacement number used in each analysis is delineated in the far left column of Table 6.2 
to the immediate right beside the input data set group. This amounted to 4 X 3 = 12 scope 
estimates per industry per year, and 24 for the industries for which 1880 data sets were 
able to be constructed.  These were wholly separate analyses because a separate cost 
function that included the 1880 data was computed for each of these industries.  These 
                                                 
12Friedlaender, Winston and Wang, pp. 15-16 and footnote 42, p. 16. 
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analyses appear as “double-deck” tables in the same sub-table as the 1850-70 analyses for 
the industries for which they apply, and are denoted by a hyphen followed by a capital 
“E” following each year in the year heading—the “E” denoting the fact that these 
analyses contain data for the year “Eighty”.    
Varying these zero-replacement numbers usually did not create much variation in 
the results within each input data set.  I held true to this practice across the board, 





Industry Groupings Scope Analysis Estimates, 1850-1870 [1880] 
 
 
Table 6.2 (a). Shoes 
 
Input Data 
Set 1850 1860 1870 1850-E 1860-E 1870-E 1880-E 
WmnYmn1 0.240823 0.129158 0.132358 0.245361 0.117324 0.122775 -0.02895 
WmnYmn10 0.244643 0.131503 0.134302 0.249056 0.119753 0.124811 -0.02636 
WmnYmn100 0.28285 0.154953 0.153747 0.286017 0.144044 0.145168 -0.00042 
WmnYtot1 -0.56536 -1.01692 -0.68307 0.151045 -2.19622 0.278608 119.6342 
WmnYtot10 -0.56534 -1.01691 -0.68303 0.151021 -2.19613 0.278514 27.479 
WmnYtot100 -0.56516 -1.01678 -0.68268 0.150786 -2.19513 0.277573 27.4713 
WtotYmn1 0.999845 1.001957 1.000602 0.999866 1.00162 1.000243 1.001248 
WtotYmn10 0.999837 1.001946 1.000578 0.99986 1.001612 1.000226 1.001242 
WtotYmn100 0.99976 1.001841 1.000343 0.999804 1.001523 1.000051 1.001183 
WtotYtot1 0.936064 6.387836 1.080372 0.950264 3.473437 1.03408 3.371701 
WtotYtot10 0.936057 6.387769 1.080347 0.950258 3.473406 1.034062 3.371681 














Table 6.2 (b). Flour 
 
Input Data 
Set 1850 1860 1870 1850-E 1860-E 1870-E 1880-E 
WmnYmn1 0.23398 0.095499 0.217353 0.248558 0.090223 0.273712 0.018847 
WmnYmn10 0.236613 0.098168 0.219447 0.251116 0.092903 0.275674 0.020971 
WmnYmn100 0.262943 0.124865 0.240387 0.276695 0.119709 0.295293 0.042212 
WmnYtot1 -0.50437 -0.58504 -0.56528 -0.53215 -0.58571 -0.5691 -17.4822 
WmnYtot10 -0.50435 -0.58503 -0.56525 -0.53213 -0.5857 -0.56907 -17.482 
WmnYtot100 -0.50415 -0.58491 -0.56492 -0.53193 -0.58559 -0.56877 -17.48 
WtotYmn1 1.00379 1.002622 1.011563 1.004276 1.002974 1.014193 1.004743 
WtotYmn10 1.003777 1.002614 1.011532 1.004261 1.002965 1.014155 1.004737 
WtotYmn100 1.00365 1.002538 1.011215 1.004111 1.002876 1.013776 1.004673 
WtotYtot1 231.7391 -66.9525 -2.2556 -8.11176 -6.60286 -1.30394 -0.40287 
WtotYtot10 231.7361 -66.952 -2.25552 -8.11164 -6.6028 -1.3039 -0.40287 
WtotYtot100 231.7067 -66.9469 -2.25482 -8.11043 -6.60221 -1.30341 -0.40284 
 
 
Table 6.2 (c). Men’s clothing 
 
Input Data Set 1850 1860 1870 
WmnYmn1 -0.00738 -0.2333 -0.24038 
WmnYmn10 0.031579 -0.21385 -0.2038 
WmnYmn100 0.419741 -0.02008 0.160771 
WmnYtot1 -1.95338 -1.27885 -1.68623 
WmnYtot10 -1.95078 -1.27856 -1.68365 
WmnYtot100 -1.92486 -1.27566 -1.65784 
WtotYmn1 2.01323 1.910025 2.375191 
WtotYmn10 2.013234 1.91004 2.368561 
WtotYmn100 2.013282 1.910197 2.302275 
WtotYtot1 3.051633 0.673977 -0.77688 
WtotYtot10 3.051404 0.673943 -0.77517 
WtotYtot100 3.049124 0.673604 -0.75807 
 
 
Table 6.2 (d). Millwork 
 
Input Data Set 1850 1860 1870 
WmnYmn1 1.499427 0.244278 1.059855 
WmnYmn10 1.509642 0.247866 1.063521 
WmnYmn100 1.604521 0.281322 1.09782 
WmnYtot1 -0.12823 -0.25386 -0.57797 
WmnYtot10 -0.12634 -0.25349 -0.58018 
WmnYtot100 -0.10811 -0.24986 -0.60088 
WtotYmn1 1.412856 1.685678 1.021653 
WtotYmn10 1.412781 1.685634 1.021582 
WtotYmn100 1.412036 1.685198 1.020874 
WtotYtot1 -0.32334 -0.16941 1.133047 
WtotYtot10 -0.32332 -0.1694 1.132967 






Table 6.2 (e). Furniture 
 
Input Data Set 1850 1860 1870 
WmnYmn1 -0.30969 0.075866 -0.3631 
WmnYmn10 -0.24418 0.174312 -0.20124 
WmnYmn100 0.408694 1.153916 1.415417 
WmnYtot1 -0.98677 -0.97058 -0.8247 
WmnYtot10 -0.98413 -0.9648 -0.79705 
WmnYtot100 -0.9578 -0.90692 -0.52066 
WtotYmn1 0.590909 0.941305 0.996353 
WtotYmn10 0.612153 0.950839 0.931965 
WtotYmn100 0.824608 1.046188 0.287822 
WtotYtot1 0.552011 0.642028 -0.77488 
WtotYtot10 0.552704 0.644568 -0.75713 
WtotYtot100 0.559638 0.669969 -0.57966 
 
 
Table 6.2 (f). Tobacco* 
 
Input Data 
Set 1850 1860 1870 1850-E 1860-E 1870-E 1880-E 
WmnYmn1 1.219094 1.705935 0.355234 2.076544 1.664364 0.282973 0.293539 
WmnYmn10 1.218356 1.706433 0.355386 2.074298 1.664184 0.283615 0.294532 
WmnYmn100 1.21098 1.711408 0.356902 2.051831 1.662381 0.290033 0.304461 
WmnYtot1 0.124653 -1.38326 51.95966 0.030383 3.041498 0.262598 29.23821 
WmnYtot10 0.124492 -1.38322 51.95618 0.030344 3.041421 0.262581 29.23815 
WmnYtot100 0.122877 -1.38288 51.92135 0.029956 3.040646 0.262414 29.23755 
WtotYmn1 0.940254 0.980794 0.984174 0.825232 0.915334 0.947792 0.96384 
WtotYmn10 0.940204 0.98076 0.984153 0.825142 0.915272 0.947754 0.963826 
WtotYmn100 0.939703 0.980416 0.983942 0.824242 0.914656 0.947373 0.963677 
WtotYtot1 0.297212 0.540109 0.402834 0.111284 0.18506 0.163126 0.179722 
WtotYtot10 0.297195 0.54009 0.402825 0.111271 0.185049 0.163119 0.17972 
WtotYtot100 0.297027 0.539905 0.402736 0.111144 0.184934 0.163053 0.179703 
 
 
Table 6.2 (g). Foundaries* 
 
Input Data Set 1850 1860 1870 
WmnYmn1 -1.15888 -2.92911 1.833433 
WmnYmn10 -0.94733 0.38862 -0.96724 
WmnYmn100 1.189063 33.59179 -29.1429 
WmnYtot1 -0.99663 -0.89277 -1.04581 
WmnYtot10 -0.99007 -0.84774 -0.97147 
WmnYtot100 -0.92443 -0.39743 -0.22779 
WtotYmn1 0.998074 0.963958 0.994719 
WtotYmn10 0.9982 0.962351 0.994593 
WtotYmn100 0.999455 0.946264 0.993314 
WtotYtot1 1.757864 1.645903 1.007331 
WtotYtot10 1.755296 1.612229 1.003602 





Table 6.2 (h). Meat* 
 
Input Data 
Set 1850 1860 1870 1850-E 1860-E 1870-E 1880-E 
WmnYmn1 1.319933 -2.3082 1.630131 1.18297 0.984964 1.299663 0.59736 
WmnYmn10 1.316407 -2.30258 1.63129 1.183355 0.983382 1.29872 0.597415 
WmnYmn100 1.281101 -2.24629 1.642793 1.187283 0.967604 1.289669 0.597976 
WmnYtot1 -1.2992 -1.07997 4.221603 -2.0579 -1.70937 1.826761 111.3913 
WmnYtot10 -1.29738 -1.07982 4.238871 -2.05589 -1.70913 1.823291 111.3911 
WmnYtot100 -1.27926 -1.07832 4.417107 -2.03586 -1.70676 1.790437 111.3891 
WtotYmn1 1.577558 1.22034 -5.51679 0.995498 0.99524 0.788896 1.001207 
WtotYmn10 1.583855 1.22112 -6.42854 0.995477 0.995232 0.789069 1.001207 
WtotYmn100 1.646826 1.228926 17.67061 0.995273 0.995156 0.790802 1.001201 
WtotYtot1 -0.2145 -9.32862 -0.71746 0.958631 0.941393 0.649219 1.475725 
WtotYtot10 -0.21655 -9.32362 -0.74514 0.958609 0.941384 0.649431 1.475724 
WtotYtot100 -0.23704 -9.27364 -1.09325 0.958396 0.941295 0.651562 1.475714 
 
 
for the disjoint cost computations in which Mutton was a theoretical zero, its value was 
artificially augmented to 1, 10, or 100 instead of reduced.  This created a little bit of a 
problem, because it meant that the disjoint cost of producing beef without mutton was 
always going to be equal to the cost of producing beef and mutton jointly, so that when 
joint costs were subtracted from the disjoint costs, the remainder was always simply the 
disjoint cost of producing mutton without beef; or producing a small amount, 1, 10, or 
100 of each.  So no matter what proxy value for mutton was used, zero or some other 
small number, the results would have showed greater disjoint costs than joint costs, thus 
positive scope economies (unless the disjoint costs of producing mutton without beef 
were positive while the joint costs were negative, as occurred in several of the predictions 
in which total values for input prices were used).  
I also held true to this practice for industries that had very low, but greater than 
zero values for output means and totals.  Foundaries for 1860, for instance, had a mean 
value for plows of 9.  This meant that when 10 and 100 were used in its place in the 
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calculation of its disjoint costs of producing castings alone, these disjoint costs were 
usually greater than its joint costs in absolute value, so that when these disjoint costs and 
joint costs were the same sign, the scope estimate usually came out positive.  So it is 
perhaps wise to look somewhat askance at Foundaries’ estimates for 1860 using 10 and 
100 as its zero values for plows when output means were used.  This same phenomenon 
was also observed to some extent in Furniture, which had a mean value for bureaus in 
1870 of 27.9, which when the disjoint costs of producing bedsteads alone were computed 
with a value of bureaus of 100, this was greater than bureau’s value of 27.9 used when 
computing the joint costs.  Thus we should look askance at Furniture’s estimates using 
100 as its zero value for bureaus when output means were used.   
 
Referring back to Table 4.1, it can be recalled that in the upper left hand quadrant are 
listed the industries that Chandler believed were the great industries that experienced 
these great impacts of the decline in transport costs and technological advance that led to 
large-scale production methods.  Two of the industries that made it into the Scope 
analysis, Meat packing and Flour milling, are in this quadrant.  So according to Chandler, 
we ought to see the most robust results in those two industries.  The remaining industries 
all fall into one of the medium categories; either the lower left quadrant that refers to 
industries that experienced a high impact of technical progress and a low impact of 
transportation, or the upper right quadrant that refers to a low impact of technical 
progress but a high impact of transportation.   In the high-tech/low transport quadrant, we 
find tobacco manufacture, clothing and shoes, and in the low-tech/high transport 
quadrant, we find millwork, furniture, and foundaries.   
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In terms of specific mention of which industries reaped the most scope economies 
in the United States before WWI, Chandler explains that it was mainly in the dynamic 
industries of food, chemicals, and machinery groups in which cost advantages developed 
through utilizing economies of scope led to investment in related products.13  Since the 
latter two industries are not represented in our study, that leaves us only food groups in 
which to check for robust and ascending scope estimates, which mirrors the predictions 
made in the upper left quadrant of Table 4.1.   
Consequently, it is in the industry groups of Meat and Flour that we ought to see 
the best results.  Chandler explains how it was that though diversification into related 
industries, economies of scope were utilized by these industries.  In Meat, the impetus to 
diversification was the emergence of by-product industries such as fertilizer, soap, glue, 
and leather in its basic operating units, and in marketing and distribution by the addition 
of new product lines to their network, as they began to send dairy products and fruit 
through their refrigerated networks.   
Similarly, in cereals production, new products could be produced that required 
similar raw materials or used similar production processes, or could be marketed through 
established distribution networks (i.e. nonrefrigerated facilities for moving one type of 
processed grain product could be used for others), and capabilities in marketing one set of 
branded packaged products could be easily transferred to another, so the leading grain 
processors began to diversify.  Chandler explains how at Borden and at the cereal 
companies, diversification came from exploiting the economies of scope in its marketing 
and distribution organizations by moving into the production of cereals, coffee, and other 
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 Chandler, Alfred D. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994, p. 92.   
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branded, packaged products.  General Mills and Pillsbury diversified into breakfast 
cereals, cake mixes, biscuit mixes, and then animal feeds.  Ralston Purina moved from 
animal feeds to cereals and other packaged foods for human consumption.  Quaker Oats 
added new lines which included wheat cereals, farina, hominy, cornmeal, macaroni, 
spaghetti, poultry feeds, and developed a new chemical product called furfural made of 
oat hulls that would become increasingly used by producers of resin, agricultural and 
other chemicals, and later, of synthetic rubber.   
Moreover, while technically not a “grains” producer, Chandler explains how the 
vegetable-oil refiner Corn Products Refining, besides developing Mazola salad and 
cooking oil developed and improved such brands as Argo starch, Karo syrup, Kre-Mel 
desserts, as well as Certos, a dextrose sweetener in its in-house laboratories.  Its research 
department also led the company into chemicals with the development of new phenol-
type plastics.14 
Unfortunately, while the integrations Chandler describes as occurring in the meat 
industry are those that appeared in the last quarter of the 19th century, and at least 
partially coincide with the period our data cover, these massive integrations he describes 
in the cereals industry did not occur until mainly after the turn of the century.15  Both, 
moreover, are considerably more advanced and variegated than the simple “wheat & corn 
flour” and “beef & mutton” product pairings our data and technique necessitated.  
Nevertheless, integration has to start somewhere, so it is not inconceivable that some of 
these scope effects could have been operating earlier.  Certainly the railroads must have 
contributed something to the marketing and distribution networks that Chandler claims 
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 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 161-63. 
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 Ibid., pp. 18, 155. 
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gave impetus to this later diversification, and there is no theoretical difference between 
the type of scope economies presented by similar raw materials and production processes 
for an earlier, less sophisticated scope through integration that may have been acting 
earlier and setting the ball in motion.  Unfortunately, the weakness of the Meat data set 
described above (and in further detail in the appendix to this chapter) makes us cast a 
shadow of doubt upon the results obtained from it.  But the good thing, though, is that for 
both Flour and Meat there are 1880 scope estimates obtainable, which more closely 
approaches the era in which Chandler claims that the scope economies were more firmly 
in the saddle.    
With respect to the other industries contained in the analysis, Chandler does not 
make any specific mention of them with respect to scope economies apart from the fact 
that that they may have contributed to the scope economies achieved by massive retailers 
like Macy’s department store, giant mail order houses like Sears, Roebuck and 
Montgomery Ward, and chain stores like the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea company and 
Woolworth.  These were scope economies achieved through handling a number of related 
product lines through a single set of facilities, and also sometimes through backwards 
integration into manufacturing when they were not able to obtain a product at the price, 
quantity or specification required, or when they needed a product in such large volume 
that they could produce it steadily at minimum efficient scale and therefore as cheaply as 
independent suppliers.  Sears, for instance, by 1906 owned nine factories wholly or in 
part, and by 1910 owned sixteen; most of which made shoes, clothing, furniture, lumber 
hardwood, tools, plumbing goods, stoves, sewing machines and light farm machinery.  
But these speak little of the economies of scope achieved by the independent suppliers of 
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these goods, or the individual facilities of these large integrated enterprises that produced 
these goods.  Furthermore, as with the growth of the cereals industry described above, the 
major growth of these mass retail, chain store and mail-order companies did not occur 
until the early 20th century when they concentrated their outlets more in middle-sized 
towns and cities than in metropolitan centers or predominately rural areas.16  
 
Given 12 or 24 scope estimates per industry per year, it was not hard to find some kind of 
ascending pattern in at least one of the input data sets for each industry.  However, there 
was little consistency in which input data set this pattern was found, and it was often in 
the one that I thought to be the least intuitively pleasing of the four, which was w-
totals/y-means.   Nevertheless, there do appear to be some “winner” and “loser” 
industries among the bunch, using frequency of appearance of an ascending pattern 
within the four input sets as a criterion.  
The two clear winners in the analysis are Shoes and, to a lesser extent, Flour.  
Shoes, which had one of the best data sets of the bunch, displays a more or less ascending 
and positive pattern of scope estimates in two of the four input sets, w-totals/y-means and 
w-totals/y-totals and also in the w-means/y-totals input set that included the 1880 data.  
One interesting phenomenon is the observance of a slight dip in the overall ascending 
scope estimates in 1870 in the w-totals/y-means and w-totals/y-totals input sets, followed 
by a rebound in the scope estimates for 1880 in the results for those input sets that 
included the 1880 data.  This phenomenon mirrors that contained in many of the scale 
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estimates of Chapters Four and Five, including that of Shoes, that displayed a dip in the 
MES for 1870 corresponding to the post-Civil War aftermath shock.   
The skyrocketing 1880 scope estimates that appear in the w-means/y-totals input 
set for Shoes are by no means unique phenomena, as they are mirrored in the exact same 
input set for Meat and Tobacco.  Meat displays a steeply ascending scope pattern in this 
input set, including in its 1850-70 estimates.  Although such steeply ascending results are 
not seen in any of Meat’s other input sets, these are nonetheless encouraging results 
considering the weakness of the Meat data set discussed at length in the text above and 
the appendix below (particularly its 1870 estimates), and considering the weak results of 
the other industries in the analysis; most of whom had much better data sets than Meat.   
The same may be said for the results for Tobacco in its w-means/y-totals input 
group. While these are not the most consistently rising estimates to be found in Tobacco, 
which are to be found in its w-totals/y-means inputs group, they confirm a definite 
pattern:  in 3 out of the 4 industries for whom we were able to construct 1880 estimates, 
we have skyrocketing 1880 estimates in the w-means/y-totals input group.  These results, 
if the study were confined to this input group, would serve as testimony to the efficacy of 
our methodology.   Recalling that the 1880 data sets were constructed as perfectly 
integrated industries with each firm producing a positive quantity of each good in its 
output vector in homogeneous proportion to the composition of output on the national 
average level (see appendix to this chapter for more detailed discussion of these data), we 
would expect to see greater scope estimates for that year if there was any validity to the 
study, which indeed we do.  While there are other instances of exploding estimates in 
other industries, such as in Flour for 1850 in its 1850-70 estimates in its w-totals/y-totals 
  
295
inputs group, another appearance of them in Meat for 1870 in its w-totals/y-means inputs 
group for 1850-70, and another appearance of them in Tobacco for 1870 in its w-
means/y-totals input group for 1850-70, these are scattered incidents that do not form a 
consistent pattern of clustering in a single year and inputs group.   
Meat and Tobacco also display the dip in the scope estimates for 1870 followed 
by a rebound for 1880 in their results for their input sets that included the 1880 data that 
mirrors that contained in Shoes and in the scale estimates of Chapters Four and Five; 
Meat in its w-totals/y-means and w-totals/y-totals input groups, and Tobacco in its w-
means/y-totals and w-totals/y-totals groups, and to a lesser extent in its w-means/y-means 
group.  Whether this phenomenon is due to the post-Civil War aftermath shock or merely 
the weakness of the data sets for those industries for that year is another matter.  Since the 
only other asterisked industry in the analysis, Foundaries, has no 1880 estimates, we have 
no basis for comparison.  However, since this 1870 dip is also present in two of the 
ascending input groups for Shoes, an industry with a very good data set, we cannot rule 
out these post-war depression forces as a possible cause.  Considering that these dips are 
seen in 3 out of the 4 industries surveyed that had 1880 estimates, we must therefore view 
it as an indicator of a distinct pattern.   
Furthermore, the Chapters Four and Five scale estimates also display the 1870 dip 
as occurring for Tobacco, Shoes and Flour, although not for Meat.  This means that out of 
the three industries that displayed a 1870 MES dip that also made it into the scope 
analysis with a complete 1850-80 analysis—Flour, Tobacco and Shoes—that dip is 
present again in the scope estimates for two out of those three, Tobacco and Shoes.   Thus 
there is a parallel between the scale and scope estimates showing that there was 
  
296
synchronicity between the two, as Chandler maintained.  But we have produced new 
evidence here to indicate that the post-Civil War aftermath shock as described by many 
authors was indeed a real one that temporarily stymied economies of scale and scope; a 
factor not mentioned to any significant extent by Chandler, but is worthy of noting here 
in historical context.  And our evidence indicates that scale and scope economies resumed 
in the era after 1870, as maintained by Chandler, and this is displayed in our results that 
show a recovery in full force as occurring by 1880.  However, we must continue to bear 
in mind that these 1880 scope estimates assumed a fictional wholly integrated structure of 
industry. 
It is quite strange that we do not see the exploding 1880 estimates in the w-
means/y-totals input group for Flour with its good data set, whose results for that input 
group explode in the opposite direction, going down to a larger absolute value negative 
number for 1880.  However, those disappointing results are offset by consistently rising 
scope estimates for its w-totals/y-totals estimates that included the 1880 data, and an 
overall ascending pattern for its w-totals/y-means estimates.   
 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, our analysis of economies of scope yields results that are overall 
supportive of the Chandlerian hypothesis.  Our method of empirical analysis, the Sc 
definition of economies of scope presented in Equation (1) that represents the percentage 
cost savings due to joint production, shows that in that in the food industries of Flour and 
Meat, which were the two industries among our analysis that were in the upper left hand 
quadrant of Table 4.1 that Chandler believed were the great industries that experienced 
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these great impacts of the decline in transport costs and technological advance that led to 
large-scale production methods, we do see results that show an ascending scope pattern in 
at least some of their input data groups.  Flour contains results that display this pattern 
more conspicuously across its input groups than the typical industry of the bunch.  While 
Meat does not stand out as above the average in terms of this characteristic of an 
ascending pattern across input groups, the fact that it fares no worse, and in fact better 
than some of its counterparts despite having a very weak data set speaks volumes.  Had 
better data been available for Meat, particularly for 1870, who knows how the results 
could have differed.  The only surprise in the bunch that Chandler would not have 
anticipated was Shoes, which was probably the most robust industry in the bunch in 
terms of displaying ascending scope results.  One may say this is really not that much of a 
surprise, considering its very good data set.  However, Clothing, which also had a very 
good data set, did not fare that well in terms of observation of an ascending pattern.  So 
overall, we must view the robust results of Shoes as an unanticipated surprise result.  The 
efficacy of our methodology is confirmed by the presence of exploding scope estimates 
for 1880 in 3 out of the 4 industries whose data included 1880 estimates that were derived 
from estimates of a perfectly integrated industrial structure, and by a dip in the scope 
estimates for 1870 followed by a rebound in 1880 seen in 3 of those 4 industries, which 
must be viewed as a continuation of a pattern observed in Chapters Four and Five that 









Chapter Seven: CONCLUSION 
 
 
In wrapping up our study concerning the measurement and quantification of the 
relationship between railroadization in the United States in the mid-19th century and the 
subsequent evolution of the modern, large-scale, corporate form of industrial business 
organization marked by significant economies of scale and scope as described by 
Chandler, our preliminary comparison of the development and growth of the American, 
British and German railroad networks in Chapters Two and Three revealed that 
Chandler’s claims that British industrialization of the mid-to-late nineteenth century was 
less heavily impacted by the railroads must be viewed with a certain degree of 
skepticism.  While our comparison of railroad mileage phases data for the three countries 
essentially does correspond to and support Chandler’s claims that a greater expansion of 
the railroad systems of the United States and Germany at mid-century and resultant 
vastness thereof with respect to Britain had occurred by the 1870’s, and may have been 
instrumental in expanding markets, we are left wanting in terms of concrete evidence that 
this was a paramount factor contributing to a more concentrated industrial sector that was 
intensive in the new science-based technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution, and 
that these forces were set in motion by the 1870’s.  In comparing and interpreting rates of 
railroad physical capital accumulation of the three countries, while we do observe more 
rapid capital growth and accumulation in the German and American railroad systems than 
in Britain during the time leading up to the 1870’s, one cannot ignore the sharp spikes in 
the British capital flow data in the 1840’s and 1860’s.  Nor can one ignore that fact that 
Britain had far greater railroad mileage per square mile of national territory throughout 
the time period covered by this analysis.  These revealed facts, in combination with the 
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revealed history detailing the strong dependence of Britain’s railroad system on coal, and 
the strong dependence of its own, the American, and Continental railroad systems on its 
iron industry, leave us with an indicator of the possibility that the railroads may have had 
a far greater impact on the British industrial development at mid-century than Chandler 
gave them credit for.  That is because he focused on market-expanding properties, and 
ignored the factor input demand effects of the railroads on manufacturing industries.   
 Moreover, our examination of the role of financial intermediaries in the growth of 
the railroad systems of the three countries makes us very skeptical about Chandler’s 
claim that the American and German railroad systems were constructed using more 
extensive recourse to outside sources of finance than the British, and its ramifications for 
industrial development in the latter decades of the 19th century.  Our literature survey 
indicates that Britain’s railroads may have also been heavily financed by outside capital, 
and that this financing did have a dramatic impact on its capital markets, as evidenced by 
the development of a national market for railroad shares.  Our principal empirical 
analysis of comparative financial intermediation effects from the railroads consisting of 
the stock of railroad financial capital data for the United States and Britain for 1830-1914 
that were normalized by being measured relative to G.N.P. showed Britain in a strong 
lead all the way until the 1870’s, which suggests that railroad finance played a stronger 
role in the British economy at least until the 1870’s, and points to a stronger impact of the 
railroads on financial intermediation facilities in Britain than in the United States all the 
way until the 1870’s.   
 Britain may have thus experienced a significant impact of the railroads on its 
industrial landscape that was different in character from the American case, and financial 
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augmentation from the railroads that was just as great, if not greater than that of the 
United States.  Why this did not translate into rapid economic growth centered on the 
science-based technologies of the Second Industrial Revolution at the end of the 19th 
century is another question; but it is not at all clear from the evidence uncovered in this 
section that the answer is a lesser impact of the railroads on Britain’s industrial 
development.  
 In the empirical analyses of economies of scale and scope that focused on 
American industry as it developed from 1850-1880 in the following chapters, we also 
find mixed evidence in support of Chandler’s contention that the growth of the American 
railroad network did, in fact, expand markets and augment the American financial sector 
such that the result was a more concentrated, large-scale mode of industrial organization 
characterized by extensive and increasing economies of scale and scope in sync with the 
growth of its extensive railroad system. 
 In the analyses of economies of scale in Chapters Four and Five, it was found that 
even when the industries that Chandler said were the great industries that experienced the 
greatest impact of the decline in transport costs and technological advance that led to 
large-scale production methods were re-tested using superior data in place of that which 
was found to be flawed, or split into finer product group distinctions so as to cleanse and 
distill a product group of a flawed component, there were little scale economies achieved 
by 1880; the time by which, if Chandler’s theory were correct, there ought to have been.  
In our results that measure and quantify economies of scale through the method of 
Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), the general pattern of the industries surveyed is 
relatively great economies of scale as having been achieved by 1860, followed by a 
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pronounced dip at 1870, and only modest increases by 1880 that often do not regain their 
1860 levels.  Even after substitution and purging of the flawed data from the study to the 
best of our ability, these eight principal industries were only evenly split between those 
whose MES rose in 1880 over their 1860 levels and those who declined.  A similar 
examination of a sample of industries that Chandler believed were less strongly impacted 
by the technological and transportation improvements of the era for the sake of 
comparison yielded results that were no better or worse.   
While the dips of 1870 make sense in the context of the Civil War aftermath 
shock, there is no rational explanation for the extremely low MES’s observed at 1880 in 
the context of Chandler’s hypothesis.  If 1870 were the benchmark period in which to 
begin to expect to see the effects of transportation improvements upon scale economies in 
American industry, then 1880 is certainly a liberal allowance in terms of time to expect to 
see the effects of the railroads upon market expansion and financial intermediation to 
have been taking place; post-war resumption of investment and capital accumulation 
notwithstanding.   
 In the analysis of economies of scope in Chapter Six, we find results that are more 
supportive of the Chandlerian hypothesis.  Our method of empirical analysis that 
represents the percentage cost savings due to joint production showed that in that in the 
food industries of Flour and Meat, which were the two industries among our analysis that 
Chandler believed were the great industries that experienced these great impacts of the 
decline in transport costs and technological advance that led to large-scale production 
methods, we saw results that showed an ascending scope pattern in at least some of their 
input data groups.  The efficacy of our methodology is confirmed by the presence of 
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exploding scope estimates for 1880 in 3 out of the 4 industries whose data included 1880 
estimates that were derived from estimates of a perfectly integrated industrial structure, 
and by a dip in the scope estimates for 1870 followed by a rebound in 1880 seen in 3 of 
those 4 industries, which must be viewed as a continuation of a pattern observed in 
Chapters Four and Five that displayed the same frequently-occurring phenomenon in its 
scale estimates. 
 Regarding the omnipresent dips at 1870 seen in both the scale and scope 
estimates, it appears that Chandler may have been incorrect in pointing to that date as the 
benchmark period in which to begin to expect to see the effects of transportation 
improvements upon scale and scope economies in American industry.  He may have 
underestimated or overlooked the severity and duration of the Civil War aftermath shock 
that greatly retarded investment and capital accumulation in the economy well into the 
1870’s, not producing a recovery until the 1880’s.  Or perhaps the impact of the railroads 
upon scale and scope of industry were not felt until much later than Chandler believed 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SIX: Final Assembly of Data Set 
 
The below tables delineate the final assembly of the raw data for the economies of scope 
analysis of Chapter Six for each of the eight selected industries for each year 1850, 1860 
and 1870, and for the four of those industries that were estimated for 1880.  Each table 
contains the data for total cost, price of capital, price of labor, price of materials and 
quantity of each output in each industry’s final output vector for each firm.  Each table 
also contains the mean and standard deviation of each of these variables, which appear in 
the bottom two rows of each table.  The means and standard deviations of each variable 
have been computed on a per firm basis; that is, they are intended to capture the average 
quantity and standard deviation of each variable pertaining to each firm that was counted 
as being in that industry.  Consequently, for output quantity, values of zero pertaining to 
the quantity of one of the outputs in the industry output vector produced by a firm that 
produced none of that output, but a positive quantity of the other, were included in the 
calculation of the mean and standard deviation for that output.  So for instance, the mean 
and standard deviation of an output variable such as boots will include the output of boots 
produced by shoe firms that produced a positive quantity of shoes, but zero boots; or vice 
versa.  
 
This final assembly has been significantly scaled down in number of observations from 
the original internet samples due to the need to eliminate those firms that lacked a 
complete set of variables.  The assembly omits all firms in the samples who lacked 
sufficient data to construct variables for price of labor, capital, and value of inputs, and 
also omits any firm that did not produce a quantity of at least one of the outputs in its 
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respective industry output vector that was greater than zero; the exception to this latter 
rule, of course, being the 1880 estimates whose output quantities were estimated. 
Positive figures for the variables for price of labor, capital, and aggregate value of 
inputs were the necessary and sufficient conditions for both a complete input price vector 
and total cost figure for each firm.  Positive figures for price of labor and capital implied 
positive figures for total amount paid in wages for the year and for capital expenses for 
each firm.  When aggregated with a positive figure for value of inputs, a complete 
estimate for total cost for each firm was constructed.  A positive value for price of 
materials was a given, as this was an industry-wide average based on fragmentary data on 
individual input prices and quantities (see discussion in Chapter Six), or a proxy obtained 
from reference books in the case of the 1880 figures.   
All dollar figures corresponding to total costs and input prices have been rounded 
to the second decimal place where necessary, and are expressed in current prices.  In the 
final analysis, all dollar figures were converted to 1860 prices.  The data for total cost and 
price of labor were converted using the North American Wholesale Price Indices in Brian 
Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics: the Americas, 1750-2000.1  Since the data 
for price of capital were constructed from a ratio of the cost of capital and the value of 
output, the price indexes used to convert these data are themselves ratios of the general 
price data contained in Mitchell and the Warren-Pearson product-group specific 
wholesale price index found in the Census Bureau’s Historical Statistics of the United 
States.2  Shoes were converted using the index for Hides and leather products (Series E 
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55); Flour and Tobacco, Farm products (Series E 53); Millwork and Furniture, House-
furnishing goods (Series E 61); Foundaries, Metals and metal products (Series E 58); and 
Meat, Foods (Series E 54).  The only exception was Men's Clothing, which was 
converted in exactly the same manner barring the fact that new data pertaining explicitly 
to Clothing from the updated 2006 edition of Historical Statistics were used to convert 
the 1870 data into 1860 prices.3  The 1850 data for Men's Clothing were converted to 
1860 prices as described above as using the Warren-Pearson price index for Textile 
products (Series E 56).   
The data for price of inputs were converted solely using the Warren-Pearson 
indices.  For some industries, the index differs from that used to construct the 
corresponding index for price of capital because the index was selected based on the 
intermediate inputs used to produce the product rather than its output.  So for Millwork 
and Furniture, for instance, since their primary input was feet of lumber, Building 
materials (Series E 59) was selected rather than House-furnishing goods.  Since the 
primary input of the Meat industry was livestock animals, the Farm products index was 
used instead of Foods.  Since the primary input of Men's clothing was yards of cloth, the 
Textiles index was used for each year, including 1870, not the Clothing index from the 
2006 edition.  Since the primary inputs of Foundaries were about evenly split between 
iron and coal, I constructed an average composite index from the indices for Fuel and 
lighting (Series E 57) and Metals and metal products. 
 
                                                 
3
 See Peter H. Lindert’s Table Cc49-57 Consumer price indexes, for selected groups: 1851-1880 [Hoover], 
Series Cc54, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Three, Part C: Economic Structure and Performance (Cambridge 




The means terms used in the final empirical analysis (see Equation [2], Chapter Six) are 
also in constant 1860 prices.  They were calculated by simply taking the converted means 
of each period, and taking the grand sample mean value for all three periods.  They were 
not weighted by sample size.  So even in the extreme case of Meat, in which there were 
only two firms in the sample for 1870, the 1870 data were assigned an equal weight of 
one third in the grand sample means in the case of a three-period analysis excluding the 
estimated 1880 data.   
Poor, and therefore possibly misleading sample size notwithstanding, these 1870 
Meat data were assigned equal weight in the means because for the most part, they did 
not display any wide variation from the means of the earlier years.  So it is not too far off 
the mark to assume that these two firms were representative meat producers, and that an 
average of their production may not be too far off from an actual industry average for that 
year.  The one exception to this was for the variable Mutton, whose average quantity 
went down from 620 in 1850, then up to 3678 in 1860, and then down to zero in 1870.  
Of the two firms contained in the sample for that year, none produced any Mutton.  
However, in light of the general deficiencies described above pertaining to the asterisked 
industries, this zero estimate was considered to be not too far off the mark from what one 
could expect from a faulty data set of even adequate sample size.  Any attempts to 
remedy this deficiency of sample size through a re-weighting scheme were therefore 
viewed as “putting lipstick on a pig” (forgive the pun) and cast aside.   
The Meat data set shared the same problem as Tobacco and Foundaries; that is, 
well-filled-in columns corresponding to one of the outputs in its output vector, but scant 
incidence of the other, leading to much smaller means figures for that variable when 
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averaging in these zero figures.  In the case of Meat, this “good and bad” output pairing 
scheme was Beef and Mutton, respectively.  While the zero figure for the mean for 
Mutton for 1870 is indeed a jump down from the earlier figures, it is a fact that the 
mutton quantity data is always more sparse than the beef data.  Consequently, the average 
mutton quantity is always a lot smaller than for beef for each year.  Even if the 1870 data 
were as good in sample size as the earlier years, the 1870 mutton mean would have likely 
been a small number anyway.  So by averaging that zero in equally with the means of the 
earlier years, I did not think I was making an already-bad data set that much worse.   
Further evidence in support of this contention may be found by examining the 
data sets of the other two asterisked industries, Tobacco and Foundaries, who also display 
wide variation in the means figures for their “bad” output variable across the years, 
despite adequate sample size for all years.  Foundaries, whose “good and bad” pair was 
castings and plows respectively, had a mean of plows that dipped from 62.8 in 1850 
down to the single digits in the later years.  Tobacco, whose “good and bad” pair was 
Cigars and Loose Tobacco respectively, had a mean for Loose Tobacco that rose from 
180 in 1850 to 6482 in 1860, and then went down to 1418 in 1870.  These wide spreads 
between the means of these years appear to be caused by random fluctuations in the 
number of filled-in rows in which a firm produced a positive quantity of the “bad” output 
vis-à-vis the number of rows in which the entry corresponding to the “bad” output 
equaled zero.  These large jumps in the means for these “bad” outputs may be therefore 
regarded as a general deficiency pertaining to an overall weak data set, not inadequate 
sample size.  Since the other industries with a “bad” output variable also displayed wide 
variation in the mean of that variable, I could not make a principled conjecture that 
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Meat’s small sample size for 1870 was the root cause of the anomalous mean figure for 
that year.  This rendered a re-weighting of Meat’s 1870 data in its grand sample mean 
moot, or superfluous at best.  It is very likely that had more firms been included in the 
sample, they would also have been beef-specializing, and the mutton mean would have 
still been a small number when the total quantity of mutton for that year was averaged out 
by the total number of beef-producing firms.   
 
Estimation of the missing materials inputs prices and output quantities data for the 1880 
samples essentially involved consulting reference books for the input price that most 
closely corresponded to the proxies constructed from the 1850-70 data, and obtaining 
output quantities by dividing out the value of output for each firm in accordance with the 
proportions each output comprised of national aggregate industry data, then dividing that 
share of each firm’s output value by its respective output price, thereby obtaining an 
output quantity for each firm in the samples that possessed the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for total cost and the remaining input price vector construction.  The 1880 
estimates are thereby a hypothetical estimate that assumes a wholly integrated structure in 
which each firm produced a positive quantity of each good in its output vector, and 
homogeneity of proportional composition of output between the macro and micro level.  
One could perhaps call these estimates, and any analysis of scope economies performed 
using them “potential” scope economies, because they measure the scope economies that 
could be achieved if each firm produced a positive quantity of each good in proportion to 
the national average.  Since the firms in the 1880 estimates were not constrained by the 
necessity of possession of a positive quantity of a least one of the outputs in each 
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industry’s output vector, a lot more of the firms in the samples “passed”, and made it into 
the estimates.  Consequently, the 1880 estimates tend to be much larger in sample size 
than their 1850-70 counterparts.   
In construction of input price proxy estimates, data were selected that were as 
close as possible to the basic input product description of the earlier years both in terms 
of the type of material, its qualities and attributes, and its price range.  Particular attention 
was paid to the course of change of the price proxy from the 1850-70 data over that time 
period, and the realistic outcome that one could expect by 1880 given the course of 
inflation of the appropriate product group as predicted by the Warren-Pearson indices.    
For some industries, this was quite a challenge.  For Flour, for instance, the input 
price proxy was essentially an average of the prices firms in the samples faced for two 
basic inputs, bushels of wheat and corn.  So the challenge amounted to finding data for 
the price of both for 1880 that, when averaged together, made sense within the context of 
the data constructed from the 1850-70 samples.  The course of the proxy grain price from 
1850-70 went from $0.72 to $0.88 to $1.12 a bushel respectively; an ascending pattern 
that was completely in accordance with the Warren-Pearson farm products index for that 
period.  However, the Warren-Pearson index displayed a dip at 1880 with an index 
number more closely corresponding to the 1850 and 1860 price levels.  So in construction 
of my proxy, my objective was to hopefully obtain an estimate for 1880 somewhere in 
the $0.70-$0.90 range.   
For the price of a bushel of wheat in 1880, I found a figure of $1.25 in the 2006 
edition of Historical Statistics 4 and a price of $1.27 in the 1889 Statistical Abstract of the 
                                                 
4
 See Michael R. Haines’s Table Cc205-266 Wholesale prices of selected commodities: 1784-1998, Series 
Cc206, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
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United States.5  Since the prices were so close together, I figured I had a pretty reliable 
ballpark figure in taking the average of the two, and estimating the price of a bushel of 
wheat as $1.26.     
For the price of a bushel of corn, it was more difficult to obtain an estimate due to 
the lack of a reliable means of distinguishing the price of a bushel of corn harvested for 
grain production from the price a bushel of the final good of actual milled corn meal.  
Faced with a menu of widely disparate prices for the above in the data sources overseen, 
and anticipating the need for a measure of the price of milled corn meal for the output 
quantities estimation; and bearing the mind the need for an estimate that would drag the 
composite measure down to something in the $0.70-$0.90 range when averaged in with 
the wheat price obtained above; and predicating my choice on the logic that milled corn 
meal would naturally be more expensive than corn in its raw form harvested for eventual 
milling into grain, I naturally gravitated toward the lower of the prices found in the data 
sources for my estimate for the price of a bushel of corn. 
On the same page of the above-cited Statistical Abstract that the wheat price was 
taken from, there was a price of a bushel of corn listed of $0.551.  In the 1882 edition of 
Statistical Abstract however, there was a price of corn of $0.396 per bushel listed that 
was an average value per bushel calculated by dividing the total value of the corn crop by 
the total annual product of corn for 1880.6  Since this was listed alongside figures for 
total crop area in acres, average yield per acre, and average value of yield per acre, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Three, Part C: Economic Structure and Performance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 204. 
5
 U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1889. Twelfth 
Number. Document No. 1310. (First Reprinting, Johnson Reprint Corporation, New York, London, 1964), 
p. 310. 
6
 U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1882. Fifth 




since it was lower than the former price quoted, I assumed this to be a more reliable 
estimate for the price of a bushel of corn harvested for grain or meal production, and 
assumed the former to be the price for a bushel of milled corn meal, even though it 
appeared alongside one of the figures I used to form my proxy for the price of a bushel of 
wheat harvested for flour production in the 1889 Statistical Abstract.  So I saved the 
former price for use as an estimate for the price of corn meal for the output quantities 
estimation procedure, and went with the $0.396 price for my estimate for the price of a 
bushel of raw corn.  In addition, in the in the 2006 edition of Historical Statistics, I found 
the nearly exact same price of $0.39 per bushel of corn harvested for grain.7 
So by averaging the price of a bushel of wheat of $1.26 with the price of a bushel 
of corn of $0.396, I obtained a proxy estimate for the price of a basic bushel of grain 
input for the Flour industry for 1880 of $0.828 (or 0.83 as it appears in the tables) which 
is completely in sync with the basic price ranges that the earlier proxies fell into, and is in 
keeping with the anticipated price estimate from the course of inflation of farm products’ 
prices described in the Warren-Pearson index.   
 
A further challenge encountered in forming input price proxies was the highly predictable 
discrepancy between the prices formed from the heterogeneous ABW data that came 
from actual firms’ Census returns, that took into account all of the multifarious inputs 
that went into the production of their products, and the “one-size-fits-all” reference book 
data for prices of one or a few basic inputs that I had no other choice but to rely upon to 
                                                 
7
 See Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode’s Table Da693-706 Corn, barley and flaxseed – acreage,  
production, price, and corn stocks:  1866-1999, Series Da697, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Four, Part D: 
Economic Sectors (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 97. 
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form my 1880 price proxies.  To briefly recapitulate on the above notes in the main 
chapter text concerning material input price construction, it can be recalled that the input 
composition that was detailed in the ABW data was always more varied than that which 
could be obtained by picking out a quoted market price—the multifarious varieties of 
leather that were used in shoe production, not to mention all the auxiliary inputs for each 
industry category, like leather and cloth for upholstery for furniture, and sometimes more 
exotic inputs like mahogany, cherry, pine or walnut for furniture—and that the process of 
input vector constriction amounted to identifying one, or at most a handful of basic inputs 
that were discernable for each industry, obtaining prices for each input by dividing the 
value of each input by its quantity, and restricting the results of these calculations to those 
that fell within a basic price range could be discerned that distinguished the basic input 
items from the from the non-basic input items, and then averaging them together to form 
a proxy.   
While this process greatly simplified the matter of input price estimation, it was 
not so cut & dry as to completely eliminate any non-basic material input that went into 
the production of the final good.  Allowances had to be made for the price variation that 
one would expect to observe in a differentiated basic input, and this price variation had to 
be taken into account in constructing the price average so as to provide a more accurate 
indicator of the price of a basic input.  Thus, the price range restrictions were devised so 
as to be narrow enough to omit all the non-basic items that went into the production of a 
given good, like gallons of varnish or oil and skins for upholstery for the industry of 
Furniture for example, whose basic input was foot planks of lumber.  But the range was 
also devised to be wide enough so as to include the more-than-occasional incidence of 
  
313
more exotic, and usually more expensive materials that were used to construct furniture, 
but still fell under the rubric of the “basic” material of lumber.  Thus mahogany, cherry, 
pine and walnut wood were included because while they were more unusual, they were 
still just different varieties of the basic material input of wood, thus they were important 
components of the main input of the furniture industry.  So they were included so as to 
form a more realistic estimate of the price of the basic input of lumber faced by these 
firms.  This was part of the reason I considered my proxies to be superior to Friedlaender, 
Winston and Wang’s in that by basing them on actual prices faced by firms in the 
samples, not some general, one-size-fits-all, generic price quoted on just one market, I 
was able to incorporate these differences in materials inputs costs caused by the inclusion 
of these more exotic inputs, thereby creating more realistic price estimates.   
Nowhere in the construction of the 1880 materials prices estimates was this 
discrepancy between the heterogeneous ABW data and the one-size-fits-all reference 
book data more evident than in Tobacco.   This discrepancy made it hard to find an 1880 
proxy that fit the price ranges of the proxies of the ABW data and their predicted inflation 
patterns, and matched the more varied input composition of the ABW tobacco data.  But 
by pulling together data from disparate sources, and constructing a weighted average of 
them that was just right (in a similar manner to the average of bushels of wheat and corn 
described above), I was able to construct a proxy that made total sense in terms of the 
input price proxies of the earlier periods I constructed, and also dovetailed and matched 
what I perceived to be the input product type characteristics of the tobacco firms in the 
ABW data.   
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The price trends and inflation patterns for the proxies formed from the ABW data 
for basic material input unit for Tobacco, pounds of tobacco leaf, showed an ascending 
pattern from 1850-70 of $0.20, $0.25, and $0.46 per pound, respectively.  The Warren-
Pearson index for Farm Products displayed the same ascending pattern over this period, 
but with a dip in prices down to more in the range of the 1850-60 levels by 1880.  
However, the quoted market prices for tobacco leaf for 1880 that I found tended to be 
much lower than even these; in the $0.05-$0.15 range.  The 1882 Statistical Abstract 
listed a price of tobacco of $0.11 per pound that was an average value per pound 
calculated by dividing the total value of the tobacco crop by the total production of 
tobacco in pounds for 1880.8  The 2006 edition of Historical Statistics listed a price of 
$0.081 per pound.9 
Sensing that something was wrong, I decided to check the details of the input 
composition for Tobacco in the ABW data more carefully for the possibility of the 
presence of more exotic and expensive tobacco inputs that may have driven their average 
input costs a little higher than the quoted prices for basic, run-of-the-mill tobacco leaf.  I 
was well aware that the ABW data tended to be heavily intensive in cigar production; a 
luxury item that may have been relied more heavily on imported or more expensive 
varieties of tobacco than basic chewing or smoking tobacco.  Apart from the proverbial 
glamour and mystique surrounding cigar-smoking, the frequent incidence of output 
products coded with fancy names like “Spanish cigars” as opposed to plain old “Cigars” 
led my hunch in this direction.  It turned out that my hunch was correct.  In the input 
                                                 
8
 Statistical Abstract (1882), p. 162. 
9
 See Table Da755-765 Cotton, cottonseed, shorn wool, and tobacco – acreage, production, price, and 
cotton stocks:  1790-1999, Series Da765, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Four, Part D: Economic Sectors 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006),  p. 111. 
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products coding for Tobacco for 1850-70, besides the occasional incidence of pounds of 
“Spanish leaf”, one sees the frequent incidence of pounds of “Processed tobacco” that 
tended to be in the $0.20-$0.50 range, and even sometimes regular tobacco listed as 
“Leaf, lbs.” that had prices in that range.   
Further confirmation that cigar production tended to be heavily intensive in more 
exotic and expensive varieties of tobacco was provided to me by further exploration of 
data sources.  The 1895 Statistical Abstract lists a price for imported tobacco leaf for 
1880 as $0.503 per pound.  These data are presented in a column entitled “Other leaf” 
that is beside another column entitled “[Leaf tobacco] Suitable for cigar wrappers” that 
does not contain any data prior to 1884, but in the subsequent years of 1884-1895, the 
price of this variety of tobacco leaf is very high; in the $0.70-$1.30 range per pound.  But 
I noticed that for the years prior to 1884, the figures for “Other leaf” tend to be higher 
than in the years immediately following the inclusion of the separate category of cigar 
leaf tobacco; in the $0.50-$0.60 range for 1879-83, whereas after the data for cigar 
wrapper becomes available, these data drop down into the $0.40-$0.50 range for a good 
four years or so before they return to their 1879-83 levels.  I took this drop in price as an 
indicator that perhaps the very expensive imported cigar leaf tobaccos were averaged in 
with this generic “Other leaf” measure prior to 1884.  If that were the case, it would point 
to a strong linkage between more expensive, imported varieties of tobacco and cigar 
production.10 
Notwithstanding, these data not only reinforced my hunch that cigars’ inputs were 
more expensive and exotic than basic chewing and smoking tobacco (or at least, that the 
                                                 
10
 U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1895. 
Eighteenth Number. (First Reprinting, Johnson Reprint Corporation, New York, London, 1964), p. 384. 
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more expensive imported varieties of tobacco tended to end up being used to produce 
cigars); they provided me a seemingly reliable source to quote from with which to 
construct a proxy than embodied the additional costs faced by cigar makers that made 
their price of a basic unit input of tobacco leaf more expensive than the typical quoted 
prices for conventional, domestic leaf, and would thus be more in sync with the proxies 
formed from the ABW data.  
To construct such a proxy, I firstly constructed an initial proxy of the price of a 
basic unit input of the price of a pound of run-of-the-mill, domestic tobacco leaf by 
constructing an equally-weighted average of the above-cited Statistical Abstract (1882) 
and Historical Statistics (2006, Vol. 4) data that equaled $0.10 per pound when rounded 
to the second decimal place.  I then used that figure to construct another composite that 
was an un-equally weighted average of that figure with the figure of price for imported 
tobacco leaf for 1880 of $0.503 per pound from the 1895 Statistical Abstract.  By 
ascribing a weight of 0.60 to the proxy for basic domestic leaf, and a weight of 0.40 to 
the price of imported leaf, I obtained a price of $0.26 per pound for tobacco leaf that is in 
complete correspondence with the price ranges of my earlier proxies from the ABW data, 
matched the predicted price trend as predicted by the Warren-Pearson index, and appears, 
from inspection of the input codes, to match approximately the proportions in which we 
observe exotic tobacco leaf appearing as an input in the production process for the 
(primarily) cigar-making firms that comprise the bulk of the data for the tobacco industry 




The data used to construct material input prices for Shoes and Meat were both taken from 
the 1880 Census of Manufactures.11  The price of the basic unit input for Shoes, Sides of 
leather, was calculated by taking the data for total value of products of Tanned leather 
and Curried leather, dividing each by the total number of sides and skins of each 
produced, and then taking an equally-weighted average of the two price measures that 
resulted.12  For the price of the basic unit input for Meat that corresponded to that used in 
my 1850-80 proxy estimates (see discussion on material inputs in main chapter text), I 
took the total value of hogs, beeves and sheep slaughtered, divided each by their 
respective number of beasts slaughtered, and took an equally-weighted average of the 
three different prices per beast that resulted.13  
 
Material input prices estimation for the remaining four industries in the Scope analysis—
Men’s Clothing, Millwork, Furniture and Foundaries—was rendered moot due to my 
inability to acquire the necessary data with which to construct output quantities estimates 
for these industries.  The essential methodology used to construct these estimates was to 
firstly obtain the aggregate value of output of each good in the industry output vector, 
then divide these output values by the value of the aggregate output of the entire industry 
to determine the fraction that that each good comprised of the output value of the total 
industry.  Once these percentages were determined, they were applied to the individual 
output values of each firm in the samples to obtain an estimate of the share of output 
                                                 
11
 United States Census Office, 10th Census.  Report on the Manufactures of the United States at the Tenth 
Census: 1880. Volume 2. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883.    
12
 Census (1880), pp. 462-63.   
13
 Ibid., pp. 474-75. 
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value that each good accounted for.  In turn, each of these shares was divided by the 
appropriate product price to determine the quantity of each good produced by each firm.   
A price for each good could be determined by dividing the aggregate output value 
of each good by its quantity—or an aggregate output value could be determined by 
multiplying its quantity by its price.  If separate data were not available, an aggregate 
industry value could be estimated by summing the aggregate output value of each good.  
But without at least two out of three values for each good—price, quantity and aggregate 
value—it was impossible to perform the above-described procedure. 
Thus, the output quantities estimation procedure and data sources for just the four 
industries whose material inputs prices were delineated above are all that are presented 
here.  Unfortunately, only two of the “good” industries—Shoes and Flour--made it into 
the 1880 analysis along with the other two, Meat and Tobacco, being among the three 
“bad” industries demarked with an asterisk indicating less-than-optimal data set 
characteristics (see discussion on  Final Industry Selection and Notes on Industry 
Conglomerations, main chapter text). 
Wherever possible, the data used for aggregate output value of an industry were 
that which encompassed all the outputs and products produced by that industry, so that 
the percentages of the industry value accounted for by the two main products would sum 
to less than one.  This was done in order to keep the keep the cost function characteristics 
uniform across periods, and to obtain more realistic output quantity estimates.  It can be 
recalled from the main chapter text discussion on Industry Selection Criteria that 
collapsing of outputs was done in order to form a more robust data set, and to keep the 
number of outputs in each output vector to a minimum.  Due to heterogeneity of output 
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types, some purging of outputs that did not fit neatly under the rubric of one of the main 
product group categories was done, and justified on the predicate that these purged 
outputs were not produced jointly with the main products.  Nevertheless, the costs data 
for each firm in the data set for 1850-70 do encompass the cost of producing these purged 
items, although their output vector does not take them into account.  In order to maintain 
this continuity and to obtain more realistic output quantities that took into account the 
existence of unspecified products that comprised a portion of the output values of firms in 
the samples, I tried to leave some open space in the output values of each firm to account 
for these unspecified items, and only to divide out by price the portion of their output 
values that the main products accounted for to obtain the firms’ output quantities.   
Fortunately, I was able to obtain such aggregate output values for three out of the 
four industries that were included in the 1880 data sets.  This was not to be taken for 
granted, because for each of these industries, it appeared that these unspecified items did 
account for a significant share of the aggregate industry output value.  Although the 
Shoes industry had a value of unspecified products that was only a tiny fraction of its 
total value, the Meat industry had many other products besides the two main ones of beef 
and mutton that comprised its value.  It can be recalled from the Notes on Industry 
Conglomerations in the main chapter text that pork comprised a large percentage of the 
output of the firms in the samples, but was purged from industry output vector due to an 
unclear and inconsistent pairing pattern that was completely disjoint from beef or mutton.  
But this preponderance of pork in the ABW samples is echoed in the Census of 
Manufactures for 1880, which shows many varieties and large quantities of pork products 
contributing to the total value of products of the Slaughtering and Meat-packing 
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industry—so much so that after isolating the values comprised by beef and mutton, 
together they comprised only 21% of the total value of all products for 1880.14  The 
tobacco industry too was affected by the infusion of unspecified products not included in 
the vector of main outputs, as seen by the prominent role that the newly-found popularity 
of cigarettes had begun to play in the tobacco industry.  Isolating the value of output of 
the two main product groups, cigars and loose tobacco, and leaving a space in the value 
of aggregate output that was accounted for by cigarettes was no easy task, but an essential 
one in trying to obtain realistic output measures derived from realistic estimations of the 
fractions of firms’ output values that were allocated towards production of just the two 
main goods.    
But when such separate data was not available, as in the case of Flour, an 
aggregate industry value was estimated by summing the aggregate output value of each 
good.  The two primary outputs of the Flour industry were barrels of wheat flour and 
bushels of corn meal.  The aggregate value of output of wheat flour was calculated by 
first taking the aggregate output of wheat flour for 1880 listed in the 2006 edition of 
Historical Statistics 15 in units of short tons (2000 lbs.), and converting it to barrels at a 
rate of 196 pounds per barrel.  This figure was used to calculate the value of this 
aggregate output by multiplying it by the price of a barrel of wheat flour for 1880 given 
in the 2006 edition of Historical Statistics.16 




 See Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman’s Table Dd366-436 Physical output of selected manufactured 
products: 1860-1997, Series Dd368, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Four, Part D: Economic Sectors (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 627. 
16
 See Michael R. Haines’s Table Cc205-266 Wholesale prices of selected commodities: 1784-1998, Series 
Cc212, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Three, Part C: Economic Structure and Performance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 204. 
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The value of the aggregate output of corn meal was more difficult to obtain due to 
lack of a reliable figure for aggregate output quantity.  While the above-cited price of a 
bushel of corn of $0.551 from the 1889 Statistical Abstract of the United States 17 was 
settled on for an estimate of the price of a bushel of milled corn meal, that price listing 
contained no corresponding output quantity listing.  I could find no other estimates for 
any other aggregate quantity of corn meal other than that from which the price of corn of 
$0.396 from the 1882 edition of Statistical Abstract was derived that was an average 
value per bushel calculated by dividing the total value of the corn crop by the total annual 
product of corn for 1880.18  For lack of any more reliable estimate for the aggregate 
quantity of corn meal, this quantity was used in its place even though it probably is the 
quantity of corn in its raw form harvested for cereal production.  So I used it as an 
estimate for the total quantity of output of corn meal on the assumption that one bushel of 
corn made about one bushel of corn meal, and that most of the corn harvested was 
eventually ground into corn meal.  Although it is worthy of noting that in another table in 
the 1882 Statistical Abstract, the same quantity figure is listed in a table entitled, 
“Quantity of Indian Corn Produced, and of Corn and Corn Meal (emphasis added) 
Imported, Exported and Retained for Consumption in the United States, from 1866 to 
1882, inclusive”,19 which shows that this assumption of quantitative parity between corn 
in its raw harvested form and in its ground cereal form may not be too far off the mark.  
This said quantity was multiplied by the said price of a bushel of corn meal of $0.551 to 
obtain the estimate for the value of output of corn meal.   
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 Statistical Abstract (1889), p. 310. 
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 Statistical Abstract (1882), p. 159.   
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 Ibid., p. 125. 
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These said values of output of wheat flour and corn meal were then summed to 
obtain the value of aggregate output of the Flour industry, and the percentages that each 
comprised of this aggregate measure were applied to the individual output values of the 
firms in the samples, and each share was divided out by the appropriate product price 
described above to obtain each firm’s individual output quantities estimates.      
 
The output quantities for the two primary products of the Tobacco industry were Cigars 
and pounds of Loose Tobacco; a composite that encompassed chewing and smoking 
tobacco, dip and snuff.   
The value of the output of Loose Tobacco was obtained from the total value of 
products of the chewing, smoking, and snuff segment of the Tobacco industry for 1880 
found in the 1880 Census of Manufactures.20 
Since the 1880 Census data do not contain an isolated figure for the value of 
cigars, only an aggregated figure for the combined value of cigars and cigarettes, the 
value of the output of cigars was estimated by using converted 1890 price data (the 
earliest obtainable for cigars and cigarettes) from the Bulletin of the Department of Labor 
for 1900 and 1880 quantity data from the 2006 edition of Historical Statistics to construct 
a ratio that represented  the value of cigars out of the combined value of cigars and 
cigarettes listed in the 1880 Census.  A value of cigars was calculated by taking the price 
of cigars (cheroots) for 1890 listed in the Bulletin of the Department of Labor for 1900,21 
converting it to 1890 prices using the Warren-Pearson index for Farm products (Series E 
53), and multiplying that figure by the quantity of cigars produced in the United States 
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 Census (1880), p. 24.   
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 United States Department of Labor. Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Washington: Government 
Printing Office. Vol. V (1900), No. 29 (July, 1900), p. 745. 
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for 1880 listed in the 2006 edition of Historical Statistics.22  A similarly-constructed 
value of cigarettes was calculated from the same sources, and the ratio that cigars 
comprised out of the sum of these cigars and cigarettes values was applied to the total 
value of products of the cigars and cigarettes segment of the Tobacco industry from the 
1880 Census for an estimate of the proportion of output value of the cigars and cigarettes 
industry that was accounted for by cigars alone.   
These said values of output of Loose Tobacco and Cigars were not summed to 
obtain the value of aggregate output of the Tobacco industry.  Instead, the said value of 
output of Loose Tobacco was summed with the total value of products of the cigars and 
cigarettes segment of the Tobacco industry for 1880 found in the 1880 Census to obtain 
such a measure.23  That is because, although the ABW are lacking any output for 
cigarettes in their product coding for 1850-70, it does appear that by 1880, cigarette 
production had come to comprise a significant per cent of the output of the Tobacco 
industry.  Since the ABW data were used to construct the aggregate Census data for that 
year, which did list the value of cigarettes produced, it is a reasonable conjecture to 
suppose that cigarettes did comprise at least a significant share of the output of the firms 
in the ABW samples for 1880, although this does not appear to have been the case for 
earlier census years.  Further testimony to the increasing popularity of cigarettes as a 
smoker’s choice is found in the above-cited table from Historical Statistics from which 
the quantity of output of cigars was obtained.  The table shows, beginning in 1870, the 
quantity of cigarettes starting out small relative to cigars, but increasing rapidly to surpass 
                                                 
22
 See Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman’s Table Dd366-436 Physical output of selected manufactured 
products: 1860-1997, Series Dd376, in Carter, Susan B.,…[et al.], Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Four, Part D: Economic Sectors (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 627.   
23
 Census (1880), p. 24.    
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cigars by 1900, and later to dwarf cigar production by the mid-20th century.  So I 
considered it to be a fairly safe estimate to say that by 1880, at least a few of the firms in 
the samples were getting busy producing at least a modicum of cigarettes, and that on 
average, some portion of the output value of these firms, both on the firm-level and in the 
aggregate, came from sale of cigarettes.  But to keep the cost function the same, I only 
estimated the output quantities of Cigars and Loose Tobacco.   
These said values of output of Loose Tobacco and Cigars were each divided by 
the said value of aggregate output of the Tobacco industry to obtain the percentage of the 
value of aggregate output of the Tobacco industry that each comprised.   To obtain firm-
level output quantities, these percentages were applied to the individual output values of 
the firms in the samples, and each share was divided out by the appropriate product price.  
The price of cigars used was the same price obtained from the converted Department of 
Labor data described above.  The price of Loose Tobacco used was that obtained by 
dividing the value of output of the chewing, smoking, and snuff segment of the Tobacco 
industry from the 1880 Census by the quantity of output of the Manufactured tobacco and 
snuff industry from the Historical Statistics table cited above. 
 
The output quantities for the two primary products of the Meat industry in the analysis 
were pounds of beef and mutton. 
The value of the output of the beef industry was obtained by taking the price of 
beef per barrel for 1880 listed in the 1889 Statistical Abstract,24 converting it to pounds at 
                                                 
24
 Statistical Abstract (1889), p. 310. 
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a rate of 196 pounds per barrel, and multiplying that price by the quantity of beef sold 
fresh in the United States in 1880 listed in the 1880 Census of Manufactures.25 
The value of the output of the mutton industry was obtained by taking the price of 
mutton per pound for 1890 (the earliest price I was able to find) listed in the Bulletin of 
the Department of Labor for 1900, 26 converting it to 1880 prices using the Warren-
Pearson index for foods (Series E 54), and multiplying that figure by the quantity of 
mutton sold fresh in the United States for 1880 listed in the 1880 Census of 
Manufactures.27 
These said values of output of beef and mutton were not summed to obtain the 
value of aggregate output of the meat industry.  Instead, they were each divided by the 
total value of all products of the Slaughtering and Meat-packing industry for the United 
States for 1880 listed in the 1880 Census of Manufactures 28 and the percentages that 
each comprised of this aggregate measure were applied to the individual output values of 
the firms in the samples, and each share was divided out by the appropriate product price 
described above to obtain each firm’s individual output quantities estimates.      
 
The output quantities for the two primary products of the Shoes industry in the analysis 
were pairs of shoes and boots.  The value of the output of each of these industries was 
taken from the 1880 Census.29  These said values of output of shoes and boots were not 
summed to obtain the value of aggregate output of the shoes and boots industry.  Instead, 
                                                 
25
 Census (1880), p. 474.   
26
 United States Department of Labor. Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Washington: Government 
Printing Office. Vol. V (1900), No. 27 (March, 1900), p. 285. 
27




 Ibid., p. 458.   
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they were each divided by the total value of all products of the Shoes and Boots industry 
for the United States for 1880 listed on the same table in the 1880 Census, and the 
percentages that each comprised of this aggregate measure were applied to the individual 
output values of the firms in the samples.  These shares were then divided out by the 
appropriate product price, which was calculated by dividing the value of output of each 
product by its quantity (listed on the same table in the Census) to obtain each firm’s 
individual output quantities estimates.      
 
The three of the eight industries compiled whose data sets did not exhibit potential for 
robust Sc estimates as described in the main chapter text appear denoted by an asterisk in 



























Table A.6.1. Shoes 
 
A.6.1. (a.) 1850      
 
 















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 4,568.00 96.00 0.21 2.05 2,500 0 
2 1,360.00 180.00 0.30 2.05 1,000 0 
3 1,550.00 360.00 0.29 2.05 312 0 
4 1,600.00 360.00 0.50 2.05 365 0 
5 1,020.00 240.00 0.07 2.05 100 100 
6 7,360.00 240.00 0.83 2.05 1,200 0 
7 1,132.00 432.00 0.08 2.05 175 400 
8 2,260.00 360.00 0.20 2.05 500 0 
9 831.00 108.00 0.22 2.05 400 0 
10 2,616.00 307.20 0.11 2.05 650 0 
11 791.00 198.00 0.11 2.05 300 0 
12 4,632.00 258.86 0.44 2.05 375 300 
13 5,056.00 205.09 0.17 2.05 1,000 1,000 
14 1,020.00 140.00 0.40 2.05 5,000 0 
15 3,444.00 168.00 0.40 2.05 1,200 0 
16 8,620.00 208.00 1.00 2.05 5,000 0 
17 960.00 330.00 0.09 2.05 200 0 
18 1,130.00 240.00 0.18 2.05 300 4 
19 2,200.00 300.00 0.25 2.05 1,000 0 
20 740.00 180.00 0.10 2.05 400 0 
21 805.00 180.00 0.76 2.05 250 0 
22 3,080.00 360.00 0.25 2.05 500 0 
23 670.00 120.00 0.16 2.05 300 0 
24 586.00 168.00 0.10 2.05 333 0 
25 8,810.00 189.23 0.76 2.05 2,000 1,000 
26 1,605.00 210.00 0.25 2.05 400 0 
27 1,600.00 120.00 0.19 2.05 3,000 50 
28 1,420.00 300.00 0.30 2.05 230 0 
29 1,025.00 200.00 0.15 2.05 470 0 
30 1,620.00 180.00 0.24 2.05 500 0 
31 611.00 96.00 0.03 2.05 600 0 
32 1,554.00 126.00 0.39 2.05 638 145 
33 1,640.00 280.00 0.10 2.05 500 0 
34 1,340.00 180.00 0.33 2.05 400 0 
35 979.00 252.00 0.33 2.05 500 0 
36 3,160.00 420.00 0.39 2.05 800 500 
37 1,545.00 180.00 0.13 2.05 700 0 
38 730.00 240.00 0.10 2.05 200 0 
39 1,287.00 180.00 0.08 2.05 400 90 
40 4,444.00 324.00 1.00 2.05 1,448 0 
41 810.00 240.00 0.06 2.05 20 80 
42 1,300.00 300.00 0.02 2.05 750 0 
43 940.00 240.00 0.67 2.05 300 0 
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44 692.00 192.00 0.44 2.05 85 0 
45 2,750.00 300.00 0.10 2.05 1,000 0 
46 822.00 372.00 0.20 2.05 140 200 
47 4,264.00 294.86 0.27 2.05 0 15,000 
48 3,600.00 360.00 0.14 2.05 1,900 0 
49 592.00 312.00 0.05 2.05 100 150 
50 2,600.00 400.00 0.11 2.05 1,819 0 
51 3,660.00 240.00 0.40 2.05 1,420 0 
52 1,024.00 312.00 0.23 2.05 500 0 
53 2,094.00 248.00 0.44 2.05 0 550 
54 725.00 300.00 0.24 2.05 50 125 
55 6,724.00 333.33 0.21 2.05 3,000 1,350 
56 1,060.00 240.00 0.06 2.05 550 0 
57 1,592.00 360.00 0.60 2.05 500 0 
58 2,700.00 360.00 0.21 2.05 0 1,000 
59 8,589.00 364.00 0.58 2.05 600 1,050 
60 5,160.00 360.00 0.08 2.05 500 6,000 
61 754.00 192.00 0.14 2.05 80 108 
62 3,592.00 52.00 0.44 2.05 600 825 
63 1,000.00 300.00 0.06 2.05 0 100 
64 1,254.00 300.00 0.13 2.05 150 400 
65 1,135.00 420.00 0.31 2.05 100 250 
66 4,844.00 312.00 0.53 2.05 300 600 
67 2,050.00 300.00 0.29 2.05 150 250 
68 497.00 120.00 0.27 2.05 120 25 
69 3,462.00 240.00 0.30 2.05 400 500 
70 2,120.00 300.00 0.53 2.05 300 0 
71 830.00 240.00 0.10 2.05 300 0 
72 14,140.00 420.00 0.15 2.05 200 1,650 
73 5,800.00 360.00 0.18 2.05 600 950 
74 1,160.00 120.00 0.50 2.05 525 0 
75 1,116.00 240.00 0.29 2.05 435 0 
76 1,132.00 156.00 0.50 2.05 500 0 
77 1,285.00 300.00 0.29 2.05 0 340 
78 9,135.00 203.33 0.05 2.05 1,200 2,880 
79 3,000.00 300.00 0.21 2.05 700 600 
80 1,680.00 260.00 0.12 2.05 600 0 
81 1,482.00 396.00 0.27 2.05 250 0 
82 2,000.00 200.00 0.26 2.05 776 0 
83 1,596.00 260.00 0.06 2.05 600 225 
84 986.00 216.00 0.31 2.05 900 0 
85 3,060.00 240.00 0.38 2.05 0 260 
86 1,440.00 180.00 0.86 2.05 100 200 
87 3,000.00 200.00 0.35 2.05 1,000 0 
88 3,228.00 259.20 0.49 2.05 1,000 0 
89 7,740.00 300.00 0.17 2.05 3,000 900 
90 3,600.00 240.00 0.47 2.05 1,500 500 
91 1,595.00 360.00 0.38 2.05 500 0 
92 725.00 240.00 0.35 2.05 200 60 
93 1,482.00 396.00 0.27 2.05 250 0 
94 1,044.00 222.00 0.19 2.05 364 0 
95 1,105.00 240.00 0.10 2.05 350 100 
96 1,591.00 260.00 0.05 2.05 600 225 
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97 1,810.00 240.00 0.13 2.05 550 0 
98 2,080.00 360.00 0.28 2.05 30 250 
99 4,440.00 360.00 0.63 2.05 600 0 
100 6,040.00 170.53 0.17 2.05 3,000 0 
101 19,632.00 312.00 0.14 2.05 8,107 0 
102 3,127.00 216.00 0.42 2.05 1,000 300 
103 24,000.00 180.00 0.82 2.05 1,600 0 
104 3,180.00 280.00 0.65 2.05 2,000 0 
105 33,600.00 315.00 0.24 2.05 1,200 11,268 
106 17,480.00 245.14 0.05 2.05 25,000 0 
107 2,510.00 210.00 0.07 2.05 3,000 0 
108 940.00 180.00 0.04 2.05 1,250 0 
109 1,470.00 300.00 0.42 2.05 1,200 0 
110 1,420.00 210.00 0.37 2.05 1,200 0 
111 1,278.00 288.00 0.56 2.05 900 0 
112 1,218.00 264.00 0.60 2.05 840 0 
113 47,225.00 81.87 0.10 2.05 1,120 0 
114 2,448.00 210.00 0.12 2.05 2,880 0 
115 4,505.00 300.00 0.21 2.05 800 500 
116 1,764.00 288.00 0.09 2.05 2,000 0 
117 1,400.00 270.00 0.14 2.05 320 250 
118 975.00 300.00 0.28 2.05 400 0 
119 444.00 144.00 0.40 2.05 0 150 
120 1,376.00 288.00 0.49 2.05 400 0 
121 11,230.00 312.86 0.09 2.05 0 7,390 
122 2,200.00 200.00 0.33 2.05 1,800 0 
123 4,600.00 171.43 0.25 2.05 2,000 0 
124 1,517.00 264.00 0.37 2.05 0 300 
125 5,940.00 294.00 0.17 2.05 3,500 0 
126 1,025.00 300.00 0.50 2.05 300 0 
127 21,160.00 136.00 0.13 2.05 70,000 0 
128 67,400.00 177.39 0.20 2.05 80,000 0 
129 9,320.00 216.00 0.23 2.05 400 2,850 
130 10,548.00 160.42 0.28 2.05 8,000 2,000 
131 11,394.00 173.74 0.15 2.05 10,600 2,600 
132 3,544.00 176.00 0.67 2.05 1,500 0 
133 965.00 216.00 0.06 2.05 1,200 0 
134 2,276.00 352.00 0.22 2.05 125 500 
135 16,095.00 180.00 0.28 2.05 12,000 1,500 
136 1,624.00 204.00 0.05 2.05 5,200 0 
137 1,576.00 300.00 0.33 2.05 600 0 
138 3,110.00 280.00 0.49 2.05 0 500 
139 1,190.00 180.00 0.17 2.05 0 350 
140 26,080.00 197.65 0.26 2.05 0 8,000 
141 19,000.00 195.00 0.15 2.05 0 12,480 
142 10,650.00 200.00 0.10 2.05 0 3,500 
143 64,720.00 210.87 0.18 2.05 25,000 16,000 
144 22,240.00 138.67 0.10 2.05 30,000 0 
145 21,540.00 206.15 0.17 2.05 0 14,000 
146 90,680.00 137.74 0.15 2.05 275,000 0 
147 84,600.00 146.67 0.19 2.05 92,000 0 
148 10,980.00 135.00 0.35 2.05 14,000 0 
149 76,504.00 128.00 0.11 2.05 100,000 0 
  
330
150 15,120.00 104.00 0.27 2.05 25,000 0 
151 500.00 300.00 0.10 2.05 7,550 0 
152 1,852.00 312.00 0.10 2.05 700 500 
153 10,057.00 170.12 0.40 2.05 10,000 0 
154 42,700.00 150.00 0.26 2.05 75,000 0 
155 1,030.00 240.00 0.08 2.05 1,440 0 
156 703.00 168.00 0.17 2.05 0 300 
157 1,050.00 300.00 0.05 2.05 200 200 
158 4,080.00 180.00 0.25 2.05 2,400 0 
159 5,920.00 160.00 0.18 2.05 6,420 0 
160 15,800.00 156.00 0.11 2.05 21,000 0 
161 5,540.00 204.00 0.07 2.05 20,400 0 
162 5,294.00 212.00 0.06 2.05 12,000 0 
163 35,772.00 346.21 0.13 2.05 0 20,000 
164 8,500.00 160.00 0.06 2.05 0 4,500 
165 2,193.00 128.00 0.05 2.05 3,000 0 
166 15,839.00 269.71 0.54 2.05 0 3,200 
167 1,056.00 152.00 0.24 2.05 500 0 
168 12,114.00 230.18 0.17 2.05 0 4,368 
169 3,620.00 188.57 0.14 2.05 0 2,000 
170 4,634.00 198.00 0.10 2.05 0 2,500 
171 725.00 300.00 0.14 2.05 175 0 
172 42,896.00 316.98 0.17 2.05 60,000 0 
173 12,072.00 221.45 0.12 2.05 0 8,100 
174 2,240.00 280.00 0.20 2.05 800 0 
175 1,320.00 360.00 0.30 2.05 400 0 
176 10,050.00 240.00 0.35 2.05 1,700 0 
177 40,500.00 240.00 0.08 2.05 66,000 0 
178 157,496.00 195.98 0.83 2.05 150,000 0 
179 21,400.00 168.00 0.13 2.05 20,000 1,500 
180 1,330.00 240.00 0.19 2.05 1,000 0 
181 2,676.00 240.00 0.05 2.05 3,120 0 
182 810.00 240.00 0.03 2.05 900 0 
183 2,970.00 240.00 0.02 2.05 3,000 0 
184 27,740.00 186.00 0.22 2.05 36,000 0 
185 927.00 264.00 0.04 2.05 2,000 0 
186 1,612.00 270.00 0.12 2.05 2,400 0 
187 1,950.00 150.00 0.02 2.05 2,500 0 
188 1,225.00 240.00 0.04 2.05 1,500 0 
189 859.00 264.00 0.13 2.05 1,300 0 
190 1,340.00 300.00 0.13 2.05 2,000 0 
191 835.00 300.00 0.13 2.05 1,000 0 
192 803.00 288.00 0.13 2.05 1,000 0 
193 687.00 192.00 0.13 2.05 1,000 0 
194 2,900.00 171.43 0.06 2.05 3,500 0 
195 1,272.00 156.00 0.06 2.05 3,000 0 
196 846.00 240.00 0.13 2.05 1,300 0 
197 798.00 288.00 0.13 2.05 1,000 0 
198 741.00 216.00 0.07 2.05 1,200 0 
199 1,140.00 240.00 0.06 2.05 900 0 
200 872.00 216.00 0.05 2.05 1,200 0 
201 3,934.00 288.00 0.01 2.05 0 3,120 
202 920.00 240.00 0.03 2.05 1,500 0 
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203 1,205.00 240.00 0.14 2.05 1,000 0 
204 1,049.00 204.00 0.17 2.05 1,500 0 
205 16,301.00 3,801.00 0.05 2.05 2,500 0 
206 929.00 204.00 0.09 2.05 1,500 0 
207 2,432.00 300.00 0.40 2.05 5,400 0 
208 2,796.00 228.00 0.36 2.05 3,000 0 
209 1,917.00 156.00 0.43 2.05 2,000 0 
210 15,798.00 240.00 0.52 2.05 14,200 0 
211 2,776.00 228.00 0.36 2.05 3,000 0 
212 66,008.00 200.10 0.13 2.05 72,000 0 
213 1,736.00 216.00 0.31 2.05 1,800 0 
214 3,846.00 228.00 0.35 2.05 4,500 0 
215 3,490.00 200.00 0.29 2.05 4,000 0 
216 5,436.00 156.00 0.44 2.05 7,500 0 
217 3,312.00 198.00 0.28 2.05 5,000 0 
218 4,636.00 174.00 0.24 2.05 6,000 0 
219 1,987.00 216.00 0.25 2.05 2,500 0 
220 1,588.00 222.00 0.04 2.05 2,500 0 
221 4,452.00 115.20 0.45 2.05 2,000 0 
222 5,077.00 130.40 0.24 2.05 2,589 0 
223 7,492.00 232.00 0.13 2.05 5,000 0 
224 7,055.00 212.00 0.21 2.05 5,000 0 
225 8,035.00 168.00 0.77 2.05 3,000 1,000 
226 1,832.00 216.00 1.00 2.05 225 0 
227 1,636.00 312.00 0.21 2.05 400 50 
228 1,737.00 300.00 0.15 2.05 400 0 
229 693.00 288.00 0.54 2.05 250 0 
230 2,481.00 211.20 0.12 2.05 200 800 
231 3,586.00 312.00 1.25 2.05 850 0 
232 697.00 192.00 0.22 2.05 300 0 
233 1,478.00 300.00 0.29 2.05 300 300 
234 996.00 240.00 0.07 2.05 0 300 
235 1,520.00 240.00 0.20 2.05 0 400 
236 5,900.00 300.00 0.15 2.05 4,000 800 
237 1,000.00 300.00 0.17 2.05 600 0 
238 13,510.00 184.00 0.27 2.05 6,000 0 
239 970.00 240.00 0.21 2.05 600 0 
240 1,380.00 240.00 0.86 2.05 250 150 
241 3,552.00 144.00 0.06 2.05 0 2,880 
242 7,450.00 300.00 0.02 2.05 2,000 0 
243 2,570.00 240.00 0.48 2.05 1,000 0 
244 1,484.00 192.00 0.16 2.05 7,800 0 
245 2,059.00 240.00 0.64 2.05 300 300 
246 2,638.00 232.00 0.06 2.05 2,000 0 
247 4,260.00 222.86 0.50 2.05 1,500 0 
248 908.00 240.00 0.16 2.05 550 0 
249 2,500.00 300.00 0.40 2.05 1,000 0 
250 693.00 288.00 0.54 2.05 250 0 
251 1,962.00 182.40 0.08 2.05 2,500 0 
252 5,842.00 262.91 0.38 2.05 1,600 0 
253 860.00 180.00 0.17 2.05 500 0 
254 1,330.00 240.00 0.07 2.05 700 0 
255 2,570.00 300.00 0.55 2.05 728 0 
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256 950.00 300.00 0.22 2.05 400 0 
257 2,400.00 300.00 0.92 2.05 650 0 
258 3,820.00 264.00 1.60 2.05 400 0 
259 912.00 312.00 0.60 2.05 250 0 
260 28,346.00 174.00 0.29 2.05 41,600 0 
261 840.00 240.00 0.43 2.05 300 0 
262 2,760.00 300.00 0.37 2.05 1,000 0 
263 1,590.00 180.00 0.27 2.05 700 0 
264 1,980.00 240.00 0.64 2.05 700 0 
265 2,165.00 180.00 0.13 2.05 1,800 0 
266 29,428.00 162.16 0.27 2.05 30,000 0 
267 1,200.00 300.00 0.13 2.05 250 0 
268 1,176.00 288.00 0.07 2.05 400 0 
269 4,152.00 96.00 0.38 2.05 2,000 0 
270 4,140.00 220.00 0.13 2.05 3,600 0 
271 7,256.00 432.00 0.10 2.05 0 2,000 
272 1,650.00 200.00 0.19 2.05 500 0 
273 1,300.00 300.00 0.05 2.05 700 0 
274 1,580.00 360.00 0.10 2.05 0 70 
275 685.00 480.00 0.05 2.05 624 0 
276 886.00 168.00 0.46 2.05 208 0 
277 1,137.00 300.00 0.14 2.05 160 200 
278 6,800.00 200.00 0.50 2.05 4,000 0 
279 1,080.00 240.00 0.13 2.05 1,500 0 
280 1,429.00 240.00 0.55 2.05 150 150 
281 3,220.00 165.00 0.79 2.05 1,000 0 
282 712.00 312.00 0.13 2.05 0 250 
283 1,405.00 240.00 0.33 2.05 0 500 
284 1,570.00 240.00 0.78 2.05 0 300 
285 1,450.00 300.00 0.76 2.05 350 0 
286 2,708.00 264.00 0.33 2.05 600 0 
287 6,954.00 48.00 0.42 2.05 3,000 0 
288 10,048.00 216.00 0.31 2.05 8,000 0 
289 625.00 300.00 0.13 2.05 300 0 
290 2,084.00 216.00 0.38 2.05 550 100 
291 6,212.00 108.00 0.04 2.05 0 4,000 
292 7,450.00 300.00 0.02 2.05 12,000 0 
293 1,966.00 116.57 0.29 2.05 400 360 
294 1,125.00 300.00 0.33 2.05 416 0 
295 3,588.00 255.43 0.22 2.05 0 1,000 
296 800.00 360.00 0.24 2.05 400 0 
297 2,180.00 240.00 0.15 2.05 500 0 
298 910.00 180.00 0.33 2.05 350 0 
299 5,464.00 190.29 0.88 2.05 1,000 0 
300 1,320.00 240.00 0.17 2.05 600 0 
301 2,240.00 300.00 0.20 2.05 500 312 
302 4,890.00 267.27 0.17 2.05 800 1,400 
303 1,780.00 360.00 0.12 2.05 6 0 
304 23,625.00 258.00 0.19 2.05 4,966 8,870 
305 1,639.00 240.00 0.34 2.05 300 200 
306 10,340.00 234.00 0.67 2.05 4,000 0 
307 3,560.00 240.00 0.74 2.05 0 360 
308 7,170.00 144.00 0.12 2.05 0 7,020 
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309 6,730.00 153.60 0.57 2.05 6,000 0 
310 5,968.00 150.78 0.22 2.05 0 6,000 
311 3,494.00 149.54 0.37 2.05 9,000 0 
312 5,550.00 25.00 0.18 2.05 5,000 0 
313 2,665.00 440.00 0.46 2.05 700 0 
314 794.00 192.00 0.23 2.05 200 0 
315 1,380.00 240.00 0.11 2.05 500 0 
316 594.00 144.00 0.27 2.05 160 30 
317 1,598.00 120.00 0.53 2.05 600 150 
318 642.00 192.00 0.29 2.05 400 0 
319 3,320.00 264.00 0.22 2.05 1,872 0 
320 1,305.00 200.00 0.23 2.05 1,200 0 
321 1,758.00 336.00 0.20 2.05 0 420 
322 4,778.00 216.00 1.00 2.05 1,872 0 
323 13,945.00 168.00 0.74 2.05 3,500 2,000 
324 56,980.00 310.40 0.30 2.05 1,500 17,000 
325 4,854.00 291.43 0.19 2.05 1,040 626 
326 2,610.00 200.00 0.32 2.05 1,800 0 
327 1,270.00 240.00 0.03 2.05 500 0 
328 1,074.00 312.00 0.21 2.05 400 0 
329 1,200.00 300.00 0.20 2.05 500 0 
330 715.00 180.00 0.07 2.05 250 0 
331 1,780.00 240.00 0.74 2.05 600 0 
332 1,330.00 240.00 0.49 2.05 450 0 
333 945.00 200.00 0.13 2.05 400 0 
334 2,320.00 240.00 0.36 2.05 1,402 0 
335 788.00 216.00 0.46 2.05 200 100 
336 1,335.00 108.00 1.11 2.05 0 185 
337 416.00 216.00 0.11 2.05 0 50 
338 1,012.00 216.00 0.07 2.05 425 121 
339 892.00 180.00 0.24 2.05 200 125 
340 707.00 44.00 0.42 2.05 225 175 
341 1,211.00 240.00 0.17 2.05 400 100 
342 1,574.00 192.00 2.00 2.05 400 0 
343 8,937.00 162.86 0.50 2.05 6,800 0 
344 3,800.00 150.00 0.13 2.05 3,700 0 
345 613.00 144.00 0.04 2.05 300 0 
346 1,610.00 130.00 0.12 2.05 1,300 0 
347 2,182.00 216.00 0.05 2.05 900 0 
348 6,200.00 206.25 0.09 2.05 3,500 0 
349 810.00 180.00 0.20 2.05 318 0 
350 2,782.00 216.00 0.37 2.05 1,300 0 
351 5,234.00 192.00 0.50 2.05 1,100 1,000 
352 1,626.00 288.00 0.33 2.05 500 0 
353 1,860.00 145.71 0.12 2.05 2,500 0 
354 2,262.00 192.00 0.26 2.05 1,000 0 
355 1,530.00 156.00 0.22 2.05 1,872 0 
356 6,534.00 360.00 0.26 2.05 1,200 0 
357 3,980.00 252.00 1.23 2.05 500 0 
358 2,730.00 192.00 0.13 2.05 2,000 0 
359 1,645.00 240.00 0.22 2.05 768 0 
360 2,148.00 216.00 0.33 2.05 288 0 
361 2,688.00 248.00 0.25 2.05 1,400 0 
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362 3,140.00 300.00 0.66 2.05 350 300 
363 4,261.00 240.00 0.53 2.05 560 825 
364 4,863.00 229.33 0.34 2.05 2,200 650 
365 5,243.00 204.00 0.35 2.05 3,300 0 
366 954.00 270.00 0.22 2.05 225 0 
367 2,347.00 120.00 0.31 2.05 900 0 
368 1,090.00 180.00 0.29 2.05 300 0 
369 1,094.00 240.00 0.17 2.05 600 0 
370 2,750.00 200.00 0.49 2.05 500 0 
371 2,234.00 136.80 0.35 2.05 1,500 0 
372 2,875.00 300.00 0.42 2.05 900 0 
373 2,347.00 300.00 0.25 2.05 750 0 
374 622.00 264.00 0.20 2.05 220 0 
Mean 6,082.24 245.08 0.29 2.05 4,890.71 641.57 




A.6.1. (b.) 1860 
 
 















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 1,695.00 480.00 0.74 1.81 200 50 
2 1,000.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 500 0 
3 3,130.00 360.00 0.41 1.81 300 200 
4 1,800.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 250 125 
5 1,980.00 225.00 0.24 1.81 200 150 
6 5,175.00 384.00 0.16 1.81 1,600 300 
7 804.00 336.00 0.09 1.81 150 150 
8 8,200.00 300.00 1.25 1.81 1,800 0 
9 1,424.00 408.00 0.12 1.81 430 180 
10 1,190.00 300.00 0.19 1.81 150 50 
11 4,580.00 396.00 0.29 1.81 400 500 
12 860.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 100 40 
13 1,330.00 240.00 0.48 1.81 250 100 
14 2,012.00 130.29 0.31 1.81 1,000 0 
15 12,120.00 266.09 0.20 1.81 15,000 0 
16 8,394.00 270.00 0.44 1.81 8,216 0 
17 2,062.00 210.00 0.10 1.81 1,248 0 
18 6,218.00 252.00 0.07 1.81 2,080 520 
19 770.00 360.00 0.13 1.81 208 50 
20 3,360.00 288.00 0.32 1.81 2,500 0 
21 1,448.00 360.00 0.06 1.81 805 0 
22 3,800.00 300.00 0.09 1.81 0 1,000 
23 2,420.00 240.00 0.25 1.81 100 500 
24 1,024.00 252.00 0.22 1.81 500 100 
25 2,360.00 300.00 0.06 1.81 1,000 400 
26 2,400.00 300.00 0.11 1.81 600 250 
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27 2,410.00 300.00 0.41 1.81 350 360 
28 14,360.00 258.46 0.29 1.81 3,360 1,600 
29 980.00 240.00 0.25 1.81 200 60 
30 3,670.00 300.00 0.21 1.81 200 400 
31 4,360.00 300.00 0.25 1.81 600 0 
32 8,175.00 300.00 0.83 1.81 3,500 0 
33 1,230.00 300.00 0.46 1.81 72 108 
34 7,460.00 360.00 0.33 1.81 500 365 
35 790.00 240.00 0.29 1.81 300 0 
36 3,200.00 300.00 0.66 1.81 250 200 
37 1,160.00 360.00 0.71 1.81 0 100 
38 12,200.00 420.00 0.25 1.81 2,000 0 
39 4,460.00 360.00 0.22 1.81 180 480 
40 1,720.00 240.00 0.14 1.81 919 0 
41 1,300.00 300.00 0.45 1.81 400 0 
42 1,820.00 360.00 0.24 1.81 100 150 
43 719.00 300.00 0.28 1.81 200 30 
44 1,227.00 240.00 0.20 1.81 280 0 
45 8,000.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 2,000 0 
46 3,190.00 300.00 0.86 1.81 150 200 
47 1,696.00 264.00 0.42 1.81 312 144 
48 4,220.00 324.00 0.42 1.81 800 500 
49 1,456.00 168.00 0.28 1.81 260 150 
50 929.00 192.00 0.63 1.81 300 0 
51 2,575.00 300.00 0.15 1.81 125 125 
52 762.00 240.00 0.02 1.81 200 50 
53 1,200.00 300.00 0.27 1.81 500 100 
54 2,420.00 240.00 0.07 1.81 0 600 
55 1,793.00 240.00 0.56 1.81 150 208 
56 2,472.00 300.00 0.38 1.81 150 520 
57 1,040.00 240.00 0.20 1.81 100 150 
58 1,540.00 180.00 0.14 1.81 0 100 
59 11,590.00 360.00 0.70 1.81 600 130 
60 1,415.00 240.00 0.33 1.81 100 300 
61 1,580.00 240.00 0.44 1.81 300 0 
62 2,645.00 360.00 0.09 1.81 200 700 
63 835.00 360.00 0.46 1.81 150 0 
64 1,795.00 240.00 0.31 1.81 150 250 
65 2,575.00 300.00 0.51 1.81 150 450 
66 950.00 300.00 0.41 1.81 75 150 
67 1,185.00 300.00 0.53 1.81 150 100 
68 4,660.00 300.00 1.24 1.81 500 250 
69 3,137.00 240.00 0.10 1.81 480 720 
70 615.00 240.00 0.40 1.81 100 75 
71 2,684.00 300.00 0.32 1.81 300 300 
72 2,100.00 300.00 0.14 1.81 300 300 
73 1,232.00 360.00 0.35 1.81 250 100 
74 3,310.00 300.00 1.33 1.81 500 0 
75 935.00 360.00 0.09 1.81 0 220 
76 3,432.00 240.00 0.52 1.81 350 400 
77 5,860.00 360.00 0.32 1.81 800 1,250 
78 3,940.00 360.00 0.18 1.81 0 1,000 
79 1,388.00 384.00 0.24 1.81 50 150 
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80 1,695.00 420.00 0.05 1.81 150 300 
81 1,018.00 216.00 0.41 1.81 100 250 
82 2,320.00 312.00 0.95 1.81 75 200 
83 550.00 120.00 0.08 1.81 0 104 
84 1,375.00 660.00 0.31 1.81 100 250 
85 3,164.00 240.00 0.51 1.81 0 800 
86 11,816.00 288.00 0.88 1.81 300 2,000 
87 2,140.00 300.00 0.67 1.81 150 150 
88 800.00 360.00 0.24 1.81 200 68 
89 2,450.00 300.00 0.59 1.81 400 200 
90 1,525.00 300.00 0.33 1.81 300 200 
91 1,025.00 300.00 0.44 1.81 75 175 
92 1,092.00 336.00 0.08 1.81 200 150 
93 4,700.00 375.00 0.50 1.81 500 500 
94 3,300.00 300.00 0.29 1.81 1,000 150 
95 3,030.00 360.00 0.28 1.81 600 250 
96 9,272.00 384.00 0.34 1.81 700 700 
97 1,470.00 300.00 0.23 1.81 250 200 
98 2,780.00 360.00 0.17 1.81 1,000 0 
99 2,590.00 272.00 0.17 1.81 416 443 
100 1,116.00 240.00 0.59 1.81 100 100 
101 4,744.00 224.00 0.69 1.81 1,200 200 
102 1,505.00 300.00 0.40 1.81 500 0 
103 3,318.00 300.00 2.94 1.81 200 50 
104 4,048.00 288.00 0.42 1.81 700 587 
105 2,800.00 300.00 0.20 1.81 900 0 
106 1,350.00 300.00 0.47 1.81 200 150 
107 779.00 252.00 0.19 1.81 110 105 
108 1,450.00 200.00 0.32 1.81 125 200 
109 1,140.00 300.00 0.22 1.81 600 0 
110 2,199.00 480.00 0.38 1.81 500 200 
111 1,906.00 360.00 0.38 1.81 400 150 
112 2,860.00 300.00 0.14 1.81 200 400 
113 4,914.00 267.43 0.77 1.81 400 400 
114 2,762.00 312.00 0.28 1.81 600 350 
115 6,986.00 336.00 0.57 1.81 1,000 1,000 
116 1,906.00 330.00 0.17 1.81 300 350 
117 804.00 204.00 0.15 1.81 160 150 
118 670.00 240.00 0.07 1.81 75 300 
119 896.00 240.00 0.73 1.81 100 100 
120 1,716.00 43.20 0.22 1.81 300 500 
121 1,013.00 90.00 0.36 1.81 300 150 
122 1,682.00 180.00 0.88 1.81 300 150 
123 1,204.00 168.00 0.13 1.81 500 0 
124 1,176.00 264.00 0.40 1.81 50 128 
125 1,432.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 350 0 
126 1,505.00 300.00 0.44 1.81 500 0 
127 991.00 384.00 0.37 1.81 100 100 
128 6,117.00 318.86 0.32 1.81 700 600 
129 10,800.00 300.00 0.50 1.81 3,300 1,100 
130 900.00 120.00 0.40 1.81 150 125 
131 6,539.00 537.60 0.05 1.81 1,000 2,500 
132 4,579.00 336.00 0.10 1.81 800 830 
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133 821.00 216.00 0.40 1.81 50 125 
134 2,420.00 240.00 0.11 1.81 550 600 
135 1,250.00 240.00 0.23 1.81 100 208 
136 1,080.00 180.00 0.13 1.81 250 300 
137 832.00 216.00 0.17 1.81 100 158 
138 1,250.00 240.00 0.11 1.81 60 260 
139 740.00 240.00 0.52 1.81 250 70 
140 1,722.00 336.00 0.63 1.81 225 200 
141 6,758.00 214.80 0.44 1.81 1,200 570 
142 3,643.00 240.00 0.56 1.81 424 450 
143 1,955.00 240.00 0.73 1.81 350 300 
144 1,185.00 240.00 0.72 1.81 100 125 
145 4,063.00 300.00 1.37 1.81 150 416 
146 935.00 180.00 0.29 1.81 160 150 
147 940.00 240.00 0.47 1.81 100 150 
148 500.00 300.00 0.20 1.81 20 0 
149 1,840.00 240.00 1.25 1.81 200 0 
150 7,328.00 300.00 1.24 1.81 300 500 
151 4,370.00 350.00 0.13 1.81 800 0 
152 9,779.00 312.00 0.16 1.81 0 1,940 
153 1,190.00 300.00 0.31 1.81 50 100 
154 985.00 360.00 0.17 1.81 500 200 
155 11,498.00 193.71 1.90 1.81 3,000 300 
156 735.00 360.00 0.13 1.81 0 100 
157 2,270.00 284.00 0.11 1.81 300 300 
158 7,414.00 300.00 0.78 1.81 1,200 750 
159 13,924.00 232.62 0.25 1.81 18,720 0 
160 5,700.00 400.00 0.10 1.81 500 300 
161 8,784.00 225.82 0.42 1.81 3,000 1,300 
162 4,350.00 250.00 0.34 1.81 1,400 1,200 
163 1,452.00 300.00 0.06 1.81 200 400 
164 7,925.00 204.00 0.54 1.81 1,500 1,700 
165 4,096.00 429.00 0.65 1.81 500 500 
166 1,248.00 360.00 0.32 1.81 100 150 
167 21,165.00 320.00 0.10 1.81 1,000 4,000 
168 5,026.00 216.00 0.22 1.81 4,000 1,400 
169 8,297.00 117.00 0.46 1.81 6,500 800 
170 2,930.00 360.00 0.09 1.81 300 1,200 
171 7,044.00 173.14 0.12 1.81 0 5,000 
172 19,734.00 210.63 0.06 1.81 0 25,000 
173 55,740.00 190.36 0.15 1.81 0 50,000 
174 15,700.00 145.95 0.20 1.81 30,000 0 
175 61,600.00 240.00 0.14 1.81 54,000 0 
176 108,232.00 264.97 0.33 1.81 50,000 30,000 
177 17,088.00 288.00 0.16 1.81 20,200 0 
178 103,128.00 346.33 0.24 1.81 108,000 0 
179 76,330.00 355.38 0.25 1.81 0 40,000 
180 95,584.00 297.88 0.25 1.81 90,000 0 
181 800,000.00 416.67 1.00 1.81 595,000 0 
182 27,300.00 384.00 0.12 1.81 0 6,000 
183 12,705.00 285.47 0.48 1.81 0 2,496 
184 96,500.00 300.00 0.08 1.81 0 3,000 
185 2,850.00 300.00 0.10 1.81 3,000 0 
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186 69,396.00 311.32 0.11 1.81 75,000 0 
187 5,445.00 240.00 0.16 1.81 3,900 0 
188 7,510.00 216.00 0.14 1.81 8,160 0 
189 2,050.00 400.00 0.15 1.81 150 300 
190 58,450.00 150.00 0.21 1.81 72,000 0 
191 22,372.00 233.38 0.18 1.81 37,440 0 
192 24,962.00 220.80 0.01 1.81 0 18,720 
193 51,200.00 360.00 0.21 1.81 0 24,000 
194 134,250.00 300.00 0.07 1.81 0 75,000 
195 2,866.00 188.00 0.23 1.81 1,600 100 
196 3,086.00 309.00 0.09 1.81 300 1,200 
197 3,215.00 360.00 0.07 1.81 312 0 
198 299,333.00 250.00 0.27 1.81 290,000 0 
199 188,420.00 229.68 0.36 1.81 150,000 0 
200 5,852.00 250.29 0.14 1.81 7,500 500 
201 20,080.00 249.60 0.14 1.81 0 27,000 
202 17,900.00 168.00 0.06 1.81 18,000 0 
203 7,120.00 283.64 0.13 1.81 10,000 0 
204 29,468.00 259.20 0.09 1.81 77,000 0 
205 16,520.00 197.14 0.41 1.81 15,000 0 
206 4,185.00 165.00 0.50 1.81 1,500 0 
207 33,600.00 189.23 0.14 1.81 0 37,000 
208 68,500.00 223.64 0.18 1.81 0 7,600 
209 23,350.00 152.94 0.22 1.81 13,000 13,000 
210 69,200.00 315.00 0.40 1.81 70,000 0 
211 35,340.00 2,400.00 0.22 1.81 3,000 0 
212 1,660.00 280.00 0.20 1.81 600 0 
213 80,700.00 300.00 0.13 1.81 0 50,000 
214 29,560.00 251.25 0.06 1.81 90,000 0 
215 67,200.00 271.58 0.13 1.81 80,000 0 
216 15,000.00 230.77 0.30 1.81 5,200 800 
217 6,196.00 198.00 0.14 1.81 10,000 0 
218 27,400.00 300.00 0.04 1.81 0 30,000 
219 25,608.00 312.00 0.15 1.81 31,200 0 
220 206,900.00 295.71 1.16 1.81 0 48,000 
221 8,300.00 300.00 0.38 1.81 2,000 0 
222 23,600.00 274.29 0.04 1.81 20,000 0 
223 4,875.00 240.00 0.38 1.81 4,000 0 
224 5,465.00 240.00 0.49 1.81 0 2,600 
225 72,174.00 291.89 0.14 1.81 73,600 0 
226 19,910.00 404.00 0.12 1.81 0 12,700 
227 3,434.00 255.00 0.08 1.81 3,700 0 
228 30,370.00 312.50 0.08 1.81 0 15,000 
229 5,384.00 192.00 0.08 1.81 6,000 0 
230 100,443.00 273.68 0.27 1.81 0 46,000 
231 800.00 300.00 0.25 1.81 800 0 
232 685.00 300.00 0.03 1.81 0 750 
233 806.00 336.00 0.02 1.81 480 0 
234 1,450.00 300.00 0.02 1.81 1,500 0 
235 14,252.00 296.00 0.26 1.81 15,500 0 
236 1,900.00 300.00 0.48 1.81 1,450 0 
237 43,500.00 200.00 0.04 1.81 0 50,000 
238 3,315.00 360.00 0.74 1.81 800 100 
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239 8,652.00 180.92 0.15 1.81 8,500 0 
240 3,452.00 288.00 0.40 1.81 1,050 0 
241 968.00 270.00 0.10 1.81 100 100 
242 2,623.00 240.00 0.95 1.81 150 150 
243 3,755.00 165.00 0.04 1.81 2,744 0 
244 3,086.00 174.00 1.16 1.81 400 150 
245 1,975.00 240.00 0.31 1.81 1,400 0 
246 8,960.00 384.00 0.25 1.81 700 857 
247 4,040.00 288.00 0.50 1.81 0 450 
248 26,040.00 315.43 0.20 1.81 5,700 1,600 
249 836.00 336.00 0.22 1.81 200 700 
250 655.00 180.00 0.57 1.81 75 75 
251 1,775.00 300.00 0.25 1.81 400 220 
252 1,486.00 318.00 0.03 1.81 364 0 
253 1,880.00 260.00 0.17 1.81 400 0 
254 2,060.00 320.00 0.20 1.81 200 0 
255 2,666.00 211.20 0.50 1.81 100 360 
256 660.00 300.00 0.07 1.81 150 100 
257 1,069.00 312.00 0.23 1.81 100 300 
258 1,000.00 288.00 0.82 1.81 0 104 
259 5,404.00 288.00 0.55 1.81 312 728 
260 1,685.00 300.00 0.51 1.81 50 300 
261 3,744.00 126.00 0.40 1.81 600 1,100 
262 1,235.00 240.00 0.06 1.81 500 600 
263 722.00 432.00 0.14 1.81 40 40 
264 1,062.00 240.00 0.05 1.81 200 200 
265 16,700.00 288.00 0.18 1.81 2,600 0 
266 2,650.00 300.00 0.22 1.81 100 300 
267 1,178.00 360.00 0.29 1.81 20 100 
268 3,807.00 274.29 0.36 1.81 75 450 
269 709.00 384.00 0.06 1.81 192 0 
270 2,196.00 237.00 0.18 1.81 100 600 
271 3,750.00 42.86 0.12 1.81 0 1,714 
272 7,220.00 360.00 2.20 1.81 312 200 
273 1,680.00 240.00 0.13 1.81 250 250 
274 1,210.00 240.00 0.19 1.81 250 200 
275 3,254.00 240.00 0.59 1.81 250 400 
276 2,375.00 360.00 0.72 1.81 60 275 
277 3,475.00 300.00 1.29 1.81 100 200 
278 3,160.00 300.00 0.27 1.81 300 700 
279 2,662.00 300.00 0.29 1.81 400 625 
280 813.00 156.00 0.06 1.81 100 330 
281 993.00 312.00 0.83 1.81 100 100 
282 1,470.00 300.00 0.32 1.81 300 100 
283 2,480.00 360.00 0.61 1.81 200 350 
284 1,128.00 312.00 0.52 1.81 709 160 
285 1,400.00 200.00 0.04 1.81 260 540 
286 2,435.00 180.00 0.59 1.81 300 200 
287 1,310.00 180.00 0.13 1.81 300 300 
288 5,256.00 256.00 0.84 1.81 1,200 225 
289 4,895.00 270.00 0.43 1.81 1,092 312 
290 1,568.00 384.00 0.15 1.81 300 650 
291 1,018.00 240.00 0.12 1.81 500 0 
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292 2,400.00 200.00 0.23 1.81 500 260 
293 1,555.00 300.00 0.40 1.81 500 170 
294 8,464.00 240.00 0.78 1.81 600 650 
295 2,104.00 144.00 0.18 1.81 250 400 
296 12,278.00 334.00 0.27 1.81 5,000 2,000 
297 1,184.00 192.00 0.64 1.81 200 0 
298 2,261.00 312.00 0.09 1.81 600 525 
299 1,537.00 240.00 0.58 1.81 129 139 
300 1,400.00 360.00 0.28 1.81 300 200 
301 1,990.00 420.00 0.34 1.81 300 200 
302 1,205.00 360.00 0.16 1.81 0 200 
303 5,520.00 240.00 1.04 1.81 250 600 
304 782.00 240.00 0.64 1.81 75 100 
305 970.00 300.00 0.11 1.81 80 80 
306 2,406.00 384.00 0.64 1.81 0 268 
307 1,457.00 240.00 0.42 1.81 112 200 
308 1,975.00 168.00 0.39 1.81 200 300 
309 1,814.00 312.00 0.46 1.81 250 200 
310 11,284.00 312.00 0.52 1.81 300 1,400 
311 5,880.00 288.00 0.11 1.81 1,872 0 
312 2,430.00 384.00 0.05 1.81 0 480 
313 854.00 480.00 0.13 1.81 0 156 
314 1,147.00 300.00 0.43 1.81 100 100 
315 2,184.00 288.00 0.31 1.81 150 468 
316 938.00 288.00 0.17 1.81 20 300 
317 2,927.00 288.00 0.10 1.81 300 400 
318 1,330.00 240.00 0.20 1.81 700 0 
319 3,807.00 274.29 0.38 1.81 75 450 
320 1,030.00 480.00 0.09 1.81 0 150 
321 1,185.00 480.00 0.25 1.81 100 0 
322 4,630.00 180.00 0.53 1.81 600 400 
323 4,600.00 300.00 0.19 1.81 5,000 0 
324 2,014.00 300.00 0.41 1.81 300 350 
325 2,620.00 240.00 0.17 1.81 936 400 
326 1,783.00 300.00 0.27 1.81 0 350 
327 962.00 156.00 0.30 1.81 400 0 
328 2,600.00 200.00 0.93 1.81 400 225 
329 3,430.00 288.00 0.98 1.81 600 150 
330 4,162.00 320.00 0.45 1.81 830 420 
331 4,720.00 330.00 0.22 1.81 450 800 
332 1,485.00 300.00 0.13 1.81 200 400 
333 6,330.00 264.00 0.02 1.81 1,080 5,160 
334 2,200.00 150.00 0.60 1.81 200 300 
335 1,670.00 360.00 0.09 1.81 500 0 
336 1,392.00 156.00 0.24 1.81 200 350 
337 2,170.00 200.00 0.87 1.81 200 200 
338 2,963.00 255.00 0.24 1.81 416 520 
339 1,970.00 240.00 0.35 1.81 250 520 
340 717.00 300.00 0.14 1.81 100 70 
341 1,268.00 300.00 0.15 1.81 0 180 
342 1,240.00 120.00 0.50 1.81 250 0 
343 1,225.00 300.00 0.14 1.81 200 200 
344 1,796.00 300.00 0.06 1.81 500 300 
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345 10,650.00 300.00 0.33 1.81 2,000 1,000 
346 1,280.00 240.00 0.26 1.81 250 300 
347 1,130.00 240.00 0.13 1.81 50 225 
348 1,396.00 288.00 0.22 1.81 300 250 
349 1,090.00 300.00 0.45 1.81 200 200 
350 2,268.00 240.00 0.55 1.81 750 150 
351 6,900.00 300.00 1.33 1.81 600 0 
352 850.00 360.00 0.36 1.81 200 60 
353 1,870.00 240.00 0.33 1.81 850 0 
354 1,696.00 139.20 0.14 1.81 1,800 0 
355 1,085.00 300.00 0.08 1.81 400 300 
356 1,271.00 120.00 0.89 1.81 300 75 
357 5,400.00 300.00 0.20 1.81 0 1,000 
358 777.00 312.00 0.20 1.81 100 100 
359 1,476.00 300.00 0.24 1.81 250 100 
360 1,430.00 240.00 0.21 1.81 300 150 
361 850.00 300.00 0.27 1.81 0 75 
362 1,150.00 300.00 0.40 1.81 270 50 
363 2,138.00 360.00 0.15 1.81 260 360 
364 16,960.00 312.00 0.03 1.81 20,000 0 
365 2,520.00 240.00 0.13 1.81 200 350 
366 1,065.00 240.00 0.29 1.81 600 100 
367 21,290.00 300.00 1.44 1.81 2,500 2,020 
368 1,194.00 240.00 0.43 1.81 400 0 
369 1,097.00 432.00 0.30 1.81 80 150 
370 1,870.00 240.00 0.24 1.81 450 150 
371 4,668.00 240.00 0.36 1.81 642 546 
372 1,268.00 240.00 0.13 1.81 300 150 
373 820.00 360.00 0.13 1.81 600 0 
374 1,145.00 240.00 0.19 1.81 400 100 
375 996.00 168.00 0.36 1.81 600 75 
376 1,250.00 240.00 0.62 1.81 500 0 
377 4,800.00 300.00 0.67 1.81 1,000 0 
378 2,500.00 300.00 0.38 1.81 650 0 
379 8,280.00 468.00 0.05 1.81 300 2,870 
380 1,432.00 216.00 0.53 1.81 200 150 
381 1,416.00 288.00 0.40 1.81 300 60 
382 1,166.00 240.00 0.48 1.81 250 100 
383 1,620.00 120.00 0.29 1.81 600 300 
384 866.00 300.00 0.12 1.81 100 150 
385 1,730.00 300.00 0.10 1.81 280 260 
386 1,591.00 288.00 0.19 1.81 500 350 
387 1,530.00 240.00 0.30 1.81 500 150 
388 1,455.00 300.00 0.43 1.81 300 225 
389 1,696.00 139.20 0.30 1.81 1,200 0 
390 2,051.00 150.00 0.36 1.81 600 100 
391 662.00 360.00 0.07 1.81 300 75 
392 1,420.00 210.00 0.71 1.81 50 150 
393 1,100.00 240.00 0.37 1.81 82 60 
394 543.00 240.00 0.38 1.81 65 7 
395 1,332.00 150.00 0.74 1.81 150 100 
396 4,080.00 216.00 0.67 1.81 1,000 300 
397 1,533.00 300.00 0.18 1.81 300 300 
  
342
398 1,540.00 180.00 0.63 1.81 200 80 
399 1,614.00 123.00 0.15 1.81 625 160 
400 1,982.00 240.00 0.68 1.81 300 100 
401 10,306.00 120.00 4.48 1.81 192 150 
402 1,150.00 210.00 0.43 1.81 218 110 
403 8,670.00 220.00 0.20 1.81 3,500 1,200 
404 40,072.00 259.16 0.48 1.81 26,000 1,500 
405 3,277.00 300.00 0.18 1.81 500 500 
406 1,210.00 240.00 0.19 1.81 200 104 
407 3,850.00 360.00 0.07 1.81 1,700 600 
408 650.00 240.00 0.18 1.81 150 50 
409 2,363.00 256.00 0.12 1.81 625 225 
410 914.00 144.00 0.17 1.81 400 12 
411 17,828.00 300.00 0.20 1.81 5,600 0 
412 4,660.00 320.00 0.42 1.81 1,200 0 
413 11,044.00 255.53 0.42 1.81 0 600 
414 4,655.00 228.00 0.25 1.81 600 600 
415 1,260.00 360.00 0.30 1.81 550 0 
416 6,124.00 304.00 0.28 1.81 0 1,100 
417 875.00 300.00 0.28 1.81 0 200 
418 1,113.00 288.00 0.63 1.81 700 0 
419 23,244.00 305.14 0.31 1.81 21,000 0 
420 1,665.00 300.00 0.47 1.81 150 150 
421 1,259.00 420.00 0.34 1.81 624 0 
422 3,100.00 300.00 0.35 1.81 0 630 
423 2,689.00 288.00 0.10 1.81 900 300 
424 5,150.00 360.00 0.38 1.81 0 850 
425 13,500.00 360.00 0.07 1.81 0 2,000 
426 1,780.00 280.00 0.10 1.81 50 300 
427 1,193.00 264.00 0.16 1.81 150 130 
428 1,240.00 300.00 0.20 1.81 0 120 
429 2,099.00 312.00 0.20 1.81 600 450 
430 4,023.00 201.60 0.25 1.81 800 600 
431 621.00 324.00 0.17 1.81 50 50 
432 3,620.00 360.00 0.26 1.81 1,000 600 
433 1,507.00 144.00 0.06 1.81 1,000 50 
434 4,935.00 200.00 0.13 1.81 5,000 250 
435 978.00 120.00 0.47 1.81 450 0 
436 1,595.00 360.00 0.21 1.81 150 300 
437 3,940.00 360.00 0.75 1.81 0 1,200 
438 1,380.00 660.00 0.40 1.81 0 100 
439 4,750.00 900.00 1.00 1.81 0 200 
440 991.00 600.00 0.09 1.81 12 75 
441 1,820.00 900.00 0.40 1.81 0 150 
442 2,220.00 720.00 0.08 1.81 0 240 
Mean 10,703.62 288.78 0.36 1.81 5,582.11 1,692.87 




























n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 6,116.00 999.00 0.05 2.93 300 125 
2 1,680.00 266.67 0.17 2.93 125 200 
3 5,200.00 360.00 0.16 2.93 200 425 
4 1,590.00 125.00 0.35 2.93 100 50 
5 7,475.00 500.00 1.33 2.93 80 250 
6 447.00 100.00 0.06 2.93 40 0 
7 1,080.00 150.00 0.08 2.93 80 100 
8 1,125.00 150.00 0.07 2.93 200 150 
9 1,120.00 300.00 0.14 2.93 75 20 
10 1,414.00 200.00 0.05 2.93 80 200 
11 1,150.00 200.00 0.19 2.93 150 90 
12 1,704.00 600.00 0.45 2.93 0 144 
13 730.00 100.00 0.20 2.93 25 130 
14 1,300.00 450.00 0.34 2.93 50 100 
15 2,875.00 500.00 0.31 2.93 100 500 
16 950.00 200.00 0.11 2.93 35 200 
17 1,340.00 50.00 0.80 2.93 25 100 
18 5,080.00 400.00 0.13 2.93 200 520 
19 745.00 300.00 0.33 2.93 25 100 
20 1,215.00 200.00 0.47 2.93 25 100 
21 13,687.00 600.00 0.73 2.93 500 1,000 
22 1,368.00 250.00 0.20 2.93 100 200 
23 7,022.00 666.00 0.14 2.93 100 328 
24 1,597.00 225.00 0.20 2.93 50 200 
25 350.00 17.50 0.10 2.93 36 36 
26 3,325.00 250.00 0.80 2.93 200 250 
27 2,370.00 200.00 0.19 2.93 50 400 
28 1,264.00 600.00 0.63 2.93 11 75 
29 825.00 150.00 0.06 2.93 25 350 
30 5,267.00 600.00 0.16 2.93 50 700 
31 5,700.00 400.00 1.00 2.93 500 0 
32 2,956.00 112.50 0.14 2.93 150 10 
33 5,340.00 500.00 0.10 2.93 300 400 
34 1,446.00 100.00 1.12 2.93 25 100 
35 6,565.00 175.00 1.16 2.93 100 250 
36 1,400.00 66.67 0.35 2.93 100 100 
37 3,650.00 300.00 0.05 2.93 0 416 
38 7,723.00 750.00 0.38 2.93 280 450 
39 520.00 110.00 0.26 2.93 150 100 
40 1,155.00 275.00 0.59 2.93 25 75 
41 1,105.00 100.00 0.26 2.93 90 120 
42 1,208.00 200.00 0.08 2.93 52 208 
43 30,000.00 90.91 0.17 2.93 2,000 5,000 
44 1,340.00 312.00 0.07 2.93 311 107 
  
344
45 8,794.00 200.00 0.41 2.93 350 1,050 
46 4,400.00 266.67 0.70 2.93 150 1,100 
47 2,325.00 200.00 0.09 2.93 390 0 
48 2,750.00 266.67 0.48 2.93 133 300 
49 844.00 125.00 0.30 2.93 0 200 
50 7,204.00 520.00 0.31 2.93 520 520 
51 1,470.00 450.00 0.13 2.93 30 200 
52 1,540.00 250.00 0.21 2.93 125 100 
53 2,450.00 300.00 0.42 2.93 100 250 
54 12,634.00 1,000.00 0.47 2.93 178 220 
55 3,370.00 450.00 0.10 2.93 250 485 
56 1,217.00 200.00 0.08 2.93 52 208 
57 1,775.00 600.00 0.13 2.93 200 200 
58 4,000.00 171.43 0.11 2.93 3,000 0 
59 1,048.00 50.00 0.21 2.93 50 170 
60 8,274.00 625.00 0.81 2.93 200 400 
61 1,647.00 378.50 0.09 2.93 19 150 
62 4,550.00 333.33 0.43 2.93 150 500 
63 2,628.00 333.33 0.34 2.93 100 350 
64 2,150.00 500.00 0.34 2.93 20 70 
65 1,580.00 300.00 0.07 2.93 100 313 
66 1,922.00 33.33 0.10 2.93 12 280 
67 2,200.00 166.67 0.09 2.93 40 300 
68 9,200.00 360.00 0.81 2.93 100 900 
69 919.00 364.00 0.08 2.93 75 100 
70 2,206.00 200.00 0.57 2.93 25 250 
71 670.00 50.00 0.33 2.93 30 150 
72 4,000.00 200.00 0.72 2.93 0 500 
73 924.00 400.00 0.19 2.93 0 75 
74 681.00 20.00 0.34 2.93 180 75 
75 2,009.00 25.00 0.99 2.93 120 72 
76 2,428.00 200.00 0.43 2.93 100 312 
77 2,402.00 175.00 0.48 2.93 200 300 
78 4,200.00 200.00 0.53 2.93 0 500 
79 4,600.00 333.33 0.56 2.93 250 250 
80 865.00 66.67 0.18 2.93 75 100 
81 1,480.00 150.00 0.19 2.93 200 300 
82 17,960.00 565.71 0.39 2.93 500 1,500 
83 5,724.00 416.00 0.20 2.93 350 626 
84 50,000.00 224.00 0.24 2.93 30,000 0 
85 23,000.00 433.33 0.23 2.93 1,700 5,000 
86 130,000.00 681.82 0.08 2.93 318,800 0 
87 16,300.00 583.33 0.02 2.93 12,000 0 
88 31,720.00 500.00 0.13 2.93 25,500 0 
89 59,400.00 2,416.67 0.30 2.93 48,000 0 
90 37,000.00 625.00 0.23 2.93 4,000 11,000 
91 117,300.00 600.00 0.18 2.93 72,000 0 
92 61,900.00 438.60 0.18 2.93 38,000 0 
93 43,700.00 488.89 0.19 2.93 30,000 0 
94 7,825.00 123.08 0.42 2.93 4,000 0 
95 4,590.00 625.00 0.15 2.93 3,000 0 
96 13,579.00 676.00 0.22 2.93 150 108 
97 334,300.00 511.11 0.12 2.93 215,000 0 
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98 105,636.00 339.62 0.24 2.93 0 26,400 
99 274,200.00 387.10 0.29 2.93 185,000 0 
100 54,500.00 204.55 0.22 2.93 22,500 0 
101 438.00 50.00 0.27 2.93 13 20 
102 9,505.00 266.67 0.30 2.93 1,200 200 
103 14,240.00 250.00 0.08 2.93 18,000 0 
104 63,350.00 952.38 0.25 2.93 42,000 0 
105 35,000.00 769.23 0.22 2.93 20,000 0 
106 97,000.00 500.00 0.17 2.93 51,000 0 
107 28,000.00 625.00 0.16 2.93 18,000 0 
108 125,000.00 444.44 0.12 2.93 120,000 0 
109 14,000.00 300.00 0.10 2.93 57,000 0 
110 34,267.00 425.00 0.33 2.93 20,000 0 
111 4,800.00 280.00 0.10 2.93 5,000 0 
112 22,560.00 276.92 0.25 2.93 0 4,800 
113 6,700.00 500.00 0.15 2.93 3,000 0 
114 6,720.00 310.67 0.02 2.93 5,616 0 
115 680.00 200.00 0.14 2.93 0 100 
116 3,800.00 900.00 0.15 2.93 100 300 
117 2,329.00 300.00 1.24 2.93 50 56 
118 65,260.00 714.29 0.38 2.93 0 30,000 
119 4,570.00 366.67 0.27 2.93 300 600 
120 9,692.00 250.00 0.20 2.93 0 1,200 
121 650.00 300.00 0.10 2.93 125 0 
122 7,520.00 500.00 1.20 2.93 0 520 
123 8,550.00 416.67 0.79 2.93 208 600 
124 1,262.00 362.00 0.11 2.93 0 200 
125 1,151.00 150.00 0.25 2.93 12 153 
126 2,538.00 200.00 1.40 2.93 125 100 
127 2,530.00 424.00 0.16 2.93 104 260 
128 3,500.00 380.00 0.17 2.93 650 0 
129 705.00 50.00 0.69 2.93 80 80 
130 846.00 300.00 0.45 2.93 103 0 
131 11,420.00 480.00 0.39 2.93 1,500 800 
132 2,250.00 400.00 0.37 2.93 500 250 
133 3,460.00 550.00 0.54 2.93 60 360 
134 1,830.00 400.00 0.20 2.93 50 200 
135 6,550.00 500.00 0.15 2.93 25 430 
136 62,000.00 652.17 0.21 2.93 33,000 8,000 
137 21,000.00 1,000.00 0.30 2.93 5,750 2,800 
138 1,450.00 350.00 0.33 2.93 200 0 
139 1,600.00 400.00 0.77 2.93 50 75 
140 1,042.00 500.00 0.19 2.93 32 150 
141 650.00 300.00 0.10 2.93 125 0 
142 2,100.00 300.00 0.06 2.93 200 260 
143 3,590.00 475.00 0.27 2.93 60 250 
144 1,080.00 200.00 0.10 2.93 240 0 
145 8,500.00 900.00 0.05 2.93 800 1,000 
146 950.00 350.00 0.06 2.93 150 0 
147 1,510.00 500.00 0.67 2.93 90 150 
148 5,800.00 333.33 0.98 2.93 30 500 
149 3,400.00 333.33 0.33 2.93 0 200 
150 1,276.00 400.00 0.30 2.93 0 100 
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151 2,910.00 400.00 0.12 2.93 50 400 
152 1,172.00 250.00 0.46 2.93 50 100 
153 1,834.00 200.00 0.68 2.93 70 100 
154 788.00 130.00 0.26 2.93 15 80 
155 892.00 25.00 0.08 2.93 125 180 
156 805.00 5.00 0.83 2.93 75 20 
157 2,009.00 250.00 0.63 2.93 200 100 
158 1,800.00 400.00 0.06 2.93 100 125 
159 2,082.00 300.00 0.72 2.93 150 100 
160 666.00 25.00 0.21 2.93 30 100 
161 700.00 20.00 0.12 2.93 150 150 
162 1,203.00 400.00 0.12 2.93 50 120 
163 1,918.00 416.00 0.55 2.93 208 0 
164 4,385.00 676.00 0.52 2.93 0 260 
165 3,772.00 800.00 1.79 2.93 0 140 
166 28,500.00 666.67 0.23 2.93 10,000 0 
167 2,000.00 300.00 0.36 2.93 0 190 
168 1,580.00 500.00 0.39 2.93 20 80 
169 1,910.00 180.00 0.51 2.93 50 175 
170 730.00 100.00 0.50 2.93 30 50 
171 2,350.00 300.00 0.41 2.93 0 300 
172 1,060.00 250.00 0.23 2.93 75 100 
173 1,616.00 416.00 0.50 2.93 150 100 
174 1,025.00 300.00 0.55 2.93 45 80 
175 555.00 37.50 0.09 2.93 25 200 
176 1,170.00 150.00 0.24 2.93 0 110 
177 2,500.00 300.00 0.21 2.93 0 350 
178 3,190.00 500.00 0.14 2.93 0 864 
Mean 13,771.08 358.93 0.34 2.93 8,103.15 727.81 




















Quantity of  
Boots (prs.) 
n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1  2,300.00  300.00  0.16   2.85  1,412   451  
2  2,120.00  120.00  1.76   2.85   490   156  
3 885.00  225.00  1.19   2.85   242  77  
4 92.00   12.00  0.03   2.85   314   100  
5  1,400.00  250.00  0.18   2.85  1,288   411  
6 750.00  100.00  0.21   2.85   692   221  
7  2,150.00  150.00  1.88   2.85   461   147  
8 700.00  300.00  0.11   2.85   519   166  
9 845.00  310.00  0.18   2.85   576   184  
10 950.00   25.00  0.43   2.85   536   171  
11 775.00  100.00  0.32   2.85   403   129  
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12 625.00  175.00  0.27   2.85   317   101  
13 950.00   75.00  0.62   2.85   375   120  
14 700.00  400.00  0.20   2.85   582   186  
15  2,425.00  225.00  0.78   2.85  1,037   331  
16  1,000.00  200.00  0.40   2.85   576   184  
17  2,900.00  200.00  1.67   2.85   692   221  
18 78,800.00  333.33  0.39   2.85   36,593  11,678  
19  1,000.00  200.00  0.20   2.85   864   276  
20  7,150.00  450.00  0.03   2.85  4,437  1,416  
21  4,400.00  150.00  0.08   2.85  2,881   920  
22 350.00  100.00  0.24   2.85   360   115  
23  3,600.00  500.00  0.50   2.85  2,305   736  
24  1,012.00   72.00  0.08   2.85   726   232  
25  3,210.00  520.00  0.05   2.85  2,161   690  
26 910.00  110.00  0.11   2.85   519   166  
27 453.00  128.00  0.03   2.85   576   184  
28  4,132.00  533.33  0.28   2.85  2,081   664  
29  1,750.00  350.00  0.31   2.85   922   294  
30 14,500.00  300.00  0.60   2.85  5,763  1,839  
31  1,192.00  248.00  0.02   2.85  1,556   497  
32 912.00  312.00  0.31   2.85   562   179  
33  2,520.00  520.00  0.32   2.85  1,441   460  
34  2,100.00  360.00  0.27   2.85  1,268   405  
35  1,426.00  626.00  0.23   2.85   749   239  
36  1,700.00  350.00  0.20   2.85  1,153   368  
37  1,700.00  350.00  0.20   2.85  1,153   368  
38 750.00  300.00  0.09   2.85   634   202  
39  2,350.00  450.00  0.17   2.85   864   276  
40 740.00   37.50  0.05   2.85   802   256  
41  1,950.00  200.00  0.19   2.85  1,052   336  
42 850.00  150.00  0.45   2.85   634   202  
43  3,100.00  300.00  0.27   2.85  2,161   690  
44  2,874.00  396.00  0.06   2.85  2,888   922  
45  1,300.00  150.00  0.36   2.85   807   257  
46 605.00   50.00  0.16   2.85   461   147  
47  5,300.00  320.00  0.25   2.85  3,515  1,122  
48 299.00   0.33  0.35   2.85   164  52  
49 365.00  100.00  0.15   2.85   389   124  
50  1,428.00  250.00  0.12   2.85   936   299  
51 430.00   35.00  0.05   2.85   300  96  
52  2,550.00  375.00  0.39   2.85  1,335   426  
53 750.00   25.00  1.00   2.85   288  92  
54  1,250.00  250.00  0.37   2.85   778   248  
55  3,000.00  400.00  0.11   2.85  2,556   816  
56 900.00  400.00  0.08   2.85  1,383   441  
57  4,750.00  250.00  0.33   2.85  3,458  1,103  
58 700.00  150.00  0.35   2.85   490   156  
59 500.00  125.00  0.10   2.85   864   276  
60 525.00  150.00  0.17   2.85   429   137  
61 900.00  100.00  0.24   2.85   706   225  
62  1,084.00   50.00  0.24   2.85   836   267  
63 900.00  200.00  0.20   2.85   576   184  
64  2,300.00  500.00  0.12   2.85  1,498   478  
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65  5,150.00  375.00  0.53   2.85  2,161   690  
66  1,154.00   0.33  1.03   2.85   447   143  
67 310.00  150.00  0.01   2.85   403   129  
68 632.00  125.00  0.03   2.85   447   143  
69 431.00  160.00  0.05   2.85   369   118  
70 600.00  100.00  0.24   2.85   490   156  
71 374.00   0.33  0.20   2.85   363   116  
72  1,259.00  133.33  0.57   2.85   516   165  
73  1,500.00  125.00  0.06   2.85   922   294  
74 775.00   87.50  0.06   2.85   735   234  
75  5,250.00  360.00  0.08   2.85  3,227  1,030  
76 625.00  100.00  0.19   2.85   449   143  
77 350.00   50.00  0.08   2.85   357   114  
78 800.00   37.50  0.26   2.85   547   175  
79 850.00  200.00  1.08   2.85   294  94  
80 599.00   0.33  0.04   2.85   703   224  
81  1,500.00  400.00  0.18   2.85   817   261  
82  1,150.00  300.00  0.44   2.85   657   210  
83  2,000.00  300.00  0.47   2.85   980   313  
84  2,300.00  200.00  0.12   2.85  1,412   451  
85 675.00  300.00  0.12   2.85   375   120  
86  2,250.00  150.00  0.82   2.85   838   268  
87 700.00  150.00  0.11   2.85   519   166  
88 51,700.00  430.00  0.16   2.85   29,390  9,379  
89  3,000.00  533.33  0.06   2.85  1,844   589  
90 950.00  300.00  0.15   2.85   576   184  
91 30,000.00  560.00  0.20   2.85   17,288  5,517  
92  2,100.00  450.00  0.16   2.85  1,441   460  
93  1,400.00  300.00  0.29   2.85   807   257  
94  1,800.00  300.00  0.11   2.85  1,008   322  
95  1,050.00  250.00  0.30   2.85   576   184  
96  4,400.00  500.00  0.13   2.85  2,766   883  
97  2,005.00  150.00  0.13   2.85  1,369   437  
98  1,450.00  300.00  1.00   2.85   519   166  
99 600.00  300.00  0.20   2.85   288  92  
100 550.00  200.00  0.14   2.85   421   134  
101 700.00  100.00  0.11   2.85   519   166  
102  1,100.00  300.00  0.15   2.85  1,153   368  
103  6,250.00  450.00  3.33   2.85   864   276  
104  2,037.00  520.00  0.13   2.85  1,798   574  
105  1,570.00  100.00  0.05   2.85  1,694   541  
106  1,874.00  300.00  0.54   2.85   860   275  
107  2,668.00  100.00  1.24   2.85   697   223  
108  1,113.00  450.00  0.19   2.85   892   285  
109  3,339.00  313.00  0.40   2.85  1,729   552  
110  1,500.00  300.00  0.31   2.85   922   294  
111  1,805.00  233.33  0.09   2.85  1,465   468  
112  1,500.00  600.00  0.15   2.85  1,153   368  
113 191,466.00  167.53  0.42   2.85   138,443  44,182  
114 249.00   0.33  0.09   2.85   317   101  
115  1,250.00  450.00  0.25   2.85   807   257  
116  1,400.00  200.00  0.27   2.85   864   276  
117 401.00   0.33  0.07   2.85   622   199  
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118  1,275.00  208.33  0.03   2.85   864   276  
119  2,700.00  140.00  0.83   2.85  1,037   331  
120  1,014.00   0.33  0.44   2.85   659   210  
121 522.00   0.33  0.63   2.85   228  73  
122 399.00   0.33  0.20   2.85   288  92  
123 427.00   25.00  0.05   2.85   569   182  
124 599.00   0.33  0.26   2.85   553   177  
125  1,035.00  150.00  0.08   2.85  1,037   331  
126  2,100.00  200.00  0.85   2.85   818   261  
127 850.00  100.00  0.92   2.85   346   110  
128  4,450.00  337.50  0.34   2.85  2,737   874  
129  3,090.00  466.67  0.18   2.85  1,642   524  
130  1,250.00  200.00  0.50   2.85   922   294  
131  1,050.00  400.00  0.21   2.85   403   129  
132 849.00   0.33  0.16   2.85   547   175  
133 449.00   0.33  0.15   2.85   576   184  
134  1,950.00  450.00  0.56   2.85  1,037   331  
135  1,499.00   0.33  0.43   2.85   795   254  
136  5,930.00  350.00  3.33   2.85   864   276  
137 549.00   0.33  0.50   2.85   346   110  
138  5,200.00  300.00  1.96   2.85  1,173   374  
139  1,700.00  500.00  0.20   2.85  1,729   552  
140  1,100.00  500.00  0.25   2.85   692   221  
141 850.00   25.00  0.18   2.85   547   175  
142  1,000.00  200.00  0.20   2.85   864   276  
143  1,068.00  418.00  0.19   2.85   599   191  
144 680.00   40.00  0.09   2.85   634   202  
145  3,264.00  364.00  1.53   2.85   864   276  
146  3,400.00  500.00  1.67   2.85   864   276  
147  1,159.00   0.33  0.42   2.85   692   221  
148  4,000.00  500.00  0.67   2.85  1,729   552  
149  4,000.00  400.00  0.74   2.85  1,566   500  
150  1,100.00  200.00  1.27   2.85   317   101  
151  2,775.00  525.00  0.79   2.85  1,199   383  
152  1,905.00  530.00  0.17   2.85  1,112   355  
153 870.00  300.00  0.33   2.85   519   166  
154  2,728.00  390.00  0.24   2.85  2,120   676  
155  2,150.00  350.00  0.36   2.85   951   303  
156  1,150.00  225.00  0.27   2.85   634   202  
157  1,550.00  600.00  0.14   2.85  1,210   386  
158  3,200.00  500.00  0.28   2.85  2,046   653  
159  1,050.00  350.00  0.33   2.85   864   276  
160  2,800.00  550.00  0.10   2.85  1,762   562  
161 705.00  500.00  0.07   2.85   622   199  
162  1,970.00  200.00  0.55   2.85  1,049   335  
163  1,445.00  190.00  0.22   2.85   918   293  
164  1,570.00  235.00  0.65   2.85   535   171  
165  7,000.00  666.67  0.60   2.85  3,659  1,168  
166  1,420.00  780.00  0.29   2.85   634   202  
167  3,350.00  250.00  0.71   2.85  1,302   416  
168  2,700.00  200.00  2.75   2.85   461   147  
169  4,419.00  375.00  4.42   2.85   496   158  
170  2,500.00  400.00  0.06   2.85  1,786   570  
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171  1,850.00  600.00  0.09   2.85  1,297   414  
172  2,150.00  133.33  0.56   2.85  1,037   331  
173  2,811.00  316.67  0.08   2.85  1,809   577  
174  1,200.00  450.00  0.16   2.85   908   290  
175 970.00  150.00  0.09   2.85   663   211  
176  2,800.00  250.00  0.22   2.85  2,132   680  
177  2,100.00  200.00  0.20   2.85  1,441   460  
178  1,600.00  800.00  0.53   2.85   432   138  
179  6,900.00  466.67  0.94   2.85  2,449   782  
180  3,600.00  400.00  1.00   2.85  1,153   368  
181  3,600.00  400.00  1.00   2.85  1,153   368  
182  2,960.00  480.00  0.40   2.85  1,441   460  
183  1,025.00  250.00  0.34   2.85   677   216  
184  1,900.00  300.00  0.47   2.85   980   313  
185  3,600.00  300.00  1.00   2.85  1,153   368  
186  2,950.00  475.00  0.41   2.85  1,412   451  
187  1,400.00  400.00  0.42   2.85   692   221  
188  3,350.00  550.00  0.05   2.85  2,732   872  
189  5,850.00  716.67  0.24   2.85  3,025   966  
190 870.00   60.00  0.19   2.85   540   172  
191  1,124.00  324.00  0.33   2.85   864   276  
192  5,550.00  650.00  0.08   2.85  3,746  1,195  
193 505.00  400.00  0.14   2.85   300  96  
194 860.00  300.00  0.28   2.85   415   132  
195 300.00   50.00  0.14   2.85   602   192  
196 925.00  500.00  0.15   2.85   792   253  
197 748.00  468.00  0.16   2.85   541   173  
198 11,700.00  200.00  1.94   2.85  2,375   758  
199  1,385.00  350.00  0.92   2.85   498   159  
200  1,250.00  300.00  1.60   2.85   288  92  
201  1,480.00  680.00  0.20   2.85   864   276  
202  4,600.00  300.00  0.33   2.85  2,593   828  
203  4,025.00  600.00  0.62   2.85  1,671   533  
204  1,593.00  150.00  1.35   2.85   383   122  
205 84,329.00  300.76  2.23   2.85   15,535  4,958  
206  2,050.00  500.00  0.02   2.85  1,325   423  
207  1,675.00  141.67  0.24   2.85  1,210   386  
208  2,500.00  350.00  0.43   2.85  1,325   423  
209  2,600.00  500.00  1.50   2.85   692   221  
210  2,600.00  500.00  1.50   2.85   692   221  
211  2,900.00  300.00  0.47   2.85  1,236   394  
212  1,500.00  200.00  0.33   2.85   864   276  
213  1,100.00  133.33  0.33   2.85   517   165  
214  1,630.00  322.50  0.19   2.85   893   285  
215  4,730.00  626.67  0.07   2.85  4,178  1,333  
216 399.00   0.33  0.34   2.85   334   107  
217 950.00   66.67  0.17   2.85   692   221  
218  2,200.00  125.00  0.19   2.85  1,556   497  
219 490.00  250.00  0.10   2.85   346   110  
220 756.00  456.00  0.13   2.85   461   147  
221  2,600.00  233.33  0.03   2.85  2,075   662  
222 20,500.00  181.82  0.33   2.85   10,373  3,310  
223  1,062.00  312.00  0.08   2.85   720   230  
  
351
224  1,676.00  338.00  0.08   2.85  1,702   543  
225  2,050.00  375.00  0.21   2.85  1,383   441  
226 670.00  250.00  0.06   2.85   461   147  
227  2,336.00  468.00  0.12   2.85  1,865   595  
228 912.00  462.00  0.13   2.85   864   276  
229  1,750.00  450.00  0.67   2.85   864   276  
230 800.00  200.00  0.50   2.85   346   110  
231  1,514.00  432.00  0.04   2.85  1,544   493  
232 135.00   60.00  0.05   2.85   317   101  
233  1,050.00  350.00  0.25   2.85   692   221  
234 42,590.00  200.46  0.46   2.85   16,764  5,350  
235  2,220.00  350.00  0.67   2.85   864   276  
236  4,062.00  592.00  0.62   2.85  1,775   566  
237  1,625.00  325.00  0.38   2.85   922   294  
238  1,550.00  350.00  0.29   2.85  1,498   478  
239 500.00  100.00  0.43   2.85   403   129  
240  1,550.00   25.00  1.25   2.85   461   147  
241  1,525.00  675.00  0.08   2.85  1,060   338  
242  4,500.00  666.67  0.11   2.85  2,593   828  
243  2,200.00  500.00  0.07   2.85  1,614   515  
244  6,065.00  266.67  0.44   2.85  2,625   838  
245  1,300.00  450.00  0.10   2.85   836   267  
246 420.00  100.00  0.40   2.85   288  92  
247 420.00  100.00  0.40   2.85   288  92  
248  2,925.00  137.50  1.88   2.85   692   221  
249 475.00  100.00  0.09   2.85   461   147  
250  1,525.00  225.00  0.85   2.85   576   184  
251 868.00   25.00  0.72   2.85   419   134  
252  3,950.00  283.33  0.64   2.85  1,446   462  
253  4,300.00  250.00  0.20   2.85  2,305   736  
254 841.00  154.00  0.19   2.85   545   174  
255  1,875.00  300.00  0.25   2.85   922   294  
256  1,716.00  375.00  0.02   2.85  1,680   536  
257  4,250.00  525.00  0.10   2.85  2,363   754  
258  1,550.00  300.00  0.36   2.85   810   258  
259 635.00   60.00  0.17   2.85   692   221  
260  2,800.00  400.00  0.58   2.85  1,001   319  
261  2,800.00  400.00  0.58   2.85  1,001   319  
262 761.00  111.00  0.32   2.85   447   143  
263 700.00   50.00  0.15   2.85   576   184  
264  3,890.00  410.00  3.45   2.85   518   165  
265 700.00  200.00  0.27   2.85   432   138  
266  1,230.00  400.00  0.18   2.85   809   258  
267  1,028.00   40.00  0.26   2.85   677   216  
268  1,100.00  100.00  0.63   2.85   461   147  
269 955.00   0.33  0.84   2.85   416   133  
270  2,050.00  425.00  0.28   2.85  1,037   331  
271  5,150.00  466.67  0.54   2.85  1,614   515  
272  1,150.00  150.00  0.18   2.85   974   311  
273  1,150.00  150.00  0.18   2.85   974   311  
274  1,550.00  250.00  0.15   2.85   951   303  
275 813.00  300.00  0.15   2.85   792   253  
276  2,580.00  450.00  0.56   2.85  1,037   331  
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277  6,000.00  300.00  0.31   2.85  1,879   600  
278  1,130.00  300.00  0.58   2.85   496   158  
279 625.00   75.00  0.19   2.85   461   147  
280  1,300.00  200.00  0.42   2.85   692   221  
281  1,500.00  300.00  0.30   2.85   951   303  
282  2,400.00  133.33  0.50   2.85  1,154   368  
283 807.00  280.00  0.07   2.85   824   263  
284  1,270.00  520.00  0.08   2.85  1,037   331  
285  2,000.00  500.00  0.14   2.85  1,614   515  
286  1,200.00  300.00  0.50   2.85   576   184  
287  2,800.00  450.00  0.17   2.85  1,729   552  
288  1,790.00  250.00  0.34   2.85   772   246  
289  4,867.00  118.75  1.73   2.85   997   318  
290  1,500.00  100.00  0.33   2.85   692   221  
291  1,800.00  100.00  0.91   2.85   634   202  
292 126,700.00  331.03  0.12   2.85   72,034  22,989  
293  1,830.00   50.00  0.25   2.85  1,176   375  
294  1,200.00  300.00  0.25   2.85   922   294  
295  4,500.00  333.33  0.67   2.85  1,729   552  
296  4,540.00  220.00  1.20   2.85  1,441   460  
297  9,000.00  235.00  0.16   2.85  7,203  2,299  
298  1,170.00  137.50  0.48   2.85   719   230  
299 120,000.00  304.00  0.36   2.85   63,390  20,230  
300 10,900.00  266.67  0.01   2.85  8,661  2,764  
301  5,750.00  466.67  0.34   2.85  3,342  1,067  
302 30,000.00  278.57  0.22   2.85   15,559  4,966  
303  2,350.00  300.00  0.25   2.85  1,153   368  
304 14,050.00  125.00  0.25   2.85  6,915  2,207  
305  1,175.00  250.00  0.17   2.85   696   222  
306  5,000.00  250.00  0.09   2.85  3,227  1,030  
307 450.00   50.00  0.33   2.85   346   110  
308  1,285.00  400.00  0.20   2.85   591   189  
309 21,537.00  373.70  0.74   2.85  7,780  2,483  
310 12,000.00  500.00  0.78   2.85  5,186  1,655  
311 26,000.00  437.50  0.08   2.85   17,980  5,738  
312 16,970.00  282.69  0.18   2.85  9,797  3,126  
313 183,500.00  616.44  0.30   2.85   86,441  27,586  
314 96,000.00  394.74  0.06   2.85   57,742  18,428  
315 38,000.00  476.19  0.14   2.85   21,322  6,805  
316 112,000.00  114.29  0.27   2.85   53,017  16,920  
317 18,600.00  437.50  0.03   2.85   11,669  3,724  
318 58,000.00  600.00  0.09   2.85   31,695  10,115  
319 234,264.00  609.14  0.34   2.85   102,864  32,828  
320 340,000.00  347.22  0.34   2.85   170,000  54,253  
321 73,000.00  323.08  0.14   2.85   40,339  12,874  
322 170,000.00  375.00  0.17   2.85   100,847  32,184  
323 17,200.00  400.00  0.10   2.85   11,525  3,678  
324 13,214.00  190.48  0.21   2.85  6,768  2,160  
325  2,207.00  172.80  0.21   2.85  1,348   430  
326 850.00   50.00  0.20   2.85   864   276  
327  1,850.00  250.00  0.19   2.85   893   285  
328 75,000.00  750.00  0.23   2.85   37,458  11,954  
329  1,120.00  400.00  0.34   2.85   836   267  
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330 18,000.00  235.29  0.26   2.85  8,990  2,869  
331  3,010.00  150.00  0.23   2.85  1,614   515  
332 80,985.00  318.56  0.08   2.85   45,041  14,374  
333 186,600.00  520.00  0.25   2.85   92,203  29,425  
334 21,800.00  200.00  0.04   2.85   13,254  4,230  
335  1,113.00  208.00  0.10   2.85  1,153   368  
336 12,713.00  209.00  3.05   2.85  1,891   603  
337 264,088.00  462.68  0.14   2.85   146,912  46,885  
338 329,700.00  428.57  0.15   2.85   197,440  63,010  
339  6,715.00  312.50  0.19   2.85  3,602  1,149  
340 78,000.00  441.18  0.92   2.85   25,068  8,000  
341 19,270.00  288.46  0.36   2.85  9,544  3,046  
342  4,100.00  125.00  0.50   2.85  1,729   552  
343  1,805.00  166.67  0.14   2.85   936   299  
344 16,895.00  412.27  0.18   2.85  9,543  3,046  
345  6,500.00  300.00  0.72   2.85  2,409   769  
346 36,000.00  400.00  0.18   2.85   19,017  6,069  
347 58,653.00  351.09  0.11   2.85   35,530  11,339  
348 17,650.00  617.86  0.22   2.85   10,373  3,310  
349 142,915.00  378.49  0.24   2.85   72,034  22,989  
350 41,000.00  333.33  0.22   2.85   23,068  7,362  
351 118,850.00  426.92  0.31   2.85   55,322  17,655  
352 112,500.00  442.31  0.18   2.85   62,523  19,953  
353  3,050.00  107.50  0.43   2.85  1,325   423  
354  1,910.00  150.00  0.01   2.85  1,138   363  
355 944,000.00  374.03  1.00   2.85   288,136  91,954  
356  2,000.00  500.00  0.05   2.85  1,153   368  
357  2,025.00  375.00  0.22   2.85   980   313  
358  1,750.00  250.00  0.11   2.85  1,325   423  
359 430.00   70.00  0.11   2.85   303  97  
360 429.00   0.33  0.07   2.85   415   132  
361 690.00  200.00  0.05   2.85   558   178  
362 600.00  200.00  0.29   2.85   403   129  
363  5,850.00  297.14  0.01   2.85  4,034  1,287  
364 101,300.00  365.08  0.14   2.85   61,315  19,568  
365  1,150.00  500.00  0.21   2.85   692   221  
366  1,000.00  300.00  0.15   2.85   749   239  
367 650.00  200.00  0.17   2.85   692   221  
368 800.00  350.00  0.19   2.85   461   147  
369 400.00  300.00  0.10   2.85   288  92  
370 23,000.00  371.43  0.05   2.85   13,542  4,322  
371  1,375.00  375.00  0.60   2.85   576   184  
372  1,318.00  256.00  0.06   2.85   951   303  
373  1,900.00  450.00  0.18   2.85   954   304  
374  1,825.00  287.50  0.34   2.85   879   280  
375  3,100.00  350.00  1.25   2.85   922   294  
376 750.00  300.00  0.33   2.85   519   166  
377 500.00   50.00  0.25   2.85   461   147  
378  1,650.00  250.00  0.48   2.85   836   267  
379  6,600.00  120.00  1.05   2.85  2,190   699  
380 747.00  234.00  0.20   2.85   576   184  
381  1,650.00  175.00  0.28   2.85   836   267  
382  1,476.00  400.00  0.73   2.85   475   152  
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383 345.00   75.00  0.12   2.85   346   110  
384  3,925.00  450.00  1.10   2.85  1,311   418  
385  2,295.00  225.00  1.00   2.85   864   276  
386  3,800.00  433.33  0.67   2.85  1,729   552  
387  3,200.00  400.00  1.43   2.85   807   257  
388  2,300.00  100.00  0.50   2.85  1,153   368  
389  5,640.00  520.00  0.24   2.85  2,916   931  
390  1,425.00  375.00  0.67   2.85   692   221  
391  3,600.00  300.00  0.25   2.85  2,305   736  
392  4,900.00  233.33  1.03   2.85  1,671   533  
393  9,700.00  525.00  0.05   2.85  6,339  2,023  
394  7,923.00  427.00  4.75   2.85   850   271  
395  1,100.00   75.00  0.76   2.85   418   133  
396 900.00  300.00  0.15   2.85   749   239  
397  1,000.00  390.00  0.80   2.85   288  92  
398  2,450.00  216.67  0.83   2.85  1,037   331  
399  1,640.00  513.00  0.04   2.85  1,348   430  
400  1,985.00  150.00  0.92   2.85   692   221  
401  1,575.00  225.00  0.24   2.85   951   303  
402 867.00   0.33  0.60   2.85   482   154  
403  1,386.00  300.00  0.17   2.85   999   319  
404 13,839.00  404.80  0.24   2.85  7,198  2,297  
405 908.00  208.00  0.06   2.85   934   298  
406 337.00   0.33  0.10   2.85   599   191  
407 324.00   0.33  0.08   2.85   346   110  
408  1,054.00   0.33  1.17   2.85   454   145  
409  1,757.00  468.00  0.04   2.85  1,370   437  
410 827.00  260.00  0.09   2.85   764   244  
411  2,950.00  900.00  0.78   2.85  1,109   354  
412 531.00  312.00  0.10   2.85   415   132  
413 499.00   0.33  0.24   2.85   490   156  
414 282.00   0.33  0.10   2.85   420   134  
415  5,676.00  468.00  0.03   2.85  3,896  1,243  
416 409.00   0.33  0.04   2.85   761   243  
417 434.00   0.33  0.12   2.85   599   191  
418 185.00   0.33  0.06   2.85   288  92  
419 180.00   0.33  0.04   2.85   360   115  
420  1,366.00  416.00  0.05   2.85  1,049   335  
421  4,560.00  312.00  0.25   2.85  2,305   736  
422  3,780.00  280.00  2.84   2.85   610   195  
423  1,550.00  250.00  0.32   2.85   720   230  
424 899.00   0.33  0.38   2.85   461   147  
425 205.00   0.33  0.09   2.85   330   105  
426  3,960.00  260.00  0.20   2.85  2,881   920  
427  3,116.00  383.67  0.31   2.85  1,822   582  
428  3,435.00  336.00  0.31   2.85  1,848   590  
429 724.00   0.33  0.57   2.85   403   129  
430  4,225.00  575.00  0.20   2.85  2,840   906  
431  1,150.00  400.00  0.40   2.85   576   184  
432  2,376.00  576.00  0.31   2.85  1,484   474  
433  2,016.00  516.00  0.22   2.85  1,542   492  
434 515.00   0.33  0.13   2.85   449   143  
435 517.00   0.33  0.05   2.85   629   201  
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436 722.00   0.33  0.62   2.85   371   118  
437  4,500.00  466.67  0.39   2.85  2,219   708  
438  1,264.00  364.00  0.40   2.85   864   276  
439  1,530.00  450.00  0.17   2.85  1,037   331  
440 499.00   0.33  0.17   2.85   346   110  
441  2,180.00  180.00  0.50   2.85  1,153   368  
442 359.00   0.33  0.17   2.85   332   106  
443  1,650.00  200.00  0.95   2.85   605   193  
444  2,016.00  468.00  0.12   2.85  1,498   478  
445 413.00   0.33  0.07   2.85   432   138  
446  1,100.00  300.00  0.11   2.85  1,095   349  
447  1,200.00  500.00  0.13   2.85   864   276  
448  4,974.00  648.00  0.19   2.85  3,009   960  
449 20,895.00  626.92  0.24   2.85  8,488  2,709  
450 57,358.00  437.64  0.37   2.85   31,119  9,931  
451 206,364.00  426.36  0.23   2.85   123,175  39,309  
452 12,705.00  642.86  0.11   2.85  7,520  2,400  
453  4,350.00  450.00  0.23   2.85  2,536   809  
454  3,053.00  313.00  1.29   2.85   893   285  
455 822.00  278.00  0.12   2.85   377   120  
456 800.00  100.00  0.08   2.85   692   221  
457  4,620.00  480.00  0.02   2.85  5,186  1,655  
458  3,125.00  500.00  0.15   2.85  5,809  1,854  
459  3,784.00  375.00  0.63   2.85  1,369   437  
460 675.00   75.00  0.56   2.85   409   131  
461  1,175.00  400.00  0.50   2.85   576   184  
462  1,850.00  300.00  0.08   2.85  1,729   552  
463 905.00  300.00  0.10   2.85   583   186  
464  2,500.00  100.00  1.80   2.85   576   184  
465  3,700.00   1,000.00  0.60   2.85  1,441   460  
466  1,278.00  390.00  0.09   2.85  1,007   321  
467  3,000.00  400.00  1.18   2.85   980   313  
468  1,100.00  150.00  1.37   2.85   294  94  
469  1,075.00  275.00  0.49   2.85   588   188  
470  5,000.00  250.00  2.15   2.85   936   299  
471 862.00  400.00  0.22   2.85   531   170  
472  2,128.00  182.00  0.67   2.85   864   276  
473  1,100.00  200.00  0.07   2.85   864   276  
474 950.00  250.00  0.42   2.85   692   221  
475  1,790.00  470.00  0.25   2.85  1,153   368  
476 675.00   75.00  0.36   2.85   317   101  
477 925.00  112.50  0.18   2.85   634   202  
478 420.00   10.00  0.16   2.85   360   115  
479  1,075.00  125.00  0.56   2.85   461   147  
480  1,470.00  210.00  1.68   2.85   343   109  
481 464.00   0.33  0.37   2.85   311  99  
482  2,240.00  340.00  1.50   2.85   576   184  
483  3,064.00  288.00  0.72   2.85  1,608   513  
484  1,135.00  125.00  0.97   2.85   357   114  
485  3,295.00   75.00  0.70   2.85  1,049   335  
486  1,750.00  150.00  0.53   2.85   864   276  
487  1,870.00  500.00  0.08   2.85  1,098   351  
488 975.00   87.50  0.67   2.85   432   138  
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489  3,000.00  375.00  0.33   2.85  1,749   558  
490 555.00   5.00  0.18   2.85   317   101  
491 449.00   0.33  0.35   2.85   409   131  
492 329.00   0.33  0.24   2.85   303  97  
493 752.00   26.00  0.24   2.85   490   156  
494  1,150.00  100.00  1.45   2.85   317   101  
495 675.00   87.50  0.21   2.85   547   175  
496 680.00  280.00  0.12   2.85   965   308  
497 770.00   62.50  0.10   2.85   706   225  
498  1,075.00   75.00  0.25   2.85   692   221  
499 159.00   0.33  0.10   2.85   288  92  
500  2,809.00  450.00  0.58   2.85   994   317  
501  2,411.00  350.00  0.21   2.85  1,619   517  
502  5,967.00  467.00  2.25   2.85  1,153   368  
503 16,378.00  450.00  12.47   2.85   705   225  
504 699.00   0.33  0.12   2.85   490   156  
505 399.00   0.33  0.23   2.85   507   162  
506  1,299.00   0.33  6.67   2.85   86  28  
507  1,160.00   60.00  0.56   2.85   516   165  
508  1,101.00  141.67  0.18   2.85   648   207  
509  1,225.00   75.00  0.56   2.85   519   166  
510  2,350.00  150.00  1.33   2.85   692   221  
511  2,032.00  275.00  0.26   2.85  1,095   349  
512 11,750.00  312.50  0.80   2.85  4,034  1,287  
513  1,750.00  100.00  0.93   2.85   617   197  
514 11,376.00  275.00  0.50   2.85  4,651  1,484  
515  3,600.00  350.00  0.15   2.85  2,245   716  
516  1,485.00  150.00  0.06   2.85   954   304  
517  2,300.00  375.00  0.36   2.85   807   257  
518 900.00  500.00  0.08   2.85   749   239  
519  3,042.00   42.00  1.43   2.85   864   276  
520  2,425.00  162.50  1.20   2.85   722   230  
521 959.00   0.33  0.27   2.85   645   206  
522  1,252.00  233.33  0.07   2.85   864   276  
523 48,520.00  208.40  0.87   2.85   15,434  4,925  
524  1,860.00  270.00  0.68   2.85   847   270  
525  1,178.00  226.00  0.67   2.85   692   221  
526  1,178.00  226.00  0.67   2.85   692   221  
527 349.00   0.33  0.20   2.85   288  92  
528  5,596.00  499.20  0.09   2.85  3,746  1,195  
529  8,500.00  314.29  0.46   2.85  3,746  1,195  
530  1,700.00  325.00  0.18   2.85  1,210   386  
531  8,100.00  344.44  0.12   2.85  4,682  1,494  
532 240,000.00  244.44  0.16   2.85   129,661  41,379  
533 720.00  300.00  0.31   2.85   375   120  
534  5,020.00  624.00  0.28   2.85  2,305   736  
535 550.00  110.00  0.18   2.85   473   151  
536  1,099.00   0.33  0.17   2.85  1,037   331  
537 800.00  300.00  0.33   2.85   432   138  
538  6,799.00   0.33  6.50   2.85   576   184  
539  5,200.00  150.00  0.86   2.85  2,017   644  
540  6,750.00  650.00  2.75   2.85  1,153   368  
541  1,800.00  266.67  0.25   2.85  1,153   368  
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542  1,700.00  300.00  0.28   2.85  1,037   331  
543  1,630.00  500.00  0.34   2.85   850   271  
544 740.00   20.00  0.19   2.85   447   143  
545  3,750.00  280.00  0.22   2.85  2,651   846  
546 670.00  130.00  0.17   2.85   504   161  
547  1,600.00  300.00  0.73   2.85   634   202  
548  1,460.00  360.00  0.60   2.85   576   184  
549  2,180.00   76.67  1.54   2.85   562   179  
550 899.00   0.33  1.20   2.85   288  92  
551 513.00   0.33  0.50   2.85   346   110  
552  4,545.00  125.00  0.08   2.85  2,635   841  
553  3,350.00  175.00  2.00   2.85   720   230  
554  1,000.00  350.00  0.17   2.85   692   221  
555  2,300.00  250.00  0.50   2.85  1,153   368  
556  2,100.00  500.00  0.12   2.85  1,441   460  
557 19,860.00  272.73  0.08   2.85   15,271  4,874  
558  9,305.00  323.75  0.06   2.85  5,959  1,902  
559  2,694.00   27.30  0.98   2.85   885   282  
560  1,400.00  500.00  0.42   2.85   692   221  
561  1,050.00  300.00  0.08   2.85  1,037   331  
562 625.00  225.00  0.14   2.85   418   133  
563  1,150.00  470.00  0.09   2.85   864   276  
564  1,050.00  225.00  0.18   2.85   985   314  
565 665.00   40.00  0.75   2.85   387   123  
566 47,500.00  666.67  0.22   2.85   25,932  8,276  
Mean 11,766.57  275.05  0.48   2.85  5,861  1,871  












Table A.6.2. Flour 
 
A.6.2. (a.) 1850 
 
 

















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 720.00 120.00 0.18 0.72 0 1,125 
2 5,240.00 240.00 0.83 0.72 600 0 
3 1,904.00 144.00 2.87 0.72 0 600 
4 4,788.00 144.00 0.09 0.72 0 11,000 
5 16,620.00 264.00 0.72 0.72 2,000 0 
6 6,864.00 432.00 0.77 0.72 500 2,000 
7 2,280.00 120.00 0.32 0.72 240 1,200 
8 86,840.00 426.67 0.12 0.72 20,000 0 
9 890.00 120.00 0.25 0.72 0 2,000 
10 12,840.00 120.00 2.71 0.72 550 3,000 
11 996.00 96.00 0.19 0.72 0 1,500 
12 2,716.00 216.00 0.56 0.72 0 3,000 
13 9,354.00 204.00 0.42 0.72 720 5,000 
14 5,192.00 192.00 0.57 0.72 675 0 
15 9,480.00 240.00 0.10 0.72 1,900 0 
16 7,980.00 240.00 0.50 0.72 1,000 0 
17 4,960.00 180.00 0.46 0.72 700 0 
18 7,360.00 180.00 1.14 0.72 300 3,000 
19 5,716.00 216.00 0.48 0.72 0 4,000 
20 9,920.00 210.00 0.39 0.72 1,100 3,300 
21 1,096.00 96.00 0.83 0.72 0 1,000 
22 54,100.00 200.00 0.20 0.72 9,332 0 
23 6,940.00 120.00 0.46 0.72 145 3,720 
24 3,908.00 108.00 0.94 0.72 200 2,000 
25 5,744.00 144.00 0.44 0.72 600 3,000 
26 1,920.00 120.00 0.18 0.72 0 3,300 
27 7,816.00 108.00 0.59 0.72 100 0 
28 10,250.00 120.00 0.27 0.72 1,000 0 
29 5,246.00 96.00 0.22 0.72 800 0 
30 1,720.00 120.00 1.43 0.72 0 1,500 
31 1,832.00 72.00 0.67 0.72 0 2,400 
32 960.00 60.00 0.72 0.72 17 1,000 
33 3,220.00 120.00 1.72 0.72 133 1,000 
34 10,870.00 120.00 0.86 0.72 833 4,000 
35 9,380.00 180.00 0.48 0.72 800 4,000 
36 2,320.00 120.00 0.08 0.72 0 5,000 
37 10,180.00 180.00 0.48 0.72 666 4,000 
38 10,240.00 120.00 0.41 0.72 666 6,000 
39 1,580.00 180.00 0.35 0.72 0 3,600 
40 590.00 180.00 0.30 0.72 0 1,200 
41 2,152.00 192.00 0.09 0.72 100 4,000 
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42 1,179.00 204.00 0.37 0.72 16 2,000 
43 4,932.00 132.00 0.20 0.72 450 9,000 
44 5,970.00 120.00 1.60 0.72 200 5,000 
45 2,120.00 120.00 0.67 0.72 0 5,000 
46 2,342.00 192.00 0.44 0.72 0 4,500 
47 3,370.00 120.00 0.53 0.72 0 6,500 
48 5,340.00 180.00 0.80 0.72 0 5,000 
49 12,863.00 240.00 0.21 0.72 0 18,750 
50 8,360.00 480.00 0.13 0.72 0 10,000 
51 970.00 120.00 0.60 0.72 0 1,500 
52 7,440.00 240.00 1.56 0.72 0 4,000 
53 10,840.00 180.00 0.23 0.72 1,000 15,000 
54 18,080.00 420.00 0.44 0.72 0 16,800 
55 13,360.00 180.00 0.30 0.72 2,000 0 
56 20,932.00 216.00 0.38 0.72 3,330 2,220 
57 8,084.00 192.00 1.00 0.72 800 0 
58 23,480.00 240.00 0.67 0.72 3,000 0 
59 5,746.00 96.00 0.97 0.72 42 4,800 
60 10,864.00 264.00 0.83 0.72 1,500 0 
61 8,939.00 132.00 0.23 0.72 1,500 2,600 
62 6,840.00 300.00 0.56 0.72 1,000 0 
63 7,280.00 240.00 0.60 0.72 1,200 0 
64 9,894.00 216.00 2.73 0.72 140 0 
65 28,480.00 240.00 0.33 0.72 3,555 1,150 
66 4,140.00 240.00 1.60 0.72 100 0 
67 15,840.00 120.00 0.30 0.72 2,650 5,700 
68 1,970.00 120.00 1.10 0.72 150 0 
69 8,240.00 240.00 0.30 0.72 1,500 0 
70 6,790.00 120.00 0.33 0.72 1,330 0 
71 6,860.00 180.00 0.14 0.72 1,400 0 
72 16,360.00 180.00 0.31 0.72 3,000 0 
73 1,610.00 360.00 0.50 0.72 0 3,000 
74 28,720.00 240.00 0.36 0.72 4,400 0 
75 14,240.00 240.00 0.40 0.72 2,022 0 
76 62,360.00 180.00 1.17 0.72 6,600 0 
77 6,530.00 180.00 3.13 0.72 330 0 
78 7,409.00 126.00 0.10 0.72 0 20,400 
79 3,230.00 180.00 0.24 0.72 0 1,000 
80 8,960.00 180.00 0.89 0.72 0 168 
81 48,224.00 408.00 0.17 0.72 15,000 0 
82 31,700.00 300.00 0.26 0.72 27,000 0 
83 40,770.00 266.67 0.30 0.72 7,000 0 
84 151,256.00 336.00 0.14 0.72 25,000 0 
85 6,240.00 240.00 0.38 0.72 980 0 
86 33,600.00 200.00 0.10 0.72 5,000 60,000 
87 5,944.00 492.00 2.50 0.72 400 0 
88 7,740.00 240.00 3.33 0.72 600 0 
89 8,300.00 240.00 0.03 0.72 9,000 300 
90 6,412.00 312.00 0.30 0.72 1,200 2,250 
91 3,305.00 180.00 1.54 0.72 200 2,000 
92 1,500.00 120.00 0.30 0.72 780 0 
93 14,245.00 240.00 0.10 0.72 3,000 8,438 
94 74,200.00 240.00 0.12 0.72 20,000 0 
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95 25,080.00 360.00 1.25 0.72 3,000 0 
96 3,970.00 240.00 1.00 0.72 500 0 
97 12,200.00 300.00 0.40 0.72 3,000 0 
98 106,400.00 300.00 0.11 0.72 37,000 0 
99 19,480.00 240.00 0.95 0.72 2,100 0 
100 9,408.00 204.00 1.50 0.72 1,000 0 
101 15,480.00 240.00 0.53 0.72 2,400 4,800 
102 28,460.00 492.00 0.16 0.72 8,000 0 
103 34,720.00 480.00 0.53 0.72 3,500 0 
104 30,425.00 300.00 0.12 0.72 5,400 0 
105 32,028.00 264.00 0.04 0.72 0 5,000 
106 4,690.00 240.00 5.33 0.72 500 300 
107 6,300.00 300.00 0.45 0.72 0 2,000 
108 11,250.00 300.00 0.04 0.72 2,250 0 
109 21,674.00 312.00 0.20 0.72 3,200 0 
110 48,720.00 240.00 0.15 0.72 2,900 0 
111 7,300.00 300.00 0.40 0.72 1,000 0 
112 14,720.00 360.00 0.89 0.72 400 0 
113 16,100.00 300.00 0.38 0.72 1,100 0 
114 64,580.00 360.00 0.41 0.72 9,000 0 
115 13,124.00 312.00 1.54 0.72 850 0 
116 2,204.00 204.00 0.31 0.72 33,100 2,100 
117 10,890.00 360.00 1.18 0.72 800 550 
118 1,316.00 216.00 0.23 0.72 14,000 2,000 
119 8,908.00 144.00 0.34 0.72 1,000 7,500 
120 5,865.00 240.00 1.33 0.72 300 1,500 
121 135,290.00 420.00 0.07 0.72 30,000 0 
122 2,090.00 240.00 0.29 0.72 0 7,000 
123 8,263.00 240.00 0.53 0.72 840 1,000 
124 12,432.00 216.00 0.09 0.72 2,400 5,000 
125 11,040.00 240.00 0.85 0.72 1,200 1,000 
126 20,676.00 240.00 0.30 0.72 3,600 1,000 
127 6,640.00 240.00 0.16 0.72 1,200 0 
128 13,720.00 360.00 1.84 0.72 1,400 200 
129 6,055.00 180.00 0.13 0.72 5,300 8,000 
130 28,600.00 200.00 0.15 0.72 7,000 0 
131 15,532.00 216.00 0.17 0.72 3,600 0 
132 25,150.00 300.00 0.80 0.72 2,800 0 
133 4,966.00 216.00 0.56 0.72 1,800 0 
134 4,648.00 216.00 0.81 0.72 400 0 
135 23,720.00 240.00 1.50 0.72 2,000 0 
136 7,300.00 150.00 1.72 0.72 500 0 
137 11,856.00 228.00 0.48 0.72 1,799 0 
138 19,364.00 198.00 0.66 0.72 2,500 0 
139 6,851.00 240.00 2.65 0.72 444 0 
140 34,020.00 240.00 0.50 0.72 5,000 0 
141 6,240.00 240.00 0.42 0.72 1,200 0 
142 3,790.00 300.00 0.54 0.72 1,400 0 
143 12,182.00 216.00 0.18 0.72 2,400 0 
144 8,720.00 360.00 0.80 0.72 1,000 0 
145 36,080.00 360.00 0.63 0.72 6,000 0 
146 11,740.00 240.00 0.43 0.72 2,000 0 
147 19,000.00 300.00 0.62 0.72 2,600 0 
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148 2,340.00 240.00 1.94 0.72 100 500 
149 13,027.00 240.00 0.61 0.72 1,866 0 
150 5,625.00 300.00 0.42 0.72 1,000 0 
151 15,220.00 240.00 0.14 0.72 3,640 0 
152 7,574.00 312.00 0.64 0.72 1,000 0 
153 1,425.00 240.00 0.76 0.72 100 550 
154 23,720.00 240.00 1.50 0.72 2,000 0 
155 3,884.00 384.00 0.83 0.72 600 0 
156 13,600.00 300.00 0.21 0.72 4,000 0 
157 81,288.00 396.00 0.18 0.72 19,000 0 
158 33,530.00 300.00 0.13 0.72 9,000 0 
159 22,900.00 300.00 0.08 0.72 5,000 0 
160 22,420.00 210.00 0.21 0.72 0 30,000 
161 1,656.00 96.00 0.84 0.72 0 1,200 
162 5,880.00 240.00 0.20 0.72 900 0 
163 23,900.00 300.00 0.24 0.72 2,500 0 
164 6,214.00 264.00 0.94 0.72 200 0 
165 4,765.00 240.00 0.46 0.72 106 0 
166 4,440.00 240.00 0.29 0.72 0 6,400 
167 13,440.00 480.00 0.26 0.72 0 5,000 
168 1,912.00 312.00 0.40 0.72 0 1,400 
169 2,180.00 180.00 0.29 0.72 0 2,000 
170 6,560.00 240.00 0.42 0.72 0 6,000 
171 17,600.00 300.00 1.28 0.72 0 15,000 
172 3,416.00 216.00 0.15 0.72 0 3,000 
173 15,520.00 360.00 0.24 0.72 0 15,000 
174 4,640.00 240.00 0.67 0.72 0 3,000 
175 12,250.00 300.00 0.22 0.72 800 0 
176 15,027.00 300.00 0.35 0.72 775 0 
177 18,300.00 300.00 0.45 0.72 1,700 0 
178 7,208.00 204.00 1.50 0.72 700 0 
179 19,805.00 360.00 0.32 0.72 2,817 0 
180 14,180.00 180.00 0.24 0.72 2,000 0 
181 11,350.00 300.00 0.75 0.72 400 0 
182 18,080.00 360.00 0.75 0.72 2,000 0 
183 23,311.00 312.00 0.40 0.72 2,999 0 
184 6,450.00 300.00 0.82 0.72 300 0 
185 25,480.00 840.00 0.49 0.72 1,400 0 
186 14,822.00 180.00 0.34 0.72 1,000 0 
187 9,784.00 384.00 0.39 0.72 400 4,000 
188 11,716.00 360.00 1.19 0.72 0 25 
189 12,155.00 240.00 0.91 0.72 1,364 0 
190 11,960.00 240.00 0.77 0.72 800 0 
191 1,965.00 240.00 1.60 0.72 100 0 
192 37,329.00 312.00 0.17 0.72 5,760 8,250 
193 141,145.00 360.00 0.31 0.72 20,000 0 
194 275,800.00 400.00 0.43 0.72 43,000 0 
195 14,312.00 312.00 0.52 0.72 1,250 0 
196 31,867.00 228.00 0.20 0.72 5,000 0 
197 119,680.00 336.00 0.18 0.72 20,000 0 
198 144,300.00 300.00 0.16 0.72 25,000 0 
199 23,311.00 312.00 0.40 0.72 2,999 0 
200 9,960.00 360.00 0.47 0.72 7,300 0 
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201 22,300.00 300.00 0.76 0.72 3,750 0 
202 9,480.00 240.00 0.43 0.72 3,000 0 
203 5,312.00 312.00 0.62 0.72 400 0 
204 3,240.00 240.00 0.44 0.72 444 550 
205 5,228.00 144.00 0.54 0.72 675 0 
206 8,830.00 180.00 0.10 0.72 1,700 0 
207 4,845.00 240.00 0.46 0.72 400 0 
208 12,985.00 300.00 0.64 0.72 500 0 
209 21,148.00 216.00 0.95 0.72 2,220 0 
210 12,540.00 144.00 0.56 0.72 1,800 0 
211 24,628.00 264.00 0.88 0.72 1,800 8,000 
212 5,744.00 144.00 1.99 0.72 445 0 
213 12,740.00 150.00 1.14 0.72 1,000 0 
214 4,192.00 192.00 3.00 0.72 100 0 
215 11,295.00 240.00 0.71 0.72 650 0 
216 3,082.00 192.00 0.09 0.72 225 0 
217 8,240.00 240.00 0.50 0.72 666 1,000 
218 7,493.00 144.00 0.45 0.72 880 2,400 
219 3,780.00 180.00 0.91 0.72 400 0 
220 15,818.00 144.00 0.30 0.72 3,000 0 
221 8,660.00 180.00 0.23 0.72 2,000 0 
222 21,280.00 360.00 0.25 0.72 4,000 0 
223 3,190.00 240.00 0.17 0.72 720 0 
224 4,740.00 240.00 0.31 0.72 775 0 
225 18,212.00 156.00 0.34 0.72 2,200 0 
226 10,100.00 300.00 0.30 0.72 1,000 0 
227 3,694.00 144.00 0.35 0.72 66 0 
228 7,355.00 240.00 0.45 0.72 1,100 0 
229 3,320.00 120.00 0.57 0.72 440 0 
230 6,550.00 240.00 0.43 0.72 392 0 
231 2,468.00 204.00 0.11 0.72 275 0 
232 4,166.00 228.00 2.91 0.72 105 900 
233 13,740.00 240.00 0.38 0.72 1,400 0 
234 26,790.00 240.00 1.04 0.72 1,550 0 
235 12,760.00 300.00 0.73 0.72 1,000 0 
236 12,520.00 240.00 0.56 0.72 840 5,500 
237 7,932.00 216.00 1.00 0.72 1,000 0 
238 25,480.00 240.00 0.31 0.72 4,000 0 
239 30,371.00 212.00 0.14 0.72 5,500 0 
240 18,573.00 216.00 0.27 0.72 2,222 0 
241 6,049.00 144.00 0.85 0.72 500 0 
242 7,215.00 540.00 0.26 0.72 913 0 
243 14,314.00 204.00 0.48 0.72 940 0 
244 9,766.00 216.00 0.32 0.72 1,200 0 
245 6,080.00 240.00 0.56 0.72 1,000 0 
246 10,440.00 240.00 0.61 0.72 444 0 
247 6,940.00 240.00 0.67 0.72 600 0 
248 15,520.00 210.00 0.32 0.72 2,000 0 
249 6,630.00 360.00 2.56 0.72 200 300 
250 11,776.00 396.00 0.35 0.72 690 4,400 
251 23,480.00 240.00 0.09 0.72 1,500 0 
252 13,180.00 480.00 0.33 0.72 400 0 
253 9,240.00 240.00 0.43 0.72 230 0 
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254 14,880.00 240.00 0.66 0.72 311 0 
255 10,300.00 300.00 0.83 0.72 1,800 0 
256 27,390.00 420.00 0.52 0.72 2,000 0 
257 8,220.00 240.00 0.53 0.72 1,000 0 
258 53,340.00 300.00 0.66 0.72 5,800 0 
259 4,932.00 312.00 0.74 0.72 200 0 
260 14,300.00 180.00 0.14 0.72 3,000 0 
261 22,360.00 360.00 0.35 0.72 4,320 0 
262 10,220.00 240.00 0.23 0.72 1,800 0 
263 21,720.00 360.00 0.37 0.72 0 20,000 
Mean 16,820.22 244.35 0.64 0.72 2,726.61 1,908.16 




A.6.2. (b.) 1860 
 
 

















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 9,784.00 192.00 0.67 0.88 0 5,000 
2 4,760.00 360.00 0.45 0.88 120 2,250 
3 18,740.00 120.00 0.56 0.88 0 12,000 
4 3,210.00 360.00 0.14 0.88 0 2,500 
5 4,444.00 144.00 0.05 0.88 0 5,625 
6 13,836.00 168.00 0.25 0.88 1,400 7,000 
7 9,980.00 240.00 0.32 0.88 1,400 0 
8 3,538.00 144.00 0.36 0.88 200 2,500 
9 3,360.00 360.00 1.33 0.88 0 2,000 
10 26,520.00 360.00 0.29 0.88 0 11,000 
11 31,200.00 300.00 0.45 0.88 4,000 0 
12 32,730.00 240.00 0.26 0.88 6,000 5,000 
13 1,090.00 240.00 1.00 0.88 0 1,000 
14 5,900.00 300.00 1.94 0.88 200 1,350 
15 22,080.00 360.00 0.04 0.88 4,000 0 
16 6,600.00 300.00 0.22 0.88 0 9,000 
17 32,480.00 240.00 0.47 0.88 4,000 0 
18 11,200.00 300.00 0.27 0.88 0 15,000 
19 3,350.00 300.00 1.54 0.88 150 600 
20 8,352.00 276.00 0.33 0.88 200 10,000 
21 11,600.00 300.00 0.30 0.88 1,000 0 
22 5,012.00 312.00 0.39 0.88 400 0 
23 25,380.00 240.00 0.12 0.88 3,000 15,000 
24 22,240.00 240.00 0.31 0.88 2,400 8,002 
25 3,212.00 312.00 0.50 0.88 0 4,400 
26 2,040.00 240.00 0.17 0.88 0 2,500 
27 15,360.00 180.00 0.13 0.88 1,600 12,000 
28 2,880.00 240.00 0.09 0.88 0 4,680 
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29 4,540.00 240.00 0.26 0.88 60 3,500 
30 1,890.00 240.00 0.26 0.88 0 2,500 
31 31,900.00 300.00 0.46 0.88 4,000 0 
32 2,040.00 240.00 0.32 0.88 0 2,000 
33 19,300.00 300.00 0.38 0.88 2,600 5,000 
34 4,688.00 144.00 1.88 0.88 0 2,000 
35 63,200.00 400.00 0.16 0.88 9,200 0 
36 5,500.00 240.00 1.37 0.88 220 0 
37 8,764.00 264.00 0.18 0.88 950 0 
38 26,920.00 240.00 0.50 0.88 2,666 1,100 
39 7,845.00 360.00 0.29 0.88 21 0 
40 5,700.00 300.00 0.18 0.88 0 2,000 
41 37,980.00 240.00 0.05 0.88 8,000 0 
42 16,625.00 240.00 0.04 0.88 0 7,845 
43 2,686.00 336.00 0.46 0.88 0 407 
44 3,240.00 240.00 1.60 0.88 0 1,000 
45 5,480.00 240.00 2.86 0.88 0 300 
46 4,144.00 144.00 0.83 0.88 200 1,000 
47 19,800.00 300.00 0.43 0.88 800 0 
48 2,212.00 192.00 0.08 0.88 360 660 
49 20,720.00 360.00 0.16 0.88 3,400 0 
50 1,580.00 180.00 2.00 0.88 0 500 
51 1,030.00 180.00 0.79 0.88 0 506 
52 3,390.00 240.00 0.17 0.88 0 2,925 
53 11,740.00 240.00 0.68 0.88 600 3,800 
54 7,300.00 300.00 0.33 0.88 1,000 0 
55 8,880.00 180.00 0.15 0.88 800 3,500 
56 9,640.00 240.00 0.80 0.88 0 4,000 
57 1,495.00 120.00 0.13 0.88 100 700 
58 15,220.00 120.00 0.59 0.88 0 9,350 
59 2,772.00 72.00 1.00 0.88 0 1,500 
60 4,788.00 144.00 1.20 0.88 0 2,000 
61 14,360.00 360.00 0.29 0.88 2,000 0 
62 3,406.00 156.00 0.39 0.88 130 2,000 
63 14,710.00 240.00 0.19 0.88 1,800 3,300 
64 9,900.00 300.00 0.35 0.88 1,000 2,000 
65 9,220.00 120.00 0.19 0.88 1,020 0 
66 5,880.00 180.00 0.21 0.88 612 0 
67 6,760.00 360.00 2.69 0.88 120 900 
68 6,144.00 144.00 0.44 0.88 0 4,000 
69 4,096.00 96.00 0.12 0.88 0 4,083 
70 5,680.00 180.00 0.31 0.88 400 2,200 
71 1,320.00 120.00 0.43 0.88 0 800 
72 3,144.00 144.00 1.67 0.88 0 1,200 
73 5,680.00 180.00 0.49 0.88 400 2,000 
74 3,470.00 360.00 0.14 0.88 0 4,680 
75 6,480.00 240.00 0.38 0.88 0 8,000 
76 6,490.00 240.00 1.43 0.88 450 0 
77 13,400.00 450.00 0.24 0.88 2,000 3,000 
78 31,540.00 180.00 0.12 0.88 4,000 11,666 
79 8,180.00 180.00 0.55 0.88 900 1,500 
80 11,180.00 180.00 1.07 0.88 800 3,000 
81 32,065.00 288.00 0.31 0.88 4,400 0 
  
365
82 3,890.00 120.00 3.33 0.88 100 300 
83 4,300.00 300.00 1.25 0.88 400 0 
84 12,860.00 180.00 1.03 0.88 1,200 0 
85 15,970.00 360.00 0.24 0.88 2,000 3,275 
86 26,140.00 360.00 0.57 0.88 3,000 1,100 
87 15,050.00 300.00 0.36 0.88 1,000 10,000 
88 83,312.00 301.09 0.30 0.88 12,000 0 
89 43,480.00 240.00 6.33 0.88 1,000 0 
90 9,180.00 180.00 0.51 0.88 900 2,500 
91 4,080.00 240.00 0.22 0.88 4,000 800 
92 17,960.00 240.00 0.11 0.88 0 17,500 
93 19,720.00 240.00 0.15 0.88 0 17,500 
94 13,120.00 180.00 0.40 0.88 0 13,346 
95 6,780.00 480.00 0.42 0.88 520 800 
96 13,480.00 480.00 0.15 0.88 0 20,000 
97 2,640.00 240.00 2.56 0.88 0 780 
98 147,000.00 480.00 0.19 0.88 6,000 0 
99 5,393.00 168.00 0.21 0.88 45 4,500 
100 18,952.00 276.00 0.32 0.88 1,760 6,500 
101 3,740.00 240.00 1.07 0.88 300 0 
102 17,104.00 312.00 0.36 0.88 1,555 5,000 
103 2,232.00 120.00 0.53 0.88 0 2,100 
104 294,900.00 300.00 0.25 0.88 30,000 0 
105 5,244.00 144.00 0.35 0.88 0 4,800 
106 3,969.00 240.00 0.35 0.88 0 4,178 
107 356,600.00 300.00 0.23 0.88 45,000 0 
108 5,144.00 144.00 1.14 0.88 400 0 
109 226,200.00 420.00 0.15 0.88 40,000 0 
110 5,780.00 180.00 0.94 0.88 100 2,000 
111 1,725.00 180.00 0.80 0.88 0 600 
112 3,070.00 240.00 0.50 0.88 160 1,000 
113 8,550.00 300.00 0.66 0.88 660 0 
114 23,145.00 300.00 0.26 0.88 3,330 500 
115 38,680.00 180.00 0.21 0.88 6,155 0 
116 3,180.00 180.00 0.44 0.88 0 2,250 
117 11,496.00 96.00 0.31 0.88 80 10,000 
118 5,504.00 504.00 1.30 0.88 200 1,000 
119 690.00 120.00 0.25 0.88 0 600 
120 13,180.00 280.00 0.35 0.88 800 4,800 
121 3,580.00 180.00 0.50 0.88 200 1,100 
122 8,240.00 240.00 0.21 0.88 600 4,000 
123 18,480.00 240.00 0.43 0.88 1,000 6,000 
124 6,420.00 120.00 0.28 0.88 0 6,000 
125 8,494.00 144.00 0.38 0.88 140 6,000 
126 9,680.00 180.00 0.24 0.88 1,330 0 
127 43,524.00 204.00 0.46 0.88 3,450 7,187 
128 7,332.00 312.00 0.67 0.88 200 3,695 
129 20,080.00 240.00 0.40 0.88 2,000 2,000 
130 6,590.00 240.00 0.37 0.88 650 0 
131 21,740.00 240.00 0.49 0.88 1,600 8,000 
132 16,642.00 192.00 0.29 0.88 60 0 
133 2,240.00 240.00 0.28 0.88 200 1,000 
134 162,600.00 360.00 0.28 0.88 20,000 0 
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135 31,520.00 240.00 0.31 0.88 4,000 0 
136 63,940.00 360.00 0.12 0.88 12,000 17,000 
137 42,285.00 480.00 0.86 0.88 4,000 0 
138 23,600.00 300.00 0.48 0.88 3,000 0 
139 60,700.00 400.00 0.49 0.88 8,000 0 
140 12,205.00 240.00 4.44 0.88 450 0 
141 85,630.00 360.00 1.64 0.88 6,000 0 
142 26,470.00 450.00 0.29 0.88 3,600 0 
143 8,468.00 240.00 2.28 0.88 333 0 
144 55,300.00 360.00 0.24 0.88 10,000 0 
145 32,840.00 360.00 0.20 0.88 6,000 0 
146 71,800.00 360.00 0.23 0.88 12,000 0 
147 53,900.00 525.00 0.20 0.88 9,000 0 
148 36,560.00 390.00 0.39 0.88 6,000 0 
149 27,900.00 300.00 0.29 0.88 4,000 0 
150 25,450.00 240.00 0.82 0.88 1,600 10,000 
151 35,365.00 360.00 0.17 0.88 6,000 2,500 
152 122,505.00 360.00 0.24 0.88 19,000 0 
153 61,880.00 360.00 0.10 0.88 10,000 13,000 
154 10,720.00 240.00 0.67 0.88 1,200 0 
155 7,570.00 300.00 0.60 0.88 800 300 
156 9,540.00 360.00 0.63 0.88 1,000 0 
157 17,580.00 360.00 0.48 0.88 2,297 2,250 
158 16,750.00 300.00 0.39 0.88 2,250 4,500 
159 21,220.00 240.00 0.33 0.88 3,000 0 
160 12,230.00 240.00 0.92 0.88 1,000 600 
161 42,960.00 240.00 0.50 0.88 6,000 0 
162 2,290.00 240.00 0.52 0.88 300 0 
163 14,600.00 300.00 0.36 0.88 2,000 0 
164 28,000.00 300.00 0.19 0.88 4,000 4,000 
165 108,850.00 300.00 1.04 0.88 10,000 0 
166 6,900.00 300.00 0.40 0.88 800 4,000 
167 24,360.00 240.00 0.32 0.88 3,000 5,000 
168 22,590.00 360.00 0.40 0.88 3,333 6,000 
169 16,580.00 240.00 0.49 0.88 202 6,000 
170 33,020.00 240.00 0.23 0.88 5,222 1,000 
171 14,480.00 480.00 0.22 0.88 2,080 2,300 
172 9,435.00 300.00 0.66 0.88 1,000 250 
173 46,920.00 360.00 0.16 0.88 6,700 1,200 
174 9,650.00 360.00 1.21 0.88 750 0 
175 24,400.00 400.00 0.59 0.88 4,000 0 
176 4,980.00 180.00 0.19 0.88 800 10,000 
177 5,960.00 360.00 1.18 0.88 613 0 
178 4,620.00 120.00 1.25 0.88 450 0 
179 27,620.00 405.00 0.30 0.88 7,200 0 
180 41,600.00 360.00 0.48 0.88 5,200 0 
181 21,730.00 240.00 0.39 0.88 3,400 0 
182 20,960.00 480.00 0.32 0.88 4,400 4,570 
183 86,840.00 320.00 0.63 0.88 10,000 0 
184 8,775.00 300.00 0.66 0.88 1,800 0 
185 7,220.00 240.00 0.45 0.88 800 0 
186 14,145.00 420.00 3.21 0.88 440 0 
187 18,090.00 360.00 0.18 0.88 800 0 
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188 34,920.00 480.00 0.64 0.88 3,500 0 
189 66,920.00 480.00 0.23 0.88 12,000 0 
190 36,200.00 400.00 0.60 0.88 5,000 0 
191 38,840.00 420.00 0.23 0.88 7,000 0 
192 6,980.00 480.00 1.30 0.88 450 550 
193 21,674.00 312.00 0.20 0.88 3,200 0 
194 49,200.00 300.00 0.18 0.88 8,000 0 
195 13,924.00 312.00 0.52 0.88 1,700 0 
196 26,860.00 320.00 0.45 0.88 700 16,000 
197 12,380.00 240.00 0.22 0.88 1,200 0 
198 16,780.00 480.00 0.48 0.88 2,000 0 
199 25,100.00 300.00 0.14 0.88 3,780 0 
200 16,294.00 240.00 0.18 0.88 4,380 0 
201 56,100.00 300.00 0.30 0.88 6,600 0 
202 5,200.00 300.00 1.75 0.88 400 0 
203 6,240.00 240.00 0.63 0.88 800 0 
204 30,200.00 400.00 0.29 0.88 600 0 
205 35,900.00 300.00 0.33 0.88 3,750 0 
206 18,312.00 156.00 0.77 0.88 0 7,300 
207 2,620.00 120.00 0.23 0.88 0 8,000 
208 110,460.00 360.00 0.09 0.88 12,000 35,000 
209 6,140.00 240.00 0.65 0.88 500 500 
210 20,470.00 360.00 0.24 0.88 3,000 0 
211 187,160.00 360.00 0.06 0.88 30,000 0 
212 6,060.00 360.00 0.83 0.88 200 0 
213 2,000.00 480.00 0.20 0.88 340 0 
214 9,360.00 360.00 1.50 0.88 800 0 
215 30,720.00 360.00 0.17 0.88 5,000 0 
216 7,860.00 360.00 0.42 0.88 1,000 0 
217 30,946.00 348.00 0.45 0.88 4,000 0 
218 9,810.00 360.00 0.05 0.88 888 0 
219 32,755.00 282.00 0.35 0.88 430 0 
220 8,812.00 312.00 0.64 0.88 900 0 
221 27,824.00 312.00 0.14 0.88 5,000 0 
222 22,280.00 480.00 0.19 0.88 3,333 0 
223 3,740.00 240.00 1.08 0.88 500 0 
224 8,800.00 300.00 0.38 0.88 1,600 0 
225 22,395.00 360.00 0.20 0.88 30,000 1,500 
226 4,662.00 300.00 0.44 0.88 500 1,000 
227 7,480.00 240.00 1.75 0.88 350 500 
228 11,660.00 11.61 0.32 0.88 1,733 2,632 
229 41,650.00 300.00 0.17 0.88 6,500 0 
230 68,720.00 480.00 0.40 0.88 8,000 2,000 
231 60,553.00 300.00 0.10 0.88 8,000 0 
232 35,900.00 300.00 0.42 0.88 5,000 0 
233 16,600.00 300.00 0.28 0.88 2,400 0 
234 9,360.00 360.00 0.67 0.88 1,020 0 
235 9,600.00 300.00 1.04 0.88 800 0 
236 11,685.00 360.00 1.03 0.88 666 0 
237 59,036.00 372.00 0.15 0.88 8,320 0 
238 14,100.00 300.00 0.66 0.88 1,250 0 
239 32,220.00 360.00 0.37 0.88 3,120 0 
240 12,800.00 300.00 1.08 0.88 1,100 0 
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241 9,030.00 240.00 0.54 0.88 300 5,000 
242 64,400.00 300.00 0.26 0.88 18,000 0 
243 16,600.00 300.00 0.90 0.88 1,600 0 
244 15,240.00 240.00 3.64 0.88 600 0 
245 28,900.00 300.00 0.68 0.88 3,550 0 
246 7,944.00 144.00 0.60 0.88 700 0 
247 9,360.00 360.00 0.73 0.88 1,000 0 
248 23,280.00 240.00 0.54 0.88 2,200 6,000 
249 6,280.00 240.00 1.00 0.88 600 0 
250 8,915.00 420.00 0.38 0.88 1,920 0 
251 20,600.00 300.00 0.25 0.88 3,500 0 
252 43,500.00 375.00 0.30 0.88 6,666 0 
253 16,800.00 300.00 0.33 0.88 3,000 0 
254 192,940.00 420.00 0.22 0.88 30,000 0 
255 31,960.00 480.00 0.34 0.88 8,000 0 
256 51,050.00 300.00 0.10 0.88 7,600 0 
257 10,622.00 336.00 0.87 0.88 1,200 1,000 
258 54,160.00 432.00 0.26 0.88 8,000 0 
259 21,360.00 360.00 0.32 0.88 4,000 0 
260 28,660.00 360.00 0.52 0.88 4,695 0 
261 142,325.00 360.00 0.11 0.88 25,100 0 
262 27,300.00 450.00 0.38 0.88 4,000 0 
263 18,280.00 480.00 0.05 0.88 0 20,000 
264 33,700.00 240.00 0.16 0.88 2,000 20,000 
265 2,380.00 420.00 0.20 0.88 180 700 
266 12,220.00 360.00 0.06 0.88 1,100 7,000 
267 17,600.00 300.00 0.36 0.88 1,840 0 
268 6,040.00 240.00 0.31 0.88 400 3,000 
269 4,712.00 312.00 0.18 0.88 0 6,000 
270 2,912.00 312.00 0.69 0.88 125 600 
271 60,773.00 510.00 0.04 0.88 5,300 17,500 
272 31,888.00 360.00 0.40 0.88 0 21,600 
273 33,700.00 360.00 0.21 0.88 400 0 
274 52,900.00 300.00 0.27 0.88 0 50,000 
275 9,400.00 300.00 0.08 0.88 0 10,000 
276 13,360.00 360.00 0.08 0.88 0 16,000 
277 4,225.00 300.00 0.36 0.88 200 500 
278 5,542.00 192.00 0.21 0.88 0 3,000 
279 13,260.00 360.00 0.42 0.88 0 8,000 
280 68,470.00 420.00 0.15 0.88 600 60,000 
281 4,415.00 240.00 0.92 0.88 0 2,000 
282 19,009.00 300.00 0.18 0.88 1,175 10,000 
283 32,270.00 420.00 0.55 0.88 1,600 9,000 
284 54,200.00 300.00 0.24 0.88 0 10,000 
285 28,810.00 240.00 0.18 0.88 7,900 0 
286 9,160.00 360.00 0.13 0.88 430 0 
287 27,250.00 300.00 0.72 0.88 1,050 0 
288 15,275.00 300.00 1.49 0.88 400 0 
289 14,240.00 240.00 0.50 0.88 2,000 0 
290 20,525.00 300.00 0.42 0.88 1,400 0 
291 10,367.00 240.00 2.13 0.88 250 0 
292 57,935.00 300.00 0.19 0.88 5,000 0 
293 7,900.00 300.00 0.14 0.88 400 0 
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294 10,925.00 300.00 0.65 0.88 700 1,000 
295 6,950.00 300.00 0.52 0.88 450 2,000 
296 5,630.00 240.00 2.25 0.88 130 0 
297 7,940.00 240.00 0.23 0.88 800 0 
298 26,520.00 480.00 0.45 0.88 1,400 0 
299 2,220.00 330.00 2.14 0.88 50 0 
300 8,600.00 300.00 0.24 0.88 750 0 
301 12,220.00 360.00 4.46 0.88 160 0 
302 20,095.00 360.00 1.08 0.88 1,410 0 
303 21,657.00 360.00 0.51 0.88 1,112 5,000 
304 35,488.00 360.00 0.32 0.88 3,992 0 
305 208,000.00 428.57 0.26 0.88 25,000 0 
306 27,020.00 360.00 0.65 0.88 2,500 0 
307 10,347.00 408.00 0.75 0.88 333 0 
308 17,914.00 300.00 0.40 0.88 1,400 0 
309 13,360.00 240.00 1.88 0.88 175 0 
310 7,700.00 150.00 0.08 0.88 300 0 
311 202,400.00 480.00 0.10 0.88 26,250 0 
312 35,000.00 300.00 0.24 0.88 5,000 0 
313 9,680.00 240.00 0.87 0.88 660 0 
314 22,550.00 400.00 2.39 0.88 900 0 
315 28,172.00 222.00 0.51 0.88 2,960 0 
316 30,480.00 160.00 1.08 0.88 2,000 0 
317 13,630.00 240.00 0.61 0.88 900 0 
318 1,450.00 150.00 0.20 0.88 6,000 0 
319 15,060.00 420.00 1.75 0.88 444 800 
320 11,810.00 360.00 0.78 0.88 1,250 0 
321 4,033.00 240.00 0.89 0.88 0 400 
322 5,862.00 312.00 0.98 0.88 150 0 
323 6,667.00 180.00 0.54 0.88 700 0 
324 32,100.00 150.00 0.56 0.88 3,500 0 
325 23,600.00 300.00 1.33 0.88 2,000 0 
326 7,240.00 240.00 0.23 0.88 0 2,200 
327 36,300.00 150.00 0.32 0.88 6,000 0 
328 31,400.00 150.00 0.44 0.88 4,500 0 
329 10,760.00 360.00 1.18 0.88 850 0 
330 35,444.00 222.00 0.50 0.88 5,000 0 
331 6,130.00 240.00 1.00 0.88 300 0 
332 15,700.00 180.00 1.56 0.88 600 0 
333 16,095.00 180.00 2.09 0.88 500 0 
334 19,770.00 360.00 0.27 0.88 2,222 0 
335 12,999.00 312.00 0.57 0.88 1,366 0 
336 707,200.00 400.00 0.16 0.88 105,840 0 
337 5,360.00 360.00 0.56 0.88 400 0 
338 10,860.00 180.00 0.61 0.88 1,100 0 
339 8,465.00 240.00 0.69 0.88 820 0 
340 15,480.00 240.00 0.78 0.88 140 0 
341 9,200.00 300.00 0.65 0.88 444 0 
342 6,940.00 240.00 0.30 0.88 500 0 
343 8,336.00 336.00 0.27 0.88 430 0 
344 35,980.00 240.00 0.52 0.88 4,500 0 
345 7,462.00 312.00 0.65 0.88 445 2,200 
346 48,700.00 300.00 0.43 0.88 5,500 0 
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347 40,340.00 360.00 0.28 0.88 5,000 0 
348 18,400.00 300.00 0.89 0.88 1,200 0 
349 22,230.00 240.00 0.27 0.88 2,500 0 
350 93,004.00 252.00 0.35 0.88 12,000 0 
351 48,470.00 360.00 0.18 0.88 4,000 19,800 
352 14,920.00 360.00 1.47 0.88 800 0 
353 11,076.00 288.00 0.25 0.88 1,500 0 
354 20,762.00 240.00 0.28 0.88 2,400 0 
355 21,676.00 180.00 0.24 0.88 3,000 0 
356 19,920.00 240.00 0.51 0.88 2,640 0 
357 10,990.00 240.00 0.40 0.88 1,500 0 
358 5,662.00 312.00 1.09 0.88 4,000 700 
359 6,440.00 240.00 0.57 0.88 450 0 
360 31,284.00 192.00 0.22 0.88 3,200 0 
361 21,600.00 300.00 0.43 0.88 1,950 0 
362 11,560.00 360.00 0.53 0.88 700 0 
363 46,480.00 240.00 0.65 0.88 4,500 0 
364 45,235.00 150.00 0.36 0.88 5,414 0 
365 29,410.00 240.00 1.11 0.88 2,200 0 
366 10,268.00 156.00 3.38 0.88 223 0 
367 7,298.00 228.00 0.47 0.88 210 0 
368 18,580.00 180.00 0.96 0.88 550 0 
369 61,240.00 270.00 1.27 0.88 2,450 0 
370 26,124.00 308.00 0.56 0.88 2,000 0 
371 11,440.00 240.00 1.36 0.88 1,022 0 
372 43,600.00 720.00 0.50 0.88 15,000 0 
373 2,197.00 240.00 2.70 0.88 45 0 
374 1,287.00 312.00 0.82 0.88 60 0 
375 8,550.00 300.00 1.32 0.88 450 0 
376 14,395.00 180.00 0.52 0.88 2,149 0 
377 2,140.00 240.00 0.97 0.88 180 0 
378 4,079.00 180.00 2.68 0.88 60 0 
379 34,860.00 300.00 1.02 0.88 2,000 0 
380 2,912.00 312.00 0.50 0.88 400 0 
381 16,840.00 420.00 0.58 0.88 2,400 0 
382 9,880.00 480.00 0.25 0.88 0 7,600 
383 31,600.00 300.00 0.23 0.88 0 24,000 
384 37,900.00 800.00 0.56 0.88 1,600 200 
385 7,980.00 960.00 0.21 0.88 1,400 0 
386 5,180.00 780.00 0.39 0.88 600 0 
387 44,160.00 1,080.00 0.71 0.88 4,444 0 
Mean 26,430.63 294.58 0.62 0.88 3,140.35 2,469.75 
































n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 12,096.00 332.00 0.65 1.12 375 2,190 
2 1,611.00 48.00 0.41 1.12 0 956 
3 9,825.00 300.00 0.04 1.12 0 9,125 
4 24,296.00 259.20 0.12 1.12 0 18,000 
5 13,000.00 250.00 0.47 1.12 400 5,500 
6 2,460.00 160.00 0.16 1.12 0 2,500 
7 1,250.00 150.00 0.33 1.12 0 1,000 
8 11,200.00 100.00 2.07 1.12 0 1,930 
9 2,740.00 60.00 0.20 1.12 0 2,500 
10 3,775.00 33.33 1.79 1.12 0 1,000 
11 5,460.00 200.00 0.11 1.12 136 368 
12 6,010.00 175.00 1.58 1.12 100 500 
13 3,080.00 40.00 0.19 1.12 0 1,664 
14 3,136.00 318.00 0.51 1.12 0 18,000 
15 1,625.00 125.00 0.36 1.12 0 1,200 
16 6,468.00 133.33 1.95 1.12 134 734 
17 17,363.00 400.00 0.43 1.12 0 1,200 
18 12,650.00 300.00 0.32 1.12 800 4,000 
19 950.00 50.00 1.00 1.12 0 300 
20 30,600.00 300.00 0.28 1.12 0 8,000 
21 1,275.00 100.00 0.56 1.12 0 300 
22 1,575.00 175.00 0.84 1.12 50 300 
23 3,050.00 250.00 0.20 1.12 0 10,000 
24 14,180.00 90.00 0.49 1.12 600 6,000 
25 6,900.00 200.00 0.40 1.12 400 1,000 
26 1,575.00 75.00 0.40 1.12 0 1,000 
27 750.00 50.00 0.28 1.12 0 525 
28 5,900.00 100.00 0.46 1.12 0 1,200 
29 10,100.00 100.00 0.24 1.12 660 2,220 
30 5,200.00 200.00 0.17 1.12 0 4,000 
31 1,540.00 40.00 1.72 1.12 0 500 
32 12,750.00 250.00 0.16 1.12 0 5,478 
33 3,700.00 150.00 0.21 1.12 0 1,000 
34 1,975.00 75.00 1.43 1.12 0 600 
35 16,700.00 100.00 0.09 1.12 0 800 
36 1,800.00 200.00 1.56 1.12 0 400 
37 11,652.00 252.00 0.31 1.12 0 3,600 
38 2,948.00 198.00 0.23 1.12 0 1,000 
39 11,504.00 250.67 0.48 1.12 1,200 0 
40 12,150.00 150.00 0.19 1.12 0 10,500 
41 3,200.00 50.00 0.75 1.12 0 3,300 
42 6,650.00 150.00 0.44 1.12 0 4,500 
43 15,250.00 250.00 0.25 1.12 0 5,000 
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44 240,940.00 255.00 0.04 1.12 28,566 56,000 
45 4,550.00 400.00 0.57 1.12 371 0 
46 8,830.00 150.00 0.23 1.12 550 1,620 
47 61,325.00 241.67 0.23 1.12 8,000 0 
48 4,100.00 100.00 0.30 1.12 660 0 
49 2,280.00 100.00 0.27 1.12 0 1,500 
50 2,900.00 100.00 0.37 1.12 0 2,000 
51 15,500.00 175.00 0.07 1.12 1,200 8,000 
52 21,125.00 525.00 0.29 1.12 0 10,000 
53 32,800.00 400.00 0.40 1.12 2,550 8,480 
54 19,800.00 133.33 0.30 1.12 1,600 6,650 
55 1,330.00 50.00 0.56 1.12 0 1,000 
56 30,006.00 200.00 0.43 1.12 3,000 2,000 
57 7,150.00 150.00 0.60 1.12 0 4,800 
58 65,223.00 525.00 0.27 1.12 7,642 0 
59 5,060.00 250.00 0.27 1.12 400 300 
60 31,700.00 250.00 0.31 1.12 0 4,000 
61 27,920.00 375.00 0.62 1.12 3,000 0 
62 51,500.00 600.00 0.47 1.12 1,000 0 
63 43,875.00 666.67 0.80 1.12 0 533 
64 9,110.00 360.00 0.15 1.12 666 333 
65 60,450.00 425.00 0.25 1.12 4,600 0 
66 160,000.00 454.55 0.12 1.12 23,000 0 
67 27,150.00 150.00 0.32 1.12 2,700 0 
68 10,200.00 700.00 0.45 1.12 2,327 0 
69 48,800.00 475.00 0.91 1.12 6,100 0 
70 121,030.00 600.00 0.37 1.12 15,000 500 
71 288,000.00 1,000.00 0.09 1.12 40,000 0 
72 112,400.00 777.78 0.09 1.12 18,000 0 
73 26,450.00 250.00 0.71 1.12 1,500 0 
74 13,060.00 150.00 0.33 1.12 1,200 100,000 
75 20,660.00 400.00 0.11 1.12 2,000 0 
76 12,325.00 150.00 0.08 1.12 60 0 
77 20,800.00 500.00 0.50 1.12 2,400 0 
78 21,850.00 425.00 0.26 1.12 1,600 0 
79 15,285.00 300.00 0.69 1.12 1,200 0 
80 38,220.00 300.00 0.20 1.12 5,000 1,300 
81 60,160.00 450.00 0.24 1.12 8,000 4,600 
82 445,000.00 750.00 0.12 1.12 66,000 0 
83 7,100.00 500.00 2.59 1.12 272 0 
84 17,830.00 65.00 4.60 1.12 300 0 
85 17,160.00 500.00 0.48 1.12 1,600 0 
86 7,050.00 400.00 0.79 1.12 637 0 
87 21,055.00 300.00 0.36 1.12 2,400 0 
88 27,720.00 1,200.00 0.38 1.12 0 13,440 
89 13,600.00 75.00 1.17 1.12 0 4,000 
90 236,230.00 625.00 0.25 1.12 0 30,575 
91 62,000.00 600.00 0.08 1.12 6,000 0 
92 4,200.00 200.00 0.29 1.12 0 3,500 
93 39,600.00 600.00 0.17 1.12 0 33,600 
94 3,600.00 200.00 0.12 1.12 0 3,000 
95 6,850.00 150.00 0.31 1.12 0 4,000 
96 27,350.00 550.00 0.19 1.12 0 6,600 
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97 34,000.00 250.00 0.08 1.12 800 0 
98 89,000.00 500.00 0.40 1.12 2,250 0 
99 45,305.00 700.00 0.21 1.12 1,809 0 
100 113,500.00 500.00 2.29 1.12 0 5,211 
101 80,500.00 625.00 0.24 1.12 8,000 0 
102 58,900.00 233.33 0.72 1.12 0 4,400 
103 44,331.00 500.00 0.77 1.12 1,600 0 
104 473,650.00 777.78 0.32 1.12 38,700 0 
105 25,005.00 350.00 0.50 1.12 174 1,650 
106 5,125.00 75.00 1.32 1.12 240 0 
107 27,904.00 600.00 0.49 1.12 840 0 
108 501,400.00 545.45 0.28 1.12 60,000 0 
109 14,500.00 250.00 0.32 1.12 1,035 0 
110 8,980.00 600.00 0.29 1.12 60 0 
111 24,250.00 600.00 0.40 1.12 995 0 
112 31,450.00 450.00 0.36 1.12 1,800 0 
113 29,445.00 400.00 2.05 1.12 0 2,500 
114 18,400.00 400.00 3.47 1.12 800 0 
115 46,990.00 250.00 0.54 1.12 1,980 0 
116 21,700.00 800.00 0.26 1.12 400 0 
117 5,550.00 233.33 0.24 1.12 220 0 
118 41,300.00 500.00 0.20 1.12 0 10,000 
119 49,700.00 216.67 0.61 1.12 4,000 1,500 
120 14,800.00 300.00 0.42 1.12 800 0 
121 7,650.00 600.00 0.39 1.12 200 0 
122 22,792.00 700.00 0.81 1.12 909 0 
123 34,070.00 500.00 0.87 1.12 1,111 0 
124 18,050.00 150.00 0.56 1.12 1,100 0 
125 16,340.00 540.00 0.26 1.12 4,250 0 
126 10,300.00 150.00 1.25 1.12 800 0 
Mean 39,023.93 323.14 0.56 1.12 3,260.55 3,821.29 







Flour 1880 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 
Obs. 
No.  












n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1  6,520.00  80.00  0.77  0.83   165  4,365  
2  5,725.00  150.00  0.67  0.83   182  4,802  
3  4,550.00  300.00  0.45  0.83   143  3,788  
4  7,350.00  175.00  0.83  0.83   181  4,774  
5 810.00  60.00  0.19  0.83   33   868  
6  5,160.00  160.00  0.22  0.83   195  5,158  
7 14,875.00  187.50  0.32  0.83   538  14,204  
8  3,385.00  260.00  0.12  0.83   149  3,945  
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9  1,450.00  33.33  1.07  0.83   32   845  
10  6,400.00  66.67  0.80  0.83   160  4,216  
11 12,700.00  100.00  0.12  0.83   538  14,204  
12 11,650.00  225.00  0.38  0.83   366  9,672  
13  5,300.00  75.00  0.43  0.83   199  5,264  
14  9,506.00  273.00  0.58  0.83   256  6,764  
15  6,300.00  100.00  0.57  0.83   187  4,937  
16 15,200.00  266.67  0.22  0.83   573  15,128  
17  2,470.00  140.00  0.08  0.83   107  2,818  
18 16,578.00  114.00  0.12  0.83   699  18,459  
19  8,700.00  450.00  0.12  0.83   361  9,525  
20  5,405.00  30.00  2.38  0.83   72  1,894  
21  1,215.00  37.50  0.17  0.83   56  1,465  
22  2,276.00  78.00  0.51  0.83   67  1,759  
23  8,890.00  300.00  0.24  0.83   356  9,390  
24  4,237.00  56.00  0.02  0.83   192  5,073  
25  2,530.00  125.00  0.60  0.83   72  1,894  
26  4,700.00  50.00  0.44  0.83   145  3,833  
27 10,875.00  300.00  0.39  0.83   440  11,611  
28  6,000.00  250.00  0.26  0.83   243  6,425  
29  6,806.00  306.00  0.36  0.83   235  6,200  
30  2,417.00  10.00  0.43  0.83   79  2,096  
31  4,110.00  100.00  0.71  0.83   120  3,156  
32  8,470.00  145.00  0.29  0.83   368  9,725  
33  2,890.00  183.33  0.37  0.83   114  3,021  
34  1,394.00  75.00  2.00  0.83   21   564  
35  3,325.00  112.50  0.33  0.83   128  3,382  
36  9,450.00  150.00  1.00  0.83   213  5,636  
37  7,635.00  85.00  0.06  0.83   360  9,492  
38 10,060.00  125.00  0.30  0.83   359  9,469  
39  9,059.00  200.00  0.26  0.83   331  8,736  
40 77,350.00  228.57  0.07  0.83  3,448  91,027  
41  1,700.00  100.00  0.32  0.83   67  1,781  
42 12,195.00  175.00  0.11  0.83   592  15,624  
43  1,850.00  100.00  0.38  0.83   67  1,759  
44  8,235.00  175.00  0.28  0.83   320  8,455  
45  9,525.00  200.00  0.43  0.83   301  7,947  
46  6,638.00  78.00  0.07  0.83   295  7,801  
47  1,160.00  150.00  0.75  0.83   34   902  
48  8,525.00  200.00  1.03  0.83   207  5,456  
49  2,130.00  130.00  0.83  0.83   51  1,353  
50  7,166.00  125.00  0.63  0.83   205  5,411  
51  5,770.00  175.00  0.17  0.83   253  6,668  
52  1,275.00  125.00  0.33  0.83   64  1,691  
53  1,700.00  75.00  2.40  0.83   21   564  
54  4,172.00  100.00  2.00  0.83   64  1,691  
55  7,425.00  150.00  0.32  0.83   269  7,102  
56  3,655.00  150.00  0.87  0.83   98  2,593  
57  1,075.00  125.00  0.19  0.83   45  1,197  
58  7,784.00  150.00  0.18  0.83   354  9,356  
59 24,100.00  83.33  0.08  0.83  1,029  27,167  
60 11,997.00  257.33  0.30  0.83   423  11,155  
61 11,997.00  257.33  0.30  0.83   423  11,155  
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62 166,500.00  312.50  0.25  0.83  5,978  157,818  
63  3,800.00  250.00  0.33  0.83   128  3,371  
64  4,300.00  150.00  0.81  0.83   111  2,931  
65  4,250.00  200.00  0.71  0.83   120  3,156  
66 21,090.00  300.00  0.56  0.83   615  16,232  
67 51,600.00  400.00  0.53  0.83  1,600  42,245  
68 16,400.00  250.00  0.19  0.83   692  18,262  
69  5,170.00  70.00  0.38  0.83   171  4,509  
70 30,200.00  300.00  0.18  0.83  1,204  31,789  
71  2,710.00  66.67  0.17  0.83   124  3,269  
72  3,750.00  75.00  0.27  0.83   155  4,103  
73  2,200.00  150.00  1.42  0.83   45  1,195  
74  8,000.00  125.00  1.40  0.83   152  4,024  
75 216,000.00  500.00  0.52  0.83  6,136  161,989  
76 17,900.00  342.86  1.19  0.83   358  9,447  
77 587.00  25.00  0.60  0.83   21   564  
78  2,410.00  28.57  0.19  0.83   115  3,044  
79  4,325.00  30.00  0.39  0.83   142  3,750  
80 12,100.00  25.00  0.51  0.83   418  11,038  
81  9,530.00  96.00  0.61  0.83   286  7,539  
82  5,195.00  17.50  0.18  0.83   284  7,508  
83 17,600.00  400.00  0.64  0.83   484  12,772  
84 105,650.00  150.00  0.04  0.83  4,654  122,873  
85  3,170.00  60.00  0.45  0.83   142  3,752  
86 29,900.00  400.00  0.28  0.83  1,238  32,691  
87 600.00  25.00  1.50  0.83   9   225  
88 13,200.00  300.00  0.55  0.83   389  10,258  
89 184,800.00  463.16  0.16  0.83  7,771  205,164  
90 13,558.00  258.33  2.50  0.83   171  4,509  
91  6,990.00  240.00  0.63  0.83   204  5,394  
92  3,600.00  100.00  0.11  0.83   162  4,284  
93 20,600.00  300.00  0.67  0.83   640  16,909  
94 23,100.00  300.00  0.59  0.83   709  18,724  
95  9,900.00  100.00  1.33  0.83   192  5,073  
96  4,945.00  87.50  1.15  0.83   111  2,931  
97  8,000.00  50.00  0.06  0.83   388  10,238  
98  6,388.00  210.00  0.10  0.83   264  6,981  
99  4,675.00  425.00  3.33  0.83   51  1,353  
100  5,195.00  87.50  0.24  0.83   180  4,745  
101  2,928.00  205.00  0.37  0.83   115  3,044  
102  1,525.00  50.00  0.54  0.83   51  1,353  
103  3,650.00  78.00  0.60  0.83   107  2,818  
104  4,650.00  150.00  0.44  0.83   154  4,058  
105  6,330.00  150.00  0.30  0.83   213  5,636  
106  2,060.00  150.00  0.53  0.83   64  1,691  
107  2,330.00  200.00  0.36  0.83   94  2,480  
108  2,790.00  125.00  0.51  0.83   85  2,232  
109  2,700.00  50.00  0.92  0.83   70  1,837  
110  3,600.00  50.00  0.31  0.83   139  3,664  
111  2,500.00  75.00  0.22  0.83   96  2,536  
112  3,375.00  150.00  0.54  0.83   120  3,156  
113  3,075.00  60.00  0.29  0.83   120  3,156  
114  2,220.00  30.00  1.60  0.83   40  1,060  
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115  2,115.00  100.00  0.30  0.83   99  2,615  
116  2,317.00  50.00  0.61  0.83   70  1,855  
117  7,100.00  142.86  0.61  0.83   210  5,546  
118  2,900.00  300.00  0.17  0.83   128  3,382  
119  4,400.00  150.00  2.92  0.83   51  1,353  
120  6,150.00  250.00  1.67  0.83   102  2,705  
121  3,825.00  125.00  0.31  0.83   137  3,607  
122  6,925.00  250.00  1.26  0.83   136  3,578  
123  5,254.00  200.00  0.60  0.83   143  3,787  
124  5,949.00  525.00  0.91  0.83   141  3,720  
125  8,640.00  240.00  0.47  0.83   274  7,233  
126  9,188.00  156.50  0.48  0.83   268  7,074  
127 18,363.00  313.00  0.10  0.83   854  22,545  
128 31,800.00  150.00  0.06  0.83  1,397  36,873  
129  2,355.00  100.00  0.48  0.83   90  2,367  
130  8,668.00  156.00  0.12  0.83   360  9,507  
131  4,560.00  150.00  0.14  0.83   186  4,924  
132 38,500.00  233.33  0.19  0.83  1,573  41,540  
133  8,100.00  150.00  0.21  0.83   299  7,891  
134  3,400.00  250.00  2.23  0.83   48  1,263  
135  7,925.00  150.00  0.32  0.83   306  8,083  
136  9,000.00  197.50  0.44  0.83   292  7,705  
137  6,350.00  50.00  0.41  0.83   209  5,518  
138  6,060.00  235.00  0.56  0.83   191  5,041  
139 13,150.00  125.00  0.16  0.83   529  13,978  
140  2,015.00  53.75  0.96  0.83   44  1,172  
141  7,300.00  250.00  1.13  0.83   171  4,509  
142  6,450.00  200.00  0.13  0.83   321  8,477  
143 10,500.00  150.00  0.08  0.83   510  13,471  
144  1,550.00  150.00  0.21  0.83   62  1,635  
145  4,600.00  100.00  0.67  0.83   128  3,382  
146  3,580.00  300.00  1.00  0.83   85  2,255  
147  4,900.00  133.33  1.34  0.83   96  2,525  
148 69,150.00  300.00  1.31  0.83  1,304  34,440  
149 10,350.00  66.67  0.19  0.83   402  10,602  
150  3,500.00  212.50  0.18  0.83   141  3,731  
151  1,750.00  100.00  0.09  0.83   92  2,435  
152 18,274.00  470.00  0.26  0.83   662  17,473  
153  7,130.00  100.00  1.11  0.83   154  4,058  
154  8,200.00  250.00  0.13  0.83   327  8,624  
155  8,900.00  300.00  0.39  0.83   324  8,567  
156  1,850.00  250.00  0.33  0.83   64  1,691  
157  4,187.00  275.00  0.67  0.83   128  3,382  
158  6,250.00  200.00  0.16  0.83   265  6,989  
159  5,725.00  225.00  0.32  0.83   199  5,242  
160 11,300.00  150.00  0.71  0.83   302  7,964  
161  5,850.00  75.00  2.11  0.83   81  2,142  
162  5,400.00  250.00  0.11  0.83   235  6,200  
163 11,025.00  325.00  0.48  0.83   357  9,424  
164 11,300.00  150.00  0.75  0.83   342  9,018  
165  5,200.00  150.00  0.33  0.83   192  5,073  
166 11,400.00  150.00  0.36  0.83   418  11,047  
167  1,270.00  40.00  0.34  0.83   64  1,680  
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168 15,300.00  350.00  0.45  0.83   474  12,513  
169  3,750.00  100.00  0.46  0.83   139  3,675  
170  1,400.00  83.33  0.11  0.83   79  2,085  
171 21,300.00  300.00  0.02  0.83   956  25,251  
172  1,974.00  0.33  1.05  0.83   41  1,071  
173  5,245.00  150.00  0.21  0.83   199  5,258  
174  1,200.00  175.00  0.13  0.83   171  4,509  
175  4,500.00  800.00  0.67  0.83   128  3,382  
176  3,100.00  50.00  0.40  0.83   107  2,818  
177  4,310.00  120.00  0.30  0.83   140  3,697  
178  5,350.00  50.00  0.26  0.83   199  5,242  
179 11,650.00  250.00  1.17  0.83   219  5,772  
180  2,929.00  0.33  1.82  0.83   47  1,240  
181  4,570.00  60.00  0.14  0.83   187  4,943  
182  3,900.00  50.00  0.17  0.83   205  5,411  
183 37,100.00  200.00  0.17  0.83  1,477  39,004  
184 20,270.00  175.00  0.16  0.83   799  21,103  
185  5,810.00  16.67  0.69  0.83   154  4,058  
186  2,175.00  125.00  0.28  0.83   77  2,046  
187  2,450.00  62.50  0.38  0.83   90  2,367  
188  4,092.00  322.00  0.66  0.83   97  2,559  
189 14,425.00  150.00  0.14  0.83   608  16,064  
190  1,355.00  50.00  0.26  0.83   49  1,296  
191  4,670.00  90.00  0.25  0.83   173  4,565  
192 18,000.00  250.00  0.54  0.83   635  16,774  
193 32,250.00  225.00  0.33  0.83  1,110  29,309  
194 30,000.00  416.67  0.13  0.83  1,318  34,805  
195  2,140.00  50.00  0.86  0.83   50  1,316  
196 11,900.00  250.00  0.47  0.83   367  9,695  
197  7,095.00  271.00  0.53  0.83   209  5,524  
198  6,350.00  200.00  0.80  0.83   160  4,216  
199 14,600.00  400.00  0.31  0.83   546  14,418  
200 11,970.00  400.00  0.81  0.83   314  8,299  
201  9,650.00  250.00  0.33  0.83   320  8,455  
202  5,525.00  120.00  0.15  0.83   213  5,636  
203  4,002.00  60.00  1.37  0.83   75  1,976  
204  3,450.00  40.00  0.53  0.83   96  2,542  
205  3,500.00  100.00  0.19  0.83   135  3,562  
206  5,000.00  200.00  0.63  0.83   135  3,573  
207 980.00  25.00  0.81  0.83   26   699  
208  8,400.00  150.00  0.24  0.83   363  9,582  
209  4,775.00  450.00  0.41  0.83   155  4,090  
210  3,030.00  180.00  0.10  0.83   128  3,382  
211 50,800.00  62.50  0.08  0.83  2,562  67,636  
212  3,540.00  175.00  0.10  0.83   149  3,945  
213  2,326.00  38.00  0.15  0.83   97  2,562  
214 13,600.00  250.00  0.09  0.83   598  15,782  
215  2,506.00  39.00  0.59  0.83   72  1,902  
216  6,645.00  62.50  0.75  0.83   171  4,509  
217  1,884.00  80.00  0.67  0.83   51  1,353  
218  1,790.00  50.00  1.11  0.83   38  1,015  
219 17,900.00  50.00  0.23  0.83   640  16,909  
220  2,750.00  50.00  0.53  0.83   81  2,126  
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221 41,181.00  250.00  0.17  0.83  2,040  53,863  
222  3,550.00  83.33  1.98  0.83   54  1,420  
223 18,500.00  300.00  0.40  0.83   640  16,909  
224 15,100.00  125.00  1.07  0.83   320  8,438  
225  8,285.00  60.00  0.47  0.83   260  6,876  
226  1,050.00  25.00  0.18  0.83   48  1,274  
227 27,050.00  312.50  0.26  0.83  1,003  26,491  
228  4,300.00  83.33  0.77  0.83   110  2,916  
229 33,120.00  360.00  0.69  0.83   932  24,609  
230  8,900.00  50.00  0.77  0.83   222  5,862  
231  4,170.00  150.00  2.00  0.83   64  1,691  
232 10,400.00  66.67  0.53  0.83   320  8,455  
233  4,775.00  66.67  0.42  0.83   154  4,060  
234  2,040.00  200.00  0.64  0.83   67  1,759  
235 120,000.00  400.00  0.08  0.83  6,191  163,455  
236 60,900.00  150.00  0.21  0.83  2,391  63,127  
237  5,475.00  20.83  8.77  0.83   24   643  
238 43,000.00  166.67  0.10  0.83  1,745  46,077  
239  3,320.00  50.00  0.46  0.83   112  2,958  
240  6,850.00  62.50  0.68  0.83   188  4,960  
241  6,725.00  66.67  0.26  0.83   244  6,448  
242  2,892.00  36.00  0.33  0.83   107  2,818  
243 13,500.00  75.00  0.57  0.83   374  9,864  
244  1,130.00  150.00  0.18  0.83   60  1,578  
245  6,975.00  237.50  0.36  0.83   239  6,313  
246 13,800.00  200.00  2.22  0.83   192  5,073  
247  9,792.00  342.00  0.16  0.83   384  10,145  
248  5,860.00  175.00  1.48  0.83   101  2,660  
249 11,830.00  200.00  2.00  0.83   171  4,509  
250  9,620.00  200.00  0.54  0.83   285  7,536  
251 175,000.00  200.00  0.28  0.83  6,020  158,945  
252 11,265.00  250.00  0.74  0.83   288  7,609  
253  3,025.00  300.00  0.81  0.83   74  1,958  
254  5,190.00  62.50  0.41  0.83   168  4,437  
255 37,475.00  175.00  0.19  0.83  1,350  35,650  
256 11,300.00  50.00  5.62  0.83   76  2,005  
257 71,012.00  337.33  0.24  0.83  2,626  69,327  
258  4,890.00  125.00  0.30  0.83   171  4,509  
259  4,053.00  313.00  0.30  0.83   171  4,512  
260  9,100.00  166.67  0.36  0.83   293  7,735  
261 33,850.00  166.67  0.12  0.83  1,665  43,964  
262  4,500.00  300.00  0.20  0.83   170  4,481  
263  1,950.00  200.00  1.00  0.83   43  1,127  
264  7,325.00  100.00  0.24  0.83   269  7,102  
265 18,250.00  125.00  0.33  0.83   640  16,909  
266 10,400.00  150.00  0.31  0.83   342  9,018  
267 16,500.00  187.50  0.16  0.83   654  17,279  
268  4,940.00  130.00  3.33  0.83   51  1,353  
269  8,372.00  172.00  0.80  0.83   213  5,636  
270  7,800.00  75.00  0.57  0.83   299  7,891  
271 17,410.00  100.00  0.26  0.83   645  17,022  
272 10,000.00  270.00  1.06  0.83   201  5,298  
273  1,160.00  150.00  0.60  0.83   36   947  
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274  2,196.00  91.00  2.50  0.83   26   676  
275  2,650.00  75.00  0.32  0.83   107  2,818  
276  2,289.00  0.33  0.44  0.83   77  2,029  
277 20,800.00  100.00  0.16  0.83   811  21,418  
278  3,475.00  225.00  0.37  0.83   116  3,068  
279  5,270.00  250.00  0.44  0.83   192  5,073  
280  1,925.00  75.00  0.77  0.83   56  1,465  
281  2,755.00  135.00  0.07  0.83   115  3,027  
282  4,400.00  400.00  0.74  0.83   115  3,044  
283 16,750.00  175.00  0.27  0.83   639  16,869  
284 23,850.00  50.00  11.00  0.83   85  2,255  
285 14,870.00  106.67  0.20  0.83   628  16,582  
286 13,390.00  166.67  0.25  0.83   512  13,527  
287 17,405.00  202.50  0.41  0.83   619  16,345  
288  8,450.00  125.00  0.40  0.83   320  8,455  
289 14,650.00  116.67  0.39  0.83   497  13,133  
290  4,530.00  500.00  0.26  0.83   167  4,396  
291 13,510.00  250.00  0.47  0.83   450  11,893  
292  8,250.00  100.00  0.13  0.83   363  9,582  
293 111,460.00  727.27  0.49  0.83  3,487  92,070  
294 263,237.00  583.33  0.17  0.83   10,176  268,663  
295  8,120.00  210.00  0.57  0.83   241  6,363  
296 48,000.00  480.00  0.67  0.83  1,281  33,818  
297  5,750.00  375.00  0.56  0.83   152  4,002  
298 60,400.00  350.00  0.22  0.83  2,174  57,401  
299  5,030.00  325.00  2.47  0.83   69  1,826  
300 48,150.00  150.00  0.06  0.83  2,775  73,273  
301 48,000.00  500.00  0.43  0.83  1,494  39,455  
302 28,800.00  416.67  0.75  0.83   854  22,545  
303  2,280.00  60.00  0.83  0.83   56  1,488  
304 51,410.00  360.00  0.79  0.83  1,243  32,815  
305  4,220.00  60.00  0.02  0.83   235  6,200  
306  6,680.00  26.67  0.30  0.83   288  7,609  
307 125,500.00  200.00  0.29  0.83  4,485  118,420  
308 605,000.00  444.44  0.23  0.83   23,483  620,000  
309  4,600.00  300.00  0.61  0.83   140  3,692  
310 26,800.00  250.00  0.43  0.83   993  26,209  
311 159,900.00  218.18  0.25  0.83  6,065  160,129  
312 61,500.00  333.33  0.63  0.83  1,708  45,091  
313 21,650.00  150.00  0.24  0.83   880  23,243  
314 22,800.00  200.00  0.92  0.83   512  13,527  
315 35,950.00  450.00  0.11  0.83  1,520  40,131  
316 87,000.00  444.44  0.27  0.83  3,147  83,080  
317 397,133.00  650.00  0.33  0.83   13,039  344,256  
318 21,950.00  666.67  0.71  0.83   598  15,782  
319 49,900.00  300.00  0.40  0.83  1,598  42,188  
320 21,900.00  300.00  0.25  0.83   854  22,545  
321 55,420.00  242.86  0.16  0.83  2,170  57,295  
322 11,230.00  300.00  4.17  0.83   96  2,548  
323 18,850.00  166.67  0.24  0.83   878  23,188  
324 401,350.00  457.14  0.19  0.83   17,079  450,909  
325 323,500.00  727.27  0.10  0.83   12,937  341,564  
326  6,370.00  200.00  0.32  0.83   268  7,087  
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327 29,760.00  300.00  0.19  0.83  1,134  29,940  
328 11,900.00  200.00  0.67  0.83   320  8,455  
329 16,550.00  200.00  0.30  0.83   567  14,965  
330 17,119.00  272.80  1.17  0.83   365  9,649  
331 11,500.00  225.00  0.15  0.83   854  22,545  
332 256,000.00  266.67  0.57  0.83  7,472  197,273  
333 21,400.00  200.00  0.57  0.83   596  15,725  
334 71,300.00  583.33  0.26  0.83  2,493  65,833  
335  8,852.00  234.00  0.17  0.83   354  9,356  
336 271,000.00  333.33  0.21  0.83   10,034  264,909  
337 15,000.00  500.00  0.70  0.83   427  11,273  
338 23,400.00  375.00  1.54  0.83   417  11,002  
339  4,640.00  100.00  0.71  0.83   121  3,190  
340  5,752.00  17.33  0.09  0.83   342  9,018  
341  6,025.00  300.00  0.41  0.83   206  5,445  
342 89,375.00  563.33  0.23  0.83  3,192  84,286  
343 25,512.00  237.33  0.24  0.83  1,084  28,633  
344 12,900.00  200.00  0.58  0.83   371  9,796  
345 15,524.00  208.00  0.32  0.83   541  14,287  
346  8,510.00  50.00  0.30  0.83   317  8,382  
347  6,500.00  200.00  0.56  0.83   192  5,073  
348 17,700.00  150.00  0.42  0.83   608  16,047  
349 12,850.00  250.00  0.75  0.83   342  9,018  
350 17,100.00  200.00  0.21  0.83   619  16,345  
351 10,985.00  135.00  2.68  0.83   127  3,366  
352  8,325.00  400.00  0.09  0.83   384  10,145  
353 133,330.00  395.00  0.12  0.83  5,558  146,729  
354 17,610.00  300.00  0.51  0.83   503  13,279  
355 23,875.00  625.00  0.29  0.83   808  21,334  
356 25,224.00  242.80  0.61  0.83   710  18,753  
357 18,850.00  400.00  0.35  0.83   734  19,389  
358 133,000.00  750.00  0.36  0.83  4,697  124,000  
359 30,340.00  340.00  0.30  0.83  1,409  37,200  
360 19,600.00  266.67  0.31  0.83   686  18,104  
361 20,492.00  40.00  0.37  0.83   686  18,120  
362 35,600.00  500.00  0.35  0.83  1,448  38,243  
363 21,030.00  300.00  1.76  0.83   365  9,633  
364 24,350.00  300.00  0.25  0.83  1,017  26,852  
365  7,900.00  300.00  1.51  0.83   142  3,743  
366 65,200.00  166.67  0.22  0.83  2,952  77,951  
367 18,386.00  349.00  0.24  0.83   721  19,041  
368  7,650.00  150.00  0.39  0.83   328  8,652  
369 35,003.00  275.00  0.43  0.83  1,184  31,254  
370 50,250.00  250.00  0.23  0.83  1,890  49,910  
371 17,725.00  300.00  0.29  0.83   742  19,581  
372 156,020.00  503.33  0.10  0.83  6,151  162,395  
373 27,700.00  450.00  0.38  0.83  1,110  29,309  
374 25,825.00  250.00  0.12  0.83  1,212  32,009  
375 12,871.00  224.67  0.75  0.83   340  8,984  
376 39,150.00  500.00  0.43  0.83  1,388  36,636  
377 109,000.00  500.00  0.24  0.83  4,440  117,236  
378 33,370.00  225.00  1.33  0.83   674  17,783  
379 11,373.00  83.33  0.49  0.83   346  9,142  
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380 31,950.00  750.00  0.40  0.83  1,067  28,182  
381 38,400.00  333.33  0.70  0.83  1,099  29,027  
382 93,500.00  428.57  0.35  0.83  3,437  90,745  
383 207,400.00  540.00  0.20  0.83  7,621  201,218  
384 62,045.00  848.57  0.22  0.83  2,374  62,676  
385 30,200.00  400.00  1.14  0.83   749  19,784  
386 72,880.00  326.00  0.43  0.83  2,275  60,059  
387 13,050.00  120.00  9.20  0.83   56  1,471  
388 46,500.00  500.00  0.06  0.83  2,135  56,364  
389 90,000.00  500.00  0.21  0.83  4,035  106,527  
390 103,500.00  500.00  0.16  0.83  4,056  107,091  
391 20,481.00  203.00  0.36  0.83   714  18,859  
392 16,884.00  450.00  0.41  0.83   619  16,338  
393 95,030.00  375.00  0.25  0.83  3,423  90,385  
394 10,650.00  325.00  0.40  0.83   427  11,273  
395 12,900.00  333.33  1.33  0.83   256  6,764  
396 63,226.00  508.50  0.11  0.83  2,641  69,720  
397 31,650.00  375.00  0.19  0.83  1,345  35,509  
398 54,500.00  375.00  0.21  0.83  2,417  63,804  
399 13,673.00  300.00  0.72  0.83   354  9,359  
400 27,674.00  360.00  0.53  0.83   967  25,521  
401 26,750.00  375.00  0.14  0.83  1,249  32,984  
402 16,200.00  162.50  0.40  0.83   538  14,204  
403 36,189.00  564.00  0.12  0.83  1,489  39,319  
404 11,380.00  375.00  0.61  0.83   350  9,244  
405 36,000.00  150.00  0.33  0.83  1,298  34,269  
406  9,300.00  333.33  0.17  0.83   376  9,920  
407 20,360.00  900.00  0.28  0.83  1,057  27,907  
408 22,269.00  400.00  0.43  0.83   795  20,989  
409 13,025.00  425.00  0.40  0.83   427  11,273  
410 58,850.00  350.00  0.19  0.83  2,412  63,691  
411 38,300.00  266.67  0.38  0.83  1,337  35,292  
412 54,625.00  300.00  0.29  0.83  2,049  54,109  
413 70,000.00  500.00  0.16  0.83  2,635  69,576  
414 326,000.00  642.86  0.27  0.83   11,742  310,000  
415 37,700.00  550.00  0.18  0.83  1,579  41,698  
416 15,288.00  269.00  0.13  0.83   651  17,198  
417 44,760.00  225.00  0.79  0.83  1,358  35,855  
418 18,050.00  425.00  0.16  0.83   786  20,742  
419 27,290.00  330.00  0.45  0.83   855  22,579  
420 33,500.00  500.00  0.40  0.83  1,067  28,182  
421 59,009.00  471.80  0.34  0.83  1,904  50,276  
422 108,200.00  500.00  0.28  0.83  3,843  101,455  
423 103,542.00  354.20  0.22  0.83  3,924  103,592  
424 41,300.00  600.00  0.63  0.83  1,355  35,763  
425 128,800.00  471.43  0.72  0.83  3,262  86,124  
426 23,290.00  695.00  0.44  0.83   769  20,291  
427 19,190.00  350.00  0.35  0.83   742  19,593  
428 505,500.00  590.91  0.24  0.83   17,471  461,274  
429 26,144.00  552.00  1.05  0.83   570  15,058  
430  8,000.00  300.00  0.89  0.83   192  5,073  
431  7,700.00  233.33  0.24  0.83   279  7,366  
432 26,575.00  265.00  0.71  0.83   726  19,164  
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433 36,500.00  642.86  2.50  0.83   427  11,273  
434  5,200.00  325.00  0.48  0.83   179  4,735  
435 131,786.00  436.36  0.16  0.83  5,212  137,599  
436 15,460.00  360.00  0.19  0.83   672  17,739  
437 32,951.00  545.00  0.34  0.83  1,208  31,891  
438 63,700.00  350.00  0.13  0.83  3,416  90,182  
439  3,672.00  225.00  0.35  0.83   122  3,212  
440 15,500.00  166.67  0.29  0.83   598  15,782  
441 25,055.00  235.00  0.04  0.83  1,184  31,258  
442 53,400.00  400.00  0.12  0.83  2,135  56,364  
443 18,484.00  333.33  0.18  0.83   727  19,200  
444  8,200.00  100.00  0.10  0.83   413  10,901  
445  7,730.00  160.00  0.22  0.83   290  7,665  
446 36,250.00  333.33  0.17  0.83  1,494  39,455  
447 20,350.00  225.00  0.20  0.83   744  19,648  
448 25,280.00  226.67  1.33  0.83   483  12,747  
449 27,100.00  250.00  0.72  0.83   709  18,724  
450 25,948.00  312.00  0.59  0.83   726  19,164  
451  1,665.00  75.00  0.17  0.83   64  1,702  
452 12,783.00  354.00  0.50  0.83   384  10,145  
453  4,205.00  19.38  1.33  0.83   80  2,119  
454  9,500.00  200.00  0.42  0.83   308  8,122  
455 28,800.00  250.00  0.32  0.83  1,067  28,182  
456  2,500.00  75.00  0.75  0.83   85  2,255  
457 31,800.00  266.67  0.40  0.83  1,067  28,182  
458  4,144.00  92.00  0.26  0.83   184  4,847  
459 957,600.00  666.67  0.17  0.83   38,427  1,014,545  
460 1,720,500.00  714.29  0.09  0.83   69,083  1,823,927  
461 31,910.00  370.00  0.19  0.83  1,200  31,676  
462 16,600.00  133.33  0.28  0.83   606  16,007  
463 57,980.00  420.00  0.35  0.83  1,964  51,855  
464 26,400.00  600.00  0.16  0.83  1,052  27,776  
465 13,692.00  357.14  0.40  0.83   427  11,273  
466 18,975.00  150.00  0.79  0.83   544  14,356  
467  8,850.00  500.00  1.50  0.83   171  4,509  
468 11,500.00  150.00  1.95  0.83   175  4,622  
469 21,300.00  150.00  0.24  0.83   874  23,075  
470 31,855.00  214.29  1.00  0.83   726  19,164  
471 24,008.00  166.67  0.20  0.83   854  22,545  
472 37,550.00  325.00  0.35  0.83  1,276  33,694  
473 14,600.00  300.00  0.20  0.83   536  14,159  
474 21,376.00  225.00  0.10  0.83   898  23,716  
475  9,855.00  225.00  0.67  0.83   256  6,764  
476 10,400.00  50.00  0.38  0.83   342  9,018  
477  7,840.00  450.00  1.85  0.83   116  3,054  
478 17,200.00  200.00  0.33  0.83   640  16,909  
479  5,990.00  100.00  1.36  0.83   113  2,974  
480 13,750.00  83.33  0.16  0.83   546  14,411  
481 47,750.00  400.00  0.32  0.83  1,599  42,216  
482  7,050.00  175.00  0.38  0.83   222  5,862  
483  3,250.00  83.33  2.20  0.83   43  1,127  
484 14,700.00  250.00  0.31  0.83   555  14,655  
485 15,050.00  600.00  0.31  0.83   555  14,655  
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486 41,500.00  400.00  0.54  0.83  1,191  31,451  
487 33,916.00  450.00  0.83  0.83   825  21,790  
488  7,600.00  266.67  0.58  0.83   222  5,862  
489 14,094.00  337.50  0.53  0.83   406  10,709  
490  9,870.00  350.00  0.56  0.83   384  10,145  
491 15,100.00  366.67  0.77  0.83   555  14,655  
492  2,900.00  80.00  1.00  0.83   64  1,691  
493  5,150.00  100.00  0.54  0.83   143  3,782  
494 19,100.00  266.67  0.06  0.83   841  22,196  
495 10,892.00  156.00  0.74  0.83   287  7,589  
496  9,290.00  450.00  2.99  0.83   100  2,643  
497 14,200.00  500.00  0.33  0.83   512  13,527  
498 27,580.00  325.00  0.52  0.83   828  21,869  
499 22,890.00  18.00  1.04  0.83   512  13,527  
500 18,250.00  333.33  0.47  0.83   540  14,266  
501 30,300.00  300.00  0.75  0.83  1,025  27,055  
502 15,950.00  300.00  0.13  0.83   650  17,163  
503 15,296.00  450.00  1.25  0.83   273  7,215  
504 24,700.00  100.00  0.39  0.83   871  22,996  
505  6,650.00  150.00  0.55  0.83   196  5,163  
506 12,210.00  203.00  0.85  0.83   301  7,936  
507 111,808.00  441.60  0.15  0.83  4,337  114,498  
508 12,161.00  100.00  0.63  0.83   340  8,973  
509 100,300.00  416.67  0.17  0.83  3,959  104,532  
510 12,950.00  200.00  0.58  0.83   367  9,695  
511  2,100.00  50.00  1.21  0.83   42  1,116  
512 24,300.00  350.00  0.64  0.83   670  17,698  
513 110,100.00  160.00  0.21  0.83  4,122  108,838  
514 65,555.00  200.00  0.68  0.83  1,770  46,725  
515 28,554.00  273.33  0.47  0.83   901  23,778  
516  9,620.00  200.00  0.64  0.83   269  7,093  
517 45,700.00  433.33  1.24  0.83   897  23,673  
518 20,800.00  425.00  0.31  0.83   683  18,036  
519 30,440.00  313.33  0.19  0.83  1,153  30,436  
520 63,300.00  333.33  0.67  0.83  1,665  43,964  
521 46,000.00  500.00  0.29  0.83  1,751  46,218  
522 141,100.00  260.00  0.09  0.83  5,764  152,182  
523 22,650.00  75.00  0.72  0.83   594  15,686  
524 42,360.00  150.00  0.51  0.83  1,252  33,063  
525 44,850.00  283.33  0.22  0.83  1,921  50,727  
526  5,750.00  200.00  0.20  0.83   215  5,670  
527  4,350.00  25.00  0.12  0.83   181  4,774  
528 208,550.00  61.11  0.22  0.83  7,685  202,909  
529  5,087.00  250.00  0.20  0.83   213  5,636  
530  2,202.00  300.00  0.67  0.83   64  1,691  
531  7,600.00  300.00  0.12  0.83   350  9,244  
532 36,750.00  583.33  0.63  0.83  1,025  27,055  
533 70,950.00  450.00  0.15  0.83  2,863  75,578  
534 23,600.00  250.00  0.35  0.83   854  22,545  
535 11,170.00  270.00  0.11  0.83   470  12,400  
536  6,060.00  150.00  1.23  0.83   122  3,213  
537 20,000.00  366.67  0.20  0.83   769  20,291  
538 10,800.00  333.33  0.20  0.83   384  10,145  
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539  8,000.00  400.00  0.22  0.83   287  7,575  
540  6,480.00  150.00  0.17  0.83   256  6,759  
541 13,406.00  256.00  0.40  0.83   427  11,273  
542 11,077.00  187.00  0.17  0.83   430  11,361  
543 28,525.00  250.00  0.50  0.83   854  22,545  
544 90,780.00  250.00  4.42  0.83   725  19,149  
545 44,880.00  591.00  0.29  0.83  1,498  39,539  
546 12,550.00  450.00  0.18  0.83   478  12,625  
547 30,650.00  500.00  0.21  0.83  1,119  29,535  
548  3,510.00  150.00  0.10  0.83   149  3,945  
549  2,855.00  90.00  0.18  0.83   118  3,111  
550  4,445.00  145.00  0.43  0.83   149  3,945  
551  2,999.00  0.33  0.45  0.83   94  2,480  
552 11,350.00  33.33  1.27  0.83   235  6,200  
553  6,950.00  100.00  0.50  0.83   213  5,636  
554 60,600.00  290.00  0.31  0.83  2,220  58,618  
555  6,450.00  300.00  0.27  0.83   239  6,313  
556 15,392.00  392.00  0.17  0.83   619  16,345  
557 18,320.00  120.00  1.08  0.83   394  10,399  
558 72,600.00  450.00  0.46  0.83  2,306  60,873  
559 37,600.00  450.00  0.89  0.83   961  25,364  
560 18,000.00  400.00  0.62  0.83   555  14,655  
561  3,860.00  200.00  0.04  0.83   213  5,636  
562  2,325.00  200.00  0.22  0.83   96  2,536  
563 37,677.00  520.00  1.82  0.83   585  15,444  
564  5,330.00  250.00  3.33  0.83   51  1,353  
565 16,000.00  300.00  1.47  0.83   291  7,681  
566 14,100.00  400.00  1.14  0.83   299  7,891  
567 120,100.00  350.00  0.38  0.83  3,971  104,836  
568 28,800.00  266.67  0.31  0.83  1,117  29,484  
569  4,010.00  10.00  0.55  0.83   117  3,100  
570 11,050.00  100.00  1.57  0.83   190  5,022  
571 22,205.00  333.33  16.67  0.83   51  1,353  
572 314,000.00  500.00  0.78  0.83  8,240  217,564  
573 12,925.00  550.00  0.35  0.83   423  11,160  
574 47,625.00  200.00  0.31  0.83  1,664  43,946  
575 26,650.00  600.00  0.40  0.83   854  22,545  
576 23,565.00  25.00  0.04  0.83  1,025  27,055  
577 16,875.00  112.50  0.69  0.83   430  11,357  
578 13,460.00  52.00  0.36  0.83   470  12,400  
579  6,175.00  87.50  0.59  0.83   216  5,704  
580  6,190.00  8.57  0.69  0.83   154  4,058  
581 79,400.00  350.00  0.13  0.83  3,259  86,056  
582 14,200.00  66.67  0.40  0.83   427  11,273  
583 30,350.00  283.33  0.40  0.83  1,067  28,182  
584 43,500.00  166.67  0.06  0.83  1,879  49,600  
585 31,830.00  500.00  0.75  0.83   854  22,545  
586 15,599.00  0.33  0.03  0.83   670  17,698  
587 19,300.00  200.00  0.67  0.83   445  11,746  
588  2,300.00  150.00  0.17  0.83   128  3,382  
589 31,800.00  433.33  0.60  0.83   854  22,545  
590 18,410.00  180.00  1.04  0.83   410  10,822  
591 159,744.00  527.11  0.10  0.83  6,618  174,727  
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592 18,498.00  448.00  0.48  0.83   533  14,085  
593 13,950.00  100.00  0.36  0.83   470  12,400  
594  7,400.00  400.00  0.50  0.83   213  5,636  
595 14,250.00  50.00  0.42  0.83   512  13,527  
596 228,500.00  583.33  0.25  0.83  8,539  225,455  
597 108,674.00  353.00  0.22  0.83  4,387  115,827  
598 15,900.00  125.00  0.37  0.83   525  13,865  
599 84,540.00  390.00  0.43  0.83  2,476  65,382  
600 38,547.00  319.50  0.43  0.83  1,347  35,570  
601 85,500.00  437.50  0.05  0.83  3,885  102,582  
602 14,650.00  116.67  0.48  0.83   442  11,679  
603 106,600.00  666.67  0.57  0.83  3,014  79,585  
604 12,792.00  64.00  0.30  0.83   427  11,273  
605 35,854.00  317.33  0.21  0.83  1,393  36,776  
606 15,320.00  50.00  1.71  0.83   250  6,597  
607 10,450.00  450.00  0.91  0.83   235  6,200  
608 102,875.00  500.00  0.25  0.83  3,757  99,200  
609 19,325.00  166.67  0.95  0.83   448  11,836  
610 75,500.00  150.00  0.21  0.83  2,669  70,455  
611 75,250.00  250.00  0.59  0.83  3,629  95,818  
612 44,100.00  200.00  0.47  0.83  1,281  33,818  
613  8,000.00  100.00  0.31  0.83   276  7,293  
614 14,325.00  150.00  0.04  0.83   640  16,909  
615  7,670.00  100.00  0.42  0.83   256  6,764  
616 279,112.00  790.22  0.54  0.83  7,952  209,951  
617 24,950.00  150.00  0.66  0.83   645  17,039  
618  4,400.00  300.00  0.38  0.83   168  4,430  
619 111,000.00  485.71  0.75  0.83  2,837  74,899  
620 26,060.00  60.00  0.03  0.83  1,662  43,887  
621 35,075.00  25.00  0.71  0.83   897  23,673  
622 31,055.00  512.50  0.77  0.83   773  20,412  
623  8,788.00  156.50  0.81  0.83   238  6,290  
624 32,950.00  425.00  0.23  0.83  1,217  32,127  
625  8,275.00  50.00  0.41  0.83   368  9,723  
626 43,250.00  333.33  0.15  0.83  1,749  46,190  
627 20,900.00  300.00  0.54  0.83   555  14,655  
628 12,585.00  250.00  0.34  0.83   441  11,650  
629  6,071.00  350.00  2.00  0.83   64  1,691  
630 32,375.00  350.00  0.30  0.83  1,152  30,408  
631 15,050.00  400.00  0.19  0.83   564  14,880  
632  8,075.00  166.67  1.07  0.83   159  4,207  
633 85,700.00  550.00  0.37  0.83  2,861  75,527  
634 12,930.00  550.00  0.37  0.83   427  11,273  
635 28,000.00  550.00  0.45  0.83   854  22,545  
636  8,800.00  500.00  0.57  0.83   299  7,891  
637  8,500.00  166.67  0.48  0.83   265  6,989  
638 33,800.00  375.00  0.50  0.83  1,114  29,422  
639 10,510.00  60.00  0.29  0.83   374  9,864  
640 13,530.00  15.00  0.33  0.83   257  6,785  
641 11,446.00  246.00  0.64  0.83   332  8,769  
642 11,175.00  337.50  0.33  0.83   385  10,168  
643 60,800.00  366.67  0.63  0.83  1,681  44,392  
644 12,069.00  300.00  1.19  0.83   251  6,637  
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645 33,900.00  400.00  0.44  0.83  1,176  31,045  
646  5,490.00  600.00  1.23  0.83   104  2,751  
647 17,295.00  50.00  0.71  0.83   448  11,836  
648  7,212.00  120.00  2.01  0.83   106  2,802  
649 11,780.00  120.00  0.47  0.83   361  9,539  
650 10,350.00  400.00  0.83  0.83   256  6,764  
651  9,695.00  17.50  1.13  0.83   203  5,366  
652 42,524.00  512.67  0.29  0.83  1,469  38,775  
653 14,743.00  50.00  0.50  0.83   427  11,268  
654 11,458.00  50.00  0.46  0.83   368  9,706  
655 11,260.00  75.00  0.94  0.83   263  6,933  
656 15,600.00  75.00  0.88  0.83   388  10,236  
657  5,857.00  11.67  0.89  0.83   144  3,792  
658 16,770.00  500.00  0.27  0.83   640  16,909  
659 15,390.00  50.00  0.22  0.83   577  15,240  
660  7,325.00  225.00  0.06  0.83   342  9,041  
661  3,724.00  0.33  0.80  0.83   107  2,818  
662 15,425.00  312.50  0.45  0.83   478  12,625  
663  6,359.00  0.33  1.43  0.83   120  3,156  
664 28,925.00  200.00  1.31  0.83   556  14,683  
665  5,000.00  200.00  0.43  0.83   149  3,945  
666 11,190.00  50.00  0.39  0.83   380  10,033  
667 15,850.00  300.00  1.11  0.83   327  8,644  
668 29,534.00  265.00  0.55  0.83   811  21,418  
669  3,212.00  62.00  0.81  0.83   83  2,204  
670  3,975.00  120.00  0.14  0.83   148  3,921  
671 23,500.00  250.00  0.67  0.83   634  16,740  
672 16,775.00  150.00  0.38  0.83   558  14,742  
673 34,300.00  625.00  0.12  0.83  2,135  56,364  
674 52,200.00  600.00  0.37  0.83  1,747  46,128  
675 12,800.00  50.00  0.05  0.83   606  16,007  
676 14,165.00  200.00  1.53  0.83   279  7,355  
677 414,000.00  300.00  0.14  0.83   22,753  600,724  
678 17,950.00  75.00  0.52  0.83   570  15,049  
679  9,480.00  400.00  0.20  0.83   431  11,385  
680 12,360.00  75.00  0.77  0.83   332  8,754  
681 33,050.00  187.50  0.70  0.83   854  22,545  
682  8,600.00  150.00  0.41  0.83   314  8,291  
683  2,985.00  225.00  0.05  0.83   179  4,735  
684  2,439.00  0.33  0.03  0.83   126  3,314  
685  3,880.00  40.00  0.43  0.83   142  3,740  
686 35,900.00  300.00  0.23  0.83  1,319  34,833  
687  2,625.00  100.00  1.50  0.83   51  1,353  
688 25,750.00  375.00  0.29  0.83   897  23,673  
689 27,450.00  216.67  0.67  0.83   767  20,246  
690 38,517.00  675.00  0.10  0.83  1,640  43,287  
691 26,783.00  420.00  0.93  0.83   598  15,782  
692 21,550.00  183.33  0.79  0.83   538  14,204  
693 10,800.00  250.00  1.38  0.83   208  5,490  
694 47,300.00  100.00  0.39  0.83  1,742  45,993  
695 56,250.00  83.33  0.21  0.83  2,033  53,681  
696 20,460.00  40.00  1.30  0.83   427  11,273  
697 11,250.00  200.00  1.00  0.83   256  6,764  
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698  7,150.00  100.00  1.85  0.83   115  3,044  
699  7,150.00  100.00  1.85  0.83   115  3,044  
700 15,290.00  225.00  0.33  0.83   519  13,708  
701  8,850.00  325.00  1.15  0.83   186  4,904  
702  8,035.00  360.00  0.53  0.83   242  6,386  
703 11,620.00  400.00  0.55  0.83   388  10,231  
704 19,940.00  250.00  0.49  0.83   615  16,233  
705 11,246.00  333.33  0.03  0.83   472  12,456  
706 68,300.00  166.67  0.45  0.83  2,274  60,027  
707 11,455.00  60.00  0.14  0.83   533  14,068  
708 24,385.00  91.67  0.73  0.83   617  16,289  
709 43,160.00  125.00  0.67  0.83  1,245  32,860  
710  6,594.00  175.00  2.44  0.83   84  2,221  
711  6,638.00  550.00  0.16  0.83   287  7,575  
712  2,546.00  50.00  0.73  0.83   88  2,311  
713  8,670.00  30.00  0.10  0.83   342  9,018  
714 61,900.00  400.00  0.56  0.83  1,612  42,555  
715 29,540.00  300.00  0.67  0.83   769  20,291  
716 10,890.00  100.00  0.67  0.83   320  8,455  
717 274,252.00  525.20  0.20  0.83   10,678  281,908  
718  6,150.00  300.00  0.77  0.83   278  7,327  
719 20,600.00  300.00  0.59  0.83   576  15,218  
720 22,750.00  250.00  0.19  0.83   889  23,470  
721  4,200.00  150.00  0.56  0.83   152  4,002  
722  7,868.00  125.00  0.40  0.83   256  6,764  
723  9,375.00  100.00  0.62  0.83   275  7,253  
724 26,580.00  250.00  0.27  0.83   966  25,512  
725  7,645.00  300.00  0.33  0.83   256  6,764  
726 14,500.00  450.00  1.21  0.83   282  7,440  
727 14,100.00  300.00  0.14  0.83   598  15,782  
728  4,895.00  75.00  0.39  0.83   163  4,305  
729  7,300.00  100.00  0.60  0.83   213  5,636  
730 11,400.00  150.00  5.56  0.83   77  2,029  
731  7,720.00  120.00  0.58  0.83   222  5,862  
732 17,345.00  420.00  0.41  0.83   579  15,295  
733 16,814.00  200.00  0.37  0.83   572  15,105  
734 14,525.00  225.00  0.53  0.83   405  10,690  
735 23,300.00  300.00  0.22  0.83   987  26,064  
736  7,696.00  75.00  0.77  0.83   195  5,156  
737  5,471.00  125.00  4.04  0.83   48  1,255  
738  5,925.00  312.50  0.88  0.83   146  3,850  
739 27,500.00  333.33  0.50  0.83   854  22,545  
740 11,750.00  50.00  0.79  0.83   299  7,891  
741 12,600.00  75.00  0.29  0.83   448  11,836  
742 28,600.00  250.00  0.41  0.83   939  24,800  
743  9,320.00  150.00  1.03  0.83   207  5,456  
744  1,920.00  150.00  1.00  0.83   43  1,127  
745 54,165.00  160.00  2.28  0.83   729  19,254  
746 20,580.00  300.00  0.33  0.83   769  20,291  
747 40,700.00  350.00  0.23  0.83  1,494  39,455  
748 55,725.00  300.00  0.36  0.83  1,804  47,616  
Mean 31,960.58  240.98  0.63  0.83  1,141  30,132  
S.D. 89,374.97  163.41  1.03   -  3,539  93,423  
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Table A.6.3. Men’s clothing 
 






1850 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 


















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  3y  
1 2,855.00 80.00 0.11 1.69 200 0 0 
2 5,790.00 300.00 0.11 1.69 300 500 0 
3 3,500.00 360.00 0.99 1.69 100 204 0 
4 8,212.00 100.36 0.32 1.69 275 364 250 
5 1,080.00 240.00 0.02 1.69 25 20 30 
6 1,880.00 360.00 0.01 1.69 100 20 20 
7 2,150.00 300.00 0.11 1.69 150 150 0 
8 2,868.00 256.00 0.34 1.69 75 0 0 
9 5,024.00 162.67 0.53 1.69 300 500 150 
10 4,400.00 400.00 0.05 1.69 200 250 200 
11 1,960.00 240.00 0.12 1.69 84 50 0 
12 2,514.00 216.00 0.67 1.69 200 0 0 
13 1,680.00 240.00 0.37 1.69 50 100 0 
14 1,380.00 240.00 0.49 1.69 40 30 20 
15 17,371.00 148.14 0.35 1.69 1,200 0 800 
16 3,062.00 258.00 0.28 1.69 104 104 104 
17 705.00 180.00 0.11 1.69 50 100 0 
18 12,460.00 244.00 0.22 1.69 500 500 600 
19 20,840.00 225.60 0.53 1.69 800 800 700 
20 10,417.00 221.33 0.30 1.69 400 600 600 
21 5,410.00 210.00 0.31 1.69 200 200 0 
22 3,964.00 151.20 0.68 1.69 150 120 120 
23 2,452.00 276.00 0.04 1.69 100 0 0 
24 2,812.00 144.00 0.48 1.69 0 620 0 
25 1,490.00 240.00 0.33 1.69 300 0 0 
26 1,780.00 120.00 1.25 1.69 75 90 20 
27 15,618.00 141.45 0.34 1.69 1,100 2,000 1,500 
28 87,000.00 60.00 0.17 1.69 7,200 6,664 12,200 
29 7,840.00 120.00 0.00 1.69 200 0 0 
30 1,136.00 168.00 0.20 1.69 200 0 0 
31 670.00 120.00 0.17 1.69 200 0 0 
32 2,940.00 270.00 0.10 1.69 150 100 100 
33 1,736.00 240.00 0.09 1.69 100 100 150 
34 9,976.00 142.43 0.41 1.69 560 731 500 
35 925.00 120.00 0.01 1.69 60 80 70 
36 1,461.00 156.00 0.15 1.69 90 130 120 
37 11,677.00 274.67 0.85 1.69 300 300 260 
38 3,804.00 368.00 0.16 1.69 104 150 150 
39 2,742.00 218.40 0.10 1.69 100 100 150 
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Mean 7,066.18 213.13 0.31 1.69 419.03 401.97 482.41 
S.D.  14,024.15 82.40 0.28 0.00 1,145.91 1,091.82 1,949.57 
 
 






1860 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 


















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  3y  
1 39,740.00 478.50 0.48 1.75 500 1,500 4,000 
2 38,090.00 246.00 0.34 1.75 3,650 800 1,040 
3 2,370.00 180.00 0.26 1.75 125 150 75 
4 17,800.00 240.00 0.30 1.75 2,000 5,000 0 
5 3,400.00 240.00 0.15 1.75 500 100 0 
6 1,780.00 240.00 0.14 1.75 50 100 50 
7 6,200.00 171.43 0.29 1.75 600 0 0 
8 3,500.00 300.00 0.03 1.75 150 75 75 
9 1,130.00 240.00 0.57 1.75 50 40 0 
10 1,725.00 300.00 0.07 1.75 30 300 0 
11 8,096.00 214.00 0.32 1.75 444 252 180 
12 2,400.00 300.00 0.60 1.75 100 400 300 
13 4,160.00 180.00 0.71 1.75 100 300 100 
14 7,688.00 114.46 1.72 1.75 0 1,200 0 
15 5,160.00 320.00 0.17 1.75 200 400 0 
16 2,310.00 320.00 0.04 1.75 100 200 100 
17 1,101.00 198.00 0.08 1.75 96 220 40 
18 1,680.00 240.00 0.12 1.75 200 200 0 
19 1,560.00 180.00 0.11 1.75 150 0 0 
20 1,140.00 240.00 0.13 1.75 120 150 0 
21 1,010.00 360.00 0.21 1.75 80 0 0 
22 888.00 288.00 0.06 1.75 175 150 0 
23 15,660.00 360.00 0.24 1.75 300 400 400 
24 12,868.00 150.86 0.40 1.75 864 4,000 2,000 
25 5,982.00 233.14 0.95 1.75 144 576 288 
26 2,530.00 240.00 0.78 1.75 100 350 150 
27 3,170.00 204.00 0.18 1.75 100 250 200 
28 5,246.00 249.00 0.39 1.75 150 450 150 
29 2,080.00 240.00 0.31 1.75 60 120 48 
30 157,900.00 108.83 0.04 1.75 75,000 0 0 
31 4,440.00 280.00 1.32 1.75 100 200 100 
32 2,932.00 216.00 0.17 1.75 300 0 0 
33 9,313.00 213.00 0.19 1.75 312 620 520 
34 4,668.00 67.50 0.16 1.75 1,912 1,300 470 
35 7,309.00 213.00 0.35 1.75 200 300 300 
36 25,430.00 186.32 0.23 1.75 450 650 475 
37 11,640.00 264.00 0.18 1.75 300 800 0 
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38 6,874.00 248.57 0.27 1.75 216 360 0 
39 12,600.00 275.00 0.40 1.75 400 800 500 
40 3,840.00 315.00 0.35 1.75 200 200 100 
41 7,116.00 183.27 0.50 1.75 300 425 434 
42 272,250.00 232.00 0.32 1.75 10,000 20,000 12,000 
43 2,404.00 180.00 0.05 1.75 150 200 50 
44 9,030.00 207.27 1.21 1.75 300 200 300 
45 1,740.00 260.00 0.06 1.75 40 90 150 
46 6,720.00 240.00 0.10 1.75 100 600 200 
47 1,761.00 232.00 0.89 1.75 25 0 0 
48 9,380.00 153.33 0.35 1.75 250 0 400 
49 30,004.00 100.08 0.28 1.75 1,250 2,500 2,152 
50 29,670.00 118.78 1.08 1.75 1,400 1,400 300 
51 2,284.00 192.00 0.18 1.75 0 750 0 
52 15,095.00 216.92 0.57 1.75 720 1,040 850 
53 7,990.00 340.00 0.16 1.75 200 300 300 
54 91,600.00 480.00 0.34 1.75 1,600 1,600 1,900 
55 2,900.00 225.00 0.07 1.75 200 350 350 
56 96,620.00 188.00 0.57 1.75 5,000 8,000 8,000 
57 30,170.00 134.40 0.41 1.75 1,500 3,000 3,000 
58 30,004.00 50.04 0.29 1.75 1,250 2,500 2,152 
59 898.00 150.00 0.33 1.75 100 30 25 
60 6,350.00 240.00 0.06 1.75 1,000 500 500 
61 1,600.00 300.00 1.54 1.75 50 50 0 
62 3,062.00 300.00 0.38 1.75 100 150 150 
63 2,860.00 22.50 0.59 1.75 400 300 300 
64 1,184.00 192.00 0.11 1.75 300 0 0 
65 15,400.00 270.00 0.24 1.75 1,000 1,500 1,500 
66 31,800.00 240.00 0.60 1.75 1,500 1,500 400 
67 1,318.00 300.00 0.71 1.75 28 37 27 
68 8,878.00 206.40 0.78 1.75 1,000 1,000 500 
69 2,360.00 360.00 0.77 1.75 150 150 50 
70 3,146.00 20.57 0.04 1.75 1,300 0 0 
71 2,780.00 216.00 0.11 1.75 200 150 0 
72 4,704.00 156.00 0.41 1.75 350 400 400 
73 14,560.00 206.40 0.30 1.75 480 1,000 250 
74 7,755.00 316.80 0.25 1.75 180 280 300 
75 4,414.00 13.71 0.38 1.75 250 175 0 
Mean 16,096.23 225.31 0.38 1.75 1,642.68 974.53 648.01 





















1870 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 


















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  3y  
1 7,556.00 250.00 0.63 1.92 156 312 156 
2 2,720.00 133.33 0.09 1.92 100 300 300 
3 19,500.00 875.00 0.20 1.92 200 400 300 
4 2,700.00 200.00 0.11 1.92 100 300 100 
5 7,200.00 633.33 0.08 1.92 280 0 260 
6 1,850.00 300.00 0.08 1.92 100 300 200 
7 11,800.00 450.00 0.08 1.92 600 0 0 
8 35,600.00 258.33 1.12 1.92 600 700 800 
9 1,555.00 206.67 0.09 1.92 120 200 0 
10 16,800.00 138.46 0.39 1.92 0 6,550 0 
11 11,000.00 250.00 0.72 1.92 120 150 150 
12 23,500.00 500.00 0.24 1.92 416 600 450 
13 7,000.00 380.00 0.70 1.92 200 200 120 
14 20,000.00 555.56 0.23 1.92 400 150 50 
15 1,840.00 400.00 0.97 1.92 50 25 30 
16 2,800.00 500.00 0.11 1.92 35 85 35 
17 1,800.00 500.00 0.12 1.92 150 0 0 
18 6,955.00 475.00 0.34 1.92 210 325 210 
19 7,415.00 520.00 1.10 1.92 150 0 0 
20 26,000.00 576.92 0.21 1.92 715 850 715 
21 3,400.00 800.00 0.05 1.92 200 50 0 
22 80,902.00 800.00 0.20 1.92 1,252 2,584 0 
23 25,500.00 458.33 0.36 1.92 400 600 500 
24 4,343.00 625.00 0.16 1.92 80 128 111 
25 9,281.00 389.33 1.21 1.92 100 250 50 
26 72,000.00 9.06 0.60 1.92 4,000 4,000 4,000 
27 144,700.00 225.00 1.47 1.92 2,000 2,500 1,500 
28 3,706.00 208.00 0.09 1.92 156 266 244 
29 23,950.00 900.00 0.27 1.92 400 400 400 
30 11,900.00 350.00 0.22 1.92 150 250 200 
Mean 19,842.43 428.91 0.41 1.92 448.00 749.17 362.70 












Table A.6.4. Millwork 
 
A.6.4. (a.) 1850 
 
 
Millwork 1850 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 












n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 8,600.00 360.00 0.49 0.26 31,200 100 
2 2,580.00 540.00 0.23 0.26 30 50 
3 3,200.00 360.00 0.13 0.26 100 100 
4 20,930.00 240.00 0.24 0.26 4,500 0 
5 2,180.00 240.00 0.79 0.26 6,000 0 
6 702.00 312.00 0.25 0.26 4,000 0 
7 1,870.00 240.00 1.08 0.26 2,500 150 
8 1,250.00 240.00 1.05 0.26 10,000 0 
9 4,705.00 420.00 0.96 0.26 30,000 225 
10 5,400.00 300.00 1.14 0.26 16,000 0 
11 6,545.00 405.00 0.40 0.26 31,200 1,200 
12 1,150.00 600.00 0.24 0.26 30,000 160 
13 1,584.00 192.00 1.11 0.26 10,000 0 
14 1,530.00 180.00 0.60 0.26 20,000 0 
Mean 4,444.71 330.64 0.62 0.26 13,966.43 141.79 
S.D.  5,283.91 126.40 0.39 0.00 12,249.13 313.76 
 
 
A.6.4. (b.) 1860 
 
 
Millwork 1860 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 












n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 2,100.00 600.00 0.15 0.27 9,000 1,000 
2 3,400.00 375.00 0.16 0.27 0 100 
3 124,000.00 400.00 0.70 0.27 94,000 0 
4 10,600.00 300.00 5.00 0.27 0 800 
5 33,500.00 480.00 1.79 0.27 96,000 1,530 
6 12,272.00 378.00 0.17 0.27 7,540 350 
7 10,320.00 540.00 0.17 0.27 5,000 300 
8 6,995.00 312.00 0.09 0.27 15,000 0 
9 1,500.00 300.00 0.91 0.27 800 0 
10 3,936.00 282.00 0.49 0.27 100 0 
11 4,500.00 300.00 1.38 0.27 2,000 500 
12 4,012.00 216.00 1.94 0.27 200,000 0 
13 23,040.00 360.00 0.50 0.27 12,000 1,500 
14 12,341.00 384.00 0.04 0.27 1,248 1,300 
15 4,921.00 360.00 1.33 0.27 800 0 
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16 1,620.00 240.00 0.40 0.27 10,000 0 
17 8,480.00 360.00 0.94 0.27 1,000 800 
Mean 15,737.47 363.94 0.95 0.27 26,734.59 481.18 






Millwork 1870 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 












n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 6,835.00 500.00 0.18 0.32 120 55 
2 22,500.00 285.71 0.50 0.32 400 400 
3 85,000.00 662.50 1.03 0.32 2,000 1,200 
4 15,525.00 300.00 0.97 0.32 1,500 900 
5 39,000.00 500.00 0.80 0.32 2,000 500 
6 24,185.00 208.33 1.43 0.32 0 300 
Mean 32,174.17 409.42 0.82 0.32 1,003.33 559.17 






























Table A.6.5. Furniture 
 
A.6.5. (a.) 1850 
 
 
Furniture 1850 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 1,241.00 84.00 0.96 0.06 10 25 
2 1,366.00 336.00 0.28 0.06 5 0 
3 780.00 180.00 0.26 0.06 20 20 
4 1,555.00 240.00 0.70 0.06 0 100 
5 1,400.00 300.00 0.50 0.06 0 100 
6 1,405.00 360.00 0.15 0.06 30 100 
7 2,029.00 432.00 1.45 0.06 10 30 
8 2,000.00 240.00 0.38 0.06 40 100 
9 5,425.00 360.00 0.97 0.06 36 100 
10 9,400.00 300.00 0.36 0.06 0 3,000 
11 1,430.00 160.00 0.51 0.06 12 0 
12 930.00 180.00 0.70 0.06 30 51 
13 82,100.00 400.00 0.83 0.06 6,000 0 
14 1,120.00 200.00 0.53 0.06 15 0 
15 1,400.00 300.00 0.80 0.06 10 10 
16 1,374.00 312.00 0.58 0.06 30 0 
17 2,036.00 234.00 0.59 0.06 10 0 
18 1,325.00 300.00 0.65 0.06 20 0 
19 630.00 240.00 0.12 0.06 5 20 
20 885.00 360.00 0.78 0.06 0 60 
21 2,960.00 480.00 1.33 0.06 0 50 
22 3,285.00 300.00 1.33 0.06 0 1,000 
23 1,367.00 264.00 1.27 0.06 0 50 
24 1,896.00 300.00 0.88 0.06 0 75 
25 1,430.00 540.00 1.35 0.06 0 30 
26 1,407.00 312.00 1.04 0.06 15 40 
27 1,600.00 300.00 0.46 0.06 0 1,200 
28 2,406.00 240.00 1.15 0.06 0 40 
29 467.00 168.00 0.31 0.06 0 78 
30 9,898.00 300.00 0.16 0.06 0 624 
31 4,100.00 180.00 1.14 0.06 50 100 
32 1,175.00 300.00 0.22 0.06 12 50 
33 3,171.00 144.00 1.86 0.06 15 50 
34 1,026.00 192.00 0.67 0.06 11 26 
35 3,785.00 120.00 0.95 0.06 50 150 
36 860.00 180.00 0.16 0.06 15 0 
37 2,002.00 300.00 0.51 0.06 24 0 
Mean 4,396.38 274.00 0.73 0.06 175.00 196.73 






A.6.5. (b.) 1860 
 
 
Furniture 1860 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 660.00 360.00 0.20 0.08 2 30 
2 2,880.00 400.00 1.32 0.08 18 50 
3 1,020.00 360.00 0.19 0.08 24 0 
4 7,680.00 300.00 0.48 0.08 0 500 
5 6,800.00 300.00 1.00 0.08 100 200 
6 1,480.00 480.00 1.13 0.08 0 30 
7 1,186.00 360.00 1.19 0.08 0 30 
8 2,023.00 360.00 0.36 0.08 0 400 
9 3,696.00 79.20 0.61 0.08 50 150 
10 1,500.00 300.00 0.63 0.08 0 100 
11 5,736.00 309.00 0.33 0.08 50 100 
12 4,620.00 375.00 0.40 0.08 0 500 
13 3,610.00 360.00 0.28 0.08 0 200 
14 1,035.00 420.00 0.91 0.08 6 25 
15 548.00 180.00 0.21 0.08 0 50 
16 5,260.00 40.00 0.46 0.08 100 300 
17 5,176.00 312.00 0.26 0.08 42 200 
18 3,150.00 300.00 0.73 0.08 25 0 
19 2,318.00 360.00 0.40 0.08 0 50 
20 4,370.00 240.00 1.94 0.08 25 100 
21 11,530.00 300.00 0.65 0.08 600 0 
22 2,620.00 300.00 0.13 0.08 0 1,200 
23 784.00 336.00 0.33 0.08 6 40 
24 1,460.00 360.00 0.72 0.08 12 20 
25 10,284.00 360.00 2.00 0.08 0 300 
26 897.00 300.00 0.04 0.08 25 12 
27 3,104.00 300.00 0.88 0.08 20 0 
28 13,120.00 400.00 0.65 0.08 60 0 
29 945.00 150.00 0.78 0.08 6 20 
30 14,700.00 480.00 0.24 0.08 416 0 
31 4,752.00 288.00 0.56 0.08 100 150 
32 4,840.00 360.00 0.97 0.08 288 0 
33 1,210.00 180.00 0.40 0.08 9 50 
34 13,620.00 432.00 0.86 0.08 0 2,000 
Mean 4,371.00 315.92 0.65 0.08 58.35 200.21 










A.6.5. (c.) 1870 
 
 
Furniture 1870 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 1,254.00 450.00 0.25 0.11 0 50 
2 10,000.00 400.00 1.00 0.11 0 1,500 
3 4,760.00 100.00 2.36 0.11 24 200 
4 70,200.00 250.00 0.85 0.11 0 11,000 
5 3,850.00 333.33 0.04 0.11 0 72 
6 1,880.00 250.00 0.71 0.11 25 100 
7 9,900.00 600.00 1.11 0.11 30 288 
8 3,800.00 200.00 0.37 0.11 50 500 
9 2,350.00 600.00 0.71 0.11 0 156 
10 46,300.00 909.09 0.48 0.11 150 600 
Mean 15,429.40 409.24 0.79 0.11 27.90 1,446.60 































Table A.6.6. Tobacco* 
 
A.6.6. (a.) 1850 
 
 
Tobacco* 1850 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 













n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 2,130.00 240.00 0.20 0.20 245,000 0 
2 2,072.00 336.00 0.07 0.20 186,000 0 
3 1,326.00 288.00 0.67 0.20 50,000 0 
4 860.00 240.00 0.17 0.20 160,000 0 
5 2,360.00 240.00 0.35 0.20 200,000 0 
6 1,696.00 144.00 0.13 0.20 600,000 0 
7 760.00 300.00 0.20 0.20 160,000 0 
8 610.00 240.00 0.03 0.20 120,000 0 
9 2,260.00 480.00 0.14 0.20 192,000 0 
10 1,230.00 240.00 0.31 0.20 200,000 0 
11 1,152.00 336.00 0.06 0.20 728,000 0 
12 1,725.00 360.00 0.29 0.20 256,000 0 
13 5,768.00 288.00 0.11 0.20 364,000 0 
14 10,434.00 375.00 0.29 0.20 700 0 
15 1,160.00 360.00 0.33 0.20 100,000 0 
16 3,060.00 240.00 0.17 0.20 610,000 0 
17 3,132.00 206.40 0.14 0.20 1,000,000 0 
18 2,356.00 139.20 0.26 0.20 600,000 500 
19 4,964.00 216.00 0.83 0.20 200,000 0 
20 7,980.00 480.00 0.19 0.20 400,000 0 
21 890.00 240.00 0.63 0.20 40,000 0 
22 1,940.00 360.00 0.05 0.20 150,000 0 
23 4,850.00 225.00 0.36 0.20 50,000 0 
24 736.00 168.00 0.36 0.20 100,000 0 
25 615.00 144.00 0.17 0.20 300,000 0 
26 1,190.00 180.00 0.16 0.20 412,000 0 
27 21,480.00 240.00 1.38 0.20 139,000 0 
28 3,268.00 171.00 0.29 0.20 0 6,000 
29 5,286.00 139.64 0.32 0.20 1,000,000 150 
30 3,000.00 300.00 0.33 0.20 80,000 0 
31 21,634.00 124.80 1.38 0.20 1,440,000 0 
32 2,800.00 300.00 0.45 0.20 260,000 0 
33 940.00 240.00 0.33 0.20 90,000 0 
34 1,716.00 204.00 0.27 0.20 150,000 0 
35 1,338.00 288.00 0.67 0.20 120,000 0 
36 3,190.00 240.00 0.34 0.20 412,000 0 
37 3,412.00 180.00 1.60 0.20 156,000 0 
Mean 3,657.30 256.57 0.38 0.20 304,613.51 179.73 




A.6.6. (b.) 1860 
 
 
Tobacco* 1860 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 













n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 28,200.00 377.14 0.13 0.25 2,000,000 0 
2 4,360.00 480.00 1.00 0.25 150,000 0 
3 9,508.00 67.20 1.29 0.25 0 33,000 
4 4,286.00 151.50 0.29 0.25 0 2,500 
5 3,320.00 360.00 0.40 0.25 200,000 0 
6 31,340.00 174.46 0.11 0.25 0 250,000 
7 2,724.00 312.00 2.08 0.25 60,000 0 
8 5,200.00 300.00 0.83 0.25 200,000 0 
9 1,200.00 300.00 0.16 0.25 25,000 0 
10 1,480.00 240.00 0.55 0.25 70,000 0 
11 5,320.00 225.00 0.19 0.25 360,000 0 
12 2,740.00 144.00 0.24 0.25 500,000 0 
13 2,592.00 278.40 0.67 0.25 40,000 0 
14 3,360.00 180.00 0.42 0.25 100,000 0 
15 3,140.00 420.00 0.33 0.25 150,000 0 
16 4,254.00 201.00 0.68 0.25 572,000 0 
17 9,140.00 405.00 0.67 0.25 500,000 0 
18 6,822.00 436.00 0.41 0.25 520,000 0 
19 1,410.00 360.00 0.80 0.25 50,000 0 
20 7,112.00 172.80 0.11 0.25 595,000 0 
21 7,572.00 468.00 0.33 0.25 300,000 0 
22 5,680.00 186.67 0.10 0.25 400,000 0 
23 2,220.00 360.00 0.10 0.25 150,000 0 
24 7,008.00 504.00 0.18 0.25 500,000 0 
25 2,820.00 240.00 0.22 0.25 150,000 0 
26 23,770.00 412.80 0.14 0.25 1,080,000 0 
27 11,418.00 264.00 0.40 0.25 624,000 0 
28 4,265.00 360.00 0.15 0.25 388,000 0 
29 1,270.00 360.00 0.14 0.25 109,000 0 
30 2,385.00 360.00 0.50 0.25 100,000 0 
31 1,620.00 360.00 0.13 0.25 130,000 0 
32 3,480.00 216.00 0.24 0.25 150,000 0 
33 4,120.00 320.00 0.10 0.25 125,000 0 
34 1,920.00 210.00 0.14 0.25 50,000 0 
35 1,455.00 600.00 0.42 0.25 62,000 0 
36 1,300.00 240.00 0.33 0.25 50,000 0 
37 2,160.00 120.00 0.30 0.25 150,000 0 
38 12,492.00 349.50 0.17 0.25 780,000 0 
39 4,760.00 300.00 0.15 0.25 520,000 0 
40 10,720.00 240.00 2.00 0.25 100,000 50,000 
41 8,670.00 480.00 0.30 0.25 500,000 0 
42 4,820.00 228.00 0.13 0.25 60,000 0 
43 1,080.00 96.00 0.05 0.25 350,000 0 
44 2,016.00 79.64 0.33 0.25 500,000 0 
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45 4,300.00 360.00 0.20 0.25 300,000 0 
46 4,900.00 360.00 0.19 0.25 2,180,000 0 
47 6,800.00 300.00 0.06 0.25 400,000 21,000 
48 3,290.00 200.00 0.23 0.25 233,000 0 
49 1,280.00 240.00 0.33 0.25 150,000 0 
50 2,112.00 300.00 0.33 0.25 364,000 0 
51 1,028.00 136.00 0.18 0.25 156,000 0 
52 860.00 360.00 0.29 0.25 140,000 0 
53 4,528.00 246.86 0.29 0.25 350,000 0 
54 4,528.00 192.00 0.36 0.25 340,000 0 
55 6,355.00 1,080.00 0.17 0.25 120,000 0 
Mean 5,572.91 303.89 0.38 0.25 330,054.55 6,481.82 






Tobacco* 1870 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 2,200.00 300.00 0.17 0.46 84,000 0 
2 1,650.00 225.00 0.06 0.46 100,000 0 
3 2,273.00 55.56 0.43 0.46 0 4,000 
4 2,080.00 15.00 1.00 0.46 0 300 
5 4,500.00 500.00 0.56 0.46 90,000 0 
6 9,900.00 700.00 0.83 0.46 200,000 0 
7 20,000.00 857.14 0.21 0.46 321,000 0 
8 2,900.00 600.00 0.39 0.46 90,000 0 
9 9,393.00 413.60 0.65 0.46 155,000 0 
10 14,400.00 400.00 0.60 0.46 160,000 0 
11 8,100.00 437.50 0.18 0.46 273,600 0 
12 2,140.00 700.00 0.08 0.46 120,000 0 
13 525.00 110.00 0.10 0.46 48,000 0 
14 35,449.00 279.49 0.33 0.46 667,000 0 
15 3,001.00 200.00 0.37 0.46 135,000 0 
16 11,500.00 333.33 0.04 0.46 36,600 0 
17 13,020.00 354.55 0.38 0.46 500,000 0 
18 2,316.00 550.00 0.13 0.46 92,000 0 
19 1,860.00 350.00 0.17 0.46 60,000 0 
20 1,200.00 300.00 0.04 0.46 60,000 0 
21 765.00 200.00 0.33 0.46 25,000 0 
22 6,700.00 625.00 0.09 0.46 600,000 0 
23 10,800.00 311.11 0.20 0.46 150,000 0 
24 55,220.00 681.82 0.20 0.46 0 50,000 
25 9,752.00 428.57 0.03 0.46 250,000 0 
26 5,689.00 312.00 0.50 0.46 0 20,250 
27 7,020.00 400.00 0.17 0.46 8,500 0 
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28 21,000.00 343.75 0.18 0.46 900,000 0 
29 2,500.00 250.00 0.37 0.46 45,000 0 
30 3,864.00 433.33 0.20 0.46 147,000 0 
31 6,780.00 400.00 0.36 0.46 175,000 0 
32 13,000.00 406.25 0.24 0.46 210,000 0 
33 3,800.00 266.67 0.63 0.46 80,000 0 
34 1,485.00 500.00 0.15 0.46 40,000 0 
35 4,000.00 675.00 0.16 0.46 175,000 0 
36 11,058.00 9.45 0.05 0.46 560,000 0 
37 1,975.00 160.00 0.01 0.46 67,000 0 
38 7,880.00 375.00 0.85 0.46 88,000 0 
39 5,750.00 350.00 0.22 0.46 135,000 0 
40 4,650.00 466.67 0.54 0.46 70,000 0 
41 5,300.00 375.00 0.40 0.46 109,000 0 
42 2,216.00 442.00 0.19 0.46 78,000 0 
43 3,300.00 400.00 0.25 0.46 100,000 0 
44 3,920.00 233.33 0.25 0.46 80,000 0 
45 6,475.00 416.00 0.28 0.46 117,700 0 
46 7,300.00 500.00 0.56 0.46 120,000 0 
47 2,150.00 900.00 0.14 0.46 35,000 0 
48 2,800.00 450.00 0.39 0.46 40,000 0 
49 4,643.00 246.60 0.20 0.46 100,000 0 
50 2,650.00 750.00 0.03 0.46 135,000 0 
51 7,890.00 728.00 0.03 0.46 520,000 0 
52 6,340.00 525.00 1.06 0.46 108,000 0 
53 5,750.00 350.00 0.22 0.46 135,000 0 
54 4,700.00 600.00 0.07 0.46 140,300 0 
55 10,000.00 400.00 0.77 0.46 260,000 0 
56 290,000.00 365.85 0.10 0.46 4,000,000 0 
57 3,620.00 620.00 1.00 0.46 62,000 0 
58 3,350.00 500.00 0.13 0.46 40,000 0 
59 9,500.00 416.67 0.10 0.46 225,000 0 
60 4,800.00 250.00 0.40 0.46 109,000 0 
61 7,700.00 600.00 0.22 0.46 258,000 0 
62 2,900.00 400.00 1.43 0.46 55,000 0 
63 26,786.00 650.00 0.71 0.46 540,000 0 
64 3,740.00 240.00 0.57 0.46 80,000 0 
65 1,350.00 600.00 0.18 0.46 75,000 0 
66 25,385.00 350.00 0.20 0.46 0 58,738 
67 1,620.00 133.33 0.13 0.46 2,000 0 
68 1,600.00 500.00 0.56 0.46 100,000 0 
69 2,300.00 400.00 0.03 0.46 120,000 0 
70 2,600.00 225.00 0.33 0.46 100,000 0 
71 2,150.00 20.00 0.41 0.46 111,800 0 
72 875.00 150.00 0.25 0.46 100,000 0 
73 400.00 37.50 0.45 0.46 30,000 0 
74 2,025.00 166.67 0.26 0.46 100,000 0 
75 2,920.00 520.00 0.34 0.46 100,000 0 
76 56,625.00 420.00 0.97 0.46 1,089,000 0 
77 1,475.00 133.33 0.04 0.46 196,600 0 
78 340.00 97.00 0.15 0.46 32,500 0 
79 1,020.00 400.00 0.60 0.46 25,000 0 
80 1,212.00 400.00 0.22 0.46 40,000 0 
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81 4,817.00 1,090.67 0.13 0.46 62,100 0 
82 1,460.00 400.00 1.00 0.46 30,000 0 
83 2,500.00 500.00 0.40 0.46 150,000 0 
84 5,500.00 625.00 0.50 0.46 200,000 0 
85 12,000.00 777.78 0.14 0.46 310,000 0 
86 9,300.00 600.00 0.17 0.46 240,000 0 
87 5,800.00 500.00 1.32 0.46 118,000 0 
88 5,324.00 624.00 1.46 0.46 120,000 0 
89 11,500.00 400.00 0.50 0.46 220,000 0 
90 12,551.00 866.67 0.80 0.46 249,400 0 
91 30,200.00 625.00 0.40 0.46 800,000 0 
92 42,650.00 1,375.00 0.21 0.46 750,000 0 
93 16,000.00 321.43 0.17 0.46 600,000 0 
94 26,500.00 186.67 0.04 0.46 1,806,000 0 
Mean 11,169.40 426.38 0.36 0.46 236,618.09 1,417.96 









Tobacco* 1880 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 













n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1  1,218.00  468.00  0.67  0.26   35,748  938  
2  446.00  30.00  0.08  0.26   61,009  1,600  
3  1,500.00  100.00  0.05  0.26   238,318  6,250  
4  16,500.00  333.33  0.42  0.26   905,607  23,750  
5  10,000.00  400.00  1.04  0.26   228,785  6,000  
6  1,300.00  100.00  0.45  0.26   52,430  1,375  
7  1,050.00  50.00  0.48  0.26   50,047  1,313  
8  5,400.00  466.67  0.30  0.26   238,318  6,250  
9  3,166.00  416.00  0.90  0.26   114,393  3,000  
10  10,800.00  80.00  0.83  0.26   285,981  7,500  
11  15,500.00  62.50  0.21  0.26   667,290  17,500  
12  9,400.00  44.44  0.50  0.26   571,963  15,000  
13  5,800.00  266.67  0.75  0.26   190,654  5,000  
14  10,425.00  228.33  0.19  0.26   502,136  13,169  
15  11,240.00  454.55  0.08  0.26   586,262  15,375  
16  3,800.00  450.00  0.89  0.26   107,243  2,813  
17  1,850.00  200.00  0.25  0.26   95,327  2,500  
18  2,800.00  450.00  0.75  0.26   95,327  2,500  
19  2,711.00  312.50  0.23  0.26   142,991  3,750  
20  732.00  312.00  0.44  0.26   27,359  718  
21  899.00  0.50  1.22  0.26   27,407  719  
22  716.00  312.00  0.05  0.26   45,852  1,203  
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23  4,393.00  383.33  0.67  0.26   142,991  3,750  
24  9,000.00  147.06  0.62  0.26   309,813  8,125  
25  7,040.00  44.44  1.00  0.26   190,654  5,000  
26  16,500.00  68.97  0.50  0.26   810,280  21,250  
27 108,500.00  108.33  3.60  0.26   1,191,589  31,250  
28  40,900.00  778.57  0.08  0.26   3,098,131  81,250  
29  1,300.00  500.00  0.15  0.26   131,075  3,438  
30  190.00  75.00  0.58  0.26   6,196  163  
31  55,800.00  66.67  0.71  0.26   1,668,224  43,750  
32  7,000.00  222.22  0.11  0.26   428,972  11,250  
33 404,870.00  175.00  0.31  0.26   15,285,701  400,875  
34  2,740.00  310.00  0.15  0.26   124,879  3,275  
35  9,200.00  340.00  0.29  0.26   333,645  8,750  
36  2,216.00  372.00  0.09  0.26   126,785  3,325  
37  6,500.00  625.00  0.40  0.26   238,318  6,250  
38  2,175.00  675.00  0.27  0.26   89,369  2,344  
39  7,844.00  624.00  0.06  0.26   407,237  10,680  
40  1,696.00  461.00  0.28  0.26   68,636  1,800  
41  922.00  468.00  0.09  0.26   53,621  1,406  
42  1,150.00  150.00  0.27  0.26   52,430  1,375  
43  1,250.00  200.00  0.60  0.26   47,664  1,250  
44  40,500.00  460.00  0.38  0.26   2,144,860  56,250  
45  1,550.00  175.00  1.13  0.26   38,131  1,000  
46  4,000.00  300.00  0.45  0.26   157,290  4,125  
47  96,000.00  262.50  0.67  0.26   2,859,813  75,000  
48  2,100.00  300.00  0.23  0.26   104,860  2,750  
49  6,300.00  433.33  1.14  0.26   166,822  4,375  
50  500.00  83.33  0.13  0.26   38,131  1,000  
51  1,183.00  270.00  0.10  0.26   70,351  1,845  
52  585.00  92.50  0.22  0.26   42,897  1,125  
53  813.00  313.00  0.50  0.26   23,832  625  
54  6,478.00  626.00  0.17  0.26   285,981  7,500  
55  2,256.00  142.20  0.30  0.26   112,486  2,950  
56  4,260.00  312.00  0.07  0.26   219,252  5,750  
57  16,200.00  525.00  0.50  0.26   571,963  15,000  
58  5,570.00  467.50  0.12  0.26   285,981  7,500  
59  3,600.00  333.33  0.29  0.26   166,822  4,375  
60  1,138.00  175.00  0.42  0.26   56,577  1,484  
61  8,000.00  500.00  0.12  0.26   390,841  10,250  
62  1,800.00  200.00  0.50  0.26   76,262  2,000  
63  12,500.00  900.00  0.17  0.26   571,963  15,000  
64  8,600.00  450.00  0.46  0.26   309,813  8,125  
65  1,100.00  300.00  0.33  0.26   57,196  1,500  
66  93,300.00  366.36  0.13  0.26   5,719,626  150,000  
67  3,400.00  120.00  0.18  0.26   190,654  5,000  
68  20,042.00  399.00  0.25  0.26   1,143,925  30,000  
69  4,700.00  500.00  0.22  0.26   428,972  11,250  
70  4,540.00  633.33  0.12  0.26   307,430  8,063  
71  57,000.00  93.75  1.28  0.26   1,191,589  31,250  
72  1,575.00  412.50  0.12  0.26   81,505  2,138  
73  1,550.00  125.00  0.83  0.26   57,196  1,500  
74  3,100.00  500.00  0.13  0.26   214,486  5,625  
75  7,200.00  60.00  0.60  0.26   238,318  6,250  
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76  7,150.00  525.00  0.29  0.26   333,645  8,750  
77  1,575.00  237.50  0.28  0.26   85,794  2,250  
78  2,900.00  300.00  0.40  0.26   119,159  3,125  
79  3,200.00  450.00  0.09  0.26   166,822  4,375  
80  710.00  250.00  0.30  0.26   47,664  1,250  
81  4,400.00  600.00  0.50  0.26   190,654  5,000  
82  12,200.00  457.14  0.20  0.26   714,953  18,750  
83  10,000.00  411.11  0.27  0.26   714,953  18,750  
84  4,750.00  450.00  0.40  0.26   238,794  6,263  
85  16,000.00  291.67  0.37  0.26   643,458  16,875  
86  4,900.00  400.00  0.08  0.26   171,589  4,500  
87  3,500.00  333.33  0.15  0.26   162,056  4,250  
88  2,176.00  313.00  1.00  0.26   57,196  1,500  
89  3,026.00  164.00  0.19  0.26   257,383  6,750  
90  4,960.00  500.00  0.75  0.26   190,654  5,000  
91  2,280.00  466.67  0.14  0.26   133,458  3,500  
92  2,000.00  400.00  0.23  0.26   104,860  2,750  
93  21,700.00  600.00  0.21  0.26   1,143,925  30,000  
94  2,100.00  187.50  0.11  0.26   109,626  2,875  
95  6,570.00  240.00  0.16  0.26   352,710  9,250  
96  4,685.00  312.00  0.67  0.26   142,991  3,750  
97  2,534.00  300.00  0.25  0.26   142,991  3,750  
98  770.00  60.00  0.22  0.26   42,897  1,125  
99  357.00  0.33  0.13  0.26   36,129  948  
100  10,000.00  500.00  0.56  0.26   428,972  11,250  
101  2,450.00  225.00  0.40  0.26   119,159  3,125  
102  5,800.00  300.00  0.20  0.26   238,318  6,250  
103  26,500.00  153.85  0.10  0.26   1,429,907  37,500  
104  1,350.00  150.00  0.28  0.26   95,327  2,500  
105  2,085.00  492.50  0.25  0.26   114,393  3,000  
106  300.00  75.00  0.08  0.26   28,598  750  
107  1,200.00  166.67  0.26  0.26   72,449  1,900  
108  1,532.00  166.67  0.25  0.26   76,262  2,000  
109  3,665.00  276.75  0.51  0.26   131,075  3,438  
110  2,200.00  200.00  0.20  0.26   142,991  3,750  
111  7,200.00  500.00  0.09  0.26   381,308  10,000  
112  6,040.00  264.50  1.56  0.26   122,019  3,200  
113  18,381.00  294.83  0.21  0.26   571,963  15,000  
114  2,500.00  166.67  0.33  0.26   142,991  3,750  
115  3,600.00  300.00  0.40  0.26   142,991  3,750  
116  2,250.00  90.00  0.40  0.26   95,327  2,500  
117  11,500.00  500.00  0.41  0.26   524,299  13,750  
118  16,200.00  553.85  0.10  0.26   1,000,935  26,250  
119  4,000.00  250.00  0.25  0.26   190,654  5,000  
120  1,187.00  162.00  0.06  0.26   76,262  2,000  
121  2,050.00  300.00  0.19  0.26   114,393  3,000  
122  4,776.00  300.00  1.25  0.26   114,631  3,006  
123  6,500.00  333.33  0.60  0.26   238,318  6,250  
124  8,200.00  379.00  0.11  0.26   432,547  11,344  
125  31,000.00  500.00  0.15  0.26   1,429,907  37,500  
126  1,700.00  500.00  0.10  0.26   99,140  2,600  
127  1,200.00  400.00  0.50  0.26   47,664  1,250  
128  1,000.00  300.00  0.04  0.26   119,159  3,125  
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129  800.00  200.00  0.10  0.26   47,664  1,250  
130  24,500.00  312.50  0.20  0.26   1,191,589  31,250  
131  10,620.00  424.00  0.20  0.26   476,636  12,500  
132  8,000.00  625.00  2.40  0.26   119,159  3,125  
133  950.00  250.00  0.14  0.26   66,729  1,750  
134  885.00  260.00  0.18  0.26   52,430  1,375  
135  9,800.00  500.00  0.15  0.26   476,636  12,500  
136  3,400.00  200.00  0.80  0.26   119,159  3,125  
137  3,000.00  83.33  0.67  0.26   106,051  2,781  
138  8,600.00  680.00  0.22  0.26   428,972  11,250  
139  1,945.00  145.00  1.88  0.26   38,131  1,000  
140  1,400.00  175.00  0.67  0.26   50,047  1,313  
141  3,650.00  175.00  3.87  0.26   36,939  969  
142  3,122.00  386.00  0.63  0.26   114,393  3,000  
143  6,900.00  415.00  0.36  0.26   398,849  10,460  
144  17,390.00  873.33  0.32  0.26   756,421  19,838  
145  7,325.00  255.00  0.56  0.26   255,238  6,694  
146  8,542.00  636.33  0.05  0.26   503,327  13,200  
147  1,051.00  228.00  0.44  0.26   54,336  1,425  
148  532.00  159.00  0.30  0.26   31,696  831  
149  540.00  42.00  0.59  0.26   24,118  633  
150  1,425.00  178.33  0.35  0.26   68,159  1,788  
151  934.00  160.00  0.69  0.26   38,131  1,000  
152  1,048.00  396.00  0.19  0.26   73,402  1,925  
153  1,649.00  490.00  0.47  0.26   71,495  1,875  
154  325.00  0.33  0.19  0.26   38,131  1,000  
155  884.00  0.33  0.22  0.26   64,346  1,688  
156  749.00  0.33  1.00  0.26   23,832  625  
157  10,500.00  250.00  0.50  0.26   476,636  12,500  
158  9,800.00  337.50  0.14  0.26   514,766  13,500  
159  11,463.00  234.00  0.46  0.26   467,103  12,250  
160  3,404.00  702.00  0.31  0.26   152,523  4,000  
161  2,050.00  550.00  0.36  0.26   133,458  3,500  
162  3,367.00  468.00  0.42  0.26   113,106  2,966  
163  10,000.00  416.67  0.67  0.26   357,477  9,375  
164  1,649.00  0.33  0.46  0.26   72,449  1,900  
165  3,286.00  518.00  0.17  0.26   184,458  4,838  
166  9,976.00  520.00  0.63  0.26   381,308  10,000  
167  951.00  338.00  0.12  0.26   60,771  1,594  
168  1,524.00  0.33  1.25  0.26   38,131  1,000  
169  873.00  0.33  0.26  0.26   46,472  1,219  
170  2,854.00  572.00  0.35  0.26   108,673  2,850  
171  469.00  0.33  0.27  0.26   26,692  700  
172  3,704.00  338.00  0.25  0.26   188,700  4,949  
173  301.00  0.33  0.20  0.26   23,832  625  
174  9,200.00  325.00  0.43  0.26   333,645  8,750  
175  454.00  0.33  0.18  0.26   26,215  688  
176  3,042.00  416.00  1.00  0.26   76,643  2,010  
177 799,000.00  433.33  0.21  0.26   33,841,121  887,500  
178 470,000.00  500.00  0.03  0.26   28,598,131  750,000  
179 140,500.00  175.00  0.60  0.26   4,766,355  125,000  
180  16,500.00  138.89  1.00  0.26   476,636  12,500  
181  59,500.00  300.00  0.11  0.26   2,859,813  75,000  
  
405
182  33,000.00  400.00  0.06  0.26   1,668,224  43,750  
183  25,300.00  527.27  0.27  0.26   1,057,654  27,738  
184  1,200.00  100.00  0.25  0.26   57,196  1,500  
185  3,452.00  626.00  0.33  0.26   142,991  3,750  
186  863.00  60.00  0.17  0.26   71,495  1,875  
187  4,200.00  500.00  0.18  0.26   262,150  6,875  
188  2,600.00  333.33  0.28  0.26   119,159  3,125  
189  3,500.00  375.00  0.11  0.26   214,486  5,625  
190  850.00  16.67  0.13  0.26   71,495  1,875  
191  2,400.00  300.00  0.12  0.26   119,159  3,125  
192  2,675.00  42.86  0.63  0.26   76,262  2,000  
193  5,248.00  416.00  0.71  0.26   166,822  4,375  
194  1,299.00  0.33  0.73  0.26   52,430  1,375  
195  575.00  37.50  0.67  0.26   28,598  750  
196  1,250.00  150.00  0.71  0.26   33,364  875  
197  652.00  52.00  0.25  0.26   57,196  1,500  
198  2,181.00  195.00  0.16  0.26   174,687  4,581  
199  6,532.00  303.20  0.39  0.26   362,243  9,500  
200  3,112.00  253.00  0.20  0.26   237,412  6,226  
201  1,689.00  56.00  1.08  0.26   47,664  1,250  
202  3,500.00  250.00  0.13  0.26   190,654  5,000  
203  3,450.00  100.00  0.11  0.26   223,065  5,850  
204  23,800.00  300.00  0.09  0.26   1,668,224  43,750  
205  27,500.00  34.88  0.21  0.26   1,143,925  30,000  
206  1,300.00  300.00  0.88  0.26   38,131  1,000  
207  833.00  125.00  0.19  0.26   50,666  1,329  
208  2,100.00  160.00  0.24  0.26   119,159  3,125  
209  8,400.00  400.00  0.12  0.26   405,140  10,625  
210  17,000.00  375.00  1.76  0.26   324,112  8,500  
211  7,000.00  312.50  0.31  0.26   381,308  10,000  
212  6,900.00  144.00  0.25  0.26   291,701  7,650  
213  2,780.00  40.00  6.25  0.26   19,065  500  
214  2,450.00  400.00  0.14  0.26   164,439  4,313  
215  1,999.00  0.33  2.14  0.26   33,364  875  
216  6,500.00  625.00  0.42  0.26   285,981  7,500  
217  1,825.00  525.00  0.48  0.26   79,360  2,081  
218  900.00  150.00  0.91  0.26   26,215  688  
219  2,700.00  600.00  0.14  0.26   166,822  4,375  
220  410.00  20.00  0.25  0.26   28,979  760  
221  1,410.00  150.00  0.24  0.26   90,561  2,375  
222  1,149.00  0.33  0.20  0.26   71,495  1,875  
223  18,000.00  300.00  0.33  0.26   714,953  18,750  
224  2,064.00  300.00  0.81  0.26   76,262  2,000  
225  7,527.00  400.00  1.75  0.26   150,140  3,938  
226  1,600.00  450.00  0.15  0.26   95,327  2,500  
227  700.00  400.00  0.13  0.26   38,131  1,000  
228  2,800.00  100.00  0.60  0.26   119,159  3,125  
229  1,084.00  234.00  0.07  0.26   71,495  1,875  
230  20,700.00  372.22  0.28  0.26   857,944  22,500  
231  360.00  20.00  0.32  0.26   29,790  781  
232  1,450.00  42.86  1.06  0.26   40,514  1,063  
233  3,200.00  166.67  0.35  0.26   190,654  5,000  
234  22,250.00  130.00  0.36  0.26   857,944  22,500  
  
406
235  40,400.00  520.00  0.50  0.26   1,429,907  37,500  
236  7,600.00  625.00  0.42  0.26   285,981  7,500  
237 140,601.00  238.49  0.45  0.26   5,326,640  139,694  
238  1,925.00  625.00  0.29  0.26   115,822  3,038  
239  23,201.00  260.00  0.60  0.26   796,458  20,888  
240  10,669.00  237.35  0.21  0.26   461,574  12,105  
241  9,424.00  180.00  0.21  0.26   453,757  11,900  
Mean  15,713.94  296.08  0.46  0.26   690,520  18,109  






















Table A.6.7. Foundaries* 
 
A.6.7. (a.) 1850 
 
 
Foundaries* 1850 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output 
Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 8,978.00 144.00 0.80 23.50 100 0 
2 2,270.00 120.00 0.18 23.50 50 0 
3 28,264.00 360.00 0.18 23.50 0 600 
4 6,360.00 156.00 0.36 23.50 40 0 
5 18,550.00 276.92 0.69 23.50 0 400 
6 4,296.00 264.00 1.06 23.50 0 20 
7 12,294.00 360.00 0.25 23.50 0 600 
8 11,427.00 384.00 0.77 23.50 75 0 
9 1,880.00 360.00 0.28 23.50 19 0 
10 2,896.00 348.00 0.89 23.50 21 0 
11 4,136.00 384.00 0.56 23.50 0 50 
12 3,640.00 300.00 1.00 23.50 28 0 
13 3,640.00 300.00 1.00 23.50 28 0 
14 220,000.00 487.50 0.54 23.50 3,500 0 
15 31,287.00 331.43 0.56 23.50 300 0 
16 5,510.00 300.00 1.06 23.50 121 0 
17 8,962.00 240.00 0.48 23.50 85 0 
18 27,460.00 450.00 0.50 23.50 320 0 
19 4,729.00 312.00 0.89 23.50 45 0 
20 21,480.00 480.00 0.10 23.50 200 0 
21 4,709.00 429.00 0.74 23.50 34 0 
22 2,004.00 246.00 0.08 23.50 30 0 
23 2,400.00 160.00 0.88 23.50 17 0 
24 9,550.00 240.00 0.38 23.50 130 0 
25 4,249.00 360.00 0.54 23.50 0 150 
26 8,040.00 240.00 0.46 23.50 65 0 
27 19,560.00 304.00 1.00 23.50 155 0 
28 2,970.00 360.00 0.51 23.50 33 0 
29 9,240.00 348.00 0.45 23.50 52 0 
Mean 16,923.48 311.89 0.59 23.50 187.86 62.76 












A.6.7. (b.) 1860 
 
 
Foundaries* 1860 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output 
Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 14,480.00 480.00 0.07 21.42 270 0 
2 3,920.00 330.00 0.60 21.42 35 0 
3 9,800.00 180.00 0.83 21.42 120 0 
4 14,228.00 282.00 4.80 21.42 50,000 0 
5 7,887.00 144.00 1.25 21.42 15 0 
6 87,209.00 389.87 0.67 21.42 1,000 0 
7 295,678.00 1,242.76 0.68 21.42 80 0 
8 19,450.00 500.00 0.54 21.42 195 0 
9 27,470.00 369.23 0.15 21.42 540 0 
10 73,557.00 272.57 0.35 21.42 1,420 0 
11 147,500.00 362.79 1.41 21.42 1,600 0 
12 50,700.00 522.58 0.40 21.42 1,000 0 
13 33,448.00 527.00 0.79 21.42 450 0 
14 45,775.00 377.14 0.57 21.42 400 0 
15 6,955.00 240.00 0.31 21.42 90 0 
16 1,190.00 360.00 0.20 21.42 9 0 
17 229,500.00 336.00 0.67 21.42 1,000 0 
18 3,480.00 360.00 0.48 21.42 0 80 
19 9,878.00 24.00 1.69 21.42 60 0 
20 3,534.00 96.00 0.52 21.42 60 100 
Mean 54,281.95 369.80 0.85 21.42 2,917.20 9.00 























Foundaries* 1870 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output 
Quantities 














n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 25,790.00 600.00 0.48 30.66 150 0 
2 17,500.00 76.47 7.50 30.66 20 0 
3 31,500.00 750.00 1.25 30.66 91 0 
4 2,565.00 175.00 0.75 30.66 4 0 
5 27,550.00 937.50 0.50 30.66 200 0 
6 6,712.00 250.00 1.32 30.66 0 130 
7 13,777.00 408.33 0.50 30.66 450 0 
8 13,465.00 120.00 3.33 30.66 38 0 
9 165,000.00 400.00 0.40 30.66 1,450 0 
10 177,000.00 850.00 1.00 30.66 500 0 
11 47,625.00 827.78 0.43 30.66 300 0 
12 2,697.00 250.00 0.83 30.66 20 0 
13 116,850.00 370.37 1.25 30.66 612 0 
14 3,820.00 100.00 0.38 30.66 23 0 
15 12,680.00 625.00 1.45 30.66 50 0 
16 137,650.00 590.91 0.48 30.66 1,400 0 
17 39,254.00 389.47 2.06 30.66 68 0 
18 76,300.00 424.24 0.16 30.66 1,350 0 
19 64,200.00 500.00 0.68 30.66 300 0 
Mean 51,680.79 455.00 1.30 30.66 369.79 6.84 






















Table A.6.8. Meat* 
 




















n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 6,353.00 264.00 0.08 11.84 87,500 0 
2 8,870.00 360.00 0.15 11.84 160,000 0 
3 989.00 240.00 0.28 11.84 21,000 0 
4 20,270.00 420.00 0.30 11.84 175 200 
5 2,360.00 360.00 0.83 11.84 150 0 
6 6,532.00 216.00 0.16 11.84 68,500 6,000 
7 6,650.00 300.00 0.10 11.84 79,040 0 
8 3,860.00 360.00 0.11 11.84 60,000 0 
9 6,330.00 180.00 0.17 11.84 70,000 0 
10 5,770.00 360.00 0.72 11.84 48,000 0 
Mean 6,798.40 306.00 0.29 11.84 59,436.50 620.00 
























n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 23,940.00 360.00 0.04 17.63 369 700 
2 2,314.00 360.00 0.25 17.63 21,000 0 
3 157,592.00 324.00 0.05 17.63 1,750,000 0 
4 10,648.00 324.00 0.36 17.63 90,000 0 
5 16,970.00 360.00 0.25 17.63 157,000 0 
6 2,220.00 480.00 0.30 17.63 26,500 4,800 
7 20,660.00 480.00 0.07 17.63 176,200 35,000 
8 8,320.00 320.00 0.11 17.63 90,000 12,000 
9 35,801.00 360.00 0.26 17.63 364,800 0 
10 71,420.00 480.00 0.15 17.63 720,000 0 
11 29,460.00 420.00 0.16 17.63 362,400 0 
12 7,992.00 492.00 0.27 17.63 93,000 4,500 
13 3,820.00 240.00 0.09 17.63 26,700 0 
14 15,440.00 240.00 0.06 17.63 185,400 0 
15 1,740.00 120.00 0.13 17.63 20,000 8,000 
16 6,660.00 360.00 0.03 17.63 93,000 1,200 
  
411
17 7,536.00 768.00 1.60 17.63 12,000 0 
18 1,814.00 264.00 0.33 17.63 16,960 0 
Mean 23,574.83 375.11 0.25 17.63 233,629.39 3,677.78 
























n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 9,468.00 200.00 0.18 13.71 78,720 0 
2 21,512.00 360.00 0.33 13.71 10,000 0 
Mean 15,490.00 280.00 0.26 13.71 44,360.00 0.00 









1880 Vector of Input Prices Vector of Output Quantities 
Obs. 
No.  










n C 1w  2w  3w  1y  2y  
1 13,782.00  328.50  0.03  18.17   41,015   5,736  
2  2,867.00  0.33  0.03  18.17   9,292   1,300  
3 10,225.00  200.00  0.73  18.17   17,784   2,487  
4  3,220.00  400.00  0.05  18.17   9,477   1,325  
5 30,565.00  391.25  0.03  18.17   101,239   14,159  
6  8,300.00  300.00  0.27  18.17   19,500   2,727  
7 407,602.00  684.64  0.67  18.17   780,000  109,091  
8 20,600.00  100.00  0.11  18.17   57,070   7,982  
9 15,400.00  350.00  0.01  18.17   40,898   5,720  
10  3,100.00  250.00  0.11  18.17   18,720   2,618  
11  2,705.00  200.00  0.11  18.17   7,615   1,065  
12 73,300.00  160.00  0.13  18.17   205,504   28,742  
13  4,450.00  300.00  0.02  18.17   17,329   2,424  
14 477,500.00  500.00  0.25  18.17  1,027,000  143,636  
15 11,250.00  500.00  0.47  18.17   19,500   2,727  
16 10,750.00  133.33  0.26  18.17   24,931   3,487  
17  4,680.00  100.00  0.45  18.17   8,684   1,215  
18  1,325.00  50.00  0.06  18.17   8,320   1,164  
19 14,460.00  266.67  0.04  18.17   42,900   6,000  
  
412
20  5,454.00  159.67  0.19  18.17   13,975   1,955  
21 856,000.00  300.00  0.06  18.17  2,210,000  309,091  
22  3,600.00  100.00  0.10  18.17   12,480   1,745  
23  3,610.00  100.00  0.12  18.17   8,645   1,209  
24  9,310.00  55.00  0.04  18.17   29,042   4,062  
25  5,777.00  60.00  0.17  18.17   15,002   2,098  
26 2,263,150.00  414.71  0.04  18.17  5,928,000  829,091  
27 51,460.00  600.00  0.23  18.17   111,722   15,625  
28  4,775.00  125.00  0.34  18.17   9,100   1,273  
29  4,150.00  75.00  0.15  18.17   12,480   1,745  
30  4,350.00  116.67  0.24  18.17   15,990   2,236  
31  3,600.00  500.00  0.15  18.17   10,400   1,455  
32 11,750.00  166.67  0.55  18.17   23,660   3,309  
33  5,350.00  225.00  0.09  18.17   16,900   2,364  
34 11,452.00  400.00  0.16  18.17   32,071   4,485  
35 2,265,246.00  213.38  0.20  18.17  5,200,000  727,273  
36 39,626.00  725.00  0.42  18.17   81,019   11,331  
37 19,220.00  666.67  0.42  18.17   37,440   5,236  
38 26,500.00  375.00  0.78  18.17   29,900   4,182  
39  5,400.00  100.00  0.20  18.17   15,501   2,168  
40 560,000.00  171.43  0.09  18.17  1,479,920  206,982  
41  6,200.00  175.00  0.08  18.17   16,120   2,255  
42  9,030.00  240.00  0.07  18.17   24,284   3,396  
43 281,523.00  175.00  0.36  18.17   536,960   75,099  
44  9,050.00  200.00  0.04  18.17   30,030   4,200  
45  6,227.00  250.00  0.02  18.17   16,120   2,255  
46 20,575.00  240.00  0.23  18.17   45,591   6,376  
47  9,375.00  125.00  0.27  18.17   47,788   6,684  
48 10,715.00  228.00  0.15  18.17   45,687   6,390  
49 34,400.00  266.67  1.43  18.17   39,000   5,455  
50  3,725.00  200.00  0.30  18.17   26,000   3,636  
51  9,825.00  333.33  0.16  18.17   24,302   3,399  
52 449,600.00  350.00  0.06  18.17  1,133,600  158,545  
53  6,735.00  225.00  0.29  18.17   16,341   2,285  
54 15,125.00  200.00  0.04  18.17   54,600   7,636  
55  9,400.00  133.33  0.38  18.17   20,800   2,909  
56  6,165.00  365.00  0.13  18.17   15,600   2,182  
57 25,150.00  400.00  0.09  18.17   60,970   8,527  
58  6,903.00  468.00  0.74  18.17   10,530   1,473  
59 83,600.00  400.00  0.06  18.17   224,900   31,455  
60  7,222.00  330.00  0.14  18.17   18,062   2,526  
61 20,050.00  450.00  0.13  18.17   48,360   6,764  
62  5,700.00  250.00  0.08  18.17   31,200   4,364  
63  8,373.00  466.67  0.11  18.17   24,393   3,412  
64 91,850.00  625.00  0.10  18.17   273,650   38,273  
65 13,800.00  400.00  0.11  18.17   45,474   6,360  
66 111,700.00  357.14  0.20  18.17   260,000   36,364  
67 12,590.00  445.00  0.50  18.17   26,104   3,651  
68 13,450.00  225.00  0.38  18.17   33,800   4,727  
69 11,150.00  250.00  0.03  18.17   31,200   4,364  
70 24,150.00  600.00  1.25  18.17   31,200   4,364  
71 15,870.00  450.00  0.13  18.17   41,600   5,818  
72  3,795.00  250.00  0.36  18.17   9,360   1,309  
  
413
73  3,800.00  200.00  0.62  18.17   6,305  882  
74 10,925.00  275.00  0.02  18.17   28,600   4,000  
75  9,175.00  300.00  0.10  18.17   25,771   3,604  
76 10,100.00  300.00  0.08  18.17   34,320   4,800  
77  7,650.00  500.00  0.13  18.17   20,800   2,909  
78  2,740.00  450.00  0.11  18.17   9,724   1,360  
79 138,500.00  700.00  0.11  18.17   351,000   49,091  
80  3,000.00  500.00  0.02  18.17   10,660   1,491  
81  6,600.00  500.00  0.01  18.17   20,800   2,909  
82  6,200.00  500.00  0.02  18.17   17,082   2,389  
83  4,500.00  450.00  0.06  18.17   12,870   1,800  
84 11,225.00  166.67  0.22  18.17   23,205   3,245  
85 10,513.00  638.00  0.17  18.17   27,084   3,788  
86  7,040.00  420.00  0.07  18.17   18,200   2,545  
87 18,975.00  350.00  0.05  18.17   51,805   7,245  
88 52,475.00  180.00  0.52  18.17   100,100   14,000  
89  6,440.00  240.00  0.07  18.17   19,656   2,749  
90 13,500.00  450.00  0.12  18.17   43,789   6,124  
91  9,460.00  160.00  0.02  18.17   32,292   4,516  
92  6,754.00  780.00  0.02  18.17   19,500   2,727  
93 10,100.00  300.00  0.16  18.17   24,128   3,375  
94 19,450.00  225.00  0.47  18.17   39,000   5,455  
95 210,000.00  500.00  0.72  18.17   358,800   50,182  
96 58,500.00  300.00  0.20  18.17   130,000   18,182  
97  9,035.00  300.00  0.27  18.17   18,928   2,647  
98  3,575.00  25.00  0.33  18.17   7,800   1,091  
99  2,951.00  137.50  0.12  18.17   6,630  927  
100 10,200.00  350.00  0.05  18.17   31,200   4,364  
101 132,500.00  285.71  0.48  18.17   325,000   45,455  
102 10,175.00  200.00  0.27  18.17   24,050   3,364  
103 13,295.00  425.00  0.04  18.17   41,600   5,818  
104  8,000.00  100.00  0.13  18.17   20,800   2,909  
105 22,480.00  100.00  1.00  18.17   30,680   4,291  
106  6,120.00  300.00  0.18  18.17   14,466   2,023  
107 21,325.00  492.50  0.26  18.17   49,400   6,909  
108  7,775.00  300.00  0.20  18.17   25,701   3,595  
109  5,397.00  362.50  0.09  18.17   15,200   2,126  
110  7,580.00  383.33  0.19  18.17   20,150   2,818  
111 10,600.00  300.00  0.42  18.17   19,630   2,745  
112  8,600.00  200.00  0.06  18.17   27,014   3,778  
113  6,365.00  240.00  0.04  18.17   24,931   3,487  
114 46,400.00  85.71  1.36  18.17   57,200   8,000  
115 14,263.00  436.50  0.28  18.17   37,365   5,226  
116  8,350.00  166.67  0.15  18.17   35,100   4,909  
117  7,250.00  125.00  0.27  18.17   14,560   2,036  
118 21,350.00  300.00  0.04  18.17   117,000   16,364  
119  2,144.00  0.33  0.44  18.17   4,680  655  
120  3,515.00  315.00  0.27  18.17   7,800   1,091  
121  2,985.00  75.00  0.12  18.17   8,580   1,200  
122  1,336.00  15.00  0.13  18.17   5,138  719  
123  1,278.00  5.00  0.31  18.17   2,548  356  
124  8,395.00  225.00  0.04  18.17   31,200   4,364  
125  3,550.00  100.00  0.12  18.17   8,921   1,248  
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126  3,037.00  437.00  0.39  18.17   5,304  742  
127  8,200.00  400.00  0.03  18.17   22,360   3,127  
128 16,310.00  475.00  0.14  18.17   37,076   5,185  
129 20,225.00  625.00  0.05  18.17   48,360   6,764  
130  6,250.00  100.00  0.27  18.17   14,300   2,000  
131  3,000.00  400.00  0.29  18.17   7,280   1,018  
132 969,948.00  540.00  0.10  18.17  2,596,880  363,200  
133  1,450.00  50.00  0.70  18.17   2,600  364  
134 14,047.00  625.00  0.24  18.17   26,772   3,744  
135 11,735.00  116.67  0.14  18.17   28,210   3,945  
136  2,619.00  0.33  0.17  18.17   9,048   1,265  
137  3,640.00  48.00  0.33  18.17   7,790   1,089  
138  8,475.00  300.00  0.14  18.17   18,850   2,636  
139  3,277.00  75.00  0.09  18.17   11,544   1,615  
140 10,170.00  125.00  0.36  18.17   19,596   2,741  
141 65,900.00  600.00  0.05  18.17   169,000   23,636  
142  5,750.00  100.00  0.20  18.17   13,000   1,818  
143 10,880.00  150.00  0.54  18.17   19,240   2,691  
144  2,605.00  145.00  0.20  18.17   6,656  931  
145  6,412.00  106.00  0.07  18.17   19,110   2,673  
146 10,000.00  500.00  0.09  18.17   27,456   3,840  
147 1,562,672.00  596.67  0.05  18.17  3,962,772  554,234  
148 662,053.00  290.17  0.33  18.17  1,363,926  190,759  
149 38,056.00  450.00  0.64  18.17   60,970   8,527  
150 49,359.00  333.33  0.24  18.17   110,133   15,403  
151  2,575.00  37.50  0.20  18.17   6,630  927  
152 12,365.00  182.50  0.12  18.17   33,800   4,727  
153 13,599.00  0.33  0.24  18.17   37,180   5,200  
154  4,060.00  20.00  0.08  18.17   12,480   1,745  
155 14,800.00  150.00  0.22  18.17   34,840   4,873  
156  5,800.00  150.00  0.16  18.17   16,120   2,255  
157  5,644.00  150.00  0.43  18.17   10,530   1,473  
158  1,538.00  79.00  0.17  18.17   5,473  765  
159 19,936.00  312.00  0.15  18.17   52,000   7,273  
160 14,005.00  200.00  1.00  18.17   18,200   2,545  
161  4,870.00  50.00  0.30  18.17   13,000   1,818  
162 11,630.00  83.33  0.28  18.17   23,608   3,302  
163 45,804.00  520.00  0.31  18.17   100,690   14,083  
164 14,950.00  150.00  0.03  18.17   42,120   5,891  
165 15,299.00  350.00  0.30  18.17   34,315   4,799  
166 1,283,750.00  750.00  0.05  18.17  3,279,900  458,727  
167 147,500.00  562.50  0.10  18.17   455,000   63,636  
168 114,200.00  416.67  0.37  18.17   247,000   34,545  
169  4,000.00  150.00  0.06  18.17   13,195   1,845  
170  5,200.00  33.33  0.13  18.17   11,700   1,636  
171 15,455.00  200.00  0.07  18.17   39,088   5,467  
172  4,963.00  313.00  0.09  18.17   13,686   1,914  
173 19,334.00  400.00  0.19  18.17   57,200   8,000  
174  3,750.00  25.00  0.36  18.17   7,280   1,018  
175 15,500.00  100.00  0.76  18.17   23,972   3,353  
176  3,100.00  300.00  0.29  18.17   9,100   1,273  
177  8,160.00  500.00  0.23  18.17   17,316   2,422  
178  7,837.00  33.33  0.35  18.17   18,564   2,596  
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179 13,757.00  450.00  0.08  18.17   33,548   4,692  
180  5,756.00  20.00  0.14  18.17   18,200   2,545  
181  8,065.00  50.00  0.56  18.17   23,400   3,273  
182  5,495.00  166.67  0.29  18.17   12,826   1,794  
183  7,475.00  100.00  0.15  18.17   16,783   2,347  
184  1,600.00  150.00  0.19  18.17   4,053  567  
185  7,620.00  300.00  0.03  18.17   22,685   3,173  
186  8,402.00  156.00  0.11  18.17   21,252   2,972  
187 12,210.00  454.00  0.10  18.17   37,991   5,313  
188 27,565.00  600.00  0.55  18.17   56,277   7,871  
189  5,700.00  150.00  0.23  18.17   11,180   1,564  
190 14,000.00  250.00  0.11  18.17   36,400   5,091  
191  8,400.00  200.00  0.10  18.17   26,000   3,636  
192  2,550.00  50.00  0.20  18.17   5,200  727  
193  3,100.00  20.00  0.15  18.17   8,793   1,230  
194 10,450.00  100.00  0.15  18.17   26,572   3,716  
195  4,939.00  0.33  0.02  18.17   15,080   2,109  
196  2,750.00  200.00  0.62  18.17   10,556   1,476  
197  2,300.00  300.00  0.29  18.17   8,915   1,247  
198 80,200.00  200.00  0.07  18.17   199,940   27,964  
199  3,524.00  0.33  0.07  18.17   8,759   1,225  
200  4,397.00  50.00  0.11  18.17   12,212   1,708  
201  5,332.00  166.00  0.28  18.17   5,486  767  
202  4,359.00  0.33  0.04  18.17   13,385   1,872  
203  7,572.00  0.50  0.42  18.17   15,465   2,163  
204  6,949.00  47.50  0.05  18.17   20,345   2,845  
205  6,477.00  95.40  0.31  18.17   45,526   6,367  
206  7,290.00  375.00  0.22  18.17   18,078   2,528  
207 14,300.00  125.00  0.03  18.17   45,552   6,371  
208 773,300.00  600.00  0.01  18.17  2,119,000  296,364  
209 10,059.00  0.33  0.04  18.17   37,060   5,183  
210 19,136.00  568.00  0.17  18.17   45,240   6,327  
211 35,680.00  600.00  0.18  18.17   87,558   12,246  
212  5,330.00  300.00  0.21  18.17   12,610   1,764  
213 128,250.00  450.00  0.01  18.17   395,200   55,273  
214 58,280.00  480.00  0.17  18.17   140,400   19,636  
215  7,850.00  150.00  0.11  18.17   24,440   3,418  
216  1,023.00  100.00  0.09  18.17   2,769  387  
217  8,438.00  219.00  0.67  18.17   15,600   2,182  
218  5,419.00  1.00  0.08  18.17   16,125   2,255  
219 21,116.00  550.00  0.13  18.17   61,880   8,655  
220 14,971.00  137.00  0.14  18.17   37,700   5,273  
221  4,600.00  200.00  0.17  18.17   31,200   4,364  
222  3,860.00  100.00  0.13  18.17   11,700   1,636  
223  1,625.00  125.00  0.74  18.17   2,210  309  
224 14,078.00  580.00  0.06  18.17   40,167   5,618  
225  4,530.00  930.00  0.48  18.17   5,460  764  
226 12,500.00  150.00  0.08  18.17   104,000   14,545  
227 16,000.00  500.00  0.08  18.17   46,800   6,545  
228  8,165.00  400.00  0.48  18.17   13,429   1,878  
229  2,150.00  100.00  0.22  18.17   7,150   1,000  
Mean 71,737.48  272.91  0.23  18.17   177,960   24,889  
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